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Abstract 
Terrorism in the name of religion and ethnicity is the most important security 
challenge facing the world since the cold war. Among different types of terrorism its 
suicide version is the most complicated one to combat. Because a very high number 
of the current suicide attacks against civilian targets are executed by Muslim 
militants, suicide terrorism is associated with the religion of Islam. Muslim militant 
groups use Islamic jurisprudential terms, including jihad, to justify their otherwise 
felonious acts of terrorism. This tactic of sanctification of criminal acts of terrorism 
by use of Islamic legal terms and language may lead one to decide that it is Islamic 
law per se that is the driving force behind the current phenomenon of suicide 
terrorism. Since it was the Twelver Shia Muslims of Lebanon who began the use of 
suicide tactics in its current form, Shia Islam, as the branch of the faith in which its 
followers are seen as pioneers of suicide operations, is naturally the major focus of 
interest in this regard.  
On account of the widespread use of juridical language by organisers and supporters 
of suicide terrorism, this thesis investigates whether suicide terrorism as such falls 
within the rules of legitimate warfare (jihad) as found in Usuli Twelver Shia Islamic 
law, or not. A detailed discussion of contested interpretations of Islam leads to an 
examination of Shia jurisprudence which then enables a critical evaluation of Jihad 
in Shia Jurisprudence and a critical discussion of jihad and suicide terrorism. Islamic 
jurisprudentialism, or fiqh mindedness, provides a language utilised by violent 
Muslim extremists who have recourse to, or who otherwise support, suicide 
terrorism. Furthermore, fatwas are also used by violent extremist Muslims to imbue 
their orders and prohibitions with a sense of religious holiness and sanction. This 
provides a context wherein their rulings are promoted as beyond dispute. Thus, with 
respect to Shia jurisprudence, the mechanism in which religious law is made will be 
laid bare and the criteria for distinguishing a valid fatwa will be illustrated. All 
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elements of Usuli Shia Islamic law which are related to warfare (as armed violence) 
will be discussed, and their potential to be used as a justification for suicide terrorism 
will be closely examined, as will the non-jurisprudential justifications which are also 
used. It will be argued that, for the most part, current normative uses of Usuli 
Twelver Shia jurisprudential justification of suicide terrorism constitutes a departure 
from the authentic Shia tradition. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
In today’s world, intimate knowledge about Islam and Muslims is not a luxury, 
but a matter of mutual survival. Omid Safi1 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate whether jihad, as a jurisprudential 
concept in Shia Islam, can be said to justify acts of suicide terrorism. 
Terrorism is one of the most significant threats facing the international 
community today.2 The world presently faces new dimensions of terrorism 
and an expansion of its use. One of the new and rapidly growing forms of 
terrorist attack, which has made combating terrorism much more 
complicated, is the suicide operation. Recently the proportion of terrorist 
suicide operations has increased dramatically. As some statistics show, the 
number of suicide attacks has grown from an average of 4.7 per year in the 
1980s to over 350 per year in the current decade of the 21st century. With 
Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and several African countries joining the battle 
ground of suicide terrorism since the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011, the 
expansion of suicide terrorism has reached record highs of around 600 
incidents in 2014.3 The fact that a significant shift has taken place, with 
                                                          
1 Forward to Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Sharia`h Law: an Introduction (Oxford: Oneworld, 
2008), p. vii. 
2 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, (Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 
2003), p. 5. 
3 Yoram Schweitzer, Ariel Levin and Einav Yogev, Suicide Attacks in 2014: The Global Picture, 
INSS Insight No. 653, January 6, 2015. Accessible via: 
http://www.inss.org.il/?id=4538&articleid=8514 
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suicide bombing incidents appearing in new countries, suggests the further 
expansion of this kind of terrorism can be considered as bad news for the 
world community which rather hoped that suicide terrorism was an 
exceptional situation.  
Although the use of suicide attacks has occurred throughout history, its main 
notoriety as a specific kind of contemporary violent event began in the 1980s. 
Accordingly, the origins of modern Muslim religious suicide attacks (known 
as self-martyrdom or Istishhadi in Persian) is found with the Shia in Iran 
during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980–1988. Mohammad Hossein Fahmideh, a 
teenage volunteer militia fighter who took part in the war, is said to be the 
first Muslim to have undertaken a suicide attack in contemporary history. In 
November 1980 Fahmideh wrapped himself in a grenade belt and threw 
himself under an Iraqi tank and stopped it. Ayatollah Khomeini declared 
Fahmideh an Iranian national hero, calling him “our leader”.4  
 
A portrait of Fahmideh in one of Tehran’s streets5 
Fahmideh’s operation was an inspiration for further volunteers for martyrdom 
                                                          
4 http://www.tebyan.net/index.aspx?pid=52570. 
5 Ibid. 
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and on some occasions other Iranian Basij (volunteer militia) ran through 
minefields to detonate buried landmines and clear a safe battlefield path for 
the following soldiers.6 Technically, as I will show in chapter three, these kind 
of operations are categorized as suicidal tactics rather than suicide ones, but 
this does not make that much of difference in respect to the possibility of these 
incidents being inspirational for the promotion of suicide tactics by Shia 
militants of Lebanon, for example. What happened in Iran did not attract that 
much attention at the time, but following the success of a 1983 truck bombing 
of two barrack buildings in Beirut, that killed 300 and helped drive American 
and French Multinational Force troops out of Lebanon, the international 
community faced a rapid spread of suicide operations. 
Today suicide terrorism is a real global threat. Besides the suicidal use of 
airplanes in the United States with regards to the attack of 9/11, suicide 
bombings have occurred in 45 countries.7 Since over 80% of all suicide 
attacks from 2001 were carried out by Muslims,8 suicide bombing is often 
associated with the religion of Islam. Furthermore, a large number of Muslim 
terrorist organizations have used jihad to justify their suicide operations; 
hence suicide bombings are now mostly related to jihad, which in some parts 
of the media in the West is regarded as meaning holy war against non-
Muslims. Although most Muslim scholars may consider the western media’s 
                                                          
6 Ibid. 
7 These include: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Bulgaria, China, Djibouti, 
Egypt, Finland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Palestinian territories, Qatar, 
Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, 
Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, and Yemen Chicago project on security and 
terrorism, Suicide attack database, accessible via: http://cpostdata.uchicago.edu/search_new.php 
8 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Columbia University Press, 2006, p. 34. 
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reducing the term of jihad to “war” unjustified, nevertheless war is an 
important form of jihad in regard to it being a jurisprudential term, as will be 
shown below. 
While a minority of Sunni scholars refer to jihad as the sixth pillar of Islam, 
in fact it occupies no such official status. In Twelver Shia Islam, however, 
jihad is one of the 10 practices of the religion.9 Shia organizations which 
support suicide bombers, like other violent Muslim extremist groups, 
undertake their operations in the name of waging jihad against what they view 
as the enemies of God. As well as in theory, also the first practice of suicide 
attacks, including suicide operations on the US and the French barrack 
buildings in 1983, all were done by Shia organizations.10 Does the use of 
suicide operations by Shia Muslims mean that, as compared to other 
denominations of the Islamic faith, Shia Islam justifies suicide attacks more 
specifically? As it is claimed by those undertaking or supporting suicide 
attacks, are suicide attacks considered to be a justified form of waging jihad 
according to Shia Islam? Today most suicide attacks are against civilian 
targets. What then is Shia Islam’s stand on targeting or terrorizing civilian 
people? Having in mind that in jurisprudentialist Islam there is need for 
religious permission for any serious act, what is the position of Usuli Twelver 
Shia Islamic jurisprudence (to which all those Shia groups engaged in these 
kinds of attacks supposedly belong) in regard to suicide terrorism? 
                                                          
9 Muhammad ibn Jamal al-Din Makki al-Amili, Al-Rawda al-Bahiyya fi sharh al-Luma al-
Dimashqiyya, Adab publications of Najaf, 1387L/1967. 
10 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p.132. 
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Literature review 
A term such as Jihad, as a religious concept, can be studied through different 
approaches, and already many studies have been done in this area. Besides 
some exceptions, most of the available studies on jihad can be reduced to 
three main categories:  
1. Phenomenological and Historical studies; with a focus on studying the 
identity of this phenomenon as a religious concept and the history of 
its changes. 
2. Sociological and Psychological studies; with concentration on one or 
more of social or psychological causes or consequences of jihad (or 
religious violence generally), which form the majority of the available 
literature on this subject. 
3. Intrareligious studies; through a critical analysis approach to see how 
followers of the religion see jihad and react to it religiously.  
Since in this research I engage in a study of the justification of suicide 
terrorism as a form of waging jihad in a specific branch of Islam, approaching 
the subject through an examination of the jurisprudence of the religion can 
help the most, because from a practicing Shia’s perspective jurisprudence is 
the authority which indicates justifiability or non-justifiability of any act 
finally. Moreover this particular subject has not yet been studied from this 
specific point of view, and also there is a gap in the literature of this field 
which needs to be filled.  
There are two main groups of resources on the jurisprudential study of 
“suicide terrorism as a form of jihad” from the Shia perspective. The first 
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group, which are actually the authoritative sources of Shia jurisprudence, are 
Shia classical texts which have formed what we have of Shia jurisprudence 
today. Although this group of resources are not directly related to suicide 
terrorism, which is a very recent phenomenon, still they are the ones which 
have drawn lines of separation between the legitimate and illegitimate use of 
violence (suicide terrorism being one of them) in Shia jurisprudence in the 
first place, and these lines of distinction are still respected by Shia Muslims. 
The second group are more recent academic works which specifically address 
suicide operations from a Shia Islamic perspective. 
Regarding the first group, the classical resources of Shia jurisprudence, in this 
research I only refer to works of five great Shia jurists which, as will be 
explained shortly, represent the main body of Shia jurisprudence. Three of 
these jurists, namely Muhaqiq Hilli (d. 676/1277), Allama Hilli (d. 726/1325) 
and the First Martyr or Shahid Awwal (d. 786/1385), are the ones whose 
works have received, by far, the highest volume of commentary and attention 
from Shia jurists in general and they constitute the chief pillars of Shia 
jurisprudence.11 The other two jurists whose works are of importance, albeit 
for a different reason, are Shaikh Tusi (d. 460/1067) and the Second Martyr 
or Shahid Thani (d. 966/1558). Shaikh Tusi, as the first Shia jurist, who also 
established the first major Shia seminary in 1055 in Najaf of today’s Iraq, 
based Shia jurisprudence on the traditionism of the great Sunni jurist Imam 
al-Shafi`ei.  
Although, later on, other jurists, including the above mentioned three great 
                                                          
11 Mortaza Motahari, Ashenaei ba ulum-e islami: fiqh (Introduction to Islamic sciences: fiqh), 
Sdara Publications, No year, p. 70. 
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jurists, produced more popular works, still all followed the direction laid 
down by Shaikh Tusi. The Second Martyr is important because of his famous 
commentary on the First Martyr’s treatise on Shia jurisprudence, al-Luma al-
Dimashqiyya, which was authored in prison before his execution. It has 
served as a key text-book in Shia seminaries since then. There is another great 
Shia jurist, namely Mortaza Ansari (1281/1864), who after the above three 
jurists enjoys a very high position among Shia jurists12 as a whole, but he 
produced no treatise on jihad. 
Regarding recent works on suicide operations from Shia perspectives, there 
are two books, both written in Persian, published in the last decade: 
1. Hasan Baqeri and Mortaza Salemi Qamsari, Amaalyate esteshhadi chera 
va chegooneh? (Martyrdom operation: Why and How?), published in 
2002. 
This book concentrates on the propagation of some Palestinian groups 
and is far from constituting an academic work. The only item found in 
this book which relates to my subject of study is a Fatwa, justifying a 
specific kind of suicide operation  in the Palestinian occupied territories, 
released by Sheikh Ahmad Kaftaro who is a Sunni Muslim Jurist (pp. 21-
22). The book does not answer either of the two questions which are 
mentioned in its (misleading) title in any way. It answers neither the 
‘Why’ question and nor the ‘How’ question of the title. Indeed, it would 
appear the writers have forgotten the title completely – the reader will 
become disappointed as soon as he or she endeavours to find the authors’ 
                                                          
12 Ibid, p. 71. 
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answers to the above mentioned questions. 
2. Amir Molla Mohammad-Ali, Mabanieh fiqhieh amalyate esteshhadi 
(Jurisprudential bases of martyrdom operation: Shia` and Sunni 
perspectives), published in 2006. 
This book, also written in the Persian language, is the most relevant book 
authored by a Shia Muslim justifying suicide operations 
jurisprudentially. However, the book is only focused on the 
jurisprudential laws of suicide operations against military targets (pp. 70-
95), therefore it differs from what I discuss in my research. The 
justifiability of attacking the enemy when he hides himself behind non-
combatants (Jurisprudential principle of tatarros or human shield) is the 
principle which the writer of this book finds helpful in justifying suicide 
operations inside the Palestinian territories (pp. 153-168).  But it is well 
known that tatarros is not a Quranic teaching per se but is based on some 
ambiguous historical cases and therefore does not enjoy a high position 
jurisprudentially. The tatarros principle will be discussed in my research 
in detail below.  
There is also a paradox in the book because the author regards jihad as 
defensive, and at the same time he considers suicide operation as a 
legitimate form of defensive Jihad (p. 85). He does not demonstrate how 
a suicide operation can be considered a defensive act when the operator 
is sure that he or she will die as result of the operation. Defense in Shia 
jurisprudence, as will be discussed below, is a quite minimal term. 
Defense, in its jurisprudential sense as keeping someone or something 
safe, is inconsistent with that of endangering – indeed ending – one’s life, 
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as is the case in suicide terrorism. In Shia jurisprudence defense has a 
very limited and non-aggressive application and is supposed to cause the 
least harm for both the attacker and the attacked. I will point below to 
such inconsistencies of supporters of suicide terrorism, and I will 
endeavour to discredit such claims from jurisprudential perspective. 
Statement of the problem  
Religion, as the central source of guidance for many people, has played a 
significant role in shaping human history. Despite all ups and downs religion 
still plays an important part in human life today as what moves and motivates 
people. Religion not only shapes human belief but, because of its essential 
role in human behaviour, it determines believers’ conduct to a great extent. 
Religion can shape the believers’ social and collective actions. However, 
sharing abstract beliefs is not enough to bring about any unification to the 
actions of believers in the practical realm. For bringing such unification takes 
a shared language to coordinate the potentially dispersed actions of 
individuals and give them a purposeful direction. Legal language, because of 
its definite commands and clear instruction, has the potential to unify actions 
such that otherwise isolated energies come together to enable a shared goal to 
be achieved. Legal language is usually used to form the reality rather than 
merely describe it. Accordingly, legal language is quite normative and 
stimulating.13 Islamic jurisprudence is the legal body of Islam and its 
language can function as any other legal language does. Muslim militants use 
the language of Islamic jurisprudence not only to unify their actions but also 
                                                          
13 Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, p. 163. 
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to promote a self-claimed goal as holy and therefore indisputable. 
One of the main religious legal terms that is distorted and misused by militant 
Muslims quite often to justify their terroristic action, is the term “jihad”. Jihad 
as a jurisprudential term is used to provide moral justification and, more than 
that, to sanctify specific acts of violence to the degree that strips such violence 
of its horror and the moral constraints.14 While every religion, including 
Islam, is expected to promote both inward and outward peace among its 
believers, there are cases where the most horrible crimes are justified and 
performed in the name of religion. Suicide terrorist attacks, which are the 
most fatal form of terrorism in our time, are highly associated with religion 
and in the case of Islam are undertaken in the name of jihad. In this thesis I 
shall investigate if jihad, as a jurisprudential concept, can and does justify 
suicide terrorism, or not. 
Research questions 
The principal research question of this thesis is as follows: Does Usuli 
Twelver Shia jurisprudence, and specially its law of warfare or jurisprudential 
jihad, justify suicide terrorist attacks perpetrated by Muslim militants? 
Subsidiary questions that this research addresses include: With respect to the 
role of the jurisprudential interpretation of Islam, for which its language is 
misused by suicide terrorists the most, what is the position of jurisprudential 
Islam in comparison and contrast to other main interpretations of Islam? 
Furthermore, what is the position of jihad as warfare in Shia jurisprudence 
and theology? And, lastly: if jurisprudential jihad does not in fact justify 
                                                          
14 Juergensmeyer, ibid. 
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suicide terrorism, are there other Islamic religious terms which may be, or 
are, used for the justification of suicide terrorism? 
Research objectives 
Since Islamic law, mistakenly often equated with Sharia, has been linked to 
some of the most inhumane violence committed by Muslim militants, it has 
become a negative term such that any mention of Sharia qua Sharia not only 
causes distaste and even fear on the part of non-Muslims, it even deters many 
Muslim scholars from involving themselves in its academic study and any 
promotion of its awareness in a way that helps in gaining a better 
understanding of over one-fifth of our planet’s population.  
In the research undertaken for this thesis I investigate the level of originality 
of the legal-religious language that promoters and executers of suicide 
terrorism use to justify their actions. Carrying out suicide terrorism is clearly 
driven more by political ideology rather than theology; still it does not mean 
that theology cannot be used by terrorists for justification of such violent 
tactics. Indeed, suicide terrorists clothe their actions in the symbol system and 
the legal language of Islam in order to legitimate themselves and grant 
credibility to their message. They use Islamic legal vocabulary to promote 
their merits and seize the high ground by labelling their movement Islamic. 
Taking on the legal language of Islam helps them to use Islam’s legitimizing 
force for their agendas which in turn helps them to gain the Muslim public’s 
material and/or moral support. But such a tactic in no way means that their 
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actions necessarily accord with Islamic principles, goals, or methods, which 
Islamic jurisprudence is supposed to serve.15  
I also try to show the destructive effects of validation of the terrorists’ 
religious claims by the media. For the very same reason that, for example, we 
accurately do not call terrorist casualties “martyrs”, even though they claim 
this for themselves, we should not let them misuse other elements of religion 
for furthering their inhumane agendas. For example, calling terrorists 
“jihadists”, which means “people of jihad” or mujahid, as they claim it 
themselves, puts them under the banner of jihad which, as will be discussed 
in the main body of this research, as a non-militaristic concept is a well-
established term in Islamic theology. Virtually every interpretation of Islam 
not only accepts it but allocates a special position for this highly respected 
religious term. It is not only to the benefit of terrorists to be called respected 
names such as “people of jihad”, it damages the image of the mainstream 
Muslims. It is important to bear in mind that use of the legal language of Islam 
should not mislead analysts to conclude that what terrorist groups do is in fact 
legitimately Islamic. Helping terrorists in their mistaken use of Islamic legal 
language (by recognising and repeating it through media), can even create a 
degree of indifference toward extremists among mainstream Muslims. And, 
it can become problematic if the mainstream feel that their religion is being 
treated unfairly and that they are being humiliated merely because of being 
followers of a religion of which a small minority of their co-religionists are 
committing crimes in the name of the religion. Such a misuse of religion is 
                                                          
15 John David Payne, Donna Lee Bowen and Joseph Woolstenhulme, ‘How Religious is Islamic 
Religious Terrorism?’ In Veronica Ward and Richard Sherlock (eds.) Religion and Terrorism, 
Lexington Books, 2014, p. 125. 
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not a matter which is a problem to Islam only; it can be seen among other 
religions as well. 
Research Method 
While the suicide terrorism I address is a quite recent issue, and the supporting 
resources that I use for my research, including the Holy Quran, the Sunna 
(Hadith), and works of the early jurisprudents, are classical texts, a simple 
reading of these texts is not sufficient for understanding this current 
phenomenon. Rather, in reading those texts I follow a critical analysis 
approach in order to find a broader aspect of the text which transcends their 
contextual origin. 
Thesis Structure 
Beyond this present introductory chapter, the structure of my thesis is as 
follows. Part One. The Contemporary Problem of Suicide Terrorism includes 
Chapter Two in which the definitional elements of terrorism will be clarified 
so that a comparison between this modern phenomenon and classical jihad 
becomes possible. In Chapter Three the definition and situation of suicide 
terrorism will be examined and the latest data discussed. Chapter four focuses 
on the non-jurisprudential religious justifications of suicide terrorism. Here 
the relation of two main religious terms, namely Martyrdom and Retaliation, 
with suicide terrorism is examined and discussed respectively.  
Part Two, on Jurisprudence and Jurisprudentialism, locates the place of 
Islamic jurisprudentialism as the interpretation of Islam which has the highest 
capability of being misused by extremists for justifying their actions. Mystical 
Islam, Theo-ethical Islam, and Jurisprudential Islam, will be introduced and 
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discussed in Chapter Five. Then in Chapter Six ‘jurisprudentialism’ as a 
modern political movement which is suspected of being associated with 
extensive violence including terrorism, will be analysed. This leads into Part 
Three, on Suicide Terrorism and Shia jurisprudence. This Part explains the 
mechanism of law-making/fatwa-realising in Shia Islam and the basic criteria 
for a valid religious law. Chapter seven is focused on the main sources of Shia 
Islamic law or usul al-fiqh. The last section discusses the process of law-
making, or ijtihad, in Shia jurisprudence. Chapter eight is on Shia fiqh as the 
body of Shia Islamic laws and has a particular focus on ‘jihad’ as a devotional 
act. In Chapter Nine I analyse the theological position of “jihad” in Shia 
Islam. Three main understandings will be examined, namely, jihad as warfare, 
jihad as spiritual struggle, and jihad as a pious way of life in all its aspects. 
Because of the specific focus of my research, jihad in its jurisprudential 
meaning as warfare will be closely and critically discussed in this chapter. In 
Chapter Ten the relation between suicide terrorism and the two, particular (or 
offensive) and general (or defensive), usages of jurisprudential jihad will be 
critically investigated. In this chapter the legitimate forms of jihad according 
to Shia jurisprudence will be compared with the definitional elements of 
terrorism and the compatibility or inconsistency between different forms of 
jihad and these elements will be examined. The Conclusion, Chapter Eleven, 
in addition to summarizing the research, will include some recommendations 
and points for further research. In the Appendices there can be found various 
supportive material and a note on my use of translations and transliterations. 
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Part One 
The Contemporary Problem of Suicide Terrorism 
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Chapter Two 
Terrorism: definition and definitional elements 
 
Introduction  
Terrorism has become one of the most severe threats to the security of human 
society in recent history.16 Terrorists use various types of attacks to achieve 
their objectives. Such attacks include bombings, hijackings, assaults, arson, 
firebombing, kidnapping, and armed attacks.  However, one tactic which has 
become popular among terrorist groups is the suicide attack. The fact that 
suicide terrorist attacks are over 10 times deadlier than all other forms of 
terrorism17 reflects the level of seriousness of the threat that this kind of 
terrorism is causing. Compared to other forms of terrorism, this form of 
terrorism is more associated with religion.18  Among militant groups with 
religious affiliations that apply suicide tactics, statistics show that Muslim 
militants appear to be engaged in this kind of terrorism much more than 
others.19 Again, among Muslim militant groups Shia militants hold a special 
position in this regard because they are considered to be inventors of suicide 
tactics in its current form. With respect to the position of Shia militant groups 
in introducing suicide attacks, and their claim that committing suicide 
                                                          
16 US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Handbook No. 1.03 on Suicide Bombing, 10 
August 2006: accessible via (http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/terrorism/sup3.pdf) 
17 Robert Pape, Dying to Win: Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, Random House, New York, 
2006, p. 6. 
18 J. P. Larsson, Understanding Religious Violence: Thinking Outside the Box on Terrorism, 
Ashgate, London, 2004, p. 35 
19 US Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2011, accessible via 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/195555.htm 
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operations is a part of their religious duty, it is necessary to study Shia Islamic 
jurisprudence, which is the source that determines the course of the believers’ 
actions with regards to use of violence. Jihad in Shia jurisprudence, wherein 
the jurisprudentialist Shias’ religious duties regarding warfare are 
determined, and its relation with suicide terrorism is the focus of my attention. 
To investigate this we need first to clarify what is meant by ‘terrorism’ and 
‘suicide terrorism’. 
Terrorism: disparity in definition, ambiguity of cases 
The popular saying “one man’s freedom fighter is another man’s terrorist” is 
a pointer to the extent of discord to be expected when it comes to defining 
terrorism. Such a discord might have its roots deep into the worldview of any 
given people: if the world is perceived as peaceful, violent acts appear as 
terrorism. If the world is thought to be at war, then violent acts may be 
regarded as preemptive or defensive acts in an ongoing battle and therefore 
legitimate acts of warfare.20 
Despite wide agreement that terrorism, as an evil phenomenon, exists in 
reality, few can agree on what it is exactly.21 Furthermore, terrorism not only 
does not have an agreed definition but also suffers from fundamentally 
contradictory definitions. The lack of a truly satisfactory universal definition 
of terrorism is not because of a lack of interest. Indeed, terrorism is a matter 
of interest to almost all countries nowadays and the large number of 
definitions produced by both academic scholars and governments is 
                                                          
20 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God; the Global Rise of Religious Violence, 
University of California Press, 2003, p. 9. 
21 Victoria Ward and Richard Sherlock, Religion and Terrorism, Lexington Books, 2014, p. 2. 
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testimony to this fact. Schmid and Jongman, for instance, identified 109 
definitions of terrorism in the 1980s.22 The number of definitions of terrorism 
has increased since then, especially during the first decade of 21st century as 
aftermath of shocking terrorist incidents of 9/11, the London bombing, the 
Paris and Madrid incidents and of course almost daily terrorist incidents in 
the Middle East following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which Mark 
Juergensmeyer refers to as a new way of life in the Middle East.23  
Terrorism and its definition are so important that, unlike other issues, many 
countries have their own particular definitions. For instance, in the United 
States of America alone there are several governmental definitions of 
terrorism (see appendix 4). Arguably one reason why countries choose their 
own self-interest-based definition of terrorism is that they want to use the 
combating of terrorism as an instrument for furthering their policies and 
maximizing their interests.24 In doing so terrorism is often used to define 
reality in order to place one’s own group on a high moral level, condemn the 
enemy, rally members around a cause, and silence or shape policy debate. In 
this regard ‘terrorist’ has become the mantra of our time, dividing the world 
into two camps of good and evil. Philip Herbst argues that this is the same 
negative role which once was played by the term “communist”.25 The term 
“terrorist” shuts the door to discussion about or with the stigmatized group, 
while reinforcing the righteousness of those that apply the label.26 When the 
                                                          
22 See: Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman, Political terrorism: a research guide to concepts, 
theories, data bases and literature, Amsterdam: North Holland publishing company, 1984. 
23 Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, p. 4. 
24 Brian Whitaker, “The definition of terrorism.”  The Guardian, 7 May 2001, Accessible via: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/may/07/terrorism 
25 Ward and Sherlock, Religion and terrorism, p. 2. 
26 Ibid.  
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definers of ‘terrorism’ are governmental entities then they have the power to 
shape the parameters of the term in a way that affects the status of individuals 
and groups so designated.27 In such cases the label acts as a political weapon. 
This notable inconsistency among existing definitions of terrorism, resulting 
from self-interests of the definers and also the complexity of the issue, is a 
challenging problem with practical consequences. Normally when 
undertaking research it is usual to make use of existing definitions of terms 
rather than providing new definitions. Sometimes however, for example as 
with terrorism, it is necessary to delineate the definition which will be 
applicable to the research. The main purpose of such a definition is to 
distinguish the defined term from not only distinctly different subjects but 
also those similar subjects that hold some shared characteristics. This second 
task is worthy of even more attention and precision. Accordingly, any 
definition of terrorism must distinguish it from other forms of violence and, 
more precisely, those sharing some common characteristics with it. Non-
politically motivated violence and general warfare, which might share 
targeted violence against civilians with terrorism, for example, must be 
differentiated by any valid definition of terrorism. Before attending to the 
issue of a definition of terrorism applicable to the present research project, it 
is appropriate to briefly review the history of the term. 
Terrorism: short history of the term 
Terrorism, which comes from the Latin terrere, “to cause to tremble”, refers 
to an action that is meant to terrify.28 The modern concept of terrorism is 
                                                          
27 Ibid, p. 3. 
28 Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, p. 5. 
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usually said to have emerged in the aftermath of the French Revolution when 
it was used to describe the violent suppression of the population by the state; 
terrorism was the instrument the state used against its own citizens.29 The first 
recorded use of ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ was in 1795, relating to the Reign 
of Terror instituted by the French government. Since the Jacobins, who led 
the government at the time, were also revolutionaries ‘terrorism’ gradually 
came to be applied to violent revolutionary activity in general. However the 
use of ‘terrorism’ in an anti-government context is not recorded until 1866.30 
By 1937, the League of Nations had turned the meaning around, defining 
terrorism as “criminal acts directed against a state and intended or calculated 
to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or the general 
public.”31  This definition implies that terrorism can be perpetrated solely by 
non-state actors. The exclusion of states should not be that surprising given 
that, despite its title, it was a league of “states” that formulated the definition. 
The exclusion of states from the application of the concept of terrorism 
remains fundamentally unchanged among governmental definitions of 
terrorism even until today. This is because the majority of definitions in use 
for legal and official purposes are drafted by agencies directly associated with 
governments, and they systematically exclude governments from the 
definition. Despite the fact that the currently dominant definitions of 
terrorism, practiced in legal and political procedures, are biased still they 
cannot be neglected when studying terrorism. Although I remain critical of 
                                                          
29 Ibid, p. 5. 
30 Ward and Sherlock, Religion and Terrorism, p. 3. 
31 Ibid. 
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the deficiencies of such biased official definitions of terrorism and rather 
support academic unbiased definitions, still for practical purposes I need to 
refer to these official ones. This is why in this study, I also exclude 
governments from the definition of terrorism. To leave more space for my 
own definition of terrorism, which is arrived at exclusively for this study, I 
have put the most popular official definitions of terrorism in Appendix No. 4, 
to be referred for the purpose of comparison or further information.  
Toward definition of terrorism 
As indicated above, definitions of terrorism vary not only from one country 
to another but sometimes from one institution to another within the same 
country, and even from one time period to another time in the same country 
or organization to meet specific needs or interests. In the absence of an agreed 
definition of terrorism, and to avoid the challenge of choosing one definition 
of terrorism and neglecting another, which might have useful and clarifying 
elements in it, I shall take a combined approach in this study. Such an 
approach enables a consistent focus on the main elements available in 
different definitions of terrorism that more effectively help to differentiate 
terrorism as one type of political violence from others.  
From the 109 definitions of terrorism in the period between 1936, one year 
before the first time terrorism was defined by the League of Nations, to 1981, 
one year before introduction of suicide tactics, over half the definitions (51%) 
contained the following three elements: 1- violence against civilians, 2- 
spread of fear, 3- political goals.32 No doubt after new developments 
                                                          
32 Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman, op cit. 
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following the September 11, 2001 terrorist incidents, there have been further 
modifications in the definition of terrorism; but these three elements still hold 
an important position in many new definitions as well. Alex Schmid in his 
most recent attempt to achieve an academic consensus over the definition of 
terrorism offered a new definition of terrorism. This definition, which was  
based on collected opinions of some of the most recognized experts of the 
field through special questionnaires, again included the same three elements 
of “civilians as targets”, “spread of fear as means”, and “affecting the targeted 
population politically” as goals when indicating the distinguishing elements 
between terrorism and other forms of political violence. Schmid categorised 
terrorism as: “fear-generating” political violence targeting mainly “civilians 
and non-combatants” to affect “various audiences and conflict parties”.33   
However, in answer to the question whether the above list contains all the 
elements necessary for a definition that may be agreed to by all, the answer is 
still “no”. This is more because of a clash of interests rather than the 
unreliability of such a definition. The reason why there is no universally 
accepted definition of terrorism is not because of a lack of ability among 
experts to provide a comprehensive definition but because of the general 
unwillingness of various governments to commit themselves to any such 
concise requirements when such a definition might tie their hands in one way 
or another in the future.34  
The fact that we cannot find an agreed definition for terrorism should not stop 
us from clarifying our understanding of the concept and to use it as a 
                                                          
33 Alex P. Schmid, The Routledge handbook of terrorism research, Routledge, 2011, p. 86. 
34 Ward and Sherlock, Religion and Terrorism, p. 3. 
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framework for our study, because without such a framework it is not possible 
to conduct any further meaningful discussion. As a practical approach, and to 
avoid possible endless debates over definition of terrorism, I focus on the 
above mentioned three main elements which are more common in most of 
definitions of terrorism and add another fourth element to them which I have 
borrowed it from more official definitions of terrorism. Although the fourth 
element is not as common as the other three in various definitions of 
terrorism, nevertheless, from practical point of view, it is as important if not 
more important. The fourth definitional element focuses on the identity of the 
executers of terrorism and excludes governments in this regard. Based on this 
we define terrorism as ‘the use of violence by non-state actors against 
civilians to spread fear for political objectives’. 
Definitional elements of terrorism 
I shall now endeavour to explain each of the four main definitional elements 
of terrorism and how these elements distinguish terrorism from other forms 
of violence. These constituting elements of terrorism are as follows: 
1- Executers 
2- Targets 
3- Means 
4- Goals 
1. Executers 
In my working definition of terrorism, executers of terrorism are non-state 
actors therefore this definition excludes the use of violence by governments.  
As such even the use of disproportionate violence by governments is not 
included in our definition of terrorism because such use is usually covered by 
 33 
 
concepts such as ‘law enforcement’ and ‘warfare’, or in the most serious cases 
as ‘crimes against humanity’. Nevertheless the use of violence by clandestine 
agents acting on behalf of government or political forces is considered as 
terrorism. Such agents who are in fact state actors are counted as non-state 
actors in this case. This is because if their identity as state actors is revealed 
then they are not clandestine anymore. Thus as long as the clandestine agents 
are able to hide their identity during the incident, and their act is done in the 
name of non-state actors, their use of violence against civilians is considered 
to be terrorism. As we will see below, the identity of executers of violence is 
highly important.  
2. Targets 
As noted above, the definition of terrorism is supposed to distinguish between 
three main forms of armed violence namely; 1- non-political violence, 2- 
terrorism, and 3- warfare. In general this means that armed attacks with 
political objectives are deemed warfare in the case of targeting soldiers, and 
when against non-combatant it is terrorism. However the dividing lines 
quickly become blurred – especially when it comes to defining who exactly 
is a non-combatant and who is a combatant. For example the US State 
Department regards attacks against ‘non-combatant targets’ as terrorism35 but 
that ‘non-combatants’ includes both civilians and military personnel who are 
unarmed or off duty at the time. It is not only policy circles that include 
attacks on military personnel by non-state actors as terrorism but some 
scholars go even further and consider attacks by non-state insurgents against 
                                                          
35 Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1996, US 
Department of State Publication 10433, Washington, DC: State Dept., April 1997, p. vi. 
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military targets terrorism as well.36 When there is no agreement over the 
definition of targets of terrorism among governments and academics, then 
international law does not help that much in providing an exact definition 
because it provides only a negative description when defining targets of 
terrorism: “Someone who is not a member of armed forces, who does not 
carry a weapon, and who does not take part in hostilities.”37 
In Shia jurisprudence civilians – meaning those illegitimate targets of armed 
violence – are more clearly distinguished. As will be discussed shortly, 
according to the Shia law of warfare all except those males who are present 
on the battlefield and are capable of fighting and have not announced their 
detachment from war, are considered civilians. An example of detachment 
from war in Shia jurisprudence is the clergy who have devoted their life to 
their religion. That being the case the clergy, even if upon the battlefield – of 
course, for reasons other than fighting – are considered civilians. According 
to Shia fiqh, carrying a weapon does not exclude one from being a civilian 
because, in the absence of professional army and police at the time of 
formation of fiqh, members of a society themselves were supposed to do the 
job of army personnel. As such, taking part in hostilities was the main 
criterion for separating civilian males who were capable of fighting from their 
non-civilian counterparts. In addition to taking part in hostilities (more 
specifically attending the battlefield) there were other elements which were 
taken into account when distinguishing civilians from non-civilians. 
Parameters of age, health, and gender were among such elements. The 
                                                          
36 John David Payne, Donna Lee Bowen and Joseph Woolstenhulme, ‘How Religious is Islamic 
Religious Terrorism?’ In Ward and Sherlock (eds.), Religion and Terrorism, p. 122. 
37 Ward and Sherlock, Religion and Terrorism, p. 4. 
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elderly, women, children, and the ill, defined as immune groups by Islamic 
law, were considered civilians even if were holding arm and attending the 
battlefield. In addition to these groups everyone outside the battlefield was an 
illegitimate target because military jihad was limited to the battlefield.38 I use 
the term ‘civilian’, rather than ‘non-combtants’39, with respect to the above 
explanation, as referring to targets of terrorism when comparing armed jihad 
with terrorism. Due to an expansion of the concept of battlefield, as result of 
the nature of new weapons, it is difficult to determine the exact borders of 
what constitutes a ‘battlefield’ these days. That being the case, all armed male 
personnel of foreign countries’ armies – which are in charge of fighting and 
not armed police, for example – who are at war with a Muslim country are 
considered combatants. Such personnel are not seen as targets of terrorism. 
Non-members of armies who have access to weapons are seen civilians. This 
is because, firstly; capability for fighting – in its professional sense – requires 
thorough military training and they are military personnel who have such 
capabilities. Secondly; the hostile intention is only expandable to military 
personnel of the fighting army rather than non-military armed citizens. This 
distinction between untrained armed citizens and military personel becomes 
crucial when countries like the US – in which keeping weapons by citizens is 
legal – are involved.  
3. Means 
The spread of fear is an axiomatic definitional element of terrorism. The 
element of ‘terrorization’ which lies in the literal meaning of the word 
                                                          
38 Mortaza Motahari, Jihad, Sadra Publication, 1983. 
39 It is because according to the Shia jurisprudence female or underaqge combatants are still 
considered ‘civilians’ and immune from being intentionally targeted in the battlefield. 
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‘terrorism’ is so obvious as to need no further explanation. Despite this, some 
definitions neglect the element of ‘terrorization’. For example the United 
States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism in just such a 
way when it says: “The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or 
property ...”40 for in this definition as we see that attack on properties is 
considered as terrorism as well, even though property, unlike human beings, 
cannot be terrorized as such. In our definition of terrorism ‘spread of fear’ 
among humans is a key factor. 
4. Goals (objectives) 
Terrorism primarily concerns political objectives although, as the United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/210 (1996) indicates, it might have 
political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, and/or religious 
motivations behind it. Regardless of motivations, the objective of terrorism is 
political because it is about affecting political institutions. The United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004) clarifies this when defining 
terrorism as a criminal act: “… to compel a government or an international 
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act”. Accordingly, based on 
my definition of terrorism, other forms of violence such as hooliganism which 
lack political goals, and despite the use of violence against civilians, are 
excluded. With this understanding of terrorism in mind, I turn now to defining 
suicide version of terrorism as the subject of focus in this research. 
                                                          
40 http://www.azdema.gov/museum/famousbattles/pdf/Terrorism%20Definitions%20072809.pdf 
 37 
 
Chapter Three 
Suicide attacks: facts and figures 
 
Introduction  
On October 23, 1983 at around 6:20am, a yellow Mercedes Benz truck drove 
to Beirut International airport where the US Marines had set up their local 
headquarters. The hijacked truck, carrying the equivalent of 5.5 tons of the 
explosive TNT, passed between two sentry posts, crashed through a gate and 
drove into the lobby of the Marine headquarters. By the time the two sentries 
were able to engage, the truck was already inside the building’s entrance and 
the driver had detonated his deadly cargo. The massive explosion, which was 
rated as the biggest non-nuclear explosion since World War II by the FBI, 
killed 241 service members, including 220 Marines. The incident was the 
marines’ biggest loss of life in a single day since the World War II US-Japan 
battle of Iwo Jima.41 Elsewhere in the city, French paratroopers, not realizing 
a second suicide truck bomber had driven into their basement, went to their 
barracks’ balconies to see the mushroom cloud at the airport. Two minutes later 
the second suicide bomber detonated his truck, destroying the building and 
killing 58. It was the worst military loss for France since the end of the Algerian 
War in 1962.42 The same day, the BBC reported the two suicide bombers, both 
of whom died in the attack and were named as Abu Mazen, 26, and Abu Sijaan, 
24, as members of a previously unknown Shia group called the Free Islamic 
                                                          
41  Rick Hampson, “25 years later, bombing in Beirut still resonates” USA TODAY: accessible via 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/2008-10-15-beirut-barracks_N.htm 
42 Ibid. 
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Revolutionary Movement. The group was thought to be composed of Lebanese 
Shia Muslims and was part of an extremist faction of the Amal militia.43  
The Beirut suicide bombings drove the foreign military forces out of Lebanon. 
The surprising effectiveness of the Lebanese Shia groups’ suicide tactics in 
forcing the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon, impressed many 
nationalist, leftist, and religious militant groups around the globe. The first 
group to show interest in adopting the same suicide tactics was the Tamil 
separatist Marxist-Leninist group of the Tamil Tigers (LTTE). This leftist 
secular group formed a suicide unit named “the Black Panthers”. Between July 
1987 and February 2000, the LTTE executed around 168 suicide attacks in Sri 
Lanka and India killing and wounding thousands of people. The group is the 
only organization to have succeeded in assassinating two heads of states. The 
Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi, was killed in May 1991 by a female 
suicide bomber and Sri Lanka President, Ranasinghe Premadasa, was killed in 
1993 by a male suicide bomber.44 From 1993 on, both nationalist and religious 
Palestinian groups started showing interest in using suicide attacks against 
Israel.45 In 1995 two Egyptian religious groups – the Gama`a al-Islamiya and 
Egyptian Islamic Jihad – joined the club of suicide bombers as well.46 The 
Kurdish nationalist group, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), began to use 
suicide attacks to boost the morale of its fighters after military setbacks in 
southeast Turkey, which had a negative impact on the group in 1996.47 
                                                          
43 http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/october/23/newsid_2489000/2489117.stm 
44 US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Handbook No. 1.03 on Suicide Bombing.  
45 Chicago project on security and terrorism, accessible via: 
http://cpostdata.uchicago.edu/search_results_new.php 
46 Ibid. 
47 U.S. Army Handbook on Suicide Terrorism 
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Unlike other groups, which started their suicide operations at national or 
regional levels, a Muslim militant group became the first to employ suicide 
attacks at the global level. Al-Qaeda joined the camp of suicide bombers by 
executing such attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar-e-Salaam in 
1998 and the USS Cole in Aden Harbour in 2000, followed by attacking the 
World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in September 11th 2001. The 9/11 
terrorist attacks were so shocking that, for some, the attackers and the ideology 
behind them replaced communism as the USA's chief ideological adversary.48 
Suicide bombing as an effective, inexpensive and flexible weapon was a 
revolutionary military innovation which in the age of high-tech warfare, to 
some extent, levels the technological difference between highly developed 
states and poorly equipped non-state militant actors. It was the main reason 
behind the rapid growth of this newly introduced form of violence. 
Suicide attacks: Definition and brief history  
Suicide attacks, perhaps surprisingly, have multiple definitions since they are 
a phenomenon with diverse factors, forms, and typologically different goals, 
targets, and perpetrators. Here I will mention only two of these differing 
definitions as they cover the most essential elements. Suicide attacks are 
defined by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress of 
the United States as: “Events where the ‘success’ of the operation cannot occur 
without the ‘death of the perpetrator’, and he or she is apparently aware of this 
in advance.”49  By comparison, the Australian Flinders University database on 
                                                          
48 Rick Hampson, USA TODAY, “25 years later, bombing in Beirut still resonates” 15-10-2008, accessible 
via  http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/2008-10-15-beirut-barracks_N.htm 
49 US Army Training and Command, Handbook No. 1.03 on Suicide Bombing. 
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suicide attacks defines such assaults as: “The targeted use of self-destructing 
humans against a perceived enemy for political ends”.50   
These two definitions include elements that are helpful in distinguishing 
between suicide attacks and other kinds of operations. Regardless of the 
definition used, the common element of suicide attacks is the fact that they will 
only succeed if the attacker kills himself/herself. Therefore the death of the 
executer is an essential part of operation. This is different from what is often 
described as suicidal attack. A suicidal attack is a high-risk operation where the 
death of the attacker is not necessarily a part of the operation and the perpetrator 
does not need to kill himself/herself, although his/her chance of survival might 
be very slim. The direct and indivisible relationship between the success of the 
mission and death of the attacker is the main difference between suicide attacks 
and other types of operations in which the level of risk is very high.51  Loyalty 
and honour, even unto death, has always been considered a strong aspect of 
romantic conceptualisations of a combatant’s courage and commitment to his 
beliefs.  Those who were ready to sacrifice their lives in service to their 
particular collective are considered heroes by those same societies. Suicidal 
attacks, as exemplary signs of courage, have been employed in warfare since 
ancient times because the ultimate bravery and heroism lie in ‘seeking out’ 
death.52 Among early such attacks recorded are those of the Jewish zealots in 
                                                          
50 Riaz Hassan, Global Rise of Suicide Terrorism: An Overview, Asian Journal of Social Sciences, 
(2008) 271–291. Accessible via: www.brill.nl/ajss 
51 US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Handbook No. 1.03 on Suicide Bombing. 
52 Reuven Paz, Suicide or martyrdom: the roots of anger that motivated this volcano, in Rachid El 
Houdaigui, The elements of a complex analytical approach to suicidal jihadism in Tatyana 
Dronzina and Rachid El Houdaigui (eds.), Contemporary suicide terrorism: origins, trends and 
ways of tackling it, NATO Science for peace and security studies, Vol. 101, IOS Press, 2012, p. 
32. 
 41 
 
the first century CE. They would sometimes fight the Roman occupation by 
walking up to a Roman soldier in a square, pulling out a knife and killing the 
soldier knowing that there were other Roman soldiers standing right by who 
would immediately execute the zealot.53  
Another group in history, famous for the use of suicidal attacks, was the Ismaili 
Hashasheen, also known as the Nazari Ismailis who operated in the eleventh 
through to the thirteenth centuries of the Common Era. This is where the word 
‘assassination’ comes from. However, their propensity to assassinate enemy 
leaders was very much on the basis of suicidal attacks. Assassins used to kill 
their victims, usually prominent officials, in public places where there were 
many witnesses to assure publicity for their acts. No doubt this kind of 
operation would often mean the loss of the lives of the attackers. Modern forms 
of assassination have tended to be targeted killing of prominent targets by 
anonymous attackers whose intention is to remain anonymous and to survive.54 
Apart from suicidal attacks there is a whole history of the use of suicide in 
times of war to avoid capture, to preserve intelligence information, or to avoid 
further suffering at the hands of capturing forces55 which also falls outside our 
definition. Modern suicide attacks, in the general sense of the term, began with 
kamikaze operations in October 1944, when the Japanese military realized it 
would be almost impossible to prevent the US army from invading the Japanese 
home islands.56 Conventional measures were seen to be failing to avoid the 
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defeat. Therefore, the Empire of Japan started to mount suicide attacks using 
aircrafts, speedboats, and submarines against allied naval vessels. The 
Tokkotai (meaning ‘special attack unit’ and popularly referred to as Kamikaze) 
consisted of planes and boats loaded with bombs and instructed to crash into 
allied naval targets.57 In total around 3,000 suicide attacks were carried out by 
the Japanese before the end of the war.58 While both the number of Kamikaze 
operations carried out and their fatalities were quite significant, Kamikaze has 
not been considered a significant inspiration for more recent suicide attacks. 
Despite significant number of both inter-state and civil wars which happened 
after the US-Japan war, Kamikaze did not inspire other actors to copy it in the 
immediate post US-Japan war years.59 
Suicide bombing, as a strategy of non-state actors suffering from a deficit of 
conventional military capabilities, fighting powerful state actors, emerged in 
Lebanon in the early 1980s in response to Israel's invasion of Lebanon. The 
fourth suicide attack carried out by Lebanese Shia groups, the famous suicide 
truck bombing against the US Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983, is now 
believed to have been the main inspiration for all other militant groups who 
subsequently adopted the tactic. The attack was not only significant in the 
number of deaths it produced, but it was successful in producing political 
results judged favourable to the group employing it. The powerful state actors 
(the USA and France) were forced to retreat.60 
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Suicide Attack: the Weapon of Choice 
One century after the invention of dynamite, humans had found a new way to 
kill each other using explosives. This time to kill themselves to defeat their 
enemy. Measured by the criterion of cost effectiveness, this new form of 
killing, namely suicide tactic, has no equal among all other forms of combat 
operations, except for the use of weapons of mass destruction.61 The rapid 
spread of suicide attacks since the 1980s indicates that suicide operation was 
seen as a viable and effective tactic. What made suicide attacks, chosen 
rationally from among a menu of policy options, so attractive for so many 
groups of activists? To answer this question, it is necessary to look at suicide 
attacks from four main perspectives: technical, financial, psychological, and 
political. 
From a technical perspective, the suicide attack is unique. Since almost all of 
those groups which run suicide operations suffer from a lack of access to high 
technology weapons, suicide attacks using humans as the weapon levels the 
technological playing field to a considerable degree. No more adaptable, 
opportunistic weapon system has yet been introduced to the battlefield than the 
human person. A suicide bomber, without any need to receive long term 
training with expensive high-tech weapons, can hit the target as exactly, or 
more effectively, than many expensive high-tech weapons.62 The suicide 
bomber has a huge advantage over other weapons: he or she can make 
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instantaneous contingent changes to the operation to maximize the chance of 
success.  
Defending against suicide attacks is also much more difficult by comparison to 
other weapons. A suicide bomber might look like many things, but not a bomb 
as such. As a matter of fact human ‘smart bombs’ are able to hide their reality 
to the last moment and, since they are difficult to identify, they are difficult to 
stop. Any preemptive actions to avoid possible suicide attacks could harm 
innocent people and would weaken the public standing of the defending party. 
It is clear that increased measures to combat suicide attacks could in some 
circumstances also increase public displeasure, so offering a win-win outcome 
for the militant group using suicide tactics. 
Suicide operations are relatively less complicated compared to other kinds of 
operations. It is usually the ‘escape plan’ which is the most difficult and 
complicated part of an operation, especially when it is conducted in an area 
controlled by hostile forces. Any attempt to hide the operation may be 
successful until it is executed, but once carried out the counterattacking forces 
will be swiftly mobilized, making escape from the scene difficult. Suicide 
attacks need no escape plan and can be more effective in high security areas 
when compared to other types of operation. Suicide operations cause minimal 
security risks to the group carrying them out.  Since the suicide bomber who 
executes the attack is killed as a result of the operation, there is little fear by 
the affiliating group that he/she will be caught and interrogated by security 
forces.63  
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From a financial perspective, suicide attacks are notably cost effective. For 
example, the suicide attack of October 1983 against US marines in Beirut, 
which had significant local and international consequences, cost no more than 
a few thousand dollars. Since the truck which was used for the operation was a 
stolen one it didn’t cost anything, and the only money spent went on explosive 
materials and devices. The results which were achieved by this single suicide 
operation could not have been expected to have been gained by a several times 
more costly operation of another type.64 The reality is that ordinary suicide 
operations cost even less. According to Bruce Hoffman’s estimation, a suicide 
attack can cost as little as US $150.65 Even complicated operations which might 
cost more are still considered to be worth the investment because of their 
effectiveness. The 9/11 terrorist attacks, which were quite complicated and 
more expensive than other suicide operations, are estimated to have cost not 
more than US $50,000. The attacks resulted in damage costing many orders of 
magnitude higher to the United States and the global economy.66   
The negative psychological effects of suicide attacks on the enemy are often 
the most attractive outcome for the perpetrating groups. Suicide attacks are 
much more effective in spreading terror and a sense of helplessness among the 
targeted society than other operations, and there can be no doubt that this is 
usually one of the most important goals of terrorists. It should be noted also 
that attracting public sympathy through ‘romanticising’ the perpetrator – for 
                                                          
64 Ibid. 
65Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (2nd Edition) Publisher: Columbia University Press, New 
York, NY, 2006, pp.132-3. 
66 Bruce Hoffman, “The Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” Atlantic Monthly vol. 295, No. 1 (June 
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example, as a martyr – is a major advantage of suicide operations for the 
perpetrating groups as well. Although those groups engaged in suicide attacks 
usually prefer to keep their secrets tight and therefore do not broadcast much 
information about their operations, if they do decide to engage in propaganda 
then they prefer to broadcast faces of innocent looking, young, and attractive 
suicide bombers. For instance, usually suicide bombers remain anonymous, but 
the operation carried out by an 18 years old Palestinian female suicide bomber, 
Ayat al-Akhras, on March 2002 gained such widespread international attention 
that the US president of the time, George W. Bush also talked about it.67  
Self-sacrifice of life is often considered to be a sign of the highest commitment 
to a cause. Even if the suicide operation does not achieve its initial goals, it 
may still help increase public support because the narrative of the courage of 
the attacker and his dedication to the cause can be publicized, guaranteeing 
some psychological success. According to the US Army handbook on suicide 
bombings, such attacks often result in large donations to support the cause of 
the group. 
…a Saudi telethon raised more than $100 million for the Palestinians 
after an 18-year-old Palestinian girl [Ayat al-Akhras] conducted a 
suicide bombing of a supermarket.  Support from outside of the 
country is also a common result of suicide attacks.  One estimate 
indicates that the Tamil Tigers have received annual support of 
                                                          
67 Joshua Hammer, NEWSWEEK (15 April 2002), Accessible via: 
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 47 
 
approximately $150 million from 800,000 Tamils living throughout 
the world.68 
The political results of suicide attacks are no less important than any other 
aspects of such operations. Influencing public opinion is very important for 
militant groups. Since media coverage of a suicide attack is almost guaranteed, 
groups related to these kinds of operation become quite famous and the public 
becomes interested to know about their cause and message. This may serve to 
recruit more volunteers to conduct further suicide attacks. Even if the suicide 
bomber is stopped by a security force from reaching the planned target, he/she 
can still carry out an attack and cause some form of damage and accordingly 
gain media coverage. As such the success of the suicide mission in publicizing 
the group’s message is almost guaranteed once the attacker departs for the 
operation.69 For all the above mentioned reasons, the power of suicide attacks 
is so extensive that it has been considered as the most effective weapon after 
weapons of mass destruction.70 
Suicide attacks in the mirror of statistics 
After being introduced in the early 1980s in Lebanon, the frequency of suicide 
attacks has increased dramatically from an average of fewer than five per year 
during 1980s to over 70 times greater in the second decade of twenty-first 
century. Recent tensions in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq has contributed 
significantly in sharp increase in number of suicide attacks since 2011. In 2014 
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the number of suicide attacks got close to 600.71 The huge increase in the 
number of suicide attacks is not the only matter of concern. The reality is that 
what makes these kind of incidents especially damaging is the extremely high 
number of casualties they produce.  
 
Figure 1 Average Number of suicide attacks by decade. Sources: UNAMA72, US 
NCTC73, Lancet74, Pape75, INSS76 
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73 The U.S. National Counterterrorism Center 2011 Report on Terrorism 
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74 Hicks MH, Dardagan H, Bagnall PM, Spagat M, Sloboda JA., Casualties in civilians and 
coalition soldiers from suicide bombings in Iraq, 2003-10, The Lancet, Volume 378, Issue 9794, 3 
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According to Robert Pape’s findings, while suicide attacks constituted only 
three percent of all non-state militants groups’ attacks for political objectives 
from 1980 through 2003, they accounted for 48 percent of all fatalities, making 
the average suicide attack fifteen times deadlier than other forms of attack.77 
Although this ratio has since decreased slightly still it is significantly high. The 
Australian Flinders University Data Base for Suicide Bombings shows that 
until 2006 this ratio remained well over 30 percent when the portion of suicide 
attacks of all incidents rose to four percent.78 The 2011 Country Reports on 
Terrorism released by the United States Department of State indicates that over 
10,000 terrorist attacks occurred in 2011, claiming nearly 45,000 victims in 70 
countries including over 12,500 deaths. Of these, suicide attacks accounted for 
just 2.7 percent of such incidents, but caused 21 percent of all terrorism-related 
fatalities, a fact that underscores their extreme lethality.79  
Although all four corners of the world have witnessed suicide attacks, four 
countries – Israel/Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan – have experienced 
around 90 percent of these incidents. Each country’s share is shown below in 
graph form. 
                                                          
77 Robert Pape, Dying to Win, p. 6. 
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accessible via http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/what-motivates-suicide-bombers-0 accessed 24 
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Figure 2: Israel/Palestine number of suicide attacks till year 2000, Source: 
Shabak.80 
 
Figure 3: Isreal/Palestine number of suicide attacks from 2001 until end of 
2014, Source: Shabak and NISS.81 
                                                          
80 http://www.shabak.gov.il/SiteCollectionImages/english/TerrorInfo/decade/SuicideAttacks.pdf) 
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81 Number of suicide bombings around world surged 94% in 2014 amid rise of ISIS, Haaretz, 
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During first decade of 21 century 142 suicide attacks took place in Israel and 
Occupied territories killing 516 people. These constitute almost half (43.3 
percent) of all the 1178 fatalities during this period.82  However, more recently 
a new form of suicidal attacks have been introduced by Palestinians and Arab 
Israelis. The efficiency of the Israeli security forces in blocking the movement 
of explosive ordnance has resulted in spread of unusual ways of mounting 
attacks such as the application of cold weapons and also the use of cars in the 
execution of suicidal attacks. 
 
Figure 4 Iraq number of suicide attacks till end of 2014 
Source: Iraq Bodycount, US State Department, Dan Eggen & Scott Wilson, 
NISS83 
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In only one month, May 2005, an estimated 90 suicide bombings were carried 
out in Iraq which means an average of three incidents per single day.84 It is 
important to note that after the US army started withdrawing from Iraqi cities, 
on June 30, 2009, the number of suicide attacks in Iraq decreased significantly 
but, under the influence of unrest in Syria it started increasing again.  
 
 
Figure 5: Afghanistan number of suicide attacks till end of 2014 
(Source: India-based Institute of Conflict Management (ICM), The United 
States Department of State Statistical Information on Terrorism in 2012, 
Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism, and the INSS.)85  
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The number of suicide attacks in Afghanistan was 2.5 times higher than Pakistan in 
2011. Militants carried out 102 suicide attacks in Afghanistan in which 675 people 
were killed. In 2012 there was a slight rise in number of suicide attacks from 102 
in 2011 to 113 in the year after. After a significant decrease in number of suicide 
attacks in 2013 this number almost doubled in 2014. The total for Afghanistan is 
over 1100 suicide attacks, claiming over 5000 lives.86 
 
Figure 6: Pakistan number of suicide attacks till end of 2014 
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Source: Islamabad based Conflict Monitoring Centre (CMC), Annual Report 
2011, Pakistan Bodycount, and The United States Department of State, 
Statistical Information on Terrorism in 2012.87 There was one suicide attack 
executed in 1995 on the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad which is not shown 
in the graph. 
 
The most recent developments of suicide terrorism 
In 2012 there were 340 suicide attacks worldwide resulting in 2,223 deaths and 
4,410 injuries. Suicide attacks in 2012 were 4.7 times as lethal as non-suicide 
attacks. In 2012, 11.1 percent of all attacks in Afghanistan were suicide attacks. 
This represents one-third (33.2%) or 113 attacks of all suicide attacks worldwide, 
while the remaining suicide attacks occurred primarily in Iraq 65 attacks (19.1%), 
Pakistan 45 attacks (13.2%), Nigeria 35 (10.3%), Yemen 26 attack (7.7%), Syria 
23 attacks (6.8%), and Somalia 16 attacks (4.7%) and the rest of the world 17 
attacks (5%).88 
The number of suicide bombings around the world surged 94 percent in 2014 
comparing to the previous year of 2013. Around 3,400 people were killed in suicide 
attacks in 2014, compared with 2,200 in 2013, a 37.5 percent increase. There were 
592 suicide attacks in 2014, compared with 305 in 2013. 89 
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There was a significant rise in the number of suicide bombings in the Middle 
East in 2014: 370 attacks with some 2,750 dead, compared with 163 and 1,950 
killed in 2013. This was especially notable in Iraq (271 attacks, up from 98), 
Yemen (29 attacks, up from 10), Lebanon (13 attacks, up from three) and 
Libya (11 attacks, up from one). 90 The number of suicide bombings in Syria 
remained at 41. Four such attacks were carried out in Egypt compared with 
six the previous year. The non-Arab Muslim world, Afghanistan in particular 
as well as Africa, saw a rise in suicide bombings. The suicide attacks 
conducted by Boko Haram (32 killing some 500 people) made up half the 
number of such attacks the organization has carried out since it started using 
the tactic in 2011.91  
As was expected, the trend continued in 2015 due to the instability in several 
countries and the increasing number of religious and ethnic conflicts, as well 
as the growing strength of groups like Daesh and al-Qaeda in Iraq and Syria. 
According to the Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism, as of 1 January 
to September 30 2015, over 480 suicide attacks killed more than 4550 and 
wounded above 8300 in 18 countries, which indicates no positive sign in any 
aspects.92 
 
Suicide attacks and the Islamic faith 
Based on what happened in Lebanon during early 1980s, Muslim militant 
groups are recognized as the pioneers of suicide attacks in the modern world. 
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After a temporary absence from the mid-1980s until the mid-1990s Muslim 
militants groups have returned to suicide attack strategies and now it seems 
that militant Muslim groups are behind the great majority of suicide attacks. 
In 2013, for example, it is believed that Muslim militants were responsible 
for over 95 percent of the all suicide attacks globally.93 To gain a better 
understating of the role of Muslim groups in regard to such developments it 
is helpful to categorize the durations of suicide attacks into smaller and more 
coherent time frames. Suicide attacks show a general pattern allowing for a 
division into three chronological periods – the 1980s with Shia militants at 
the centre stage; the 1990s with non-religious groups dominating; and the 
2000s onward with Sunni militant groups as the new hub. During the first two 
phases, as the following table shows, twelve organizations with different 
religious and political affiliations resorted to the use of suicide tactics against 
their enemies from the early 1980s until February 2000. 
                                                          
93 Yotam Rosner , Einav Yogev and Yoram Schweitzer, A Report on Suicide Bombings in 2013, 
INSS Insight No. 507, January 14, 2014. Accessible via: 
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=6408 
 57 
 
 
Figure 7: Number of suicide attacks by organisations 1982-2000 
(Sources: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Handbook No. 1.03, 
Suicide Bombing.)94  
 
As we know from the 9/11 terrorist incidents onwards, and especially after 
the 2003 invasion of Iraq, there was a significant shift from Shia and secular 
groups using suicide tactics toward the same tactic being used by Sunni 
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extremist militants. The high portion of suicide attacks conducted by Muslim 
militant groups raises a question about the nature of the relationship between 
the Islamic faith and such incidents. To answer this question it needs to be 
borne in mind that, as with many other things, there is no monolithic approach 
or consensus about suicide attacks among Muslims. Even according to those 
groups of traditionalist Muslims which support the idea of military jihad, a 
suicide attack is usually considered to be contrary to orthodox Islamic legal 
rules of warfare because it involves the great sin of suicide and therefore is 
religiously prohibited. According to the Islamic faith, suicide is a major sin 
and the Quran forbids all forms of suicide: 
And kill yourselves not, for God is to you truly Merciful. (4:29)95 
As we see, the Quran not only rejects suicide but recommends those who are 
driven to despair to have faith in God’s mercy in the hope that they may be 
relieved of their suffering. Another Quranic authority on the prohibition of 
suicide is found in verse 195 of the Baqara Chapter where a prohibitive text 
addresses the people:  
And spend in the way of Allah and do not throw [yourselves] with your 
[own] hands into destruction. And do good; indeed, God loves the doers 
of good. (2:195)96  
In addition to clear prohibition of self-destruction, suicide contradicts another 
important dictum of the Quran; namely, ‘sanctity of life’: 
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 ألَ للا اومن لمآ لنی نـذلا الهُّیلَ الی
 :ءاسنلا﴿٢٩﴾  
96 ﴾١٩٥ :ةرقبلا﴿ لنینن نس  ح م  لا ُّب نحمی لهـهللا ـننِ اومن نس  حلَ لو نة ُل مل ـهتلا ىللنِ  م ُم ی ند یلأنب اومق  لمَ للا لو نهـهللا نلینب لس ينف اومقنفنلَ لو 
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… slay not the life which God has made sacrosanct unless it be in a just 
cause. (6:151) 97 
Theoretically, for suicide to not contradict the ‘sanctity of life’ principle there 
can be only one possible justification, namely if the perpetrator considers 
himself/herself to be committing a great crime, because of enacting suicide 
which itself deserves death penalty. Even then there is a need for a legal 
warrant released by a valid authority which is not practical because no 
religious authority can permit the great sin of self-destruction, even as 
punishment for another sin. In such cases the one who commits suicide is 
supposed to be considered as the executer of a death penalty against 
himself/herself because of being involved in suicide terrorism. Even this 
option cannot be applied to those who commit the great crime of suicide 
terrorism, because it is punishment prior to committing crime and is unjust. 
This is besides the fact that perpetrators of suicide terrorism never consider 
themselves as criminals who deserve a ‘death penalty’, but rather see 
themselves as becoming martyrs. 
Based on clear Quranic authority, suicide is forbidden in Islam without any 
exception whatsoever. Suicide, as a great sin, is an offence for which the 
perpetrator is liable, in the event of an unsuccessful attempt, to a deterrent but 
discretionary penalty of tazir. Even when the attempt succeeds, the person is 
still liable to an expiation or kaffarah which may be taken from his property.98 
                                                          
97 ﴾١٥١ ماعنلاا( لنوملنق  علَ  م ُم ـل لعلل نهنب ممكاـص لو  مُم نل
َٰلذ ۚ  ق لح لانب ـلانِ مهـهللا لمـر لح ينـتلا لس ـفنلا اوملمت قلَ للا لو 
98 Kamali, Shari‘ah Law, p. 283. 
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Such clear and strict teachings against suicide, any form of it, have always 
been accepted by mainstream Muslim theologians since well before the 
current phenomenon of suicide attacks. Indeed they are considered to be clear 
violations of classical Islamic law. As Bernard Lewis states: “The emergence 
of the now widespread terrorism practice of suicide bombing is a 
development of the 20th century. It has no antecedents in Islamic history, and 
no justification in terms of Islamic theology, law, or tradition.”99 Accordingly 
suicide tactics could be considered as ‘bida`h’ (هعدب). Any addition which is 
against the received tradition of Islamic teachings is generally considered to 
be ‘innovation’ or ‘bida`h’ and as such is rejected by all branches of the 
Islamic faith.  
Opposed to this mainstream approach, and unlike traditionalist Muslims, 
modern militant radical organizations which utilize suicide attacks not only 
do not consider such tactics to be against Islamic teaching but claim that what 
they do is in fact jihad and as such the religious duty of all believers.100 While 
these militant groups confirm that it is the Islamic jurisprudence which is the 
source of authority in justifying or rejecting any action in the name of Islam, 
they do not explain according to which section of fiqh and under what form 
of jihad their actions are justified by Islamic jurisprudence but rather confine 
the loose use of the jurisprudential term ‘jihad’ without specifying how 
exactly jihad justifies their conduct. Instead, to justify their infamous acts of 
suicide terrorism, they might recourse to unorthodox interpretations of rare 
and ambiguous individual incidents in the history of Muslims which have 
                                                          
99 Bernard Lewis and Buntzie Ellis Churchill, Islam: The Religion and the People, Wharton 
School Publishing, 2008,  p. 53   
100 The al-Qaeda manual on “declaration of jihad”. 
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never been understood as justifier of suicide by the mainstream. One instance, 
for example, could be using the case of Auf ibn Harith in the Battle of Badr. 
Ibn Ishaq reports that the Prophet encouraged “plunging into the midst of the 
enemy without armour”.101  
The irony is that the major Muslims historians including Ibn S`ad, Ibn Kathir, 
Tabari and also Ibn Ishaq himself have recorded names of different 
‘protective tools’ amongst them at least seven armours as well as several 
shields and helmets which the Prophet used to use in battles. Neither Ibn Ishaq 
nor any other historiographer has reported that the Prophet had thrown his 
armour, or other protective tools, away and had plunged into the midst of the 
enemy. It is while the Quran counts ‘saying without doing’ among the most 
hated acts in the eyes of God: Great is hatred in the sight of God that you say 
what you do not do. (Q.61:3) 102 The least logical consequence of such claims 
is accusation of the Prophet of hypocrisy because of encouraging others to do 
what he himself abstained from doing.  
Since it is Islamic jurisprudence which decides what actions are permitted and 
what actions are prohibited for the traditionalist Muslims, the focus of my 
research will be to investigate what Shia jurisprudence has to say on suicide 
terrorism and as such I will avoid addressing individual cases such as the 
above mentioned one. Still it is necessary to determine position of two, 
exceptionally, popular non-jurisprudential justifications of suicide terrorism 
which are seen Islamic both by insiders and outsiders. These two are 
                                                          
101 The life of Muhammad; a translation of Ishaq’s Sirat Rasul Allah, A. Guillaume, Oxford 
University Press, 1955, p. 300 Hadith No 445. 
102 ﴾٣ :فصلا﴿ لنومل لع فلَ للا ا لم اوملومقلَ نلَ نهـهللا لدن نع اات ق لم لرمب لك 
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martyrdom and retaliation. As well as investigating different aspects of these 
two concepts, I will also explain their relation to Islamic jurisprudence. 
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Chapter Four  
Non-Jurisprudential Justifications of Suicide Terrorism 
 
Introduction 
The fact that there is no jurisprudential support for suicide terrorism in Islamic 
theology does not mean that extremists are unable to carry out such operations 
in the name of their religion. In this chapter, I shall discuss the main non-
jurisprudential ways in which suicide operations have been justified 
religiously by Muslim perpetrators of suicide terrorism. Before engaging the 
discussion, it must be restated that in investigating non-jurisprudential 
justifications for suicide terrorism, I maintain my jurisprudential perspective 
methodology. Retaining the jurisprudential approach may imply for some that 
I am defending jurisprudentialism and therefore constructing a position that 
implicitly rejects the critiques which will be outlined shortly. The reason this 
position has been adopted is in order to demonstrate that such religious 
justifications cannot be defended jurisprudentially. In other words, Islamic 
jurisprudence either must reject them, because they contradict long 
established jurisprudential principles, or maintain silence toward them. 
Jurisprudence cannot defend them because they are outside its normative 
system. The two most cited non-jurisprudential religious justifications for 
suicide terrorism are martyrdom, especially -of course not exclusively- 
among Shias, and ‘retaliation’, favoured among Sunnis.  
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I. Martyrdom 
While, in Western literature, martyrdom usually means “acts of voluntary 
death” in the name of one’s religious beliefs103, in Islamic literature it is the 
cause that matters; death per se is not the focus. Of course, taking part in 
legitimate warfare, where there is a possibility of death, can be included as 
such in a religious cause, for death is the side effect and not the core matter 
by itself – as the Quran reveals: And We shall bestow on him who fights in the 
way of God, whether he is killed or is victorious, a glorious reward.104 
Martyrdom has had the greatest impact in Christianity, followed by Judaism, 
with the least impact among Muslims.105 In Islam, unlike Christianity and 
Judaism, voluntary pain and suffering is not an essential part of 
martyrdom.  However, and unlike what David Cook believes, in Islam 
martyrdom is not essentially associated with an “active choice sought out a 
violent situation with godly intention and the death as a result of that 
choice”106 and, as such martyrdom in Islam is not limited to the “fighting 
martyr of religious warriors.”107 What determines martyrdom in Islam is the 
‘pure intention in doing the religious duty’ and not seeking out a violent 
situation in and of itself. We know that none of early martyrs of Islam, Yasir 
and Sumayya amongst the most famous of them, were engaged in any kind of 
violence let alone the warfare. Then neither ‘voluntary pain’ nor ‘active 
choice of a violent situation’ are coherent elements of Islamic martyrdom. 
                                                          
103 Veronica Ward, “Martyrdom in the Three Monotheistic Religions” in Religion and Terrorism, 
edited by V. Ward and R. Sherlock, p. 37. 
104 Q.4:74 
105 Ward, “Martyrdom in the Three Monotheistic Religions”, p. 37. 
106 David Cook, Martyrdom in Islam, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 30. 
107 Ibid. 
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One major exception is the Kharijite movement. Unlike other Islamic 
branches which discouraged active seeking of martyrdom, Kharijites 
encouraged the seeking of it. Interpreting verse 4:74 as the desirability of 
seeking martyrdom, Kharijites called themselves ‘al-shurat’, or vendors, 
meaning those who sell the life of this world for the next.108 It is obvious that 
rejection of kharijites by all Islamic denominations makes branding the 
kharijites’ position as Islamic irrelavant. 
Martyrdom, or shahadah (ةداهش), is a key term in the literature on so-called 
Islamic suicide operations. Suicide bombings executed by Muslim militant 
groups are often called ‘self-martyrdom operations’ by both the executers as 
well as the supporters of such tactics. This clearly shows how deeply the idea 
of ‘martyrdom’ is conceptually embedded in suicide tactics. Islamic 
martyrdom – or death in the service of Islam – is considered by many Muslims 
to be a noble and defensible act. The majority of the Muslim ulama postulate 
that after the prophets of God, martyrs or ‘shahids’ occupy the highest 
positions in the heaven. This notion is based on verse number 69 of Chapter 
four in the Quran where the ‘shohada’ [sing. shahid] are mentioned alongside 
the prophets.109 This implies that someone who dies and is subsequently 
called a martyr cannot be criticized by the truly pious for the action which led 
to his death. For the purposes of my current discussion, it is sufficient to say 
that because the concept of ‘martyrdom’ is accepted as a settled religious term 
in the Islamic faith, only individual acts of ‘suicide terrorism’ can be debated 
                                                          
108 Daniel Brown, “Hasan al-Banna; the Art of Death and Contemporary Muslim Ideologies of 
Martyrdom.” In Religion and Terrorism, edited by V. Ward and R. Sherlock, p. 157. 
109  ااقینف لر لكنئ َٰهللومَ لنمس لح لو ۚ لنی نحنلاـصلا لو نءا لدله ُّشلا لو لنی نقی  د  صلا لو لنی ینـبنلا لن  م منه یلل لع مهـهللا لم لع نلَ لنی نـذلا لع لم لكنئ َٰهللومألف ل ومسـرلا لو لهـهللا نع نطمی ن لم لو
﴿ ءاسنلا٦٩﴾  
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as justified acts of martyrdom or otherwise, not the concept itself. It means 
that since martyrdom has a very special position in the Islamic faith, if 
someone is authentically labelled a ‘martyr’, it is subsequently difficult to 
criticize the action that led to that death which, on occasion, may include 
suicide tactics as well.  
Despite the established position of ‘martyrdom’ itself in Islamic tradition, 
space still remains for different understandings of it. Martyrdom can be 
understood or interpreted in two different ways: 1- appreciation of death or, 
as 2- appreciation of life. With the first understanding, ‘life’ has no true and 
in-depth value of itself. The only possible value for life is the quality of death 
which brings life to an end. According to the second approach, life not only 
has essential value (by reason) but also it is sacred from a religious 
perspective. Then, death is undesirable and is only justifiable if it is necessary 
for the continuation of life. From the Islamic viewpoint, as Q5:32 for example 
indicates, it seems it is the second perspective which is acceptable. With the 
above point in mind, I am going to examine the relationship between 
martyrdom, as a religious concept in the Islamic faith, and the current form 
of terrorism employing suicide tactics in the name of Islam.  
Despite the fact that there is no jurisprudential justification for suicide 
terrorism in Shia fiqh, if it is not possible to reject the religious authenticity 
of calling such actions martyrdom, then little has been achieved because the 
sanctified position of martyrdom is so impregnable that no ruling can oppose 
it. Jurisprudentially speaking, when a suicide attack is justified, it is because 
of a clear legal-technical reason, albeit arguably an erroneous one. The idea 
of religious support for suicide terrorism is based on turning the concept of 
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‘shahadah’, or martyrdom, from being the reward for fulfilling 
jurisprudential duties, into an independent action. These kinds of operations 
are thus called ‘amaliyya al-istishhadiyya’ which literally means ‘martyrdom-
seeking operations’ and not ‘martyrdom operations’ or ‘self-martyrdom 
operations’ as it is so often translated into English. It means that ‘to seek 
martyrdom’ is an action which can be judged independently and the means of 
achieving it can be quite varied. However, there is no legitimate action such 
as ‘martyrdom-seeking’ in Islamic Shia jurisprudence.  
The above jurisprudential error, I argue, is perpetrated by basing the 
assessment of the believer’s action on the intention rather than on religious 
duty per se, as determined by respected jurisprudential principles. Often, the 
famous saying of the Prophet affirming that actions are evaluated by the 
intention behind them (al-A`maalu bi-Nyyat لامعلاا تاینلاب)110, is used to justify 
this distortion, which results in the relevant body of jurisprudence being 
ignored. Such an intention-based approach takes control of the believer’s 
conduct out of hands of jurisprudence and yields it up to the individual’s 
intent, leaving the person free of any outside control which is supposed to be 
imposed by jurisprudence. The practical result of such an approach is 
witnessed in the filmed testaments of some of those who commit suicide 
terrorism.  For, instead of indicating how exactly their actions have been 
approved by Islamic law, they justify their tactics simply on a, supposedly, 
‘good intention’ as being in the service of waging jihad, protecting Islam, 
combating oppressors, stopping foreign exploitation, and so on. In many 
                                                          
110 Mohammad baqer Majlesi, Bahar al-Anwar, vol. 67, p. 210. 
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cases, the mere usage of the religious and holy concept of martyrdom for such 
causes might imply that Islamic tradition does offer some tacit support for 
these kinds of operations. However, in reality, the use of a holy concept for 
labelling an action, in the absence of any independent evidence, does not turn 
the action into a holy one. And, in regards with the position of Shia 
jurisprudence about this ‘technical twist’, it is to say that in Shia jurisprudence 
only few specific rituals are intention-based, meaning that the “intention of 
nearness to God” is the single criterion for their acceptability and no other 
criteria is needed for evaluating them. With other actions, it is the outward 
consequence that makes them desirable/legitimate or undesirable/illegitimate. 
To consider suicide tactics legitimate based on the intention of the 
perpetrators, it is necessary to see such actions as ‘intention-based canonical 
rituals of Islam’, something that not even the most fanatic extremists claim. 
Other than intention-based canonical rituals of Islam such as prayers, fasting, 
almsgiving and pilgrimage, and in contradiction to what has been claimed by 
supporters of suicide terrorism, ‘intention’ or ‘niyyat’ (تین), is only a 
complementary element in completing an inherently good action. It means 
that, with bad intent, even a good action does not benefit the doer. Verse 264 
of Chapter two in the Quran clearly states that a bad intent spoils a good 
action.111  In order to assess an action as religiously good, in addition to the 
                                                          
111 ‘O Believers, do not spoil your charity by taunts and humiliation to the recipients like the one 
who practices charity to be seen by men, while he neither believes in Allah nor in the Last Day. 
His charity may be likened to the rainfall on a rock which had only a thin layer of soil upon it. 
When heavy rain fell on it, the whole of the soil washed away and the rock was left bare Such 
people do not gain the reward they imagine they have earned by their seeming charity; Allah does 
not show the Right Way to the ungrateful.’ (Q.2:264) 
 نسـانلا لءالئنر مهللا لم مقنفنمی ينـذلا لك َٰىلذل  لْا لو  ن لم لانب مُم نَالق لد لص اومل نط بمَ للا اومن لمآ لنی نـذلا الهُّیلَ الی ٍنا لو ف لص نللث لم لك مهمللث لملف نر نخ  لْا نم  ولی لا لو نهـهللانب من نم  ؤمی للا لو
 لألف ٌبا لرمَ نه یلل لع نرنفا ُل  لا لم  ولق لا يند هلی للا مهـهللا لو اومب لسلك اـم  م ٍء  يلش َٰىلل لع لنو مر ند قلی ـلا ا اد ل لص مه لك لرلتلف ٌلنبا لو مهلبا لص :ةرقبلا﴿ لنی٢٦٤﴾  
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good nature of the deed itself, the doer’s good intent is essential as well.  But 
the significance of ‘intention’ does not mean that good intent can change the 
bad nature of a deed. The jurisprudential principle of taking into account the 
“practical odiousness of actions”, asl qobhe fe`li’ (یلعف لصا حبق ), in assessing 
the religious value of actions, is against justifying bad deeds because of a 
putative good intent. In several verses of the Quran, committing bad deeds 
even with good intention has been considered a transgression, and therefore 
prohibited. The following verse, which prohibits doing wrong things to the 
religiously approved enemy in the heat of wartime, is a clear instance of that: 
O you who believe stand up for God, witnessing with justice; and do not let 
the hatred [enmity] of a people deviate you from justice. Act justly, this is 
closest to piety; and beware of God. Surely God is aware of all you do. (Q.5:8) 
As noted, both according to the Quranic and jurisprudential principles, a good 
intent by itself is not enough to confer religious acceptability upon an action. 
Actions must be good and just in themselves in order to be accepted as 
religious. This is why the position of Islam with respect to suicide terrorism 
needs to be studied independently of the issue of the intent of its practitioners. 
Of course, if an action is religiously good then its executers will be rewarded 
and, for the one who loses his/her life, the reward is in becoming a martyr, 
which is the closest rank to the prophets’ position. 
In the following discussion, the importance of the concept of ‘martyrdom’ in 
Islam and its relation to suicide terrorism will be clarified. From a practical 
point of view, the importance of a study of the relationship between the 
Islamic concept of “martyrdom” and suicide terrorism becomes clearer when 
it is realized that martyrdom is an effective tool for attracting support for 
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terrorist groups. Offering an appropriate reward is extremely helpful in 
encouraging an individual to act in a specific way. When it comes to 
sacrificing one’s own life, the payoff must be something seen to be worth 
more than that person’s life. Martyrdom plays a decisive and irreplaceable 
role in providing the reward needed to persuade people to sacrifice their lives. 
Accordingly, martyrdom is an important, rather unparalleled tool for 
recruiting the required human resources for suicide operations. If organisers 
of suicide terrorism are able to label such actions as ‘martyrdom’ then they 
will have less problem in attracting the support of adherents, or at least their 
sympathy. It is, as mentioned previously, the sanctified status of martyrdom 
in Islamic culture which allows recruiters to offer such a potentially attractive 
reward.  
To decide whether or not the concept of martyrdom may support the claims 
of perpetrators of suicide terrorism, it is necessary, first, to clarify the literal 
meaning of this concept in the Islamic Shia tradition. According to the 
Loghatnameh (Dictionary of) Dehkhoda the term ‘shahadah’, which in 
contemporary Persian is used for “martyrdom” as well as other concepts, 
essentially means “witnessing”.112 Thus ‘shahadah’ in the Persian language 
does not necessarily mean ‘martyrdom’. Indeed, in the Quran, as the holy text 
of the Islamic faith, shahadah has never been used to mean martyrdom. 
Shahadah in the Quran has different meanings. One of the meaning of 
shahadah in the Quran, “those who believe deeply in God”, has perhaps the 
closest meaning to ‘martyr’ if we understand martyrs as ‘those who are killed 
                                                          
112 Accessible via: http://www.loghatnaameh.org/dehkhodasearchresult-
fa.html?searchtype=0&word=2LTZh9in2K%2fYqg%3d%3d 
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in the good cause’. The analogy is that since the loss of life for the cause 
believed in is the strongest evidence for a deep belief in such a cause, and 
since, in the Quran, those who believe deeply in God have been called 
‘shahid’ then shahid can be used for those who are killed in the course of 
committing acts avowed to be in the service of God and Islam. As such, 
casualties of a legitimate war (on the believers’ side of course) are included 
in the category of martyrs by Muslims because, by risking their lives, they 
have demonstrated the highest level of commitment to their faith and belief 
in God. A clear example of where the word ‘shahadah’ is used in the Quran 
referring to the high position of good believers is Verse 19 of Chapter 57: 
And those who have believed in Allah and His messengers are [in 
the ranks of] the truly sincere and [shohada] those present before 
their Lord (for more information regarding translation of the term 
shahid in the Quran see appendix No.1). For them is their reward 
and their light. But those who have disbelieved and denied Our 
verses - those are the companions of Hellfire. 113 
According to this argument, the term and concept ‘martyrs’, if not equivalent, 
must be included in the category of ‘shohada’ because sacrifice of life is 
equated with the highest demonstration of deep belief in, and commitment to, 
God. But still this naming is indirect because the action leading to an 
‘honorific death’ is seen as a sign of the deep and sincere belief which 
                                                          
113  لكنئ َٰهللومَ الننَالیآنب اومبـذ لك لو او مرلف لك لنی نـذلا لو  ممه مرومن لو  ممه مر  جلَ  ممهلل  منه ب لر لدن نع مءا لدله ُّشلا لو لنومقی  د  صلا م مه لكنئ َٰهللومَ نهنل مس مر لو نهـهللانب اومن لمآ لنی نـذلا لو
 :دیدحلا﴿ نمی نح لج لا مبا لح  صلَ١٩﴾  
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deserves the title of ‘martyrdom’. Aside from thaty, there is no direct 
addressing of casualties of war as ‘shahid’ in the Quran. 
If the Quranic ‘shahadah’, in contrast to the popular definition prevalent in 
today’s Islamic languages, does not mean ‘martyrdom’, then to what does this 
term in the Quran refer? There are 160 occurrences of the word ‘shahadah’ 
or its derivatives in 123 Quranic verses. In the Quran, the word ‘shahadah’ 
generally means ‘witness’ and can have neutral, negative or positive 
connotations. The fact that the Quranic word ‘shahadah’ is used in a number 
of verses in quite different senses from its popular contemporary meaning – 
‘martyrdom’ can help with getting a better understanding of this term for this 
current discussion. In the Quran ‘shahadah’ is employed as a neutral term as 
well as negative and also positive terms. For example in the verse 282 of 
Chapter 2, it concerns contracts. This verse, with seven occurrences, has the 
highest number of occurrences of the word ‘shahada’, and all seven cases 
may be said to have neutral connotations.114 Occurrences of the word 
‘shahada’ and its derivatives in this verse are neutral and convey the prosaic 
meaning of a witness in respect to contracts and commercial transactions. 
‘Shahadah’ in its negative meaning has been used quite rarely in the 
Quran.  This can be seen most clearly in the verse 72 of Chapter 25: And [the 
                                                          
114  ۚ مهـهللا مه لـمل لع ا لم لك لبمت  ُ لی نلَ ٌبنَا لك لب
 ألی للا لو ۚ نل  د لع لانب ٌبنَا لك  م ُم لن ـیب بمت  ُ لی ل لو ۚ مهومبمت  كالف ى ا م لس ُّم ٍل لجلَ َٰىللنِ ٍن ی لدنب ممتنلیا لدلَ ا لذنِ اومن لمآ لنی نـذلا الهُّیلَ ا
 ـب لر لهـهللا نـقتلی ل لو ُّق لح لا نه یلل لع ينـذلا نلنل  ممی ل لو  بمت  ُ لی للف نلَ معی نطلت  سلی للا  ولَ اافی نع لض  ولَ ااهینف لس ُّق لح لا نه یلل لع ينـذلا لنا لك ننإلف ۚ اائ ی لش مه ن نم  س لخ بلی للا لو مه
  یلل مج لر النوُم لی  ـمل ننإلف ۖ  م ُم نلا لج  ر ن نم نن ی لدینه لش اومدنه  شلت  سا لو ۚ نل  د لع لانب مهُّینل لو  لنل  ممی للف لومه ـل نممی لرلف نن نلَ نءا لدله ُّشلا لن نم لن  و لض  رلَ نـم نم ننال َلَ لر  ما لو ٌل مج
نلَ او م لأ  سلَ للا لو ۚ او معمد ا لم ا لذنِ مءا لدله ُّشلا لب
 ألی للا لو ۚ َٰى لر  خم  لْا ا لممها لد  حنِ لر  ك لذمتلف ا لممها لد  حنِ ـل نضلَ  مطلس قلَ  م ُم نل
َٰلذ ۚ نهنل لجلَ َٰىللنِ ا ارینب لك  ولَ ا اری نغ لص مهومبمت  ُ لَ 
 الهلنو مری ندمَ اة لر نضا لح اة لرا لجنَ لنوُم لَ نلَ ـلانِ ۖ اومبالَ  رلَ ـلالَ َٰىلن  دلَ لو نة لدالهـشلنل م لو قلَ لو نهـهللا لدن نع ا لذنِ اومدنه  شلَ لو ۗ الهومبمت  ُ لَ ـلالَ ٌحالن مج  مُم  یلل لع لس یلللف  م ُم لن یلب
 نه لش للا لو ٌبنَا لك ـرا لضمی للا لو ۚ  ممت  علیالبلَ ٍء  ي لش  لُم نب مهـهللا لو ۗ مهـهللا م ُم م  ل لعمی لو ۖ لهـهللا اومـقَا لو ۗ  م ُم نب ٌقومسمف مـهننإلف اومل لع فلَ ننِ لو ۚ ٌدی﴿ ٌمینل لع هرقبلا٢٨٢﴾  
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believers are] those who do not give witness to falsehood, and when they pass 
near ill speech, they pass by with dignity. (Q.25:72).115 
In the Quran, the positive meaning of the word ‘shahada’ is equivalent to 
“witness to the truth”. The following verse is an example where ‘shahada’ 
has been used in its positive meaning: Thus We made you a moderate 
community, that you may be witnesses to humanity, and that the Messenger 
may be a witness to you… (Q.2:143)116 
And again, verse 3:53 uses the term in the same way: Our Lord! We have 
believed in what You have sent down and we follow the Noble Messenger, 
therefore record us among the witnesses of the truth. (Q.3:53)117 
Another case of usage of ‘shahadah’ in its positive meaning is verse four of 
Chapter 69: And whoever obeys Allah and the Messenger - those will be with 
[in ranks of] the ones upon whom Allah has bestowed favor of the prophets, 
the steadfast affirmers of truth, the witnesses of the truth and the righteous. 
And excellent are those as companions. (Q.4:69)118 
Shahadah in its positive meaning also has been used for God himself in the 
Quran. In actual fact, the Quranic term ‘shahid’, which is often used to mean 
‘martyr’ in contemporary popular Islamic literature, is used in many cases to 
describe one of God’s attributes which is “witness of the truth”.119  
                                                          
115 ﴾٧٢ ناقرفلا﴿ ا اما لرنك او ُّر لم نو  ـغللانب او ُّر لم ا لذنِ لو لرو ُّزلا لنومدله  شلی للا لنی نـذلا لو 
116 )143 هرقبلا( ... ا ادی نه لش  مُم  یلل لع ملومسـرلا لنوُم لی لو نسـانلا ىلل لع لءا لدله مش اومنوُم لت ل ااط لس لو اةـم
مَ  م مكالن ل لع لج  لكنل َٰلذ لك لو 
117 ﴾٥٣ نارمع لآ﴿ لنی ند نهاـشلا لع لم الن بمت  كالف ل ومسـرلا الن  علـبَا لو لت ل لزنلَ ا لمنب ـان لمآ الـنب لر 
118  ااقینف لر لكنئ َٰهللومَ لنمس لح لو ۚ لنی نحنلاـصلا لو نءا لدله ُّشلا لو لنینقی  د  صلا لو لنی ینـبنلا لن  م منه یلل لع مهـهللا لم لع نلَ لنی نـذلا لع لم لكنئ َٰهللومألف ل ومسـرلا لو  لهـهللا نع نطمی ن لم لو
﴿ ءاسنلا٦٩﴾  
119 The following verses provide such cases: 2:204, 3:18, 3:98, 4:33, 4:79, 4:166 (two times), 
5:111, 5:117, 6:19, 9:107, 10:29, 10:46, 13:43, 17:96, 22:17, 29:52, 33:55, 34:47, 41:53, 46:8, 
48:28, 58:6, 59:11, 85:9, 100:7. 
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Alongside ‘shahadah’ as ‘witness’, the other main meaning of the word 
shahadah in the Quran is ‘seen’ (contra unseen). ‘Shahadah’ in verse nine of 
Chapter 13 has such a meaning: [God is] Knower of the unseen and the 
witnessed, the Grand, the Exalted. (Q.13:9)120 
As we see, there is no case in the Quran where ‘shahadah’ and its derivatives 
convey a meaning of martyrdom. This, as noted previously, does not mean 
that there is no indirect trace of the concept of martyrdom in the Quran. 
Regarding the concept and its relationship with ‘shahadah’, some points 
should be born in mind. First, as demonstrated above, there is no case where 
the word ‘shahadah’ is used to mean ‘martyrdom’, as circumstances in which 
a believer is killed for good cause, in the Quran. Second, in several Quranic 
verses including 2:154121, 3:169122, 4:74123, 9:111124, 47:4125, and 61:4126 
those who risk their life in the cause of good are highly praised. Third, verse 
19 of Chapter 57 indicates that ‘shahadah’ refers to an exalted spiritual status. 
The verse, however, does not necessarily imply that this status is given to 
those who have lost their lives in the cause of God and today are called 
‘shahid’ or ‘martyr’. At the same time, the term does not exclude those who 
demonstrate their very strong belief in the God and His prophets by following 
their commands to the extent that are ready to endanger their lives if required 
so. Finally, although the word ‘shahadah’ has not been used as ‘martyrdom’ 
                                                          
120 ﴾٩ دعرلا﴿ نلا لعلت م  لا مرینب ُل  لا نة لدالهـشلا لو نب ی لغ لا م نلا لع 
121 ﴾١٥٤ :ةرقبلا﴿ لنو مر مع  شلَ ـلا نُن َٰهلل لو ٌءالی  حلَ  للب ٌتا لو  ملَ نهـهللا نلینب لس ينف مللت قمی ن لمنل اوملومقلَ للا لو 
122 ﴾١٦٩ :نارمع لآ﴿ لنومق لز  رمی  منه ب لر لدن نع ٌءالی  حلَ  للب ااَا لو  ملَ نهـهللا نلینب لس ينف اوملنتمق لنی نـذلا ـنلب لس  حلَ للا لو 
123  ا امی نظ لع ا ار  جلَ نهی نَ  ؤمن لف  و لسلف  بنل  غلی  ولَ  للت قمیلف نهـهللا نلینب لس ينف  لنَالقمی ن لم لو نة لر نخ  لْانب الی ن ُّدلا لةالی لح لا لنو مر  شلی لنی نـذلا نهـهللا نلینب لس ينف  لنَالقمی للف
 :ءاسنلا﴿٧٤﴾  
124  نةا لر  ـوتلا ينف اا ق لح نه یلل لع ا اد  ع لو لنومللت قمی لو لنوملمت قلیلف نهـهللا نلینب لس ينف لنوملنَالقمی  لـةن لج لا م مهلل ـنلأنب ممهللا لو  ملَ لو  ممه لسمفنلَ لنینن نم  ؤ م  لا لن نم َٰى لرلت  شا لهـهللا ـنا
 َٰلذ لو نهنب ممت  علیالب ينـذلا م ُم نع یلبنب او مر نش بلت  سالف نهـهللا لن نم نه ند ه لعنب َٰىلف  ولَ  ن لم لو ننآ  رمق لا لو نلی نجن ن  لْا لو لع لا مز  ولف لا لومه لكنل :ةبوتلا﴿ م ی نظ١١١﴾  
125 ﴾٤ :دمحم﴿  ممهللا لم  علَ ـل نضمی نلللف نهـهللا نلینب لس ينف اوملنتمق لنی نـذلا لو 
126 ﴾٤ :فصلا﴿ ٌصو مص  رـم ٌنالی نمب ممـهنلأ لك اا ف لص نهنلینب لس ينف لنوملنَالقمی لنی نـذلا ُّب نحمی لهـهللا ـننِ 
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in the Quran, it does not follow that the Quran has not mentioned the position 
of those who are killed in the service of God. As mentioned, there are many 
Quranic verses that clearly affirm that those who die in the way of God enjoy 
the highest spiritual status a human can aspire to: 
Indeed, Allah has purchased from the believers their lives and 
their properties [in exchange] for that they will have Paradise. 
They fight in the cause of Allah, so they kill and are killed. [It is] 
a true promise [binding] upon Him in the Torah and the Gospel 
and the Qur'an. And who is truer to his covenant than Allah? So 
rejoice in your transaction which you have contracted. And it is 
that which is the great attainment. (Q.9:111)127 
Or: And never think of those who have been killed in the cause of Allah as 
dead. Rather, they are alive with their Lord, receiving provision. (Q.3:169)128 
The above verses describe the high status for those who are killed in the way 
of God. Whatever term is used to describe this highly praised group, even if 
it was not the word ‘shahid’, would find a high position in the Islamic 
literature. Irrespective of authenticity of labels such as ‘shahid’ for this group, 
if an action conforms to this description it is nearly impossible to find any 
religious ruling that might overrule it.  
Regarding the position of the term ‘shahid’ in Shia jurisprudence, it is to say 
that in Shia jurisprudence the term shahid is used for one who is killed when 
fighting under the command of the immaculate Imam or his representative 
                                                          
127  ينف اا ق لح نه یلل لع ا اد  ع لو ۖ لنومللت قمی لو لنوملمت قلیلف نهـهللا نلینب لس ينف لنوملنَالقمی ۚ لـةن لج لا م مهلل ـنلأنب ممهللا لو  ملَ لو  ممه لسمفنلَ لنی نن نم  ؤ م  لا لن نم َٰى لرلت  شا لهـهللا ـننِ
 لبنب او مر نش بلت  سالف ۚ نهـهللا لن نم نه ند ه لعنب َٰىلف  ولَ  ن لم لو ۚ ننآ  رمق لا لو نلی نجن ن  لْا لو نةا لر  ـوتلا﴿ م ی نظ لع لا مز  ولف لا لومه لكنل
َٰلذ لو ۚ نهنب ممت  علیالب ينـذلا م ُم نع ی هبوتلا١١١﴾  
128 ﴾١٦٩ نارمع لآ﴿ لنومق لز  رمی  منه ب لر لدن نع ٌءالی  حلَ  للب ۚ ااَا لو  ملَ نهـهللا نلینب لس ينف اوملنتمق لنی نـذلا ـنلب لس  حلَ للا لو 
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exclusively appointed for war (in distinction for the general representative129). 
The only difference between the classical and the more recent Shia 
jurisprudence in this regard (if such a distinction be possible at all) is that in 
recent jurisprudence, “being killed when defending the seed of religion” has 
been added to the set of criteria, which makes it broader than the old set. To 
avoid becoming side-tracked by peripheral issues, I shall now focus on two 
well-known definitions of the term shahid found in the classical and the more 
recent Shia jurisprudence. The first is from Allama Hilli’s works and the 
second is from Ayatollah Khomeini’s Risalah. 
1. A Shahid is one who has been killed while fighting under the direct 
command of the immaculate Imam or his representative exclusively 
appointed for war.130 
2. A Shahid is one who has been killed while fighting under the direct 
command of the immaculate Imam or his representative exclusively 
appointed for war, or has been killed defending the seed of the 
religion.131 
It is obvious that in absence of the immaculate Imam Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
inclusion of defenders of the “seed of the religion”, is a smart way for generalizing 
the term for the contemporary time. However, while fighting under the direct 
command of the immaculate Imam, at least theoretically and from a juriprudential 
standpoint, could include preeptive jihad, defednding the ‘seed of religion’ can only 
include ‘defensive warfare’ as will be discussed in chapter ten. 
                                                          
129 Please refer to the “particular” and “general” representatives of Imam in chapter eleven. 
130 Abolqasim Najmaddin Ja`far al-Hilli, Sharaye` al-Islam, Qom, Dar al-huda lil-tabaye` wal-
nashr, 1403 AH (lunar), Vol. 1, p. 30. 
131 Rouhollah Mousawi Khomeini, Tahrir al-wasilah, Vol. 1, p. 66. 
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Martyrdom and the sanctity of life 
Despite the importance and high status of ‘shahadah’ in Islam, this concept 
cannot be employed unconditionally. There is another term in Islamic 
teaching which must be taken into account when it comes to considering 
actions which pose any risk to life, namely that of ‘the sanctity of life’. 
Sanctity of life has its roots in the Quran where human life is considered to 
be the most valuable created by God: slay not the life that God has made 
sacred.132 The Quran decrees human beings to be the representatives of God 
on Earth133, and the receptacle of God’s spirit.134 It considers humans to be 
the holders of divine honour or, ‘karamah’ (همارک)135, and suggests that 
endangering life (of self136 and others137) is a great sin. In the Quran, killing 
a single person unjustly is considered tantamount to killing all people and, 
conversely, saving one life is considered equal to saving all humans. This 
illustrates the Quranic concept of sanctity of human life: 
Therefore We ordained for the Children of Israel that he who 
slays a soul unless it be (in punishment) for murder or for 
spreading threat on earth shall be as if he had slain all mankind; 
and he who saves a life shall be as if he had given life to all 
mankind. And indeed again and again did Our Messengers come 
                                                          
132 Q.6:152. 
133  مس دلقمن لو َل ند  م لحنب مح ب لسمن من  حلن لو لءا لم  دلا مكنف  س لی لو الهینف مد نس فمی ن لم الهینف مل لع  جل َلَ اوملالق اةلفینل لخ نض  ر
ل  لْا ينف ٌل نعا لج ي ننِ نة ُل نئ للا لم لنل لكُّب لر ل الق  ذنِ لو
 :ةرقبلا﴿ لنوم لل  علَ للا ا لم م لل  علَ ي ننِ ل الق لكلل٣٠﴾  
134 ﴾٢٩ :رجحلا﴿ لنی ند نجا لس مهلل او معلقلف ي نحو ُّر ن نم نهینف مت  خلفلن لو مهمت یـو لس ا لذنإلف 
135 ﴾٧٠ :ءارسلْا﴿ الای نض فلَ الن قلل لخ  نـم  م ٍرینث لك َٰىلل لع  ممهالن لـضلف لو نتالب ـیطلا لن  م ممهالن ق لز لر لو نر  حلب لا لو  رلب لا ينف  ممهالن ل لم لح لو لم لدآ يننلب الن  مـر لك  دلقلل لو 
136   م ُم نب لنا لك لهـهللا ـننِ  م ُم لسمفنلَ اوملمت قلَ للا لو  مُم ن  م ٍضا لرلَ ن لع اة لرا لجنَ لنوُم لَ نلَ ـلانِ نل نطالب لانب م ُم لن یلب مُم للا لو  ملَ اومل مك
 ألَ للا اومن لمآ لنی نـذلا الهُّیلَ الی
 :ءاسنلا﴿ ا امی نح لر٢٩﴾  
137  ا ارو مصن لم لنا لك مـهننِ نل ت لق لا ي ف فنر  سمی للالف اانالط ل مس نه ینل لونل الن ل لع لج  دلقلف ا امومل ظ لم ل نتمق ن لم لو  ق لح لانب ـلانِ مهـهللا لمـر لح ي نـتلا لس ـفنلا اوملمت قلَ للا لو
 :ءارسلْا﴿٣٣﴾  
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to them with clear directives; yet many of them continued to 
commit excesses on earth (Q.5:32).138 
The sacred value of human life requires rejecting any actions which place it 
at risk. Accordingly, the promotion of martyrdom would appear to be in 
contradiction to the concept of the ‘sanctity of life’. To escape the apparent 
paradox resulting from promotion of martyrdom alongside the explicit 
Quranic injunction to observe the ‘sanctity of life’, some of Muslim thinkers 
such as Mohammad Khatami suggest that martyrdom should be accepted only 
when it is necessary for saving larger numbers of lives in a just way.139 In this 
approach, the two terms ‘martyrdom’ and ‘sanctity of life’ are able to coexist. 
This is because a martyr becomes one who is killed when trying to save a 
large number of lives and, at least theoretically, not when endangering his/her 
life which is a sin itself. The sin regarding danger to the martyr’s life goes to 
the killer and not the martyr. 
The above approach refers to saving lives as a justifier for martyrdom and as 
such is much clearer than other justifiers for martyrdom such as ‘serving of a 
high cause’ or ‘saving the seed of religion’ which are difficult to agree on 
their outward cases. However, and unlike serving a high cause, a perceived 
danger to the seed of religion does not happen in the absence of reciprocal 
life-threatening communal violence and therefore is a threat to lives of 
innocents. Hence, when a Muslim society is attacked from the outside 
                                                          
138  الهالی  حلَ  ن لم لو ا اعی نم لج لسـانلا ل لتلق ا لـمنلأ ُل لف نض  ر
ل  لْا ينف ٍدا لسلف  ولَ ٍس فلن نر ی لغنب ا اس فلن ل لتلق ن لم مـهنلَ ل ینئا لر  سنِ يننلب َٰىلل لع الن بلت لك لكنل
َٰلذ نل  جلَ  ن نم
 َٰلذ لد  علب ممه ن  م ا ارینث لك ـننِ ـممث نتالن یلب لانب النمل مس مر  ممه َ لءا لج  دلقلل لو ا اعی نم لج لسـانلا الی  حلَ ا لـمنلأ ُل لف﴿ لنومفنر  سم لل نض  ر
ل  لْا ينف لكنل :ةدئاملا٣٢﴾  
139  یگدنز هکلب ؛ناسنا دوخ یگدنز اهنَ هن و گرم هب فوطعم هن تسا یگدنز هب فوطعم هدارا یملاسا تداهش و داهج
ناسنا رگید یاه  …  
Accessibile via: http://www.tabnak.ir/fa/news/340686/ 
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because of religion, and it reacts proportionally to that, this can be seen an 
instance of legitimate defence as a means for stopping loss of lives and 
consequently is included in the category of ‘saving lives’. Then, the case of 
‘danger to the seed of religion’ as a threat to the lives of those who are 
attacked because of their belief can be covered by the previous justification, 
and so there is no need for mentioning it separately.  
For the Lebanese Shia jurist, Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, to ensure the 
required conditions for each of the approved principles of ‘desirability of 
martyrdom’ and ‘sanctity of life’ are met, and to avoid clashes between these 
two concepts, jurisprudentially speaking, at least two main requirements must 
be met for an act of self-sacrifice (martyrdom) to not contravene the 
injunction of the sanctity of life: 
1. It must be consequence of performing the crucial religious duty of 
stopping danger facing the “seed of religion”, which gives the action 
the necessary jurisprudential requirement of “being in the cause of 
God”.140 Such a duty is considered so vital that it overrides the 
obligation to not harm the “sacred entity” that is human life.  
2. The risk to life must be a contingent condition of fulfilling the duty. 
This means that undertaking any unnecessary risk spoils the moral-
religious virtue of the action. This second condition in turn means that 
there must be no alternative way to fulfil the duty, otherwise such 
action would be considered as unnecessary risk to life which is 
prohibited by the Quran.141 In other words, there must be no lower-
                                                          
140 Q.2:154, Q.3:169, Q.4:74, Q.9:111, Q.47:4, Q.61:4. 
141 ﴾١٩٥ :ةرقبلا﴿ لنینن نس  ح م  لا ُّب نحمی لهـهللا ـننِ اومن نس  حلَ لو نة ُل مل ـهتلا ىللنِ  م ُم ی ند یلأنب اومق لمَ للا لو نهـهللا نلینب لس ي نف اومقنفنلَ لو 
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risk way or means of fulfilling the duty. Since the value of life is very 
high, it is difficult to find many things that their fulfilment equates to 
the same value of human life. The only exception is a greater number 
of loss of lives in the case of a lack of preventive action. But if an 
action is not preventive enough, meaning one endangering his/her life 
has no effect on decreasing the number of casualties, the executer’s 
life included, then risk of life is excessive (as incompatible with 
sanctity of life) and therefore illegitimate.142  
Despite all the efforts that attempt to demonstrate the compatibility of 
martyrdom and sanctity of life, which primarily focus on the permissibility of 
endangering some lives (of invaders) to save a larger number of lives (of 
victims), or the higher cause of ‘saving the seed of religion’, the main problem 
still remains. Even if the question of the value of the endangered lives (of 
victims) is considered a just reason to extend the permission to use force 
against the aggressors and endanger their lives (because of their wrong deed), 
still the loss of the life of the martyr himself/herself requires an even greater 
burden of exculpatory evidence to be considered, consistent with the principle 
of observing sanctity of life, because the martyr has not done anything wrong 
to deserve death.  
Regarding this issue, it appears that verses 2:154 and 3:169 are designed to 
solve the contradiction of the loss of the martyr’s life with the principle of 
observing the sanctity of life. In these two verses, those who are killed in the 
                                                          
142 Shams al-Din, Fiqh al-`unf al-musallah, p. 175. 
سملا فنعلا لامعتسا ریغب اهسفن نع عفادَ نا هیملاسلاا هکرحلا یلع رذعَ اذا و اذه عفنی مل وا فلاتلاو حرجلا و لتقلل مزلتسملا حل
... حلسملا فنعلا لامعتسا  رشی لاف ،عفدلا یف  افدلا 
 ،توریب ،رشنلا و تاساردلل هیلودلا هسسوملا ،ملاسلاا یف حلسملا فنعلا هقف ،نیدلا سمش یدهم دمحم1422 ص ،175 .  
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cause of God are considered to be ‘alive’ and believers are asked not to refer 
to them as dead: And do not say of those who are killed in the cause of God, 
“Dead.” Rather, they are alive, but you do not perceive. (Q.2:154)143 
And: Do not consider those killed in the cause of God as dead. In fact, they 
are alive, at their Lord, well provided for. (Q.3:169)144 
According to these verses, since the martyr is ‘alive’, martyrdom should not 
be considered to contradict the imprecation to observe the ‘sanctity of life’. 
And since no life is lost, (because martyr is considered alive), then 
‘martyrdom’ does not contradict ‘sanctity of life’.  
In addition to theoretical discussions over martyrdom, the previously 
approved cases of martyrdom by the religion also play an important role in 
both consolidation and promotion of martyrdom. Regarding the current 
discussion over suicide tactics, similar historical events are of the utmost 
significance because, as James Thomson observed, “One timely deed is worth 
ten thousand words”. For Shia Islam, the ‘tragedy of Karbala’ plays such a 
role in affirmation of martyrdom. 
The tragedy of Karbala as an inspiration for martyrdom 
In addressing the question of martyrdom, I have so far confined my focus to 
the Quranic verses. This is because the Quran is indubitably accepted by all 
Muslims. The sanctified position of the Quran is so unassailable that some 
scholars such as Oliver Leaman call it the heart of the religion of Islam.145 By 
                                                          
143  ﴾١٥٤ :ةرقبلا﴿ لنو مر مع  شلَ ـلا نُن َٰهلل لو ٌءالی  حلَ  للب ٌتا لو  ملَ نهه ـللا نلینب لس ينف مللت قمی ن لمنل اوملومقلَ للا لو 
144  ﴾١٦٩ :نارمع لآ﴿ لنومق لز  رمی  منه ب لر لدن نع ٌءالی  حلَ  للب ااَا لو  ملَ نهـهللا نلینب لس ينف اوملنتمق لنی نـذلا ـنلب لس  حلَ للا لو 
145 Oliver Leaman, Controversies in contemporary Islam, Routledge, 2014, p. 13. 
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contrast, many of the Prophetic traditions, or hadiths as the second source of 
Islamic law after the Quran, are so controversial that some scholars, notably 
Western orientalists, when facing the deep inconsistency among the ahadith 
have rejected outright the hadiths as a reliable source for the study of Islam.146 
Jurisprudentially speaking, recorded historical events cannot be considered to 
be more reliable than the hadiths, because the hadiths were more rigorously 
collected, recorded and vetted than any of the histories that have come down 
to us. This said, even when a hadith item cannot be cross-referenced, an 
historical event will naturally be considered to be more dubious. 
However, there are some exceptions, for example where even if there is not 
complete consensus regarding the meaning and value of historical events, 
they are still considered iconic elements of the religion. The Karbala incident 
is one such seminal moment which is deeply engaged with the question of 
martyrdom in Shia tradition. It is a widespread notion that in Shia tradition, 
martyrdom has a higher status than in other branches of Islam. This is 
primarily due to the centrality of the ‘tragedy of Karbala’ among the rites and 
commemorations of Shia Muslims. This makes a discussion of the 
relationship between the ‘Karbala incident’ and the concept of ‘martyrdom’ 
in Shia Islam important for the present work. The following discussion of this 
incident analyses whether it justifies ‘martyrdom-seeking’, which is an 
essential element in persuading people to participate in suicide attacks. 
On the tenth day of Muharram (the first month of the Islamic calendar) in the 
year 61 AH (October 680 CE), a tragic event took place on the banks of the 
                                                          
146 Nasr, Islam, pp.55-6. 
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river Euphrates at a place known as ‘Karbala’ in today’s Iraq. The large army 
of Yazid, the Umayyad Caliph of the time, besieged a group of travellers 
numbering less than a hundred and pressured them to pledge allegiance to the 
Caliph and submit to his authority. The small group resisted and a battle took 
place during which they were all killed. The killed consisted of 71 followers 
and family members of Hussein, grandson of the Prophet of Islam. By the 
standards of the day, the Karbala incident, involving a relatively small 
number of people, would appear to be insignificant from an historical point 
of view. The political authority of the time might have perceived that this 
incident would be recorded in history as a chronicle like hundreds of similar 
events which would then be forgotten over time. However, the events that 
occurred were to become a beacon for future generations of Shia Muslims.147 
Imam Hussein, the slain grandson of the Prophet in Karbala, became the 
symbol par excellence of martyrdom and is now referred to as the “leader of 
the martyrs”.148 ‘Karbala’, and ‘Ashura’ in its turn, became the icons of 
martyrdom among many Muslims. The sacrifice of Imam Hussein has played 
a unique role in the promotion of martyrdom among not only the Shia but also 
some Sunnis as well. Ashura is commemorated annually by Shia Muslims 
around the world.149 Each year Arbaein, or the fortieth day of the Karbala 
incident, is attended by millions of mourners and is considered as the largest 
human gathering within the world.  
                                                          
147 Richard Bonney, Jihad: from Quran to bin Laden, Palgrave Macmilan, NY, 2004, p. 226. 
148 ادهشلا دیس 
149 Ibid. 
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Richard Bonney describes the influence of the Karbala Tragedy on Shia Islam 
as pervasive and lasting and believes the concept of ‘martyrdom’ is deeply 
embedded in Shia culture: 
Within four years [after the incident], Husayn’s [Hussein] grave at 
Karbala had become the site for wild and unprecedented expressions 
of grief, weeping and wailing for the suffering and tragic death of 
the grandson of the Prophet. To the extent that these events gave the 
Shias a martyrology, enabling the passions of Ali’s sons to be 
remembered in martyrdom plays (ta`ziyah) and permitting the 
community to indicate its willingness for martyrdom by displays of 
self-inflicted wounds, they served a long term purpose: the Shia 
perception of Islam is inseparable from the concept of martyrdom.150 
However Karbala, despite its importance, is not the focus of my discussion 
here. The relevant point is that some believe Imam Hussein knew that his 
refusal to pay allegiance, or baya`h (هعیب), to the Caliph would cost him his 
life. They conclude that, since Hussein was aware of the probable 
consequence of his refusal to pledge allegiance to Yazid, he was in fact 
“seeking martyrdom”.151 Consequently his refusal to submit to the ruling 
caliph, which he knew was inviting death, is considered by some to provide 
a legitimating precedent; evidence that may be adduced demonstrating the 
permissibility of suicide tactics.152 
                                                          
150 Richard Bonney, op cit., p. 226.  
151  هک درک رکف راب نیدنچ ،دیجنس ار نآ رخآ و ل  وا ،درک نییاپ و لااب ار روشک تسایس ) (نیسح ماما :یلمآ یداوج الله تیآ
 ار اهنآ همه و دنک تکرح لابرک فرط هب هداوناخ یاضعا همه اب هکنیا زج تسین یا هراچ چیه و هدنامن یهار چیه دید ،دنک هچ
مهفب ار هعماج رد دوجوم تقیقح مدرم اَ دنوش ریسا یخرب و زابناج یضعب و دیهش یضعب ،دربب هنحص نیا هب رب هک دننادب و دن
دیآ یم هچ و دمآ هچ نیملسم و ملاسا رس. 
Accessible via: http://www.tabnak.ir/fa/news/366243/ لابرک-تضهن-یخیراَ-یاههشیر 
152 See: Amir Molla Mohammad Ali, Mabani Fiqhi Amaliat Istishhadi (Jurisprudential bases of 
self-martyrdom operation), Zamzam Hedayat Publications, 1385 S. H. (2006). 
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The reality is that, despite this arguably shallow popular notion that Imam 
Hussein put his life at risk voluntarily, the Karbala incident is not necessarily 
associated with martyrdom seeking. Rejection of paying allegiance to Yazid 
as an approval for the ‘martyrdom seeking’ of Imam Hussein can be applied 
to any other action which might be disliked by despotic rulers. When we 
consider the seriousness of the situation that confronted Imam Hussein, as the 
grandson of the Prophet and the spiritual leader of a sizable community of 
Shias, we see that he had no choice but to reject Yazid’s authority. Yazid was 
known to be a corrupt ruler and his policies were perceived as against the 
basic teachings of Imam Hussein’s grandfather, the Prophet of Islam.153 As 
the grandson of the Prophet, Hussein’s allegiance would have conferred an 
unacceptable degree of religious legitimacy on Yazid’s unjust actions. This 
would have been a kiss of death for the message of Islam154  because Yazid 
was widely known to be unfaithful and corrupt155 and Hussein’s support 
would transcend the political sphere and affect the religious arena as well. 
Any pious person in the position of Hussein would have been expected to 
have done the same.156 Placing responsibility for the martyrdom of Hussein 
on his and his companions’ shoulders is particularly unfair. The implication 
of such arguments is that Imam Hussein, in seeking his own martyrdom, was 
actually done a favour by Yazid who helped him to attain his goal. This kind 
of interpretation of the Karbala incident might serve its promoters by 
                                                          
153 Masoudi, Murouj al-dhahab, Vol. 3, p. 77. 
154 دیزی لثم ٍ ارب ة  ملْا تیلب دق ذِ ملاسلا ملاسلْا ىلعو 
 ج ،راونلاا راحب ،یسلجملا رقاب دمحم44 ص ،326.  
155 Ibid, Vol. 2, p. 71-72. 
156  ،الله لوسر هنسل افلاخم الله دهعلاثکان الله مرحل لاحتسم ارئاج اناطلس یار نم :لاق الله ل وسر ننا سانلااهیا :) (نیسحلا لاق
.هلخدم هلخدی نا الله یلع اقح ناک لوق لا و لعفب هیلعریغی ملف ناودعلا و مثلااب الله دابع یف لمعی 
 نیسح نانخس ،یفجن قداصدمحم ، یملاسا تاراشتنا رتفد مق هیملع هزوح نیسردم هعماج ، یلع نب1380.   
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inspiring the pity of their audience, but it obscures the socially heroic act of 
Imam Hussein’s refusal to confer legitimacy on a corrupt political leader and 
preserve the ethical heart of the religion of his beloved grandfather.  
There is much evidence that may be cited from historical sources 
demonstrating that Imam Hussein’s movement was not suicidal but actually 
sought to avoid bloodshed. For instance, it is reported that Imam Hussein left 
his city Medina because it was no longer safe for him and he wished to avoid 
danger to his family and himself.157 This runs against the notion that Imam 
Hussein placed his life in danger intentionally. On the day of ‘Ashura’ when 
the caliph’s army surrounded Imam Hussein and his companions, he said “if 
you do not want me to go to the city of ‘Kufa’ then let me go to another safe 
place.”158 This clearly shows he was not intending to put his people and his 
own life in danger. Of course, Imam Hussein was unable to accept the 
government’s demand that he stop doing his religious duty in protesting 
against the corruption of the ruling clique. Imam Hussein described the 
prospect of abandoning his campaign against corruption as against his dignity 
and announced that he was ready to pay the price if it was the only way of 
doing his duty, saying “... and now the wrongdoer son of the wrongdoer [the 
Umayyad Caliphe] has left me between swords and dishonor of submission 
and dishonor is away from us.”159 Still despite refusal of the government’s 
                                                          
157 Majlesi, Bahar al-Anwar, vol 44, p. 329. 
158  مُنع فرصنا ينوعدف نیهراك يمدقمل متنك نا 
 دلج ،یدوعسم خیراَ ،یدوعسم4 ص ،304  
159 ةلذلا انم تاهیهو ،ةلذلاو ةلسلا نیب ينكرَ دق يعدلا نبا يعدلا  نِو لاَ 
 دلج ،راونلاا راهب ،یسلجم رقاب دمحم45 ص ،83.  
 87 
 
demand, Imam Hussein did not commit any act of suicide, and it was the 
government who killed him. 
There is further evidence that shows the Shia Imams regularly tried to avoid 
bloodshed as much as possible. Imam Ali accepted ‘hakamyyah’ with 
Mua`wyyah only to prevent a civil war in Kufa which would have cost many 
lives.160 Imam Hassan’s transference of the caliphate to Mua`wyyah was 
again done to stop a running bloodshed. Imam Hussein acquiesced to paying 
allegiance to Mua`wyyah for the very same reason,161 and his leaving Medina 
was done for the same purpose.162 The fact is that with too much focus on the 
Karbala incident, over 50 years of Imam Hussein’s life and the broader 
message of avoiding bloodshed has been ignored. Only the half day of 
‘Ashura’ has become, and remained, the centre of attention. All other Imams 
in their turn also refused to engage in armed uprisings and even refused to 
accept political power gained at the point of a sword if it was offered to 
them.163 
To conclude, the event of Karbala cannot be used to support the use of the 
concept of martyrdom to justify suicide tactics. This is because the main claim 
that Imam Hussein’s movement was suicide-seeking is not based on historical 
                                                          
160 Masoudi, Murouj al-dhahab, Vol. 2, p.5. 
161 Ibid. 
162 In what is known as Imam Hussein will to his brother, Muhammad Hanafyyah, before leaving 
his hometown of Medina to Mecca, he clearly mentions that he wants to do ‘amir bil-ma`roof but 
if the government and people refuse his invitation to good and avoiding evil he will stay patient 
not that he will fight with them: 
  دیرَ ،يدج ةمَ يف حلاصلاا بلطل تجرخ امنِو ، ،اادسفم لاو ااملاظ لاو اارطب لاو ،اارشَ جرخَ مل ينِ يهنَو فورعملاب رمآ نَ
 ریخ وهو ،قحلاب موقلا نیبو ينیب الله يضقی ىتح ربصَ اذه يلع در نمو ،قحلاب ىلوَ للهاف قحلا لوبقب ينلبق نمف رُنملا نع
نیمكاحلا 
 دلج ،راونلاا راهب ،یسلجم رقاب دمحم44 ص ،329  
Accessible via: http://ar.lib.eshia.ir/11008/44/329/ ارشا 
163 Masoudi, Murouj al-dhahab, Vol. 2, pp. 78-79. 
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facts. Those who perpetrate the idea that it was are often averse to reasoned 
debate on this matter. Accordingly, the claim that martyrdom is an 
indissoluble and essential part of Shia Islam is not based on persuasive 
foundations. According to Daniel Brown, the main body of Shia scholars do 
not see the Karbala event as the seeking of martyrdom.164 
Martyrdom and the victim’s rights 
In addition to the above arguments against employing martyrdom for the 
justification of suicide tactics, there is another clear problem with labelling 
suicide terrorism as ‘martyrdom’. The fact is that in the literature on 
martyrdom, too much attention is paid to the executer’s reasons for his/her 
act, and this leads to the neglect of consideration of the victim’s rights. 
Suicide terrorism is obviously consisted of ‘suicide’ and ‘terrorism’. Even if 
it is the case that the executer of suicide terrorism has good intent and thus 
his/her genuine readiness to risk or sacrifice his/her life (act of suicide) is 
considered to have religious value, such a self-affirming mission does not 
allow one to violate others’ rights, which includes the right of life above all 
else. Heeding others’ right to life is so non-negotiable that one cannot 
endanger it even to secure his own life. Shia jurists, when explaining the 
question of avoiding risk to one’s life, indicate that if one person orders 
another to do damage to a third party’s properties otherwise he will get killed, 
the threatened party is allowed to do material damage to others to save his 
own life. Some jurists allow causal physical harm to the third party to save 
one’s own life as well. But no jurist approves of endangering the lives of 
                                                          
164 Daniel Brown, “Hasan al-Banna; the Art of Death”, p. 157. 
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others’ if a person is threatened with losing his own life, if he does not kill a 
third party. The interesting point is that even if the threatener orders the 
threatened to kill the threatener himself, on pain of death, the threatened 
person is not permitted to kill the threatening person.165 Those who focus on 
the (so-called) good intention of the executer and neglect the victim’s side 
intentionally manipulate facts to achieve their goals, which are otherwise 
ruled out by the imprecation to observe the sanctity of human life in Shia 
jurisprudence.  
Previously the overwhelmingly accepted principle of ‘accountability for the 
practical odiousness of the action’ ( لصا یلعف حبق ) among Shia jurists rejected 
absolution for a bad deed by virtue of ‘good intent’. A clear case of where an 
action is ‘odious in practice’ is when an innocent person’s rights are violated. 
As we learnt, this principle is called ‘qubh fe`li’, or accountability for the 
‘externalities, or negative consequences of an act. The above principle 
prevents deeds from being judged based only on an assessment of the intent 
of the doer. So, even if the concept of martyrdom could be employed beyond 
the jurisprudential field for justifying intention-assessed wrong actions, doing 
harm to innocents as a result of good intent receives no support from 
mainstream Islamic jurisprudence. Accordingly, the role of jurisprudence in 
the carrying out of supposedly good intent-based suicidal deeds should be 
considered preventive rather than permissive. 
                                                          
165 Mahaqiq Hilli, Sharaye` al-Islam, p. 976.  
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Martyrdom and taqiyah 
There is a well-known principle in Shia Islam which gives priority to the 
safety of a person even if he or she needs to hide the truth.166 This concept is 
called taqiyah or ‘prudent dissimulation’. Although taqiyah is current among 
Sunnis as well, it has been used more extensively in Shia communities. Since 
the Shia have been in the minority in many parts of the Islamic world, to avoid 
hostile behaviour by the Sunni majority they have had, at times, to mask their 
true beliefs. The rhetorical question is: how one’s life, which is so important 
that a believer is advised to deny one’s faith to save it if required so, could be 
permitted by religious scholars to be so callously expended in a suicide 
terrorist attack that harms civilians who are illegitimate targets even in a 
legitimate defence? 
Conclusion 
Removing the check on a believer’s conduct as provided by mainstream 
Islamic jurisprudence, and ceding assessment of the moral value of an action 
solely to a judgement of the good intent or otherwise of the actor, creates so 
much room for litigating the outcome that it is difficult to enumerate all the 
possible options the believer has. Jurists not only cannot approve this 
situation, it is a core part of their responsibility to reject such intention-based 
approach adopted by the organisers of suicide tactics.  The responsibility of 
jurisprudence is to limit options and provide certainty by acting as a guide 
                                                          
166 Shaikh Murtada al-Ansai, al-Taqiyah, edited by Fares al-Hasun, Qaem Al Muhammad 
Institution, Qom 1412LH, p. 37. 
 یه هیقتلااقحلل فلاخم لعف وَ لوق يف هتقفاومب ریغلا ررض نع ظفحتل  
Accessible via: http://ar.lib.eshia.ir/1 
45/1/37 
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and authority on the proper behaviour of believers. In this case, because of 
the ease of constructing a rationale for suicide tactics offered to an actor by 
the intent-based approach, there are endless options from which the believer 
can choose. This is clearly against the philosophy of jurisprudence which is 
intended to provide an authoritative check on a believer’s actions. Since the 
role of jurisprudence is to regulate believers’ conduct through strict rulings, 
the free heuristic intention-based approach is antithetical to the philosophy of 
jurisprudence.  
When, as will be discussed shortly, there are strict rules of engagement on the 
battlefield stipulated by the jurisprudential authorities, how can it be argued 
that those same jurisprudential authorities could be persuaded to permit 
actions that harm innocent civilians in the course of suicide terrorist attacks 
(outside the battlefield), based only on the supposedly good intent inspiring 
such actions? The sensitivity of questions and problems concerning 
martyrdom has meant that despite overwhelming consensus among the 
Muslim community about the importance of the concept of martyrdom and 
the status of a martyr, if a person is indeed unanimously agreed to be one, 
there is not the same level of agreement when it comes to adjudicating actual 
cases. Often perpetrators of an incident are called martyrs by their supporters, 
but are called criminals by other Muslims. This is the case when the famous 
Lebanese Shia cleric, Seyyed Muhammad Hussein Fadlollah, the spiritual 
father of Hizbollah, referred to the perpetrators of the 9/11 attack and other 
al-Qaeda operations as criminals.167 
                                                          
167 Seyyed Muhammad Hossein Fadlollah, “Reformists’ responsibility is to clarify ambiguities”, 
Interview with Muhammad Javad Akbarain, accessible via http://www.rahesabz.net/story/18772/ 
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To justify suicide bombing under the banner of martyrdom is unacceptable. 
From what was discussed above it may be concluded that the Muslim fighter 
who is motivated by the spirit of religious duty enters the battle not with the 
intention of dying but with the conviction that, if he should die, it would be 
for reasons beyond his control. As such martyrdom in Islam does not begin 
with suicidal intention, let alone the linkage of that intention with the killing 
of non-combatants as it is the case in suicide terrorism.168 The question is that 
despite all the religious rulings against the use of martyrdom to justify suicide 
terrorism, why is this concept still quite popular among perpetrators of suicide 
terrorism? The simple answer to this question is that religion is not the only 
factor that plays a role in this regard. A combination of the devaluation of life 
and the elevation of death for a good cause can turn martyrdom into both a 
preferred and desirable action. It is regarded as preferable because of the 
worthlessness of what is lost in the extinguishing of a dark, and unbearable 
life.169 It is regarded as desirable because of what is gained, which is the 
promise of guaranteed salvation and consequent entry into heaven. The 
following elements play a central role in the process of persuading one to 
endanger one’s life in a suicide operation in the name of religion: 
1. Dissatisfaction about the current situation 
2. Hatred toward those who are perceived to be responsible for the 
situation (even indirectly civilians) 
                                                          
168   Kamali, Shari‘ah Law, p. 288. 
169 It is how Muslim extremists usually describe their societies which are ruled by authoritarian 
regimes. 
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3. A feeling of helplessness and the consequent fear resulting from the 
significant disparity between the (perceived) enemy’s and one’s own 
level of power 
4. The darkness of the world and therefore the worthlessness of human 
life because nothing to look forward to down here 
5. The faultlessness of the heaven and the afterlife 
6. Guaranteed salvation promised by martyrdom.170 
Hasan al-Banna, probably having the above points in mind, calls seeking 
death as “the art of death”, or fann al-mawt.171 Prior to blaming Islam for the 
concept of martyrdom and, as such, responsible to whatever wrong is done in 
the name of martyrdom, there is a need for addressing the socio-politico-
cultural root causes that provide so many desperate persons who are potential 
volunteers for suicide operations and ready to die. This job, obviously, is not 
the focus of this research and should be subject for separate intensive multi-
dimentional researches on socio-politico-cultural roots of suicide terrorism. 
                                                          
170 See:  Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God; the Global Rise of Religious Violence, 
University of California Press, 2003. 
Also see: Daniel Brown, Hasan al-Banna; the Art of Death and Contemporary Muslim Ideologies 
of Martyrdom, In Religion and Terrorism , edited by V. Ward and R. Sherlock. 
Also see: Veronica Ward, Martyrdom in the Three Monotheistic Religions: Historical Survey and 
Analysis, In Religion and Terrorism , edited by V. Ward and R. Sherlock, Exington Books, 2014. 
171 Brown, “Hasan al-Banna; the Art of Death”, p. 159. 
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II. Retaliation as intiqam 
Introduction 
Retaliation is another concept which is used frequently by the perpetrators of 
suicide terrorism to religiously justify their actions.172 Muslim militants who 
resort to indiscriminate terrorism against civilians justify their action as a 
reaction to the wrong deeds of their opponents.173 As such, and instead of 
showing the religious justification for their deeds, they simply focus on the 
deeds of their enemy and evaluate permissibility of their actions as being 
proportionate to the other side’s actions. It is why a major portion of such 
groups’ propaganda is solely focused on describing the dimensions of their 
enemy’s actions and the pain it causes their fellow co-religionists. In 
answering why these groups attack their fellow Muslims if they care that 
much for them, as Pratt observes, such groups have a quite dualistic approach 
toward defining themselves which requires both “ideological exclusivism” 
and “inclusivist polity”.174 When they see the whole Islamic world as their 
realm of domain they only consider like-minded extremists of their own 
group as true Muslims. Then while they react to any incident happening in 
any corner of the Islamic world and justify their terrorism as reaction to it, 
they, at the same time kill other Muslims for not being ‘Muslim enough’. 
                                                          
172 Osama Bin Laden, “God knows it did not cross our minds to attack the towers", The Guardian 
London, October 30, 2004. Retrieved May 25, 2010: accessible via 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/oct/30/alqaida.september11 
173 Sheikh Yasin, the spiritual leader of Hamas: by these operations [suicide attacks against 
civilians] Israelis will feel the same pain that Palestinians feeling.” 
174 Douglas Pratt, “From religion to terrorism” in Religion and Terrorism Edited by V. Ward and 
R. Sherlock, Lexington books, 2014, p. 84. 
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Religious roots of retaliation 
In regarding the religious roots of retaliation there are three related Quranic 
verses that can be applied to the justifiability of retaliation in its broadest 
sense. Two are about ‘qisas’,175 or retribution, and the third concerns 
muqabelah be misl,176 or reciprocal action in the course of war.  
Regarding the term qisas, it is one of three kinds of punishments permitted in 
Islamic jurisprudence when the third rank of rights has been violated.  
Jurisprudentially speaking, there are three categories of rights which, if 
breached, trigger punishment: God’s rights, the rights of the society, and 
rights of individuals. Punishments concerning the violation of God’s rights177 
are called ‘hudud’ or ‘divine rules’ and are therefore fixed. Ta`zirat are to 
punish those who breach the rights of the society and are decided case by case 
by judges. They are therefore flexible. Qisas is the right of the individual to 
ask for punishment or to forgive the one who has violated his/her rights. 
Qisas, to some degree, depends on the preference of the holder of the right. 
Of course the right of the individual to ask for punishment or to forgive the 
one who has breached his or her rights is not unlimited. Usually the holder of 
the right can forgive, ask for financial recompense [blood money], or suggest 
                                                          
175 And there is for you in legal retribution [saving of] life, O you [people] of understanding, that 
you may become righteous.  (Q.2:179) 
And We ordained for them therein a life for a life, an eye for an eye, a nose for a nose, an ear for 
an ear, a tooth for a tooth, and for wounds is legal retribution. But whoever gives [up his right as] 
charity, it is an expiation for him. And whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed - then it 
is those who are the wrongdoers.  (Q.5:45) 
176 [Fighting in] the sacred month is for [aggression committed in] the sacred month, and for [all] 
violations is legal retribution. So whoever has assaulted you, then assault him in the same way 
that he has assaulted you. And fear Allah and know that Allah is with those who fear Him.  
(Q.2:194) 
177 God’s rights are those fundamental rights of people such as “order” and “security” and also 
basic moral norms which without them believers are not able to live up to their belief. 
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a defined physical punishment which is pre-determined by the jurisprudential 
authorities for such cases. In the case of the rights of individuals, the Quran 
recommends forgiveness178 although acknowledges the right to financial 
compensation or even proportionate physical punishment. Regarding 
‘ta`zirat’ the Quran is silent or flexible.  
Hudud al-Allah comprise rulings in the Quran which, in the eye of 
jurisprudential Islam, are fixed and all believers are obliged to follow strictly. 
Marital rulings are among those codes which have been repeatedly mentioned 
in the Quran.179 In Islamic jurisprudence, ‘hudud’ are punishments for those 
kinds of crimes which undermine Islamic society from within and prevent it 
from fulfilling God’s rights. Such crimes include theft, adultery, unjust 
accusations levelled against innocents, and so on. Punishments of such crimes 
must be decided according to Sharia and therefore are fixed and non-
negotiable according to jurisprudential Islam. Warfare is not included in 
hudud. Although qisas in Shia jurisprudence is mentioned in the book of 
‘hudud’, it should not be confused with the primary meaning of hudud. As 
mentioned above qisas, as punishment for those who harm an individual, is 
left to the victim’s inclination and as such is (relatively) flexible. Qisas, 
because of its individualistic nature is entirely unrelated to warfare.  
Another term in the Quran is muqabelah be mesl. Unlike ‘qisas’, ‘moqabeleh 
be mesl’ concerns retaliation in the course of war. Although supporters of 
suicide terrorism in some cases use the term ‘qisas’ to justify their actions180, 
                                                          
178 Q.2:178. 
179 Q.2:187, Q.2:229, 230, Q.4:13. 
180 See: Amir Molla Mohammad Ali, Mabani fiqhi amalyat esteshhadi (the jurisprudential bases of 
self-martyrdom operation), Zama zam hedayat publications, Qom, 1385/2006. 
 97 
 
the fact is that qisas cannot be linked to warfare and it is the term ‘moqabeleh 
be mesl’ which might minimally relate to the subject of discussion here with 
conditions explained hereunder. I wish to distinguish between two opposite 
ways that ‘retaliation’ is used or can be used. One way is to use it equal to 
‘vengefulness’, or unjust vengeance, as a pre-Islamic tribal habit of Arabs 
which has left its trace in today’s Muslim societies as well.  The other way is 
to use it as a just and proportionate retort. When we hear the term ‘retaliation’ 
in the language of extremists it might be different from what is used in more 
mainstream language. My preference is to call the first usage of ‘retaliation’ 
as Intiqam, a term with some similarities with retaliation and which has its 
roots in the pre-Islamic era of jahiliyya or Arabia’s ‘time of excessiveness’.  
The term intiqam or ‘blind revenge’ has a negative meaning pointing to 
‘causing suffering out of hatred and anger’ to random members of a 
community in retaliation for a harm received from a member of that 
community. Generally intiqam is opposite ‘just’ or retributive retaliation.181 
Disproportionate punishment of the wrongdoer can also be included in the 
category of intiqam/unjust-revenge. Intiqam, as such, like other jahili unjust 
customs, is rejected by Islam182 because of being closely associated with the 
pre-Islamic tribal chauvinism of Arabia. Having this preliminary explanation 
regarding relation between ‘retaliation’ and ‘intiqam’ in mind, in this section 
I will look at retaliation promoted by supporters of suicide terrorism as 
intiqam and as such rooted in pre-Islamic excessiveness of Arabia’s tribalism 
and not an Islamic principle. I will show similarities and commonalities of 
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retaliation, as Muslim extremists promote it, with the culture of unjust 
revenge as found in pre-Islamic Arabia and illustrate how, as a cultural 
deficiency which has succeeded in marginalising the authentic teachings of 
Islam, it sits within Islamic teachings among such extremists. When 
something as obvious as the local dress of specific group can be promoted as 
religious dressing for quite culturally diverse groups183 it should not be 
surprising to see a tribal cultural motif such as ‘revenge’ viewed as a religious 
concept as well. I will show some cases which support my argument in this 
regard hereunder. 
Retaliation and the tribal culture of revenge 
Unlike what has been portrayed of pre-Islamic Arabia, the decadence 
destroying pre-Islamic society of Arabia was not because of a lack of any 
virtues in that society. As Izutsu observes, it was actually selectivity, 
exclusivity, and excessiveness of virtues overshadowed by blind and 
chauvinistic tribalism which nurtured that decadence and not an absolute lack 
of such virtues per se.184 While anyone outside the domain of the tribe lacked 
any rights and protection, kinsmen not only enjoyed full protection but 
deserved excessive sacrifice. ‘Blind revenge’ was the product of such biased 
                                                          
183 We see that, for example, Daesh has introduced the clothing of some Afghans as an Islamic 
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The fact is that the first founders of today Muslims militant groups, who were fighting in 
Afghanistan in the 1980s against the Soviet Union, needed to hide inside the wider society by 
dressing in local people’s way and protect themselves from their enemy. Gradually this way of 
dressing has become ‘Islamic!!’ for some militant groups. 
184 Izutsu, Ethico-religious Concepts in the Quran, pp. 28, 31. 
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kinship.185 Pre-Islamic Arab blood-kinship promoted a selfish attitude which 
demanded good only for one’s own tribesmen. This is what Farah calls 
“chauvinistic clannishness”, a translation for ‘hyper asabiyyah’. 186 
According to the jahili culture, befriending members of other tribes, whom 
they looked upon as inferiors, was considered to be beneath dignity.187 This 
harsh inequality and excessive selfishness had torn Arabia apart. Islam’s 
revolutionary concept of tawhid suggested an equal position to the creator and 
tried to change the worldview of Arabs of the time. According to the tawhidi 
worldview the only factor for making one a nobler person was his/her good 
deeds: 
O mankind! Lo! We have created you male and female, and have 
made you nations and tribes that ye may know one another. Lo! the 
noblest of you, in the sight of Allah, is the best in conduct.188 
What I want to emphasize here is that the culture of suicide terrorism is in 
close relation with the culture of jahili rather than being an Islamic one. My 
argument is based on the fact that, as Izutsu observes, Jahiliyya is not a period 
of time that has passed away. It is rather a state of tribal honour which is 
against forbearance, patience, clemency, and freedom from blind passion.189 
The pre-Islamic era of Arabia is called ‘jahiliyya’ which in English is usually 
translated ‘Age of Ignorance’ supposing the ‘jahl’ is opposite ‘ilm’, or 
knowledge.190 While in Arabic ‘jahl’ is against ‘hilm’ which means “the 
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moral reasonableness of a civilized man”.191 Islam from the very beginning 
defined itself as a moral reformation movement opposing to jahiliyya and 
replacing it with principles arising from spirit of “hilm”.192 Hilm is defined 
broadly as the pivot of all moral life. Jahl is a fierce passionate nature which 
tends to get stirred up on the slightest provocation and which may drive a man 
to all sorts of recklessness.193 How familiar does this characteristic look when 
faced with fanatic extremists these days? 
Loyalty or trustworthiness – which is related to the discussion here – for pagan 
Arabs, like many other virtues, was largely a matter of kinship by blood. Islam, by 
breaking all limitations due to the tribal pattern of society, put the virtue of 
faithfulness onto a wider basis, transforming it into a super-tribal virtue.194 Loyalty 
to fellow tribesmen for pre-Islamic Arabia justified any wrong things against others. 
What we witness of cruelty committed by some Muslim militants against ‘others’ 
– both Muslim and non-Muslim – has an inherent similarity to the tribal chauvinism 
of pre-Islamic Arabia and therefore should be considered as jahili behaviour. What 
Islam suggested was a significant and radical breakaway in the form of the 
implication of just law equal to all subjects regardless of their tribal affiliation. It 
was a revolutionary improvement because prior to that even, proportionally, fair 
tribal laws were only applicable to members of the same tribe and anyone outside 
the tribe’s circle did not enjoy any right in the time of jahilyya.195 What Islam tried 
to do was to eliminate the niggardliness of tribalism and expand these virtues to 
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include all humankind. This replacement of blood kinship with an inclusive 
approach embracing all people196 not only confirmed positive intra-tribal  precepts 
but proliferated them by removing tribal dogmatism, whilst at the same time 
highlighting the more fundamental values embedded deep in them such as justice, 
peace, right-doing, and egalitarianism. 197 
The biased approach of tribal Arabs of the pre-Islamic era was understandable, of 
course not justifiable. The tribe was not only a source of protection but more 
importantly was source of identity. People were called by their tribe. History of 
Arabia is full of naming incidents by the tribes whose members were involved. 
During inter-tribal combats and in the individual swordplay, which usually would 
take place as warm-up for the main battle, two sides would proudly and extensively 
talk about the achievements of their tribes in previous battles instead of introducing 
themselves as individuals.198 The tribe, with such a critical position, deserved any 
sacrifice by those who owed their identity to it. Manliness, as an Arab virtue, had 
to do with sacrificing for the tribe. 
Today we are facing a new kind of tribalism which although, unlike the traditional 
one, is not exclusively based on blood kinship, is as still highly identity oriented as 
traditional tribalism was. While traditional tribalism was based on real and positive 
shared kinship the new tribalism is based on the negative shared threat, or perceived 
threat, towards a perceived common identity. What is promoted of the term ‘Umma’ 
by extremists is, in my opinion, ‘threat-based’ and as such is a ‘tribe-making’ 
concept. As such any action that could be interpreted as a common threat can bring 
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pieces of this giant global tribe, in the eyes of extremists, more closely together. On 
the other hand, the intensity of sacrifice, as is seen in suicide tactics, instead of 
bringing more rightfulness crystalizes stronger linkage to chauvinistic tribalism in 
its negative meaning. It seems that today’s suicide operations, which have a highly 
sacrificial characteristic to them, trace back to the old pre-Islamic tribalism. The 
new tribalism, aware of repulsive nature of tribalistic revenge, prefers to use 
retaliation which has a more acceptable resonance but which actually means the 
former, as will be shown below. 
Evidence shows that suicide attacks conducted by a number of Muslim militant 
groups during recent decades (when Sunni militant groups dominated the field) 
were claimed to be retaliatory measures carried out under the umbrella of 
‘retaliation’. I argue that ‘retaliation’, in its tribalistic pre-Islamic meaning, is the 
concept which may explain the nature of many of these actions. The following 
briefly summarises the role of retaliation in at least some versions of suicide attacks, 
as stated by supporters of suicide terrorism or the perpetrators themselves: 
1. ‘Retaliation’, as the main reason and/or justification for committing suicide 
bombing, has been cited by religious scholars supporting suicide attacks 
quite often. For example, the Association of the Islamic Scholars of Palestine 
‘Jameiyyat Ulama al-Falesteen’ in its statement of support for suicide 
attacks against Israeli civilians clearly declares that it does so in order that 
Israelis should feel the same pain and insecurity that Palestinians do.199 
Also Shaikh Ahmad Yasin, the spiritual leader of Hamas, has been quoted 
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as having said in reference to Israel: As long as they target our civilians, 
we will target their civilians.200 
2. In addition to intellectual justification, many of those conducting suicide 
attacks also emphasize ‘retaliation’ as the main reason for their operations. 
Osama Bin Laden, pronounced the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks to 
be in retaliation for Muslims’ suffering in Lebanon and Palestine. In a 2004 
videotape speech addressing the American people, Bin Laden reveals his 
retaliatory intent by saying:  
When you squander our security we squander yours… God 
knows it did not cross our minds to attack the Towers, but after 
the situation became unbearable—and we witnessed the injustice 
and tyranny of the American-Israeli alliance against our people in 
Palestine and Lebanon—I thought about it. And the events that 
affected me directly were that of 1982 and the events that 
followed—when America allowed the Israelis to invade Lebanon, 
helped by the U.S. Sixth Fleet. As I watched the destroyed towers 
in Lebanon, it occurred to me to punish the unjust the same way: 
to destroy towers in America so it could taste some of what we 
are tasting …201   
As seen above, Bin Laden believes in punishment of the “unjust in the same 
[unjust] way’ which is clearly against the just reaction promted by the Quran (5:8). 
Muhammed Siddique Khan, leader of the 7 July 2005 suicide terrorist bombers in 
London, left behind an explanation as to why he and his three friends executed a 
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series of suicide bombings that killed themselves and 52 other people. He used the 
same language as Bin Laden and justified killing innocent people as an act of 
retaliation:  
Your democratically elected governments continuously 
perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world. And 
your support of them makes you directly responsible… Until we 
feel security, you will be our targets. And until you stop the 
bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people we will 
not stop this fight. We are at war and I am a soldier. Now you too 
will taste the reality of this situation…202 
The expression ‘our people’, repeated in different ways by both Bin Laden and 
Siddique Khan in their statements, is quite familiar for a tribesman. They see the 
world consisting of big tribes and they are ready to do whatever it takes to protect 
theirs. As such the nature of their suicide bombings, as they themselves have 
clearly asserted, is mostly concerned with maximizing the pain and discomfort of 
ordinary civilians and demonstrates the central role of intiqam, as vengefulness, in 
such attacks. Rantisi of Hamas expresses such goal explicitly: “we want to do the 
same to Israel as they have done to us.”203 As such, suicide tactics against civilians 
were a way of making innocent Israelis feel the pain that innocent Palestinians had 
felt. In cases that the targets of suicide operations are civilians then what has been 
claimed to be ‘retaliation against wrongs’ lacks any justice and as such is not but 
an act of blind revenge rather than an attempt to punish doers of previous wrong 
deeds as legitimate and just retaliation requires. 
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3. In addition to political and ideological motives, there is evidence available 
that some of the perpetrators of suicide attacks, directly or indirectly, have 
had personal motivations for exacting revenge. A good example is that which 
occurred following the Pakistani Army’s ‘Operation Silence’ against the 
militants who took the trench in the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque). An escalation 
in suicide attacks in the wake of the Lal Masjid Operation can be directly 
attributed to this operation. From 1995 until operation of Lal Mosque in July 
2007,  34 suicide attacks overall were recorded in the entire preceding 
decade in Pakistan while 43 suicide attacks were recorded in only the first 
six months following the operation.204  The intensity of the aftermath of the 
July 2007 siege of the Lal Masjid may also be judged by the fact that Pervez 
Musharraf, as commander-in-chief of Pakistan, directed the armed forces not 
to wear their uniforms in public.205 As soon as Operation Silence came to an 
end, security agencies warned that cities of Rawalpindi and Islamabad could 
be targets of a wave of suicide attacks. This was said to be because over 500 
potential suicide bombers who had been studying at the Lal Masjid-run 
Jamia Hafsa and Jamia Fareedia madrasahs had not returned to their homes. 
Security agencies warned that potential bombers were hiding in several 
religious seminaries and mosques in and around the two cities and were 
ready to blow themselves up anytime, anywhere, to avenge the killing of 
their colleagues. Subsequent events proved those agencies right. Several 
weeks after the operation ended, an 18-year-old bomber killed 22 highly 
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trained commandos of the Special Services Group (SSG) of the Pakistani 
army by targeting their mess hall, around 100 km south of the capital, 
Islamabad, on September 13, 2007. The bomber turned out to be the brother 
of a female student at the Lal Masjid-run Jamia Hafsa madrasah who was 
killed during the operation, carried out by Karar Company of the SSG.206  
 
Incidents such as the Beirut October 1983 bombings, the U.S. 9/11 attacks, and the 
Iraq invasion are considered to be landmark events in the phenomenon of suicide 
attacks at the global level; but for Pakistan, the Lal Masjid operation was the 
turning point. After Operation Silence, Pakistan experienced around 10 times more 
suicide attacks in the following five years compared to the preceding 12 years. The 
year after the Lal Masjid incident, the number of suicide bombings in Pakistan 
multiplied further. In 2008, 895 people were killed and 1873 injured in 59 such 
incidents. There were 78 suicide attacks in 2009, killing 951 people and wounding 
2361. The phenomenon peaked in 2010, when 1172 people were killed and 2204 
injured in 51 such incidents.207 According to data compiled by the Islamabad based 
Conflict Monitoring Centre, militants carried out 41 suicide attacks during the year 
2011. Six hundred and six people were killed and 1002 injured in those attacks. 
Fifty nine percent of the dead (358 out of 606) and 85 percent (856 out of 1002) 
of the injured were civilians. The army lost 33 of its soldiers, while 100 personnel 
of the Frontier Corp (a paramilitary force) and 54 policemen lost their lives in these 
suicide attacks. Fifty one suicide bombers were used to carry out 41 suicide attacks 
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because in some strikes more than one human bomb was used. In 23 out of 41 
attacks, the targets were civilians.208  
Many of those who conducted suicide attacks in the years following the Lal Masjid 
incident were believed to have been students of the Lal Masjid religious schools 
or the relatives of those killed during Operation Silence.209 This fact demonstrates 
how the justification of retaliation coloured many of these crimes, which mostly 
targeted hospitals, churches, mosques, markets, schools and other public places in 
the name of waging jihad. Yet these acts killed and injured numerous innocent 
civilians. 
4. The practice of revenge-seeking is socially accepted, and even considered 
to be a desirable behaviour among some cultures, especially those with 
strong ties to tribal honour codes and attitudes. Akbar S. Ahmed in his 
Islam under siege uses the ‘assabiyyah theory’ of Ibn Khaldun to explain 
why so many conflicts are rooted in “group loyalty” 210  which he calls the 
exaggerated, imbalanced, and obsessive form of asabyyah as “hyper-
Asabiyyah”.211 In such a confrontational context any act of dishonouring 
or perceived act of dishonouring is reacted by “revenge” to regain or 
maintain honour.212 The distorted and mostly negative notion of ‘blind 
honour’ pursued by such revengeful groups lacks many humanistic 
elements of the traditional concept of honour.213 Ahmed puts the obsessive 
form of religious loyalty in the same category of the exaggerated tribal 
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loyalty as subgroups of “group loyalty” which can promote acts of violence 
against the “other”.214 
 
From what has been learnt above we can say that Bin Laden, when he spoke the 
language of revenge looked quite similar to the pre-Islamic tribesmen who acted 
violently to defend the tribe’s honour: “…Our religion is under attack. They kill 
and murder our brothers. They compromise our honour and our dignity …”.215 
Ahmed argues that in some cases including among the Pakhtuns of Afghanistan 
and Pakistan it is not unusual to paint tribal tradition with the colour of religious 
values while such traditions have their roots in ‘pakhtunwali’ or codes of 
Pakhtuns.216 Revenge has a very central position in this tribal code of conduct. The 
passage of time does not affect the implementation of revenge. There is a Pakhtun 
proverb which quotes a Pakhtun who took revenge after a hundred years, 
remarking, “I took it quickly”.217 If this social context and honour-based cultural 
practice of seeking revenge is ignored, no religious explanation can fully account 
for the nature of suicide terrorism in such environments.  
In relation to Islamic jurisprudence with regard to retaliation, Islamic law has 
rejected attempts to frame the concept of retaliation in its pre-Islamic unjust way. 
Retaliation was replaced with ‘targeted punishment’ – a sort of religious rule of 
law – which was supposed to address only the wrong-doer himself, not his whole 
tribe or community. Retaliation in its pre-Islamic concept, by contrast, was often 
simply an explosion of collective anger and hatred preferably directed against the 
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main agent that had created the source of anger, but just as often, in practice, it was 
directed against whosoever was around. The characteristics of the recent and 
ongoing suicide attacks carried out by Sunni militants reveal the same 
characteristics and shows such operations are primarily about revenge out of hatred 
and anger.  
It is important to recognise that those organisers of suicide attacks and their 
supporters usually distort a Quranic verse to justify their actions as religiously 
approved retaliation. Verse 194 of Chapter two in the Quran, which concerns the 
prohibition on fighting during the sacred months is often cited for this purpose. 
This verse extends permission for fighting back if believers are attacked during the 
sacred months, and affirms that exacting such ‘reciprocal action’ does not breach 
religious and moral rules:  [Fighting in] the sacred month is for [aggression 
committed in] the sacred month, and for [all] violations is legal retribution. So 
whoever has assaulted you, then assault him in the same way that he has assaulted 
you. And fear Allah and know that Allah is with those who fear Him. (Q.2:194) 
Verse eight of chapter five gives a clear rejection of any vengeful interpretations 
of the above Quranic verse: … and do not let the animosity of a people prevent you 
from being just. Be just; that is nearer to righteousness... (Q.5:8). As this verse 
indicates, believers are bound by observation to moral standards, and the wrong 
deeds of their enemies do not justify them to do wrong things to their enemies, let 
alone to innocent people. The history of the early stages of Islam is full of accounts 
of iniquities committed by the pagans of Mecca against the fledgling Muslim 
community. Pagans not only threatened the lives of Muslims and the Prophet 
himself, but even after the Muslims fled Mecca for Medina the pagans attacked 
Medina several times. Despites all this hostility toward Islam, and the trouble that 
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the pagans caused for the Muslims, the Prophet did not let his army take revenge.218 
When the Prophet returned to Mecca after around a decade of exile, and despite 
the suffering caused by the pagans of Mecca, in response to those who shouted the 
slogan “today is the day of revenge,” the Prophet asked that the Muslims replace 
it with the slogan: “today is the day of mercy”.219  
The following Quranic verse clearly rejects the justification of wrong actions in 
response to wrong deeds of the enemy, and requests that believers only cooperate 
in right acts: … And do not let the hatred of a people for having obstructed you 
from al-Masjid al-Haram lead you to transgress. And cooperate in righteousness 
and piety, but do not cooperate in sin and aggression. (5:2). This verse makes it 
clear that doing the wrong thing to innocent people in retaliation for wrong things 
done to Muslims is considered to be a ‘transgression’. Likewise, supporting fellow 
believers in the committal of wrong acts is against the Quranic principle of 
“prohibition of cooperation in hatred and aggression”.220 
To sum up, arguably the agenda of the supporters of suicide terrorism is that of 
mostly blind revenge upon ‘the other’ who is regarded as responsible for all their 
sufferings. The concept of ‘the other’ in regards to vengeful agenda is quite broad 
and no one out of their tribe of identity is safe from their violence. Unlike the pre-
Islamic concept of ‘tribe’, which was based on actual blood-kinship this new 
tribalism of fanatic extremists is based only on negative element of (perceived) 
shared threat. However, advocates of this new tribalism do not even have the few 
positive functions of the old tribalism of the pre-Islamic Arabia. They are 
incapable of offering the smallest solution to the tangible problems Muslims 
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currently suffer. They have introduced no single plan for curing poverty, illiteracy, 
health problems, corruption, backwardness, and injustice in the Islamic world. 
Instead, what they have drawn upon is the dissatisfaction of the Muslim masses 
toward the status quo of crippling corruption and their desperate demand for 
change.221 What they have been successful to some extent is to blame ‘others’ for 
all these failures and to offer the one single response: ‘revenge’. It seems, despite 
all confusions created from misrepresentation of Islam by extremists and also the 
vast dissatisfaction among Muslims, mainstream Muslims do not approve unjust 
retaliation promoted by extremists. According to the result of a Gallup Poll 
research study between 2001 and 2007, undertaken in several Muslim majority 
countries, less than 7% of Muslims support violence against civilian ‘others’. The 
interesting point is that those Muslims who condemn violence against civilians 
refer directly to the Islamic teachings including Quranic verses, whilst those 
Muslims who support such violence without exception refer to political issues 
including foreign intervention and destructive policies toward Muslim lands.222 At 
least a part of such support for violence can be interpreted on the base of intiqam, 
as unjust retaliation, because it is justified as a reaction to destructive policies of 
the other side. 
Conclusion 
While Shia militant groups mostly rely on the principle of martyrdom to justify their 
resort to suicide tactics, Sunni militants more often cite the principle of retaliation 
and revenge-seeking while using ‘martyrdom’ as reward. The fact is that the 
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vengeful approach adopted by Sunni militants is not just a theoretical wrangle, but 
has become a real contemporary security concern for both non-Muslims and 
Muslims. In 2011, Sunni extremists accounted for the greatest number of terrorist 
attacks and fatalities for the third consecutive year. More than 5700 (of 10283) 
incidents were attributed to Sunni extremists, accounting for nearly 56 percent of 
all attacks and about 70 percent of all fatalities. When it comes to suicide attacks, the 
situation is even more shocking because Sunni extremists conducted 93 percent of 
suicide attacks and are responsible for the absolute majority of human losses caused 
by such attacks.223 With extremists hijacking Islamic teachings to justify their 
crimes, some might consider Muslims to be accessories to terrorism. The problem 
is not only limited to the negative impression that extremists have spread about 
Muslims and their beliefs around the world, but in the practical realm, Muslims are 
also the main targets of such crimes. The 2011 Report of the U.S. Department of 
State on Terrorism clearly identifies Muslims as the main victims of terrorism: “In 
cases where the religious affiliation of terrorism casualties could be determined, 
Muslims suffered between 82 and 97 percent of terrorism-related fatalities over the 
past five years.”224  
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Part Two 
Jurisprudence and Jurisprudentialism 
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Introduction to Part Two 
A little knowledge is a dangerous thing (English proverb) 
A precise understanding of divisions within Islamic faith is not only of the 
utmost importance for gaining a better grasp of current intellectual trends in 
the Islamic scholarship but it also can have specific practical benefits as well. 
These divisions are not only matters of intellectual debates, which usually 
may appear so, but also are playing an important and actual role in the way 
that believers see their religion and behave religiously. By following each of 
these divisions followers decide what the central tenets of their religion 
actually are, and also in which ways these tenets should be prioritized and 
deployed to order and guide the believers’ conduct. Regarding our topic of 
research this means distinguishing between different understandings of Islam 
is essential for combatting terrorism effectively. This is because gaining a 
precise knowledge of any enemy is the first step for an effective struggle; an 
otherwise uncalculated action in fighting the wrong or supposed enemy may 
bring more harm than good. For example anti-terror forces targeting the 
wrong suspects (militarily or otherwise) is unconditionally a victory for the 
camp of the terrorists. Such ill-treatment of innocent people, who otherwise 
served no use for terrorists, can inadvertently help the terrorist campaign for 
recruiting new personnel in a way that no other means can help them. That 
being said in this part I am going to briefly introduce the main understandings 
of Islam and their relation to the current violence done in the name of Islam.  
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Chapter Five 
Jurisprudential Islam and the battle of interpretations 
 
Despite the notion that Islam forms a single monolithic entity the rich 
diversity of religious beliefs and Muslim cultures proves such a notion more 
a simplistic myth than a pervasive fact. The level of diversity among Muslims 
is to such a degree that some scholars have come to the conclusion that there 
are as many “islams” as there are “Muslims”.225 Then it is needless to 
emphasize that under the normative banner of ‘sameness’ seen as a 
monolithic Islam there are a wide range of variegated identities. Does the 
existence of such a significant level of variegation mean that it is impossible 
to talk about Islam, as one coherent entity, meaningfully? Is Islam regarded 
as a ‘homonym’ word covering clashing entities which have nothing in 
common? Or is there still a way to talk about Islam as one entity while 
recognizing all above variegations among its followers? 
The best way to answer these questions is to refer to Muslims and see how 
they themselves see their religion. According to the PEW 2012 survey the 
world’s 1.6 billion Muslims are united in their belief in God and the Prophet 
Muhammad, and are bound together by such religious practices as fasting 
during the holy month of Ramadan, almsgiving to assist people in need, 
visiting the holy site of Mecca, and canonical prayers. But they have widely 
differing views about many other aspects of their faith, including how 
important religion is to their lives, who counts as Muslim and what practices 
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are acceptable in Islam.226  From what the PEW’s report shows, although 
Muslims are different in some aspects they still have enough commonalities 
to be considered as followers of the same faith. Such commonalities in the 
current Iranian circles of Islamic Studies are called islam-e had-e aqalli or 
‘minimal Islam’ and are shared almost by all Muslims. These shared elements 
constitute of two categories. Firstly: ‘fundamental beliefs’ which in PEW’s 
report are belief in God and the prophethood of Muhammad. Secondly: ‘basic 
practices’ of canonical prayers, fasting, almsgiving and pilgrimage which are 
famous as ‘pillars of Islam’. No matter how non-practicing a Muslim might 
be almost all Muslims accept these two groups of elements as the heart of the 
religion. Although there is less or no inconsistency in the first category of 
elements (beliefs), regarding the second group (basic practices) the degree of 
actual fulfilment of the practices may indicate lack of acceptance which 
usually is only matter of practical adherence and not issue of acceptance. Then 
it is possible to talk about one Islam provided that we only have in mind this 
small shared elements famous as ‘minimal Islam’. The following shape shows 
the position of ‘minimal Islam’ in relation with the wider scope of the 
religion: 
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Figure 8 Minimal Islam 
While, as we saw, it is almost easy to determine the minimal shared level of 
religiosity among Muslims it is not that easy to identify various differences 
among them. There are several ways for identifying and categorizing 
differences among Muslims. The most straight forward one is to analyze the 
word ‘Islam’ itself.  Islam can be understood in three levels:  
1- As submitting or committing oneself to God, essentially as an inward 
mental action though with outward consequences. 
2- As a system of beliefs and practices believed to be ordered by God. 
3- As a culture and civilization created by Muslims over the course of 
time.227 
I will return to a modified version of this categorization later on when I make 
a clear distinction between three concepts of iman, irfan, and fiqh, and explain 
how these three concepts have formed three different versions of Islam each 
with their own worldview and outward consequences. In my own 
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categorization the above first and second levels of Islam are seen respectively 
as the foundation for kalami and fiqhi Islams. I will not consider the third one 
Islamic because the non-Islamic elements which are followed by Muslims as 
separate from their religion should not be seen necessarily as a version of Islam. 
Of course if such cultural elements are seen by Muslims as part of their religion 
then it will be included in the second level. I, instead, will add a third dimension 
which is based on the role of pure spirituality and forms irfani, or mystical, 
Islam. 
While the above categorization is based on the definition of religion there is 
another categorization which is context based. The context-based 
categorization of Islam divides Muslims based on their relationship with 
modernity as the dominating context of the time. There is no doubt that 
modernism has changed context of human’s life significantly. As for Muslims, 
like all other subjects of modernity, according to this categorization it is 
Muslims’ distance to modernity which defines their identity. Accordingly 
Muslims should be categorized as traditionalists, modernists, and 
fundamentalists. The relation between these three categories can vary but the 
main explanation for the relation between traditionalism, modernism, and 
fundamentalism is that while modernism is an antithesis of traditionalism, 
fundamentalism is the synthesis of modernism. As such fundamentalism is a 
reaction to modernism believing that modernism is spoiling society by 
weakening the moral values.  
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Modernization has its roots in western culture and thus can explain 
developments of the western world more adequately. However categorizing 
all groups around the world based on their standpoint towards this western 
phenomenon (modernism) looks too westernized. The fact is that differences 
among Muslims are rooted in their own history. While such a categorization 
might provide a more familiar explanation for the western audience it does 
not cover the Muslims’ differences during the pre-modern era – of which a 
big part of such differences are continuing to play a significant role today as 
well. As it will be discussed shortly, a large part of the contemporary divisions 
among Muslims are actually a continuation of the same old differences in 
many respects. 
The West has had its unique experience and although many lessons can be 
learnt by others who seek the same degree of development and success, 
ignoring this uniqueness which is characteristic of all human-related 
phenomenon, can even affect learning constructive lessons from it. Tariq 
Ramadan argues that while in a typical modern western society a day-to-day 
visibility of religion is close to zero, for Muslims following the fundamental 
principles of their religion is not considered as verging on excess but can 
easily be seen inside the frame of moderation. For him such a difference is 
simply because the histories, cultures, and reference points of the Islamic 
Traditionalism
Modernism
Fundamentalim
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world and the western world are not identical.228 At the same time for 
Ramadan following religion differently does not mean that moderate Muslims 
should give way to dogmatic and excessive interpretation of the religion and 
stop taking into consideration the current social and historical contexts which 
requires respect to human rights, gender relations and so on.229 Categorizing 
Muslims based on their degree of modernity can be misleading because being 
modern and liberal can have a different meaning in the Islamic context, 
Ramadan argues: 
… People are quick, far too quick, to assume that because a woman 
or a man is religiously ‘liberal’ with regard to Islamic practices such 
as wearing the hijab or drinking alcohol, for instance, she or he will 
hold equally ‘liberal’ political views. In my experience, nothing 
could be further from the truth. There are innumerable cases of 
political personalities, intellectuals and civil society activists who 
are indeed Muslims with liberal views and practices but who 
publicly support the most hardline dictatorial regimes and/or the 
most violent resistance groups everywhere from Algeria to France. 
So moderation in religion cannot be correlated with its supposed 
political equivalent. In the western-generated analysis, however, 
there is a tendency to conflate these categories. …230 
Equating Muslim religious extremism and fanaticism with fundamentalism, 
which is a Christian reaction to its own context, can be misleading.231 
Therefore, and despite its widespread usage, this categorization is needed to 
be avoided because the Islamic religious context is quite different from its 
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Christian counterpart.232 Another very popular categorization of Muslims is 
based on the religious legal schools or madhhabs they follow.  
Although many Muslims simply consider themselves as ‘Muslim’, and do not 
give their madhhab affiliation the same importance that they give to their 
religion, the fact is that many of them are aware of their madhhab and this 
awareness is increasing. Today there are five main Islamic madhhabs that 
most of Muslims, knowingly or unknowingly, follow one of them. These 
madhabs are Maliki, Hanafi, Shafi`ei, Hanbali, and Jafari (Shia). There is no 
doubt that madhhabs play an important role in deciding the way that a Muslim 
performs his or her religious practices. However the fact is that many ordinary 
Muslims only suffice to performing a small portion of fiqh as the manifest of 
each madhhab. This small portion which is called ‘minimal fiqh’ only 
constitutes the pillars of the religion or arkan which are the four worship acts 
of canonical prayers, fasting, pilgrimage, and almsgiving in addition to 
declaration of faith or shahada. Many Muslims do not follow the whole range 
of jurisprudential rulings of madhhabs and many Muslims – including Sufis 
and followers of some sects – do not follow any madhhab. Thus categorizing 
all Muslims based on madhhabs is not inclusive and explanatory enough. 
There are some other categorizations for explaining differences among 
Muslims but none of them are as famous and also as pervasive as the above 
mentioned ones and therefore I do not mention them here. 
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Differences in the nature of religiosity as the criteria for categorization 
If the above mentioned categorizations do not clarify the deep and 
longstanding differences among Muslims then the question arises is there any 
other categorization that covers the old differences and is able to explain the 
recent challenges and developments? My suggested categorization, since it is 
directly based on the nature of religiosity of individuals, covers not only 
previous situations but can also explain recent and current developments as 
well. Some scientists believe that religion is rooted in psychological and/or 
social and/or epistemological needs of human.233  
My categorization of Islam as a religion is based on this perspective with 
regard to the following preliminary points. Firstly the foremost of the above-
mentioned three foundations of religion sees religion as rooted in human 
psychology. Religion as a psychological phenomenon can have both positive 
and negative faces. While for Freud, Hume, and Hobbes religion is a false 
belief rooted in human’s fear of the unknown,234 for others feelings of awe 
resulted from sense of the presence of an unseen majestic power among 
devotees is the psychological root of religion.235 This aspect of religion is 
related to its spiritualistic functions and qualities as we will see. Secondly, 
religion as a reflection of human social nature is another main foundation of 
religion. Human beings, as social animals, live in groups. To make life in 
community stable and productive, and to avoid disturbing clashes, human 
society not only needs positive rules/regulations and peaceful solutions to 
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possible clashes, it also requires prospects for moving in one determined 
direction for achieving its agreed goals. Religion has always played an 
important role in building and sustaining social order in human societies, and 
as such religion has its roots in social needs of human society.236 
Thirdly the human as the ‘rational animal’, in the process of thinking, as an 
ongoing and inseparable part of his essence, faces questions that take a lot of 
time and energy to answer. Some questions are too big to be answered through 
ordinary process of human thinking. The cognitive capacity of religion 
provides definitive answers for big questions about the universe, human 
existence and personal fate and so on. Religion, by answering such questions, 
helps form human worldviews and of course the worldview in its turn shapes 
the human moral values and consequently his conduct/behaviour.237  
To relate our categorization of Islam to the above mentioned classification of 
religion it should be mentioned that Islamic society after the Prophet faced 
three major crises: 
1- Crisis of too much worldliness and lack of spirituality.  
2- Crisis of faith regarding ‘who is a true Muslim’, resulted from divisions 
within the umma known as fitna based on mutual accusations of 
impurity. 
3- Crisis of social identity resulted from losing majority to non-Arab 
converts and also non-Muslim inhabitants of the newly opened lands 
after mass conquests in three continents of Africa, Asia, and Europe.  
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In response to these three crises the Islamic faith demonstrated its three; 
mystical, rationalistic, and jurisprudential capacities. The three mega-
movements of Sufism, Islamic rationalism or kalami movement, and 
jurisprudential movement, not only brought up three main qualities of Islam 
but also permanently divided believers accordingly. Each camp developed its 
own religious knowledge which are: Irfan, kalam, and fiqh, and the result was 
the formation of three essentially different understandings of Islam famous as 
Irfani Islam, Kalami Islam, and Fiqhi Islam.238 The difference between these 
three camps are so deep that Mohsen Mojtahed Shabestari sees religiosity of 
followers of mysticism (Irfan) substantially different from followers of kalam 
and fiqh and vice versa.239 This categorization, despite its long history, is 
accepted and followed by many Muslims scholars today as well and this 
means it has kept its relevance to the current developments despite its capacity 
for explaining previous situations. For example this categorization is quite 
popular among Iranian Muslim thinkers, but with the Persian translation of 
these concepts such as islam-e tajrobat-andish for mystical Islam, islam-e 
marafat-andish for kalami or theological Islam, and islam-e Shariat-andish 
for jurisprudential, or fiqh-minded, Islam.  
While this categorization of Islam has its root in the very first developments 
of Islamic faith it can also explain recent developments inside the Islamic 
faith and Islamic world. As long as Islam, as a religion, is continuing to 
provide answers for the psychological, epistemological, and social needs of 
its followers then this categorization will remain valid and explanatory. With 
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regard to the naming of the second category, or kalami Islam, it should be 
mentioned that I have chosen the appellation ‘theo-ethical Islam’ for this 
category. This naming serves to demonstrate simultaneous and equal regard 
toward both theological and ethical foundations of kalami Islam. Because of 
the nature of this work, which is a study of question of jihad and its relation 
to suicide terrorism from jurisprudential perspective, I will briefly discuss 
positions of mystical and kalami islams toward the question of widespread 
violence executed in the name of jihad and then will investigate position of 
jurisprudential Islam and its sub-categorizations in more detail. The following 
flowchart shows the structure of my chosen categorization and its dimensions: 
 
Figure 9 Islamic camps 
Islamic camps and the question of violence 
To combat violence, including terrorism, we need to know where this 
phenomenon, both ideologically and materially, is rooted and where it is fed 
from. Needless to say that any miscalculation about the nature and roots of 
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the current terrorism of the Muslim extremists not only leaves any counter-
terror attempt fruitless, but it also (by aiming at the wrong targets) may create 
new challenges and threats. To combat the current wave of terrorism the anti-
terror camp needs to demolish the social base of terrorism and for that they 
need strong cooperation of the mainstream Muslims. To gain the 
mainstream’s support anti-terrorists should speak to the mainstream in its own 
cultural language and erase its concerns regarding the anti-terror camp’s 
agendas. It is a fact that the extremists will continue to constantly monitor 
their opponents’ actions and approaches and will try to find an excuse to fuel 
the suspicion of mainstream society toward the intentions of the anti-terror 
camp. The long history of colonialism/imperialism (colonialism as practice 
and imperialism as the idea driving the prctice) makes job of extremists for 
fueling such suspicion even easier. 
Losing the trust of the mainstream populace is of course the last thing that the 
anti-terror camp needs. To win a battle against an enemy such as terrorism 
first and foremost there is a need to win the hearts and minds of its social 
base. For that purpose a clear distinction between different divisions of that 
society is axiomatic. Such a distinction is essential both for selecting a proper 
communicating language and also choosing the right strategy to avoid 
targeting incorrect suspects. These two are vital for building trust with the 
mainstream society. To gain such distinction it takes a precise understanding 
of the nature of the issue –in this case the violence executed in the name of 
religion of Islam- and the actors and factors behind it.  
Issues related to representation is another practical realm where a proper 
understanding of the internal divisions among Muslims can help to avoid 
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miscalculations and escaping costly policies based on wrong assumptions. As 
Pratt argues “true representation” has always been a major issue in Islam as 
it has been the case with its sister religions of Christianity and Judaism.240 
Usually believers see their own understanding of the religion as the authentic 
and correct one. Muslims are no exception in this regard. In today’s Islamic 
world different perspectives are competing to gain legitimacy and leadership 
to guide the direction of the Muslim community.241 Sufi movements see their 
version of Islam as the cure for the lustful and violent environment destroying 
human qualities and are seeking to revive their tariqas. Rationalist reform 
movements seek to purify the faith from customs of pre-modern societies and 
match it with the current condition and need of human society. Finally 
legalists are seeking to establish the Islamic state based on a highly idealised 
abstract conceptualisation of the Sharia. Needless to say that each movement 
sees itself as the true Islam and invites people to its way. We need to be aware 
of the nature of these movements and their internal clashes to avoid painting 
all Muslim activists with the same brush and treat them accordingly which, 
in certain circumstances, can have quite problematic consequences. If, as the 
mainstream media is eager to portray, major developments within the Islamic 
world are seen as anti-western there will be limited optimism regarding the 
success of any joint combat against violent extremism. On the other hand if 
these developments be seen (as they truly are) as an internal competition over 
supremacy and representation among different camps of Islam, then the 
outcome can be substantially different. On the contrary, if any development 
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within the Islamic world is seen necessarily as anti-western and the wrong 
prescription is advised for confronting them, then the outlook for combating 
violent extremism can turn even darker. Any foreign attack against Muslims 
might easily lead to marginalization of fundamental internal controversies 
among them in favour of confronting the foreign threat. An outside threat has 
the potential to unite unlike-minded Muslims and force them to disregard 
their essential differences. Such a prioritization of resisting a foreign invasion 
is coherently to the benefit of the hardliners who have advantage in the use of 
violence as this may give them the upper hand and the louder voice. 
When approaching Muslims’ divisions we need to also be careful about 
misreading similarities and differences. There is, for example, one major 
confusion resulting from the commonality of a minimal level of spirituality, 
jurisprudence and creedal beliefs among all three camps of Islam which has 
created the impression that all three are the same with superficial differences. 
That is not the case in any way. For example while all three camps agree on 
the existence of spiritual elements embedded in the prescribed rites or 
manasik, the other two camps (excluding mysticism) do not see Islam as only 
a vehicle for spiritualism without strong outward dimension to it. Again, 
while all three camps follow the minimal outward rites, excluding the 
jurisprudential camp the other two do not see Islam as a set of rulings and 
commands. The same applies to the creedal rational discussions. While the 
rationalist camp sees the religion, as the mutazili thinker, al-Jahiz, argues, as 
a mere continuation of human reason with seeing revelation as only a new 
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tool without any superiority over reason242 other camps do not allocate such 
a high position for reason. The other two camps either reject reason 
completely, as mysticism does, or limit it to merely a tool for discovering 
rulings of the religion as jurisprudential camp does.243 As practical result of 
misreading the similarities among Muslims of different camps, for example, 
some might consider any practicing Muslim inherently an extremist and the 
only tolerable Muslims for them are the “nominal Muslims” who do not have 
sincere belief in their religion.244 As a matter of fact, in many cases some non-
practicing Muslims support violence in a much stronger way than practicing 
Muslims, maybe, because they care less for limitations laid down by 
religion.245 
Owing to conflicting information about the internal differences and divisions 
among Muslims, these days it is not unusual to face quite contradictory 
comments about Islam. While some call Islam a religion of peace and 
therefore an essential part of the solution for human problems, some others 
see it as a part of the problem whose time has long passed and has nothing for 
humanity and perceives the faith as “the motherlode of bad ideas”.246 The 
reality is that although such observations look quite combative still they may 
enjoy a degree of truth (depending on which perspective the issue is observed 
from), nevertheless they cover only a part of the truth. In this part I have tried 
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to provide a first hand and at the same time less common image of Islam. This 
image can not only help explain the past and present developments of Islam 
but can also help with demarcating solutions for current problems related to 
this religion – including the issue of violence waged in the name of jihad. 
Mysticism and violence 
Mystical Islam is based on the spiritual journey from the disparities of the 
material world to the unity of spiritual truth. The destination and final stage 
of this journey is called wasl or re-joining. The notion of ‘re-joining’ is rooted 
in the concept of vahdat-e vojood ( وجو تدحود ), which advances the concept of 
a unity of existence removing all separations and manmade zones of 
exclusion that appear to have hitherto been a condition of human 
communities. If all humans are viewed and treated as one essentially, 
philosophically, and ontologically, the pain and problems of one become the 
pain and the problems of all.247 Iranian poet and thinker, Saadi of Shiraz, 
express this notion in a compact way:248 
Human beings are members of a whole, 
In creation of one essence and soul. 
If one member is afflicted with pain, 
Other members uneasy will remain. 
If you have no sympathy for human pain, 
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دنرکیپ کی یاضعا مدآ ینب 
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ناتسلگ ،یدعس 
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The name of human you cannot retain.249 
Since most of conflicts are over material gain, rejection of materialism by 
mysticism is another principle which can contain conflicts and violence. Faqir 
(ریقف) and darvish (شیورد), which both means ‘the poor’ pointing to some 
Quranic verses announcing anyone but God as poor, is what Islamic mystics 
including Sufis call themselves. Although such titles point to spiritual aspects 
of human entity still indicate a clear detachment from temporality and 
worldliness more than anything else. By rejecting egocentricism and 
selfishness then the source for disputes and clashes will disappear, Sufis 
claim.250  
Promotion of unconditional love is another aspect of mysticism which opposes 
violence. Since wars start in the minds of men then if the minds do not give 
way to anything but encompassing peace/love in all levels there will be no 
soldiers for power-thirsty warlords.251 Such an encompassing peace does not 
recognize such a thing as ‘others’ which is the main root of disputes at the first 
level and conflict at the final stage. For Sufism humans are facing a greater 
issue which is finding their way in re-joining their spirit to its origin and 
escaping the darkness which is detaining the essence of human being which is 
light. Humankind is prisoner in the hands of his own self-desires and self-
aversions which constructs a loveless and uncaring world.252 Such worldliness 
has been quoted by Jesus to be like “drinking sea water which makes the thirsty 
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thirstier”.253 Fighting over worldly desires which redirect humans’ attention 
from their main issue, at least in theory, has no place in mysticism. The battle 
for mystics is inside the human being rather than outside.254 It is how 
Mirbagheri describes Islamic Gnosticism when quotes the following passage 
from Rumi’s book of Masnavi Manavi:255 
Oh honorable ones, we have slain the external foe, 
A more forbidding enemy lurks down below; 
Dislodging it, intellect and intelligence would not dare, 
The inner lion is not the plaything of a hare; 
It is a common lion that breaks the legion’s rows’ 
The true lion is he/she who breaks the inner foe.256 
If the interests of others are placed before one’s self interest, as Islamic 
mysticism preaches, then there will be no reason for a conflict of interests 
which is the root-cause of clashes among humans. The egoistic trait of 
individuals is recognized by mysticism as the source of disputes and the only 
way to contain it is to replace it with the real needs of human beings which is 
realizing his potential of being the theophany of the Divine Attributes which 
every human has the capability to achieve. This is because humanity has been 
appointed as the vice-regent of God on the earth and is a comprehensive 
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theophany of all Divine Names and qualities, and has been created in the 
universal Divine form. Every human, according to mystic discourse, reflects 
God and His glory in every aspect. 257 Whatever problem is caused by a 
human being, including unjust violence, is because of suspension of the 
Divine qualities which have been embedded in essence of human. With regard 
to the concept of jihad in Islamic mysticism, jihad is not but merely ‘the war 
against the ego’ or jihad al-nafs pointing to a prophetic tradition.258 
Theo-ethical Islam and the question of violence 
When religion has become a source of dispute and conflict these days the 
ethical approach toward religion is believed to be able to stop believers from 
fighting others over religious differences or self-interests. Theo-ethicalism, as 
the ethical approach toward religion, has many of its tenets in common with 
Mutazilism. The Mutazili notion of ‘position between positions’ can be 
understood as moderation in all aspects including in time of conflict. It means 
balanced attention paid to one’s rights over, and one’s obligations towards, 
others, with respect to the material world and the spiritual world. It also means 
a balance between forgiveness and resistance, between prodigality and 
niggardliness, and a resolute aversion to extremism and terrorism in all their 
manifestations.259 For Wahbah al-Zuhaili, Islam advocates these values, not 
only among Muslims themselves, but also in their relations with other 
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communities and nations. Moderation, as balanced temperament and easiness 
(wasatiyyah, itidal and samhah) is inherent to peace if it is not peace itself.260 
In theo-ethical approach toward Islam jihad is about living morally which is 
striving in the way of God by doing good and avoiding evil. Accordingly life 
itself is a constant jihad between the believer’s passionate soul and the demand 
of the immoral desires within him. Therefore jihad is vigilance against all that 
distracts human beings from God and their exertion to do His Will within 
themselves as well as preserving the order and harmony that He has willed for 
them.261 Therefore jihad means a God-oriented life262 and is against an idol-
oriented life. Among those idols which can replace God as center of focus can 
be power, wealth, ego, and of course ideology. These are often the main sources 
of disputes and conflicts and with controlling them the source of conflict will 
dry up, according to theo-ethicalism. By promoting morality, theo-ethicalism 
can act as a preventer of violence. At the social level the ideal order and 
harmony can be gained through a moral order which promotes a collective 
spirit of unity in a way that its product could be a society where its members 
are effectively brothers and sisters. Such a moral society will lack many of 
elements which provoke violence. Religion for theo-ethicalism is in the service 
of human beings and not the other way around. As such bringing peace and 
prosperity to humanity is (or should be) the ultimate goal of religion. 
Accordingly, and as the Iranian thinker Ali Shariati has commented, “a 
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religion’s success is dependent on the success of its adherents.”263 If a religion 
brings peace among people it is a successful one and vice versa. 
Due to the centrality of the concept of ‘justice’ and also the role of ‘reason’ in 
theo-ethicalism, from the theo-ethical point of view any kind of violence and 
use of force including war must be based on being ‘just’. It is the human 
common sense which decides what ‘just use of force’ is. Regarding the 
question of ‘jihad’ from a theo-ethical perspective, it could be said that, the 
same rule of ‘just use of force’ applies. As such the use of force for just causes 
is not necessarily of a religious nature whether it be called jihad or anything 
else but should meet the criteria for ‘moral use of force’. Thus jihad, in its 
militaristic form, might be supported because of its service to the good and 
rejected otherwise by theo-ethicalists. As such, for theo-ethicalism, in the case 
of armed conflict if ‘jihad’ stands for ‘just war’ then it is accepted and if not 
then it is rejected. This is unlike jurisprudence which looks at who is involved 
in the conflict rather than what the cause of conflict is. According to fiqh, in an 
armed conflict in the name of jihad, the Muslim side is right and the other side 
is wrong and it does not change even if the Muslim side is the invader and the 
non-Muslim side is defending itself.  
Regarding suicide terrorism again the same rule applies. Since terrorism is 
against innocents it is rejected as being ‘unjust’ regardless of its form. But if a 
specific use of force, including use of suicide tactics, is justifiable according to 
the concept of ‘just war’ it seems it is difficult to assume that it is automatically 
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ruled out by the principle of ‘just use of force’. Unlike theo-ethicalism that 
looks at the cause (whether is just or not) and pays less attention to the form, 
the classical jurisprudence –as will be discussed shortly- rejects suicide tactics 
unconditionally. Therefore it could be said that theo-ethicalism, unlike many 
other issues, in this specific case has a more flexible stand in favour of violence 
because it does not reject suicide tactics unconditionally. Thus it could be said 
that, according to theo-ethicalism suicide operations, like any other form of 
violence, should be judged not by their form but by their cause. Nevertheless, 
according to theo-ethicalism what is currently done by Muslim extremists 
using suicide tactics against civilians is rejected because it is unjust and not 
because of the tool (suicide tactics) employed. Jurisprudence condemns these 
acts as well but, unlike theo-ethicalism, does so initially only because of suicide 
attackers use the wrong tactics.  
Due to the importance of the concept of ‘just war’ in the theo-ethicalist 
approach towards violence, I briefly mention the main requirements of just war. 
Although the notion of just war comes from the Latin term of jus ad bellum, 
justice of war, and is supposed to cover this part only, nowadays elements of 
jus in bello, or justice in war, and the conduct of warfare is included in ‘just 
war’ as well. There are different requirements for a just war. The following 
ones are almost the most important and at the same time inclusive of elements 
of both just cause, and the just way, of waging war: 
1- All peaceful alternatives have been exhausted before war is waged. 
2- The war be in response to a severe wrong action. 
3- The war be waged by a legitimate authority. 
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4- There be a reasonable chance for success of war to stop or punish 
the wrong doer. 
5- A proper level of proportionality has been taken into account by the 
wager of war in the way that any unnecessary harm be avoided.264 
In the Quran there are verses that support these five elements of ‘justice of 
war’ and ‘justice in war’ and put even more restriction on utilization of force. 
The most explicit verses in this regard are: Q.8:61, 2:190-193, and 22:39. 
Before addressing position of jurisprudential Islam regarding the ongoing 
violence done in the name of jihad I would like to, briefly, touch on the reason 
for popularity of the ‘jurisprudential language’ including among the Muslim 
violent extremists. I believe this is a side effect of the ‘rise of 
jurisprudentialism’ as will be discussed hereunder.  
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Chapter Six 
Jurisprudentialism as a modern phenomenon 
 
Introduction 
Schacht believes that it is impossible to understand Islam without understanding 
Islamic law.265 For him Islamic law is the core and kernel of Islam, whilst theology 
has never been able to achieve a comparable importance in Islam.266 Some scholars 
have described Islam, besides Judaism, as a “religion of law” and perceive 
Christianity as “religion of creed”.267 The importance of Islamic law, in its turn, 
proportionally gives significance to the Islamic jurisprudential camp as the self-
proclaimed custodian of Islamic law. While for all three mystical, theo-ethical, and 
jurisprudential camps, the Will of God – as the purpose for creation  of human being 
– has a central position, each camp’s understanding of God’s Will is different from 
others. For mystical Islam the re-joinment of the human spirit to the Divine Spirit 
is God’s plan for human beings. Based on the belief in human as created in the 
image of God, theo-ethicalists see God’s Will for human being acting as reflection 
of God as a moral existence. For Islamic jurisprudential camp following God’s Will 
means submission strictly to the Laws of God. As such, it can be said that, for 
jurisprudential Islam there is a shift from centrality of God Himself, which is 
embedded in notion of tawhid, toward centrality of outward practice in general and 
fulfilment of the religious law in particular. 
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Something that might appear surprising is the question of why other camps of Islam 
do not follow the jurisprudential in following God’s Law if they believe in God as 
the jurisprudential camp does. Such a surprise would make sense if there was an 
agreement among all camps regarding what the Law of God actually is. While only 
a very small portion of the Holy Book of Islam might have the potential to be 
interpreted as legal codes, jurisprudential camp considers human attempts to derive 
rulings regarding every possible action of human beings as the Law of God and 
consequently sacred. It is obvious that if the other camps would accept such 
ordinary human findings as sacred they would follow them as jurisprudential camp 
does – but they don’t. While fiqh or jurisprudence, as a human attempt in finding 
divine Will, is not considered as binding for the other camps, for jurisprudential 
camp Islam (as a din or ‘godly way of life’) is not but following the Laws of God 
as decided by jurisprudence.  
While ‘jurisprudential Islam’ might look rigid comparing to the two other camps of 
‘theo-ethical’ and ‘mystical’ islams still an even more rigid interpretation of Islam 
has emerged during the last two centuries. Due to contextual developments in the 
recent history of Muslims which are mainly consequences of ‘Western 
colonialism/imperialism’, ‘excessive legalism’ or Jurisprudentialism, as a modern 
political movement with a rigid attitude toward the faith and rejecting any reform, 
is gaining the upper hand against the traditional camps of Islam. In this chapter I 
will discuss reasons and consequences of emergence of jurisprudentialism in the 
current history of Muslims. 
Era of jurisprudentialism 
Regarding the popularity of mystical, theo-ethical and jurisprudential camps among 
Muslims it is to say that there are durations in the history of Islam when it seems 
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each camp has had a stronger presence in the public sphere. Abdulkarim Soroush 
divides the history of Islam into four eras: jihad and establishment, order through 
the implementation of law, flourishment of free thinking and arts resulting from 
success in the previous two eras, and finally the era of historical vacation for Islamic 
thought following the defeat in front of the Mongol invasion and also recent 
colonialization.268 I agree with Soroush that the relations between the general 
situation of Islamic world and the position of intellectual trends among Muslims is 
more of a causal one rather than a mere incidental simultaneity. However instead 
of believing in causal relations between the domination of each of the three camps 
and situation of the Islamic society, the former as cause and the latter as effect, I 
believe this causal relation is the other way around. Islamic history, according to 
the situation of Islamic world, can roughly be divided into three main eras: potency, 
stagnation269 and corruption. As such, it was the reality of the time which gave way 
to the domination of each camp and not vice versa.  
As we learnt before Islam has rationalistic, spiritualistic and legalistic potentials, 
and it depends on the believers’ needs and wills to have their own interpretation of 
Islam based on each of these potentialities. In other words although each of the 
rational, spiritual and legal teachings of Islam serve different needs of believers 
and, more or less, all of these teachings have their roots in the Book and the Sunna 
as the determining sources of the religion, still the axial role of each of these 
teachings in Muslim societies depends on factual conditions of the time. Because 
of the nature of each of these teachings, the living conditions of Muslim 
                                                          
268 Abdulkarim Soroush, Wake up; it the time for refreshing thoughts. Accessible via: 
http://drsoroush.com/fa/ 
269 In comparision to the former era of the ‘Golden Age’ in which the Islamic world was known as 
a scientific-led, free-thinking thriving society. 
 141 
 
communities might suit one of these teachings and rebut the rest at the same time. 
As will be explained hereunder, this has been the case during the history of 
Muslims. We discussed that the Islamic world has experienced three main durations 
each characterized by specific conditions: 
1-Era of potency (635-1250) characterized by glorious achievements and successful 
conquests in Asia, Europe and Africa. This self-confidence resulted in consecutive 
successes that opened that the way for what was by that time a free-thinking, 
scientific-led and thriving Islamic culture and civilization that made a significant 
impact on Europe.270 
2- Era of stagnation (1250-1750) characterized by comprehensive devastation as a 
result of massive destruction caused by the Mongol Invasion. Despite some political 
achievements by Ottomans, Safavids and Moghols in this time frame, Islamic world 
is far away from being a scientific-led free-thinking society as was the case in the 
first era. 
3-Era of corruption (from 1750 onward)271 characterized by a cultural perplexity in 
the aftermath of modern colonialization and western imperialism.  
The first duration was dominated by a flourishing of science and free thinking. Such 
an approach, rooted in rationalism and realism of successful and strong society of 
believers, marginalized spiritualism and legalism. The “golden age” of 800-1200 is 
the pick of duration of domination of science and free thinking rooted in the 
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rationalistic teachings of Islam.272 This is the duration that Bernard Lewis praises it 
as one of the most majestic parts of human history: “For many, many centuries the 
Islamic world was the world's greatest, most open, most enlightened, most creative, 
most powerful civilization.”273 
The second duration was dominated by a spiritualism rooted in passivism as a 
reaction to the vast destruction following the Mongol Invasion and belief in the 
shallow brevity of all material achievements.274  
The third duration is dominated by a rigid legalism. Since our center of focus here 
is on jurisprudentialism I will explain this latter duration in more detail.  There are 
two ways to look at the domination of Islamic camps throughout history: the trend 
created the situation or the other way around. Regarding the domination of legalism 
in the Islamic world in our recent era Sarah Chayes, in her book ‘Thieves of State: 
Why Corruption Threatens Global Security’, believes in the second analysis. She 
argues that foreign intervention has fostered corruption and corruption in its turn 
has led to a quest for strict legalism as the cure throughout the Islamic world.275 
Chayes contends that in many places rigid moral codes are put forth as an antidote 
to the expansion of corruption and consequent collapse of public integrity.276  She 
reveals that canonical political thinkers such as John Locke and Machiavelli, as well 
as the great medieval Islamic statesman Nizam al-Mulk, all named corruption as a 
threat to the realm. Corruption can decay a society from within. A deep and 
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organized corruption regulated by formal bureaucracy under influence of foreign 
powers, which Chayes  terms it as “kleptocracy”, drives indignant populations to 
extremes; ranging from revolution to militant puritanical religion: “People are 
becoming more devoted because they are more and more frustrated with the 
government,” a local human rights activist told Chayes. “They are turning to God 
for recourse.” 277 Governments in such countries, so often dismissed as weak or 
failed states, are in fact powerful and organized — but for crime rather than social 
services “whose core activity is not in fact exercising the functions of a state but 
rather extracting resources for personal gain.”278 She calls such corrupt 
governments with foreign enablers as “criminal kleptocracy”.279 Gallup’s 2008 
survey in the Islamic countries and the pattern of request for implementation of 
Sharia as the cure for the extensive corruption, which will be discussed shortly, 
proves the same point raised by Chayes. 
Regarding the relationship between colonialism/imperialism and the recent rise of 
the dry legalism (jurisprudentialism) it is worthy to note that colonizers, as any other 
dominant power, needed to implement an order which serve their interests the best. 
At the beginning, and partly because the colonizers’ interests were largely focused 
on commercial profit, they did not significantly interfere in native legal affairs until 
about the late 18th century.280 Hallaq describes this turning point as follows: 
As “law and order” constituted the backbone of colonialist 
administration, the colonizers needed a unified system of law that 
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facilitated their absolute control over the colonized societies – therefore 
they did not confine themselves to controlling only trade regulations… 
The gradual introduction of the Western educational system proved 
itself instrumental not only in facilitating the legal transformation but 
also in accelerating the latter’s dissemination and extending its cultural 
roots deeper in the new Muslim soil… The Westernization of education 
was both the prerequisite to, and the means of, naturalizing the new 
imperial culture without which no hegemony would be viable… By the 
middle of the nineteenth century, it was a rare Muslim country that had 
escaped surrendering its political and juridical powers to foreign 
nationals and, particularly, in favour of European states. Gradually 
European forms of education facilitated the ousting of Islamic law’s 
legists through the ready supply of a new Westernized elite in whose 
interests it was to promote the Western institutions upon which it 
depended.281 
The fact that Western powers and the Westernized elite, with each others’ help, 
were taking control of public institutions in the Muslims countries one after another 
left the Muslim masses hopeless. Serial defeats from Europeans in different fronts, 
especially in cultural front, and the incompetency of Muslim rulers in cutting this 
chain of failure widened the gap between the ruling elite and the Muslim masses. 
Muslim governments not only lost their wars to Europeans but more importantly 
lost the trust of their own subjects and consequently their loyalty. To cover the costs 
of the lost military campaigns these governments needed more resources and relied 
on the taxation of their subjects in this regard. The higher government’s taxation 
became the more dissatisfied tax payer masses turned. This was the last nail in the 
coffin for the relationship between the Muslim governments and their subjects.282 
On the other hand the more dissatisfied the Muslim intellectual elite became with 
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their own failed governments the more they were attracted to the victorious party’s 
culture and the more Westernized they became. As a result of wasting their scarce 
resources on military campaigns against Europeans (thereby losing the trust of the 
intellectual elite and the support of the masses), the weaker the Muslim 
governments became the harsher their domestic policies against their own subjects 
turned, and thus the more fragile the state-society relations developed. In gaining 
new sources for rebuilding their destroyed military capabilities, the behaviour of 
the ruling elite (out of a desperation following repeated defeats from foreigners), 
became so fierce that they cared less for many established social morals. In this 
regard they did not respect religious properties allocated to waqf and their related 
wealth and incomes. This in its turn damaged the religious legitimacy of the Muslim 
governments even further.283 Losing the trust and support of intellectual and 
religious elite left such Muslim governments vulnerable both against foreign 
pressure and also internal revolts. 
In addition to political effects, the severe financial hardship, resulting from the loss 
of massive investments in failed military campaign against foreign interventions, 
stopped the Muslim governments from funding religious teaching centers and 
paying the religious teachers and administrators’ salaries which led to the closure 
of many religious teaching centers. This in its turn not only affected the ongoing 
legitimization of the ruling elite but also left the local culture defenceless in front 
of foreign dominating culture. The mosques, and the madrasas along with them, 
appeared to many observers to stand on the brink of total collapse.284 The absorption 
of the waqfs into the central administration weakened the situation of the now 
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weakened class of ulama who had shown the greatest resistance towards foreign 
domination.285 Stripped off of the protection of the ulama, the ruling elite became 
quite vulnerable before the resentment and distrust of the tax-paying subjects. This 
made resistance to foreign domination even harder for the Muslim governments.286  
As a Shia dynasty Iranian Qajar is an exemplary case where serial defeats against 
British and Russian Empires led it to abandoning investment in religious centers 
and public infrastructures. Even comparing to the short-lived ‘Zand Dynasty’, 
Qajars left no significant trace of themselves in the major Iranian cities regarding 
building new mosque, madrasa, bazar, bridge, bathhouse, caravansarai and so on. 
On contrast they treated masses so brutally that even today Iranians calls coercive 
policies as ‘Zell ul-Sultani’. Zell ul-Sultan was the Qajar governor of Esfahan and 
is famous for burying those who could not pay their taxes alive in a wall to become 
a lesson for others. He not only did not add anything to the already available 
infrastructures of Esfahan including 162 mosques, 137 governmental offices and 
palaces, 48 madrasas, 273 public bathhouses and 12 graveyards but sold lands 
belonged to backyards of such infrastructures.287 
The dismantling of Islamic law and the escalation of corruption 
By 1900 Islamic law in the vast majority of Muslim lands had been reduced in scope 
to the area of personal status – including marriage, child custody, inheritance, and 
gifts.288 The Islamic laws connected to personal status were saved from the death 
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blows which faced other Islamic laws by virtue of the fact that it was of no use to 
the colonial powers as a tool of domination.289 Even this disinterest was turned into 
an advantage, Hallaq argues: “colonialist Europe and its academics promoted the 
idea that the personal law was sacred to Muslims and that, out of sensitivity and 
respect, colonial powers left it alone.”290 To resist Western political and military 
hegemony, the state had to adopt modern technology, modern culture and modern 
institutions. Modernization in its turn led to economic and other forms of 
dependency on one Western power or another, and in the 1950s and 1980s on the 
Soviet Union as well. To free themselves of the grip of colonialism Muslim states 
adopted modern institutions and cultures that led them to be influenced by the 
colonialists even more.291  
Due to the cultural strength of the colonizers, for the first time in the history of 
Islam the outsiders’ domination over Muslims was not only militarily and Islam’s 
cultural values were questioned deeply by the rival culture of the victorious 
outsiders. Despite sympathy to the culture of the colonizers by Muslim intellectual 
elites, since the Muslim masses were not ready to replace their own culture with the 
dominant culture of colonizers, a damaging vacuum was formed as a result of the 
absence of Islamic law and the failure of assimilation to the Western culture. 
Weakness in the local culture, without replacement of the victorious culture, 
brought ‘indifference’ among subjects and social indifference brought vast 
corruption in all levels. What can stop corruption, as a disease which decays the 
society from within and stops it from functioning, is ‘rule of law’ based on a strong 
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and coherently functioning legal system. Since the victorious culture has not been 
absorbed by Muslim masses the laws based on the colonizers’ culture were not 
internalized by the colonized populace. In the absence of any demand for the 
implementation of the culturally unfamiliar laws of the colonizers by the Muslim 
masses, the ruling group enjoyed a free hand. 
Although the colonizers’ culture was deemed to be superior in fact the laws they 
imposed on their subject colonized nations aimed to serve their own interests.292 In 
addition to the problematic nature of introduced laws by colonizers there was an 
even bigger problem with the implementation of such laws. In the absence of a 
public demand for fair and impartial implementation of culturally borrowed laws, 
the ruling group treated such laws quite selectively to maximize its own inerests. 
The ruling elite had become quite short-sighted because it needed to realize its 
interests in the shortest time possible before it faces the next coup d'état, foreign 
invasion or internal revolution. The time for such ruling groups was quite tight and 
they needed to collect as much money in the shortest time they could.293 Even if the 
nature of the barrowed/imposed law was not problematic and the law was exactly 
the same that was implemented in the colonizers’ own countries, its incomplete and 
selective implication in the colonized societies by Muslim ruling groups would 
produce different outcomes. While the implementation of such laws in the 
colonizing countries was to control powerful in the colonized countries the same, 
apparently, flawless laws were used as a tool to exploit masses. Dissatisfaction 
toward the situation attracted the attention of the oppressed subjects toward the 
malfunction of the ruling laws. To escape such a corrupt situation the replacement 
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of the law (as the blamed source for all this misery) became popular. This was 
because the ruling law was seen as a tool of domination for the colonial 
powers/corrupt rulers with no use for the colonized/oppressed populace.294 
Rise of jurisprudentialism: Fatwa replacing taqwa 
With the spread of corruption in the Muslim countries, interpreted as a consequence 
of the domination of the invading culture and its law, the Muslim puritans or Salafis 
emerged by placing great emphasis on fiqh and its positive law as a replacement for 
the perceived corrupting law of the colonizers. While influential within Muslim 
societies generally the rise of the age of legalism, as a reaction toward the crippling 
corruption, had a deeper influence on the religious circles and this pushed legalism 
even further.295 This can be seen in the teachings, for example, of Muhammad Ibn 
Abd al-Wahhab of Arabia (d. 1792) and Dan Fudio (d. 1817) of Nigeria, who gave 
a fresh impetus to conformity and imitation of the fatwa and rulings of the classical 
jurists. In their effort to purify society, the Salafis went too far in their excesses and 
injected rigidity and dry legalism into the educational system of the religious 
seminaries which in turn fostered even more rigidity. With the spread of this rigid 
legalism, Islamic civilization thus changed focus from an emphasis on spiritual 
awareness or taqwa, as characteristic of the post-Mongol era, to a penchant for 
legalism based on legal edict or fatwa.296 The consequence has been the decline of 
spirituality and the rise of extremism and intolerance in many parts of the Islamic 
world under the influence of this new movement.297 
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Early nineteenth Century is the milestone in the rise of the legalist movement 
although this movement has its roots in the teachings of a radical 14th century 
scholar, Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328). Islamic legalism or what is known as ‘Sharia-
oriented polity’ or siyasa shareiyya, as calling for implementation of Islamic law, 
is after domination of fiqh on all aspects of human life including politics and even 
can include formation of “Sharia State” which its main function is “enforcement of 
Sharia”.298 Thus the right term for this movement is ‘jurisprudentialism’ as an 
absolutist tendency in Islamic juristic thought. Rule of jurisprudence in this trend 
targets externality at the expense of meaning and substance of Islam.299 As such 
‘jurisprudentialism’ is a political movement with total emphasis on the fiqh-based 
identity of Islamic society and polity.300 
Naturally, jurisprudentialism, as a Salafi movement which claims to see its ideal in 
the salaf al-salih or the past pious, is expected to have a strong connection to the 
past history of Islam, namely system of caliphate. The irony is that, contrary to what 
it might have looked like, the caliphate was not concerned with the implementation 
of Islamic law. The maximum religious role for caliphate was the preservation and 
protection of religion, and as such caliphate was not an ‘Islamic state’ as extremist 
(impositionalist) jurisprudentialists call for it today.301 To claim originality some 
branches of jurisprudentialism call for a new caliphate as their ideal system of 
governance. The reality is that Jurisprudentialism was actually a declaration of the 
failure of a political “caliphate” and its replacement by a “Sharia-oriented policy” 
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rather than a call for its revival.302 Thus, Sharia-based polity (or more accurately 
governance of Islamic law) is a concept created by Ibn Taymiyya in 14th century, 
although this notion did not find notable support until early 19th century efforts to 
challenge the Ottoman dynastic caliphate. Ibn Taymiyyah emphasized that the 
Quran and Sunnah did not contain any reference to caliphate as an organizational 
model or a system of government, and since the rightly guided caliphate had only 
lasted for thirty years, he ignored the hollowed theory and rhetoric of caliphate and 
called attention to the Sharia and a Sharia-oriented policy as governance of the 
Islamic law.303 The Wahhabi movement of 19th century Arabia that was based on 
Ibn Taymiyya’s thought placed additional emphasis on the Sharia-based identity of 
Islamic governance and gave the jurisprudentialism of Ibn Taymiyya a significant 
lift.304 
Even then, jurisprudentialism as making the Sharia (in its narrow meaning of 
Islamic law), as a defining element of an Islamic government and state, was not 
taken seriously until the 19th century. Ibn Taymiyya’s theory of Sharia-based polity 
or siyasa shareiyya was only one of the proposed ways out of the destruction and 
stagnation following the Mongol Invasion. The mere proposal of siyasa shareiyya 
by Ibn Taymiyya should not confuse us into thinking that Ibn Taymiyya’s era was 
actually the start of jurisprudentialism and that as soon as legalism was introduced 
by Ibn Taymiyya it gained dominance.  Ibn Taymiyya’s theory was put on standby 
until early 19th century when Wahhabism was its first user and of course its practical 
pioneer. Theoretical expansion of siyasa shareiyya took an even longer time until 
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it was  given prominence in the second half of 20th century by Seyyed Qutb (d. 
1966), Abul Ala al-Mawdudi (d. 1979), Muhammad al-Ghazli (d. 1992) and Yusuf 
al-Qaradawi who saw the Islamic state essentially as a state committed to the 
enforcement of Islamic law. 305 As such focus on the implementation of Islamic law 
(or what is famously called Sharia-compliance), is fairly a recent phenomenon that 
emerged after the domination of colonialism. Even after being introduced in early 
19th century siyasa shareiyya did not find strong advocates in other parts of the 
Islamic world other than Arabia until the disruptive dismantling of the Ottoman 
Empire in early 20th century.306 
The overly legalistic tendency of jurisprudentialists has been embraced at the 
expense of the spirit of Islam and its moral and devotional teachings on matters of 
personal conduct. This tendency is manifested in the way that Islamic law is often 
presented as the core and kernel of religion and the essence of Islam itself to the 
exclusion of other nodal points. This is an exaggeration which does not find support 
in the Quran and Sunna. It is questionable whether Islam was meant to be as much 
of a law-based religion as it has been presented by jurisprudentialists.307 
Jurisprudentialism places total emphasis on conformity to rules and presents Islam 
as a law-based religion or ‘nomocracy’.308 This serves to distract attentions away 
from the meaning and purpose of Islam, and the natural integration of its values into 
one’s personal conduct. Some might argue that there is no reason to worry about 
jurisprudentialism as a valid interpretation of Islam beside other interpretations. The 
problem is that jurisprudentialism is quite absolutist and rejects any other 
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perspective. The literalist tendency of jurisprudetialism furthers its emphasis on 
conformity to rigid rules at the cost of the main ethical and spiritual dimensions of 
Islamic teachings.309 Such an approach is quite destructive. This is why Imam Ali 
considers people following such an approach as “ignorant ritualist”310 or jahil al-
mutinassik and dangerous to the message of the religion.311  
Another problem with jurisprudentialism is that it, in fact, serves as a serious 
hindrance for the development of the Muslim societies which are under its 
influence. Contrary to the claims made by jurisprudentialists that their proposed 
legalism is a sign and source of empowerment, in my opinion, it is actually more a 
sign of weakness and a blind reaction which worsens the situation by neglecting the 
realities of the times and imposing archaic ways onto new situations. Dogmatic and 
blind compliance to the ancient legal findings of past generations of less adequate 
societies imposed by jurisprudentialism is the last thing a society needs to improve. 
Another subordinate difficulty associated with jurisprudentialism is that for 
impositionalist jurisprudentialism – as the most extremist version of 
jurisprudentialism – ‘rule of jurisprudents’ is an essential and inseparable part of 
Islamic governance. Governance for jurisprudentialism is focused on the 
observance of Islamic law in a dogmatic fashion at the expense of concern for 
accountability, popular political participation, justice and fundamental rights.312 As 
such jurisprudentialism is a major obstacle in the path towards democratization as 
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the only sustainable solution for combatting corruption by creation of governmental 
transparency and the rotation of the ruling elite. 
Post-colonialism quest for cultural heritage and the question of 
jurisprudentialism  
Islamic jurisprudentialism, to a great extent, hides itself behind the legitimate quest 
for cultural heritage in the colonized societies including Islamic ones. There is a 
significant difference between reviving local cultural heritage in a positive manner 
to create self-awareness among people with imposing outdated and primitive 
prescriptions of the past for today complicated challenges under the name of Islamic 
law. As we showed before, colonialism during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries marginalized the local cultures in an attempt to convince the Muslims (and 
others) of the inadequacy of their own heritage and their inability to meet their needs 
in the post-industrial age. Not only ordering home decoration and personal dress 
was influenced by the invading culture but also European laws replaced the local 
customs in almost all areas of public law. The Islamic resurgence of the latter part 
of twentieth century was expressive of a desire on the part of the Muslim masses to 
retain and restore their own heritage.313 Such a desire by Muslim masses to return 
to themselves and their heritage has been misrepresented by jurisprudentialists to 
mean dogmatic and blind compliance to ancient legal findings of past generations 
in the name of Islamic law. In addition to the quest for cultural heritage, public 
demand has also grown over the years for the reform of government. The fact is 
that the long series of coup d'état by despotic military elites have ruled Muslims for 
much of the post-colonial period.314 What is recently showed itself in the popular 
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revolutions famous as ‘Arab Spring’ should be understood in the context of an 
urgent need for political reform and not solely as a religious movement. 
As history provides ample evidence, Muslims were successful when they were 
internally coherent and independent.315  For Kamali current situation is no different 
from the past ones in this regard: 
There are new challenges now and Muslims need to dig deep into their 
own resources and exercise imagination and initiative to find workable 
and coherent solutions to their current problems… Regarding their 
religious heritage Muslims need to take stock of what needs to be done 
to make it more relevant and resourceful for a system of governance 
through statutory law and constitutions that guarantee accountability, 
popular participation, justice and human rights… While Muslim 
reformists reject taqlid [imitation] and ask for free thinking 
reproduction of taqlid in new names and forms can be a challenge for 
them in their way for prescribing a way out of stagnation and 
desperation. The imitative ‘tradition of imitation’ that for centuries 
dominated Islamic scholarship was reinforced by colonialism, which 
gave rise, in turn, also to a neo-taqlid of a more inimical variety.316 This 
was the indiscriminate imitation of the constitutions and laws of Europe 
that the colonial regimes so avidly encouraged, nay imposed, on their 
former colonies including Muslims. The distortion wrought by this 
manner of importation obviously sowed the seeds of what was to follow 
in 19th and 20th centuries. The consistent story of failed 
constitutionalism and democracy in the Muslim world is necessarily 
linked with those distortions which robbed Muslims of confidence and 
initiative and eventually made them feel incapable of taking charge of 
their own affairs and planning their own future while keeping their own 
cultural heritage.”317 
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The Muslim quest to preserve their cultural heritage, rule of law and the demolition 
of corruption is not aimed against any third party. Of course if third parties support 
corrupt and despot rulers in the Muslim countries this might be understood as an 
unfriendly approach toward these oppressed nations. What is expected from others 
is that they do not make the already difficult way of Muslim societies toward 
democracy and cultural reintegration more challenging by misrepresenting the main 
message of the Muslim masses by confusing it with what is done by a group of 
criminals. The ugly face that the powerful media portray from Sharia, jihad and 
other Islamic principles is so destructive that the public audience have no choice 
but to hate these principles. When Muslim masses, for example, ask for Sharia the 
outsiders (having the distorted image of it in their mind) might easily expand their 
hatred toward Sharia to those who ask for its implication – which is quite natural. 
This in its turn may victimize Muslims in those societies where they are minorities 
or justify a violation of the rights and national borders of the Muslim majority 
countries by foreign powers at their whim. When Muslim reformists are responsible 
for providing an interpretation of their religion compatible with human rights and 
democracy the global media needs to stop reflecting a distorted image of Muslims. 
To return to the example of the Sharia: when the quest for Sharia is actually the 
quest for rule of law, which is a major defect in Muslim countries, this perspective 
should be reflected by the media rather than portraying it as Muslims supporting 
violence. According to Gallup’s findings for most Muslims the Sharia means “rule 
of law” rather than any rigid findings of archaic jurists. Gallup’s recent survey 
shows that the quest for Sharia is popular within Muslim societies where corruption 
is rampant such as Egypt and Pakistan, while in Turkey for instance where 
corruption is much more limited then only a small minority of less than 10 percent 
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ask for rule of Sharia.318 Gallup interviewers, through deep survey, found out that 
what Muslims expect from implementation of Sharia in fact is not but ‘rule of law’ 
which its lack is destroying their lives and societies. 319 Unfortunately this is not the 
image that the mainstream global media is broadcasting of Muslim societies these 
days.  
Shia jurisprudentialism 
From a Shia juridical perspective there can be two different approaches toward 
Islamic law: literalist conformity or rationalist interpretation. This is continuation 
of the same old division of ahl al-ray and ahl al-hadith among Muslim jurists. 
Those belong to the modern camp of literalists, whom we call them 
jurisprudentialists, in their turn have their own differences. Despite the fundamental 
commonalities, not all jursiprudentialists suggest the same tactics for the 
implementation of their views. Shia jurisprudentialists, according to their practical 
perspectives are divided into: traditionalists, pluralists and impositionalists. In our 
times, the protagonists of Islamicization, especially the radical factions among 
them, have once again taken legalism as the principal theme of their mission, shown 
by their persistent demand for conformity to the juristic legacy of Islam and 
restoration of the Islamic law.320 As their ideal, while theo-ethicalists suggest an 
ethic-based society and mysticalists promote a love-based society, Shia 
jurisprudentialists in their turn support a fiqhi-based society and polity. Shia 
jurisprudentialists, as those who advocate creating a fiqhi-based society, are divided 
into three groups: 
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Traditionalist jurisprudentialism  
This group despite its belief in fiqhi-based society, rejects forming a government in 
the name of Islam in the absence of the Shia Imams. Since ordinary believers (non-
Imams) do not have genuine access to the truth and are capable of mistake then 
nobody is entitled to rule in the name of Islam, traditionalist jurisprudentialists 
argue. Instead, they suggest focusing on the implementation of religious rulings 
rather than becoming engaged in government directly. For them no matter who is 
ruling a Muslim society he must be asked to implement as many Islamic rulings as 
possible. It could be said that according to Traditionalist Jurisprudentialism there 
should be a job division between ruler and faqih. Faqih does not interfere in politics 
but demands the ruler to fulfil fiqh rulings. The more ruler executes fiqh or religious 
rulings the more is safe from the faqih’s criticism and enjoys his support, but this 
support is temporary and changeable: it is not unconditional or permanent.321  
Pluralist jurisprudentialism  
Contrary to what the title might suggest, pluralism in this respect is not an absolute 
one including pluralism in principles of fiqh as well but is only limited to level and 
form of implementation of fiqh. In pluralist jurisprudentialism, like other 
jurisprudentialist approaches, truth has been revealed through the holy text and the 
traditions of the Prophet and the Imams, therefore people cannot contribute in 
determining the religious rulings. However they are still entitled to decide the level 
of ruling of jurisprudence and of course whether they want the rule of jurisprudents 
or not. Unlike the first and third approach, which will be discussed shortly, in 
Pluralist Jurisprudentialism ‘law’ and ‘jurisprudence’ are not the same. In order for 
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the law to be able to organize intra/inter-societal interactions and rule the society, 
it needs to be explicitly accepted by people. Unlike law, fiqh is decided somewhere 
else and is needless of any public approval. To overcome this paradox, the 
mechanism which is offered by pluralist jurisprudentialism regarding solving this 
heterogeneity between law and fiqh is a localized version of democracy which is 
called Islamic democracy. In Islamic democracy people (and actually their elected 
representative in the parliament) decide which religious rulings they want to be 
implemented and for how long. Then only those religious rulings that pass the 
democratic law-making process could be implemented temporarily as long as the 
people want them. As such the only laws passed are qualified to rule the society 
directly, although indirectly such rules can have their roots in religious sources 
including fiqh.322  
Impositionalist jurisprudentialism  
Like the first group, Impositionalist Jurisprudentialism not only considers fiqh 
equal to law but the only legitimate law to rule a Muslim society. But unlike the 
first group this one believes that for implementation of the whole all-encompassing 
jurisprudence, especially those social rulings of fiqh with social aspects, there is a 
need for a jurisprudential governance which its main function is implementing and 
more accurately imposing jurisprudential rulings. For impositionalist 
jurisprudentialists policy, or siyasa, is an integral part of Islamic governance, and 
that governance in Islam is not a matter simply of rule by the text but of politics and 
administration by judicious rulers whose decisions is to be guided by the Islamic 
law, but that they also take into consideration a variety of factors that could not be 
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encapsulated by the legal text alone.323  As such since jurisprudents are exclusive 
experts of Islamic law then this approach consequently leads to the not only 
‘governance of fiqh’ or hakamiyyate fiqh but to ‘governance of jurisprudents’ or 
hokoumate faqih. People, in this approach, do not have rights but only have 
responsibilities which they must fulfil. The government not only does not need to 
obey people’s will but can and must impose religious rulings on them by force.   
Impositionalist jurisprudentialism of both Shia and Sunni in its turn can have a 
range of advocates – the most extreme one is called pro-violence impositionalists 
or al-nasr bil-r’ub (victory through terrorising) which is keen on islamicization 
through use of violence. The current violence undertaken in Iraq and Syria under 
the flag of Daesh and other terrorist groups could be considered as an outgrowth of 
the pro-violence impositionalist jurisprudentialism but since they do not show the 
minimal adherence to jurisprudence and their acts of terrorism fall not only outside 
but against the very basic teachings of fiqh such a connection is problematic. 
However, this does not stop pro-terrorist extremists to portray themselves as 
attachment to this category so that they can harvest countless benefits from such 
relationship and it is why they try to imitate the language of impositionalist 
jursiprudentialists. Such a shared language can be seen in a Daeshi commander’s 
comment when raising his sword saying out-loudly: “I swear to God, who there is 
no god but Him, that there is no way to establish Sharia but through use of violence." 
324 
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Figure 10 Position of Jurisprudentialist camps in comparison with other camps of Islam 
One point that is needed to be born in mind regarding the above diagram is that 
jurisprudentionalism itself is on the very edge of iman and any further stretch falls 
ouside the realm of iman. Iman means freely believing in something and, naturally, 
when imposition starts iman ends. As such not only violent impositionalism but 
impositionalism itself falls outside the realm of iman. 
As mentioned above the pro-terrorist extremist Muslims could have been defined 
as a subgroup of the ‘violent impositionalist jurisprudentialism’ if they had the least 
adherence to fiqh but they act so carelessly outside, rather against, jurisprudence 
that considering them inside realm of jurisprudence requires significant level of 
inadvertence. Of course pro-terrorist extremists are eager to have themselves 
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included under the banner of jurisprudentialism to use the significant advantages of 
such connexion. Hereunder I will try to, briefly, explain the reason for such 
eagerness. 
Religion not only shapes human belief but moves and motivates people and 
determines believers’ conduct to a large extent and as such can shape the believers’ 
collective actions. However, sharing abstract beliefs is not enough to bring about 
any unification to the actions of believers in the practical realm. For bringing such 
unification takes a shared language to coordinate the potentially dispersed actions 
of individuals and give them a purposeful direction. Legal language, because of its 
definite commands and clear instruction, has the potential to unify actions such that 
otherwise isolated energies come together to enable a shared goal to be achieved. 
Legal language is usually used to form the reality rather than merely describe it. 
Accordingly, legal language is quite normative and stimulating. Islamic 
jurisprudence is the legal body of Islam and its language can function as any other 
legal language does.  
For the above characteristics Muslim violent extremists are particularly interested 
in the legal language of Islam. Without such a normative language violent 
extremists have marginal chance to invite people to their felonious agenda. Without 
a significant amount of social support and recruiting enough members ready to fight 
for them violent extremists cannot encounter the internal and external pressures 
facing them from both non-violent Muslim mainstream and also international 
players. Using the Islamic juridical language enables extremists to foist themselves 
as true representatives of Islam and in this way sell their criminal ideas as Islamic. 
There are six characteristics in the Islamic juridical language that can help violent 
extremists further their plans more smoothly: 
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1- Unification of actions: unifying actions and energies is among the highest 
priorities for furthering mega plans such as plans for changing conditions or 
entire societies. The easiest way for collecting dispersed factions and 
fractions around an idea is to wrap it in a normative language that is accepted 
and supported by all. 
2- Localization of inharmonious ideas: labeling even the most preposterous 
ideas as religious removes or decreases the level of opposition of the host 
societies. Even if extremists cannot attract support of the wider society, by 
labelling their ideas as religious, they can ensure neutralization of the host 
society and in this way hinder any coalition between the mainstream host 
society and the anti-terror camp. 
3- Sharing popularity of jurisprudentialism: at this stage jurisprudentialism, 
due to its rule in confronting corruption, enjoys a noteable amount of 
popularity. For ordinary people elimination of corruption is the first priority. 
It is because corruption affects their liefs on daily basis and fighting 
corruption for Muslim masses is more urgunt than, for example, confronting 
foreign intervention. If Muslims have problem with foreign intervention a 
big part of it is because they are convinced the foreign powers are supporting 
corrupt elite ruling their countries. By using jurisprudential language violent 
extremists can claim popularity of jurisprudentialism. 
4- Feasibility: Islamic legal language is quite abstruse. A big part of it is 
because Islamic jurisprudence has stayed in the past and as such has kept its 
old characteristics including its old vocabulary which is not familiar for 
majority of people. This unfamiliarity of Muslim masses with the Islamic 
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juridical languane provides a unique chance for the extremists to use and 
interpret it at their whim. 
5- Capacity for sanctification: one of the main problems of Muslim extremists 
is that their ideas are so malicious that in normal situation they do not have 
any chance for being accepted by people. Islamic legal language’s capacity 
for sanctification of even ordinary issues is a capability that is welcomed by 
the Muslim extremists the most. By sanctifying felonious actions such as 
terrorism extremists can strip these actions of their moral constraints at least 
in the eyes of their sympathizers. 
6- Indisputability: Jurisrudential language is used by violent extremist 
Muslims to imbue their orders and prohibitions with a sense of religious 
holiness. This provides a context wherein their rulings are promoted as 
beyond dispute. 
One of the main religious legal terms that is distorted and misused by violent 
extremist Muslims quite often to justify their terroristic action, is the term ‘jihad’. 
Muslim violent extremists use Islamic jurisprudential terms, including jihad, to 
justify their otherwise felonious acts of terrorism. This tactic of sanctification of 
criminal acts of terrorism by use of Islamic legal terms and language is one of the 
clearest istances which explains thirst of extremists for explotation of Islamic legal 
language. In this instance Jihad as a jurisprudential term is used to provide moral 
justification and, more than that, to sanctify specific acts of violence to the degree 
that strips such violence of its horror and the moral constraints. To see how genuine 
claims of pro-terrorism Muslim extremists are, in the next part we first familiarize 
ourselves with the Shia jurisprudence and then examine the postion of jihad in this 
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jurisprudence and finally investigate capacity of jihad for being used as a medium 
for justification of terrorism. 
Conclusion 
Many of Muslim countries colonized by European powers are characterised by a 
high level of corruption and Muslims see this crippling situation as result of foreign 
cultural and political domination.325 To get rid of this level of unbearable corruption 
a quest for rigid moral codes, namely Islamic law, is often and increasingly put forth 
as an antidote to the expansion of corruption and consequent collapse of public 
integrity and social morality in the Islamic world.326 Another part of this quest for 
Islamic law is related to cultural revivalism which is shared with non-Muslim 
colonized countries. The rise of jurisprudentialism has a corollary with violence 
fuelled by foreign invasion, and internal ethnic and religious conflicts. Influenced 
mostly by the popularity of jurisprudentialism the violent extremist Muslims 
(stimulated by the above mentioned situation) have shown interest in using Islamic 
legal terms and language to promote and justify their causes and methods. Such a 
usage of Islamic legal language is, especially, intensively applied by organizers and 
supporters of suicide terrorism. When studying suicide terrorism it is necessary to 
pay attention to the wider picture of the current developments in the Islamic world 
and to not confuse symptoms with root causes and also not to confuse concurrence 
with correlation and these two with causal relations between these phenomenon.  
The main difference between the mainstream jurisprudentialism with violent 
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extremism is that jurisprudentialism pursues the Islamicization of politics while 
violent extremism is after politicization of Islam in a way that justify their particular 
agenda and does not tie their hands. While the first group refers to the text sincerely 
to follow it, the second group refers to the text to exploit and twist it to legitimize 
its causes and methods. As such the first group is after Islamicization of politics 
while the second group is after politicization of Islam.  
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Part Three 
Suicide Terrorism and Shia Jurisprudence 
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Introduction to Part Three 
Nowadays many ordinary practicing Muslims are more associated to their religion 
through jurisprudence rather than theology or mysticism. By means of 
jurisprudence, many Muslims try to live in harmony with their Creator, with the 
rest of mankind, and with the rest of creation. For Shia Muslims, like their fellow 
Sunni Muslims, the commands and regulations of Islam (which are supposed to 
regulate human’s life and bring harmony and peace to him) have not been fully 
articulated in the Quran or by the Prophet or the Imams in an explicit way. Thus 
there is a need for a medium to clarify such regulations. This medium, for both 
Sunni and Shias, is fiqh or Islamic jurisprudence. Depending on how encompassing 
the realm of fiqh is seen by Muslims the coverage of fiqh may include simple rituals 
only, or alternately it may be so inclusive that does not leave anything out of its 
domain. For understanding and predicting the behaviour of those who tone their 
actions with ideas of Islamic jurisprudence, a precise understanding of fiqh is 
crucial. The importance of the study of fiqh becomes even more vital when some 
significantly destructive actions are undertaken in the name of, or by the use of, 
fiqh. Suicide terrorism is one of these destructive actions which its perpetrators 
claim to be associated with Islamic law as a product of fiqh. In this part we will try 
to provide an adequate understanding of Shia jurisprudence.  
Shia Jurisprudence: Short History 
Shia jurisprudence is the youngest among the five dominant legal schools of Islam 
today. Although the first Shia ‘jurisprudential expert/collectors of tradition/hadith’ 
or muhaddith al-fiqhi emerged during the lifetime of the twelfth Shia Imam in the 
fourth Islamic century, it took another century for Shia jurisprudence to introduce 
its first jurist or faqih. As we know ‘the experts of tradition’ or al-muhaddithun 
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were compilers of hadith. Jurisprudential muhaddithun were those who were 
compiling traditions according to their legal subject matters. Shaikh al-Kulaini (d. 
328/941) was the first Shia jurisprudential muhaddith who compiled the hadith of 
the Prophet and the Shia Imams according to their legal contents in his famous book 
‘al-Kafi’. The reason why jurisprudence in Shia Islam did not emerge at the same 
time with Sunni jurisprudence is that for Shias the Living Tradition continued three 
centuries more than that of the Sunnis. This means that for Shias, until their eleventh 
Imam deceased, they did not need to derive rulings from the text and could simply 
follow conduct of their Imams.327 
After Shaikh Kulaini the most famous of the other early Shia jurisprudential 
muhaddithun include Ibn Babavaih, better known as Shaikh Saduq (d. 381/991), 
Shaikh Mufid (d. 413/1022) and Seyyed Murtada, known as al-Sharif al-Murtada 
(d. 436/1044). These men organized the traditions in a way that one would be able 
to derive his/her religious duty by referring to them without any need for a jurist to 
undertake ijtihad and provide them with ready fatwas. As such it can be said that 
for around one century following the eleventh Imam and the end of the era of the 
Living Tradition for Shias (and before Shaikh Tusi d. 460/1067), there was a 
common simple ijtihad undertaken by general Shia Muslims themselves referring 
to the already classified traditions. In this era, other than fiqh in other subjects, Shias 
were quite close to Mutazilas. Before Shaikh Tusi most prominent Shia scholars 
were closely associated with Mutazili thinkers. For example both of the great Shia 
jurisprudential muhaddithun Shaikh al-Mufid and al-Sharif al-Murtada were 
disciples of the great Mutazili thinker Qadi Abd al-Jabbar (d. 1025). Shaikh Tusi is 
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the first Shia faqih who released fatwas and introduced Shia jurisprudence and also 
expanded this branch of Islamic jurisprudence through founding the giant Shia 
seminary of Najaf in 1055 and wrote intensive works using the same traditionist328 
approach of al-Shafi`ei. Before Shaikh Tusi Shia scholars were influenced by 
Mutazilism, Tusi turned the course around and followed Sunni Asharite scholars at 
least in jurisprudence. 
Regarding the relationship of Shia jurisprudence with politics it is worthy to know 
that, even though some Shia jurists were given governmental positions in Sunni 
dynasties, Shia jurisprudence did not find any chance to rule officially until 16th 
century.  Although the Iranian Shia dynasty of Buyids (r. 934-1062) and also some 
Shia Ilkhanids including Sultan Muhammad Khodabandeh (Uljeitu, the eighth 
Ilkhanid dynasty ruler who ruled from 1304 to 1316) were supportive of Shia 
jurisprudence, it was not until the Safavid dynasty took power in Iran in 1501 that 
it was able to find an actual chance to show its competency. Shia jurisprudence was 
introduced openly into Iran at the political level by the Safavid dynasty [r. 1501-
1732) at the beginning of the 16th century.329   
Although the Zand dynasty (r. 1750-1794) was a Shia kingdom like the Safavids, 
this short-lived dynasty was too busy establishing its rule and it did not have enough 
time or resources to focus deeply on other issues – including religion. Unlike the 
Zands the Qajar dynasty (r. 1785-1925), for various reasons to do with political 
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legitimacy, at the beginning of its rule330 invested heavily in the religious 
institutions, dedicating much property in the way of waqf. This gesture, however, 
failed to co-opt the Twelver Shia ulama into the power structures of the ruling 
dynasty.331 This was mostly because the Shia ulama were receiving religious taxes 
directly from their followers and therefore were not solely reliant on governmental 
support. By the period of European encroachment, the religious establishment and 
its personnel represented by ulama stood in a more powerful position in relation to 
the political establishment than the corresponding Sunni ulama – including their 
counterparts within the Ottoman Empire – whose power was manifestly dependent 
on the political sovereign.332  
Unlike the Safavids that had proclaimed themselves representatives of the Hidden 
Imam of Shia (and therefore investing themselves with attributes of divine authority 
that embraced both the political and the legal realms)333 neither the Qajars nor any 
of their political competitors made such religious or legal claims. After the Safavids 
the Shia ulama stepped in and proclaimed their own divine representation on behalf 
of the Hidden Twelfth Imam and thus asserted their prerogative to fill the gap and 
replace the religious powers of the Safavid kings. This measure complemented the 
exclusively temporal competence of the Qajars.334 After the decline of the Safavids, 
but certainly by the time of the rise of the Qajars, the Shia ulama stood apart from 
the ruler and his government. The fatwas of the great Shia legists could therefore 
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announce any imperial decree invalid.335 The most famous example is the fatwa of 
Mirza Hasan Shirazi against the concession to a British company for a monopoly 
over trade of tobacco, which was granted by Naser al-Din Shah in 1890. The deal 
was cancelled because of this simple single line fatwa.336 Due to this independence 
from the government it was easy for Shia ulama to represent the oppressed masses 
and this in its turn would attract massive support from the majority of the population 
that had been overly burdened by excessive taxation and mistreatment.337 Another 
issue that gave Shia ulama a strong position was the problem of decentralization 
and weak government control in the outlying provinces. The rise of regional 
chieftains after the Safavids further weakened this control and provided the 
opportunity for a powerful Shia ulama to step in to fill the vacuum even in some 
non-religious realms depending on the masses’ request.338 An example of this was 
witnessed on one occasion when Shirazi took the side of Iranian tradesmen. 
During the Qajar rule there was no one strong group to establish the final word on 
any given policy and the three main players (the ruling family, the tribal chieftains 
and the Shia ulama) were constantly balancing between themselves to ensure no 
one group could implement its own plans entirely.339 Due to this lack of absolute 
power and as a result of the resistance mounted by the Shia ulama, the Qajar dynasty 
made only very limited efforts in the way of centralization and 
modernization/westernization.340 Hallaq explains the uneven road of Qajars to 
westernization/modernisation as follows: 
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Most reform plans initiated by the Qajars never materialized on any large 
scale. The limited reforms undertaken by Qajars were both minimal and 
gradual, initially reflected in such acts as sending the first group of Iranian 
students to Europe in 1828. Western education was accompanied by a stress 
on translating European works into the Persian language and the consequent 
expansion of awareness about Western culture among the middle class 
which in turn attracted more support for modernization …. The first 
proposal for a modernization of the bureaucracy in 1851 by the Qajar 
administration (which was imitating the Ottoman Gulhane Decree of 1839) 
failed before it could produce any results… The Western style judicial 
reforms begun in 1858 – which set up provincial departments of justice and 
was aiming to centralize the judiciary system – did not have a better 
destiny… Another serious reform plan was drafted in 1871, suggesting, 
among other things the creation of a system of Western-style hierarchical 
courts with special codes to be applied within them but this project too did 
not achieve its goals…  It was not until the Constitutional Revolution of 
1905 that the first partially significant reform took place. In 1906 the first 
Iranian parliament, namely the National Consultative Assembly, was 
established. The new parliament could produce no more than a Basic Law 
that affirmed the supremacy of the Islamic law and a committee of five 
mujtahids was suggested for the purpose of ensuring this supremacy… 
However the new constitution did introduce the idea of a separation of 
powers and granted judges life tenure in an effort to enhance the concept of 
the rule of law.341  
The real wave of Westernization stormed Iran during reign of Reza Shah (r. 1925-
1942), founder of the new kingdom of the Pahlavi dynasty.342 The reason for this 
delay was the fact that Iran was difficult to centralize. Between the collapse of the 
Safavids in 1732 and the consolidation of Qajars in 1794, the country had enough 
time to fall prey to multiple competing tribal chieftains who aspired to general 
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control.343 The Qajars arrived in the midst of this scene and were too weak to bring 
the chieftains under their control. Reza Shah was famous for being strong and 
ambitious. Enjoying an iron will and a clear plan Reza shah furthered his two 
programs of ‘westernization of the country’ and ‘centralization of the political 
power’ simultaneously. He succeeded in both in less than a generation while this 
took, for example, Turkey and Egypt over a century.344 During Reza Shah’s rule 
religion in general and the ulama in particular lost a huge amount of their influence 
in the public sphere. Within the harsh policy of secularization there was no place 
for religion even in quite private issues such as dress.345 Although Reza Shah’s 
strategy of iron fist left limited chances for his opponents to challenge his rule, the 
marginalized ulama who had become his sworn enemy took revenge on his 
successor and son Mohammad Reza Shah, the second and the last Pahlavi ruler 
during the 1979 Revolution.346 Of course the ulama were not able to overthrow the 
Shah if it was not for the profound dissatisfaction with the superficial 
westernization by the secular intellectuals that undermined the figure of Shah both 
domestically and internationally. This reckless Westernization imposed by the Shah 
was described by the Leftist intellectual Jalal Al-e Ahmad (1923-1969) as 
“Westoxication” or gharbzadegi.347 
Doctrine of the Guardianship of the Jurist or Valayat-e Faqih (هیقف تیلاو) 
Deeply charged with intense anti-colonialist sentiments, Ayatollah Khomeini, the 
charismatic leader and theorist of the 1979 Revolution, proposed a new 
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administrative theory based on the political leadership of experts of the Islamic law 
or faqihs.348 Khomeini’s theory argued that, as long as the Twelfth Imam remains 
in hiding, a qualified jurist must fulfil the role of political and religious ruler – 
representing the Imam’s functions in all worldly and spiritual affairs. The idea of a 
ruler-ship of jurists which was called “Doctrine of the Guardianship of the Jurist” 
or Valayat-e Faqih (هیقف تیلاو) was formally enshrined in the 1979 Constitution of 
the new Republic. Article Five states that the Jurist, or a group of such Jurists, who 
has fulfilled the mastery of the Islamic law and has qualifications of ijtihad, is/are 
entitled to exercise leadership, provided the Imam continues to be absent.349 The 
extension of the Jurist’s powers to the political, military and other secular realms 
was justified, in Khomeini’s discourse, by reasoning to the effect that, for an Islamic 
state to be run in genuine compliance with the Islamic law, it must be supervised 
and administered by the ultimate expert in the law.350 Khomeini’s position 
represented an expansion on the doctrine he elaborated during the decade or so 
before the Revolution which was more in line with the framework of the 
Constitutional Revolution’s role dedicated to ulama. In that earlier version of 
Khomeini’s doctrine jurists assumed a supervisory role whereby Jurists evaluate all 
legislation in order to ensure that laws stand in conformity with the rules of the 
Islamic law.351  
Toward the end of his life, however, Khomeini modified his doctrine for the second 
time. Now he maintained that the ruling jurist or valiyy-e faqih is not bound by the 
Islamic law, and can make his own determination of what the law is. According to 
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this modified version of the doctrine, valiyy-e faqih could abrogate even the 
essential pillars of Islam such as pilgrimage and demolish mosques, among other 
things, if “the interests of the Islamic country” are threatened.352 Very much in the 
spirit of the modern state which sees itself as a system whose function is to create 
and impose discipline with a view to correcting any deviation from the self-
established norms, Khomeini fully absorbed this modernist perception of the law’s 
function and stated: “Islam regards law as a tool, not as an end in itself. Law is a 
tool and an instrument for the establishment of justice in society, a means for man’s 
intellectual and moral reform and his purification.”353 
Khomeini’s unusual innovation, and maybe the greatest of the whole century, of 
considering rule of jurists as the only legitimate form of governance354 may well 
have attracted very limited attention if revolutionary Iran had not challenged post-
colonialism so publicly.355 After the two popular Iranian revolutions of the 
Constitutional Revolution (1905-11) and the Nationalization Revolution (1953) 
were suppressed by foreign governments most Iranians were fed up with the 
interventions of both the West and the East (Communism). They welcomed a third 
trend which was rooted inside their own Shia culture.356 The Russians were blamed 
for the miscarriage of the Constitutional Revolution by their support for the tyranny 
of Mohammad-Ali Shah and their part in organizing a coup against the 
constitutionalists in 1911.357 Iranians never forgave the northern neighbor for its 
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interventionist policies. This is why, despite several occasions of regime change in 
Russia, even today most of Iranians do not trust Moscow. The Constitutional 
Revolution, which aimed to limit the sovereign's power by an elected parliament, 
remained as a smirking symbol, reminding Iranians how their efforts to achieve 
their goals through a Parliament failed after the coup.358 Around half a century later 
Iranians decided to try their luck once more to eject excessive foreign interference 
in their internal affairs. This time the movement focused on the nationalization of 
the oil industry as the most important section of both Iranian economy and politics. 
In 1953 the UK and the USA arranged a military coup to overthrow the nationalist 
Prime Minister Mohammad Mosadeq.359 Under these circumstances not only 
religious but even many of secular Iranians welcomed a rare political change whose 
only outstanding and popular characteristic was that of being rooted inside Iranian 
culture and not influenced by foreigners.360  
The complicated doctrine of Valayat-e Faqih was based on a very simple tradition 
attributed to the Hidden Imam, al-Mahdi, indicating that Shias should refer to the 
narrators of the Imams’ traditions in the case of seeking answers for their new 
questions.361 The Iranian clergy showed exceptional ingenuity by claiming political 
power through such a simple tradition. This doctrine unites both popular 
sovereignty and divine sovereignty under a single government headed by a jurist. 
The idea that jurists are representatives of the Imams was used to collect religious 
tax by Shia clergies before and turning it into a political tool to claim governance 
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did not happen until 1979. According to the Doctrine of Valayat-e Faqih all the 
rights that the Prophet and the Imams enjoyed regarding the management of social 
affairs the ruling jurist enjoys as well.362 
As we saw, although the Doctrine of Valayat-e Faqih is a recent innovation, another 
doctrine known as ‘Supervision of Jurist’ or Nezarat-e Faqih هیقف تراظن was 
introduced during the 1905 Constitutional Revolution which led to the idea of 
appointment of a group of jurists to check whether Parliamentary legislation 
contradicted the religion or not. After the introduction of Valayat-e Faqih several 
interpretations and replacements were suggested regarding the implementation of 
the Doctrine. The first one, which later on was introduced as a separate doctrine as 
‘Vakalat-e Faqih’, tried to reconcile the Doctrine with democracy by suggesting 
that if people wish they could elect one or more qualified jurists to represent them 
in monitoring whether the state is functioning in compliance with the Islamic 
values.  A second development occurred when Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri, 
the most prominent ideologue of the Doctrine and author of the book ‘Valayat-e 
Faqih’363, retreated from his first idea and explained that since the government is 
the right of people then any interference by any third party, including jurists, must 
be done after having the explicit permission of the people and naturally through 
election. This notion divided the Doctrine to: Entekhabi (through public election) 
and Entesabi (appointed by God) versions of Valayat-e Faqih.364 Actually Valayat-
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e Entekhabi is so close to former Vakalat-e Faqih that it is difficult to separate them 
in many aspects. 
As it is shown, each of the three Traditionalist, Pluralist and Impositionalist camps 
of Shia jurisprudentialism have their own interpretation of the Doctrine of Valayat-
e Faqih; namely, Nazarat-e Faqih for traditionalists, Valayat-e Entekhabi (and also 
Vakalat-e Faqih) for Pluralists, and Valayat-e Entesabi for impositionalists. This 
latter one denies contribution of masses in political realm and dedicates it 
exclusively to the experts of Islamic law or foqaha. 
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Chapter Seven 
Shia Jurisprudence and its Foundations: Usul al-fiqh and ijtihad 
 
Introduction 
Since we are going to study the concept of jihad in Shia jurisprudence, it is 
necessary to demonstrate what this jurisprudence is based upon and how it 
functions. In other words, while in the next chapters we will talk about what is 
happening within Shia jurisprudence regarding jihad and its relation to suicide 
terrorism, in this section we will examine what happens in the background of Shia 
jurisprudence and how Shia Islamic law is developed. Primarily it is useful to 
mention that the Shia jurisprudence has three components which are: usul al-fiqh, 
ijtihad and fiqh. 
Usul al-Fiqh: includes both the accepted sources for Islamic law and also the 
method for deriving laws from those sources. As such usul al-fiqh is, in reality, the 
"study of the rules to be used in deducing the detailed Islamic laws from their valid 
sources"365 and it teaches the correct and valid way of deducing laws from the 
relevant sources in jurisprudence. 
Ijtihad: Ijtihad in its current limited sense -which is better to be called as ‘common 
ijtihad’ or ijtihad-e motaaraf as against ijtihad-e asil or ‘original ijtihad’366- means 
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the act of deducing practical rulings from their valid sources by qualified experts, 
namely mujtihids.367 
Fiqh: is the process of deducing detailed rulings from approved sources. Islamic 
law, as detailed rulings of conduct, is the final product of fiqh. 
In this chapter we will discuss usul al-fiqh and ijtihad and in the next chapter we 
will study fiqh with focus on jihad as the tool used for the justification of violence 
by Muslim violent extremists. 
Usul al-fiqh, or Islamic legal theory 
Usul al-fiqh or principles of jurisprudence is a separate branch of legal learning 
within the discipline of Islamic legal studies. Usul al-fiqh is the ‘roots’ or principles 
from which Islamic law is derived, in other words it is Islamic legal theory or more 
generally the philosophy of Islamic jurisprudence.368 Usul al-fiqh, in both Sunni 
and Shia traditions, in its final classical form, recognizes four official bases: the 
Quran, the Sunna, the Consensus, and Reasoning.369 While different Islamic legal 
schools of both Sunni and Shia agree on the finality of these four bases they differ 
significantly over the comprehension and application of these bases for deriving 
religious rules. Hereunder we will discuss Shia usul al-fiqh based on Mortaza 
Motahari’s book of ‘usul fiqh’ which, as he himself asserts, is the closest to the 
academic method among authentic books on Shia usul al-fiqh.370 
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On the sources of Shia jurisprudence 
As was mentioned above there are four sources which the Shia jurisprudence use to 
derive religious rulings. These sources are called the ‘four proofs’ or adilla al-
arba'ah (هعبرلاا هلدا). Among the four sources of Shia jurisprudence the first three 
are, to a great extent, held in common with Sunni jurisprudence which are: the Book 
(the Quran  نآرق), the tradition (Sunna هنس) and the Consensus (Ijma`  امجا). 
Although all Islamic legal schools retain a degree of reasoning, as the fourth source 
of religious law Shia scholars of usul al-fiqh, or usuliyyun (who are also among 
‘partisans of ijtihad’ as against ‘partisans of report’ or Akhbaris)371, exclusively 
believe in authenticity of reason (Aql  لقع) as an independent and binding source of 
law which none of Sunni legal schools do.372 After introducing the first three 
sources of Shia jurisprudence, we will discuss the fourth source of Shia 
jurisprudence as the factor which distinguishes this legal school from other Islamic 
jurisprudential schools.   
The Quran (نآرقلا) 
Muslims have always used the Quran as the guideline in order to deduce Islamic 
laws from the early days of Islam. There is no doubt among any Islamic legal 
schools that the Quran is the first and the most important source for the laws and 
regulations of Islam. Of course the ayahs373 or verses of the Quran are not limited 
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to laws and regulations. In the Quran hundreds of different types of issues have 
been introduced but a part of the Quran, said to consist of about 350 ayah from a 
total of 6236 (excluding bismillahs), pertains somehow directly or indirectly to the 
laws including the regulation of religious rituals.374 Some scholars including 
Bazargan believe that the Quranic verses that relate exclusively to Fiqh or Ahkam 
(rulings) constitute less than 150 or around 2% of the Quran.375 
The Quran and the Authenticity of its Literal Meanings (Hojjiyyat Zawahir 
Quran نآرق رهاوظ تیجح) 
The legal discussions related to the Quran are basically related to the Sunna as well, 
therefore; in usul al-fiqh there are few discussions particular to the Quran. The only 
discussion centered solely on the Quran concerns the binding nature of its literal 
(exoteric) meanings, by which is meant the question of whether the laws of the 
Quran are binding testimonies for the jurisprudents to unconditionally rely on or 
not- regardless of whether or not they are qualified, conditioned and explained by 
relative traditions.  It is surprising that the experts of the principles of jurisprudence 
or usuliyyun should have doubted in abidingness of the literal laws of the Quran and 
thought up such a debate.376 Could the legitimacy of relying on the literal laws of 
the Quran be ever subject to doubt?  This is a discussion that was introduced by the 
Shia ulama of the principles or usuliyyun in order to negate the doubts raised by the 
Shia traditionists or akhbariyyun. This latter group believed that other than the 
Prophet and Imams no one has the right to refer to the Quran, or to deduce the 
Islamic law from it. In other words, the eternal benefitting of Muslims from the 
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Quran must be indirect, must be via the Sunna of the Prophet and his House or Ahl 
al-Bait (his daughter Fatima, his son of law Ali and their descendants of immaculate 
Imams).377 This claim of the akbariyyun was based upon the traditions that have 
forbidden interpreting the Quran by personal preference.378 The usuliyyun, 
however, have argued that the deduction by Muslims from the Quran is direct and 
that the meaning of the prohibition of ‘interpreting the Quran by preference’ is not 
that people have no right to understand the Quran by their own thought and 
reflection, but that the Quran must not be interpreted according to desire and 
inflated ego.379  
With regard to the authenticity of the Quran for deducing laws, Shia usuliyyun have 
introduced one more step ahead and announced that the Quran is the main source 
and that other sources of Islamic law should be examined against it. They argue that 
the Prophet and the Imams have authentically reported to have said that forged 
Traditions would appear, and in order to distinguish the true from the false, the 
believers must check all Traditions with the Quran, and any Traditions that disagree 
with the Quran must be considered as false and thus disregarded.380 In other words, 
in the Shia usuli approach it is not the Sunna which is prioritized over the Quran 
but the other way around.381 
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The Sunna (هنسلا) 
Like Sunni Legal Schools, the Sunna (with some slight differences) is the second 
source of the Shia Jurisprudence as well and is the most important source after the 
Quran. Sunna in the Shia tradition means the actions and assertions of both the 
Prophet and the Imams. Technically it means that Sunna is a sufficient proof or dalil 
for a jurisprudent to consider the action in question to be the actual law of Islam if 
it has been approved by the Prophet or the Imams. No scholar of usul al-fiqh 
opposes that Sunna, as above, being binding (hujjat). However there are differences 
on the subject of the Sunna among Shia and Sunni usuliyyun and also within Sunni 
and Shia usuliyyun. These differences mostly concern two points. The first one of 
which is a matter of difference between Shia and Sunni Muslims is the question of 
whether the Sunna of the Prophet alone is binding or whether the Sunna related by 
the Imams is also binding. Sunni Muslims only consider the Sunna of the Prophet 
as binding but Shias also refer to the words, actions and silent approvals of the 
Imams as binding. The second point which is shared by both Shia and Sunni 
usuliyyun is about required characteristics of a binding Sunna. The Sunna is 
sometimes clear in meaning and also enjoys various chains of trustworthy narrators. 
Usually there will be no problem in using such an authentic Tradition for deducing 
laws. But sometimes the authenticity of a Tradition is suspicious, or it is narrated 
by a single person which then is considered as a Single Report (khabar al-wahid ربخ
 دحاولا). Here the views vary dramatically. Some, like Abu Hanifa, pay less attention 
to such Traditions as a source of law generally and do not count weak hadith for 
consideration. From all the thousands of Traditions narrated from the Prophet, Abu 
Hanifa considered only 17 hadith to be absolutely reliable.382 Unlike Abu Hanifa, 
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some Sunni jurists have found confidence even in ‘weak’ unreliable Traditions. 
Shia usuliyyun are of the opinion that only reliable traditions are to be given 
credence.383 Although the Sunna is accepted as one of the sources of fiqh there are 
issues related to the degree of abidingness of this source which are discussed 
hereunder: 
Issues related to abidingness of the Sunna 
Regarding the binding testimony of the Sunna two subjects are discussed in the 
study of Principles.  One is the question of the binding testimony of the khabar al-
wahid or the Single Report and the other is the question of the Traditions which 
conflict with the Quran or indeed contradicting each other. In response to this two 
issues two important branches of the study of Principles is opened: one called the 
Single Report, (khabar al-wahid دحاولا ربخ) and the other Unification (or taking into 
consideration the commonalities of contradicting reports) and Preference (t'adul wa 
tarajih حیجارتلا و لداعتلا).384  
The Single Report (khabar al-wahid دحاولا ربخ)  
Khabar al-wahid is a Tradition that has allegedly been reported from the Prophet 
or one of the Imams but by only one person, or is reported by more than one person 
but does not reach the level hat there is no possibility of the Tradition being in any 
way fabricated (tawatur رَاوَ). Regarding the question whether such a Tradition can 
be used as a basis for deducing a law or not, usuliyyun are divided into two groups. 
Some usulis believe that, provided the all Transmitters of the Single Report were 
just or at least were probably truthful, the transmitted Traditions can be used to 
deduce the relevant law. However most of Shia usuliyyun believe that such a 
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document cannot be used on sensitive issues especially when it might lead to harm, 
i.e. Hudud385. The main justifications for this is the Quranic verse 49:6, in which 
the believers are told to not trust information carried by wrongdoers when decisions 
based on such information may lead to harm of someone: 
O you who have believed, if there comes to you a wicked person with information, 
investigate, lest you harm a people out of ignorance and become, over what you 
have done, regretful. " (49:6)386  
This verse, indirectly, indicates that if a good person gives us a report, we should 
put it into effect. The meaning of this ayah, therefore, has been used by a group of 
usuliyyun as a proof for the binding testimony of the Single Report in non-hudud 
cases.387   
Unification and Preference (al-T`adul wa al-Tarajih حیجارتلا و لداعتلا) 
This principle is about those Traditions on the same subject which are contrary to 
each other or oppose the dictates of the Quran. In the case of those Traditions 
opposing the Quran, as we saw above, Shia ulama of usul believe in the rejection 
of such Traditions while some Sunni Imams such as al-Shafi`ei and Ibn Hanbal give 
priority to the Traditions rather than the Quran in a case of contradiction. Regarding 
the question how Traditions contradicting each other should be treated usuliyyun 
are again divided in their views on this issue. Some usulis believe that when two 
contrasting reports exist we are to ignore both of them. Most usuliyyun treat this 
issue differently. Shia ulama of the Principles have believe that first of all the 
unified content of all the varying Traditions must, as far as possible, be 
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implemented. If this is not possible, and neither of the two sides has preference over 
the other in the reliability of the chain of narrators or in its credibility amongst 
earlier ulama such like, the jurists have the option to act according to whichever of 
them they prefer and derive the related law accordingly.388   
The section regarding the issue of contradicting Traditions is quite voluminous in 
Shia usul al-fiqh. Shia usuliyyun discuss different Traditions in this regard which 
contain instructions of what must be done in the case of contrary Traditions. The 
Traditions that lead usuliyyun to the resolution of the difficulty of contradicting 
Traditions are called Corrective Reports (akhbar ul-'Ilajiyah هیجلاعلا رابخلاا). This 
branch of the study of Principles is called ‘the Unification and Preference’ and 
discusses the unification of opposing Traditions and the superiority of some over 
others or al-t`adul wa al-tarajih (حیجارتلا و لداعتلا).389  
Common issues between the Quran and the Sunna 
Although the Book and the Sunna, with regard to being sources of fiqh, each have 
their own exclusive issues there are also some common issues between the Quran 
and the Sunna. As we learnt the binding authority of apparent laws is exclusively 
relevant to the Book, and the issues of the Single Report and of the contradicting 
testimonies are exclusively of the Sunna concern. The issues that are common both 
to the Book and to the Sunna are as follows:  
The Discussion of Imperatives (awamir رماولاا) 
Amr (plural Awamir) is an Arabic word which means to order or command. The 
topic of the ‘Commands’ in the Shia usul al-fiqh discusses how the verbs of 
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command in the Quran and the Sunna could or should be understood. There are 
many phrases in the Quran and Sunna in form of the imperative. In Shia usul al-
fiqh many questions are raised in regard to the nature of such imperative phrases. 
Questions arise as to whether or not the imperative is a proof of the matter being 
obligatory (wajib) or of being desirable (mustahab), or of neither. Does the 
imperative means that the verb is to be done once or more? Whether or not the 
imperative is an indication of immediate obligation? Is acting according to an 
imperative phrase once enough for undertaking the religious duty or must it be 
performed repeatedly in a regular way (the same as daily prayers, for example)? 
Sections of the ‘Commands’ in Shia usul al-fiqh discuss these questions in detail 
and divide imperative phrases of the Quran and the Sunna according to their 
nature.390 
The Discussion of Negative Imperatives (nawahi یهاونلا) 
This discussion elucidates how the verbs of prohibition in the Book and Sunna 
could or should be treated. Nahy (plural Nawahi) is an Arabic word which means 
to stop or prevent, and is the opposite of imperative. As with amr, there are many 
negative imperatives phrases in the Quran and in the Sunna. The same questions 
that were discussed previously on the subject of the imperative arise on the subject 
of ‘Negative Imperatives’ and similarly Shia usuliyyun divide the negative phrases 
(alike imperative ones) according to their nature.391 
The Discussion of Generalities and Particularities (`a`am wa khasصاخلا و ماعلا)  
In the Quran and Sunna there are general and common laws which apply to all, and 
there are laws related to a group of individuals: a law that is opposed to the common 
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and general law. Section of ‘Generalities and Particularities’ in Shia usul al-fiqh 
explores the relationship between these two groups of commands. For example if 
the two laws must be received as being self-contradicting, or, since one of the two 
laws compared to the other is general while the other is particular, does this mean 
the latter should be treated as an exception to the former.392 Particularities are so 
common within Islamic Law that there is a phrase indicating “ma min a`ammen illa 
wa qad khoss”393 (there is no generality which accepts no particularity).  
The Discussion of Unconditional (mutlaq قلطم) and Conditional (muqayyadدیقم) 
‘Discussion of conditional and unconditional’ is similar to ‘generality and 
particularity’, but generality and particularity are relevant to what the law applies 
to, while conditional and unconditional are relevant to the different circumstances 
and qualities of the law itself.394 “The general and particular are relevant to an order 
that generally covers all the different forms of that which the law applies to, some 
of which, due to a particular reason, are exempt from that generality.”395 However 
the question of unconditional and conditional is related to the essence and nature 
concerning to the task which the duty-bound individual (mukallaf) must perform. If 
the essence and nature related to the duty has no particular condition then it is 
unconditional, and if it has a particular condition, it is conditional.396 The 
‘Discussion of Unconditional and Conditional’ play a very important role within 
Islamic jurisprudence to the extent that separates different groups of usuliyyun from 
each other in some cases. As we will show later this discussion has been applied to 
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jihad as well and most of differences among ulama on this issue are based on their 
understanding of each of the Quranic verses or the Prophetic traditions on jihad as 
being conditional or unconditional. The important tip is that when there are different 
orders or prohibitions on a single subject (that some are unconditional and others 
are conditional) then usually conditional commands narrow unconditional ones. It 
seems that jihad was turned into an unconditional use of violence against non-
Muslims by al-Shafi`ei by declaring the restrictive verses of the Quran against 
unconditional violence as abrogated which will be discussed shortly.397 
The Discussion of Tacit Meanings (mafahim میهافم)  
In the terminology of usul al-fiqh the tacit is the opposite of spoken. Technically it 
means that when the believers are ordered to do something they have been ordered 
to avoid the opposite of it and vice versa, although the second part is not spoken of 
in the sources. We talked about it when explaining how the Scholars of Principles 
extracted the rulings for permission to rely on the Single Report from the Quranic 
verse 49:6 on “not accepting the news reported by a wrong doer before inspection”. 
Although the above verse does not say anything about the validity of a Single 
Report (since it has only rejected accepting it from wicked persons) then its tacit 
meaning is that it is acceptable from trustworthy persons. As such the tacit meaning 
of this verse is used as a proof for abidingness    of the Single Report.398 
The Discussion of the Abstract (mujmal لمجم) and the Clear (mubayyan نیبم)  
The ‘Discussion of the Abstract and the Clear’ simply means that sometimes a 
phrase in the language of the Prophet is ambiguous and its meaning is unclear. For 
example the word ghena (a special kind of music) in the Sunna is not clear by itself 
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but there are proofs from the Quran or the Sunna that explain dimensions of this 
word. In such cases the ambiguity of the abstract is cancelled by the clear 
instructions related to the same issue somewhere else.399 The issue of ‘the General 
and the Clear’ is somehow similar to that of ‘Unconditional and Conditional’. 
The discussion of the abrogator (nasikh خسان) and the abrogated 
(mansukh خوسنم)  
Discussions about ‘the Abrogator and the Abrogated’ is of an outmost importance 
in the Shia usul al-fiqh. On the issue of abrogation many questions are raised which 
are reflected on and discussed in the study of usul al-fiqh. “Sometimes in the Quran 
and the Sunna we come across an instruction that was temporary, meaning that after 
a time a different instruction was given, which has cancelled the first instruction”, 
Motahari argues.400 The discussion of the Abrogator and the Abrogated sometimes 
clashes with the discussion of Unconditional and Conditional on the subject of 
jihad. By this I mean that when some jurists consider a group of verses on jihad as 
‘Conditional’ which limit the ‘Unconditional’ verses, others may consider the 
conditional verses as ‘abrogated’ which must be ignored and refer to other verses 
of unconditional ones. The al-Shafi`ei’s view in this regard was mentioned recently. 
The Principles of Application (هیلمعلا لوصلاا) 
What was mentioned before as issues related to deriving religious duties are called 
the ‘Principles of Deducing’ or usul al-istinbat (طابنتسلاا لوصا) which include cases 
where deducing rulings from valid sources is possible. Usul al-fiqh also includes 
principles where deducing rulings from valid sources is not definite and reliable. 
This latter group of principles are called usul al-amaliyya or the ‘Principles of 
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Application’. As such usual al-amaliyya is used where there is no way for deriving 
laws from the valid sources.401 As was mentioned above, fiqh refer to the four 
sources of the Book, the Sunna, the Consensus and the Reason for deducing the 
laws. Sometimes in their referrals to the above sources the jurisprudents are 
successful and sometimes they are not. In other words; “sometimes the he 
[jurisprudent] attain the actual law in the form of certitude or a reliable probability, 
which means a probability that has been divinely endorsed. However in some cases 
he [jurisprudent] is unable to discover the duty and the Divine Will from the four 
sources, and he remains without a defined duty and in doubt. In these cases what 
must be done? Has the Lawgiver [God] specified a certain duty in the case of the 
actual duty being out of reach?”402 Shia usul al-fiqh has a certain section for such 
conditions. As we witnessed in the part of ‘the Principles of Deducing’ usul al-fiqh 
talks about the correct and valid method of deducing the laws, and in the section 
concerning the Principles of Application it talks about the correct way of acting in 
a situation where the religious duty is not clear. The Principles of Application are 
fourfold: 
1- The Principles of Exemption (Bara'at هئارب)   
2- The Principle of Precaution (Ihtiyat طایتحا)   
3- The Principle of Option (Takhyyir رییخَ)   
4- The Principle of Mastery (Istishab باحصتسا)  
The Principle of Exemption means that the believers are initially released from any 
obligation and duty if they have not been told otherwise. The Principle of Precaution 
requires that the believers must act according to precaution, which means that the 
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believers must act in such a way that if a duty actually exists as a law, they have 
performed that duty. The Principle of Option means that the believers have the 
option to choose one of two or more things, whichever they like if all of them are 
equally acceptable by the religion or the religion is silent about all of them equally. 
Finally the Principle of Mastery means ignoring any doubt as far as no definite 
evidence has opposed the original state. The above ‘Principles of Application’ are 
of significant importance because on many occasions it is not easy to find the 
definite ruling of fiqh and therefore one of above principles might be applicable.403 
In the case of jihad, if jurisprudents are not able to include a certain case of violence 
–suicide terrorism to be the example here- as a form of jihad (in a definite and 
indubitable way), then according to the Principle of Mastery such a case cannot be 
justifiable by jihad. It is because we know that self-explosion was not a way of 
waging jihad in time of absence of explosives, then based on the ‘Principle of 
Mastery’ it cannot be included in jihad. That being the case, since suicide operations 
are a contemporary phenomenon there is an onus on advocates who support it as a 
form of jihad who need to bring definitive religious proofs for it and those who 
reject its inclusion in jihad do not need to provide religious argument for its 
exclusion. 
Consensus (Ijma` لاا  امج ) 
Ijma` or Consensus means the unanimous view of Muslims on a particular issue 
and is considered as one of the sources of Islamic laws by both Sunni and Shia 
jurists. Although Ijma` is accepted by all scholars of jurisprudence among both 
Sunnis and Shias it does not mean that all legal schools understand Consensus the 
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same way. While a majority of Muslim ulama argue that consensus is a proof in its 
own right, based on a saying of the Prophet that: “My umma (nation) will not 
consensus on the wrong”404 the other part of ulama have a different opinion in this 
regard and accept Consensus conditionally. According to the first group if all 
Muslims are in agreement upon a certain point of view about a subject in one period, 
even in this period of ours, their view is definitely correct. They believe that it is 
possible for some of the nation to err, and some not to, but it is not possible for all 
of them to be in agreement on error. According to this perspective complete 
agreement of all the Muslims in one period is ruled as divine revelation; thus all the 
Muslims at the moment of consensus are treated in effect as having the same status 
as the Prophet and that which is revealed to them is the law of God.405  
Shia usuli jurists do not maintain the same principle of consensus that the Sunni 
ulama maintain. For Shia the testimony of consensus is binding only if is the means 
of discovering the Sunna. In the view of Shia jurists whenever there is no proof in 
the Quran and the Sunna about a certain subject but it is known that the general 
body of the Muslims or a numerous group of the companions of the Prophet or those 
companions of an Imam all used to act in a particular way, it can be a proof that in 
those times there existed an instruction of the Sunna which we are unaware of. Then 
in the opinion of the Shia usuli ulama consensus is binding because if all the 
Muslims have one view this is proof that the view has been received from the 
Prophet or the Imams. It is impossible for all Muslims to share the same view on a 
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matter if it came from themselves and thus their consensus is a proof of the origin 
of that view being the Sunna of the Prophet or the Imams therefore it is binding. As 
such for Shia usuliyyun consensus is not genuinely binding in its own right rather it 
is binding in as much as it is a means of discovering the Sunna.406  
Reason 
The role of reason is of outmost importance in Shia jurisprudence. As we observed 
above Shia Principles of Jurisprudence consists of two main parts: the ‘Principles 
of Deducing’ and the ‘Principles of Application’. The Principles of Application are 
essentially reason-based and at the same time the presence of reason in Principles 
of Deducing is to such an extent that all sources of deducing the religious laws are 
divided into two categories:  the Narrated and the Reasoned. The Narrated sources 
are relevant to all the discussions focused on the Book, the Sunna, and the 
Consensus, while the Reasoned part is related to reason. It is necessary to bear in 
mind that role of reason is not limited to the Reasoned source of law and that reason 
is not only an independent source of deducing laws but it is an assistant in deducing 
laws from the first three sources of law as well.  The ratiocinations used for 
deducing any new law from those three sources – namely the Book, the Sunna and 
the Consensus – are in one way or another included in intellectual activity by nature. 
We will talk shortly about this intellectual activity of deducing detailed laws from 
above valid source, which is called ‘ijtihad’, in the next section. What we are going 
to discuss in this section is Reason as the fourth source of the Islamic Law for the 
Shia usuliyyun.  
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It is necessary to mention that Shia jurisprudence, unlike other schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence, recognizes reason as one of the main sources for deducing religious 
laws.407 Shia usulis argue that wherever that reason has a clear ruling then that 
regulation is both ‘religiously’ as well as ‘morally’ binding.408 As such the Binding 
Testimony of Reason in the Shia usuli view means that if in a set of circumstances 
reason has a clear rule, then that rule (because it is definite and absolute) is binding 
as a religious duty. For example if there is no religious ruling but human common 
sense sees a serious harm in something then it follows that that thing is religiously 
prohibited because the Law Giver (God) wants the good for his creature then 
avoiding such harm is God’s will. To reach this result jurists form a logical 
syllogism and then conclude what human reason understand as absolutely (without 
any doubt) as good or bad it is considered religiously the same: 
Premise number one: God wants the good for his creatures. 
Premise number two: this specific thing is harmful (not good). 
Conclusion: this specific thing is religiously prohibited. 
This is called the “Principle of Correlation” or “whatever is ordered by Reason is 
ordered by Religion and vice versa”.409 The ‘Principle of Correlation between 
Reason and Religion’ indicates that by means of the deduction and logic of reason 
we discover that in a certain instance a certain necessary law or prohibitive law 
exists which human common sense has no doubt about then that law is Divine Will 
and religiously binding.410  
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Although Sunni schools of law use reason in deducing law it is not an independent 
source of law for them. Amongst the Sunni ulama, Abu Hanifa considered Analogy 
(qiyas) to be the fourth proof. Thus in the view of the Hanifi School the sources of 
jurisprudence are four: the Book, the Sunna, the Consensus and Analogy. We 
discussed previously that Abu Hanifa believed in an independent role of reason in 
deducing laws but what was left of his heritage was only ‘Analogy’ as a technique 
which al-Shafi`ei developed to a greater extent. The Maliki and Hanbali Sunnis, 
especially the later, do not pay that much attention to Analogy. The Shafi`ei School 
pays more attention to Traditions than the Hanafis and also more attention to 
Analogy than the Malikis and Hanbalis do, but for Shafi`ei an Analogy is only a 
tool for deriving rulings from the main sources of the Book and the Sunna and not 
an independent source as such.411 
Ijtihad (داهتجلاا) 
Literally, ijtihad, like jihad, is a derivative of J-H-D meaning ‘to strive’. In the 
Islamic juristic literature ijtihad means the independent reasoning for determining 
rules of conduct based on the Divine Will. This first-hand and independent 
reasoning can be named as the ‘original ijtihad’ to distinguish it from what became 
popular after the early mujttahids and founders of the Islamic legal schools who 
performed ijtihad in its true sense. There is also a less original intellectual activity 
in deriving the rules of conduct from the source materials of the five established 
schools of law (and not going behind these source materials) which should be called 
the ‘common ijtihad’ as against the ‘original ijtihad’. As for the necessity of ijtihad 
in the first place it is enough to say that since the divine revelation came to an end 
                                                          
411 Ibid., p. 43. 
 199 
 
with the demise of the Prophet, ijtihad was the main instrument of interpreting the 
divine message and relating it to the changing conditions of the Muslim community. 
Muslims jurists believe that ijtihad was validated by the Prophet himself and in this 
regard they point to the many traditions on the authority of ijtihad. The most famous 
of such traditions is the Prophet’s approval of the Muadh’s ijtihad which provides 
clear authority in this regard. The tradition indicates that upon sending Muadh ibn 
Jabal as judge to the Yemen, the Prophet asked him about the source on which he 
would rely in making decisions. In reply Muadh referred first to the Quran, then to 
the Sunna of the Prophet and finally, in the event where he failed to find the 
necessary guidance in either of the two, then he would formulate his own ijtihad. 
The Prophet approved of this and was well pleased with Muadh’s response.412 
The first mujtahids (those who do ijtihad), as discussed before and based on their 
approach toward the divine message, were divided into ahl-al ra’y, or people of 
personal reasoning, and ahl al-hadith, or people of Tradition. The former group of 
mujtahids were relying on reason on discovering the divine will for determining the 
right conduct of a believer in different situations while the latter were relying on 
the Prophetic traditions for that purpose. While ahl al-ra’y had the upper hand at 
the early stages of the manifestation of ijtihad, (and actually were its first founders) 
gradually, and following the collection and fabrication of more Prophetic traditions, 
they lost ground to traditionists who restricted and fixed the mechanisms of 
reaching the divine will; they rejected the continuation of the ‘original ijtihad’ and 
replaced it with the ‘common ijtihad’ as will be discussed hereunder.  
                                                          
412 Abu Davud, Al-Sunan, Tradition number 3592. 
 200 
 
In the history of Islam, as it seems to be the case with other major religions as well 
arguably, there are many cases in which over time the contents change dramatically 
but the names and titles remain the same. This creates serious problematic 
confusion for those who want to study such cases. Ijtihad, in my opinion, is one of 
the most outstanding of such cases. While in the early forms of ijtihad, for example, 
mujtihids were enjoying a huge amount of intellectual freedom to challenge pre-
suppositions considered categorical by their predecessors later so-called mujtahids 
were only re-wording opinions of the previous generations and obeying their pre-
suppositions without challenging them.. 413 I think, although such a limited 
intellectual activity still enjoys the title of ijtihad, this latter form of limited 
intellectual activity actually is little more than a highfalutin ‘imitation’ wrapped in 
title of ‘ijtihad’. 
Theoretically and because of role of ‘Reason’ in Shia jurisprudence as an 
independent source of law, original ijtihad as following independent juristic 
reasoning by Shia usuliyyun, is what differentiates Shia Juristic School from Sunni 
schools of law.414 Shia scholars of usul, in addition to the affirmative Prophetic 
traditions in favour of ijtihad believe that it was Jafar al-Sadiq (the sixth Shia Imam) 
who established the principle of ijtihad in its juristic term; therefore for them ijtihad 
enjoys much more authenticity than it does among their Sunni counterparts.415 Shia 
scholars of usul criticize ijtihad in Sunni schools of fiqh to be only a limited 
technique of analogical reasoning (qiyas) rather than the processes of independent 
reasoning that the jurist employs in order to arrive at the best guess of what he 
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thought might be the law pertaining to a particular case.416 As independent 
reasoning within the Shia Usuli school of jurisprudence ijtihad is theoretically not 
restricted to any specific technique as Sunni schools are limited to. However in 
reality there is no (or very limited) ijtihad in its true sense performed by Shia 
jurisprudents nowadays; what is presented in the name of ijtihad is often little more 
than a repetition of the opinions of classical jurists. Thus it is not much more than 
imitation or taqlid (while it is forbidden for jurists to do ‘imitation’ directly 
according to the Shia jurisprudence itself). Despite all obstacles before the concept 
of ‘original ijtihad’ in both Sunni and Shia schools of law it seems Shia school of 
jurisprudence (at least in theory) has more potential to restore ‘original ijtihad’ 
because it is less restricted to certain techniques in reasoning, namely qiyas, and 
also because ‘Reason’ is recognized as an independent source of law in Shia Islam. 
Mujtahid vs faqih 
The titles of ‘mujtahid’ (as the one who practices ijtihad) and faqih (as jurisprudent 
or expert in fiqh) are used interchangeably these days.417 Mujtahid is supposed to 
be the one who is qualified to exercise independent reasoning or ijtihad. Nowadays 
the door of ijtihad is widely considered closed and independent reasoning in its true 
sense is not practiced, and what we have are really only faqihs, as experts of Islamic 
law, and not mujtahids.418 The confusion between faqih and mujtahid is another 
instance of the neutralization of very axiomatic Islamic intellectual concepts. When 
faqihs present their act of ‘copy-paste’ of old rulings as ijtihad they ruin the ground 
for real ijtihad. The story of ijtihad reminds us of kalam when the arch-traditionist 
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Asharites, as the most severe enemy of kalam, simply called themselves 
‘mutikallim’ or partisan of kalam and killed off any possible ‘free thinking’ based 
on true kalam. This game of twisting debugging concepts by traditionist Asharites 
and turning them against their very essential philosophy is a skill that anti-
intellectual literalists deploy in case the weapon of ‘excommunication’ does not 
bring the desired result in isolating rationalists.  
Hierarchy of Shia jurists 
For centuries it was fiqh and its related fields of study including Arabic Literature 
and Grammar, Hadith, Rijal, Quranic Studies, Islamic History with focus on the 
Prophetic Biography, Logic and so on which were the only organized education in 
a big part of the Islamic world. Of course other necessary fields such as Medicine, 
Mathematics, Physics, Astronomy and few other experimental fields were popular 
among intellectuals but they seldom enjoyed the same continuous chain of 
systematic education with recognized degrees and hierarchy which fiqh did.419 
Nowadays, as it is the case with other parts of the Islamic world, classical Islamic 
studies including study of fiqh and its relevant courses, are marginalized by modern 
secular education in Shia countries as well. Still it does not mean that jurisprudential 
studies in Shia Muslim countries including Iran (as the main hub of Shia Islam) is 
in full standstill. For example according to the Iranian ‘Pupils Association News 
Agency’ (PANA) Iran has 12,269,793 students receiving education in 104,000 
modern schools420 and another 4,116,000 university students421 receive training in 
2276 modern universities, higher education centres and polytechnics422. At the 
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same time around 150,000 Iranians are graduates of classical Islamic educations or 
are receiving such education.423 In recent years the number of new students entering 
the Islamic seminaries has grown significantly. According to the report released by 
the official centre in charge of the Islamic seminaries, markaz-e howzehay-e 
elmiyyeh, these seminaries were expected to have around 15,500 new students in 
419 seminaries around the whole country in 2015424 which shows a sharp increase 
in number of new students joining the Islamic classical studies (of course if this 
number get met in full). The number of those who receive Islamic classical studies 
is notable although still low comparing to those who receive modern education. 
According to the 2011 Iranian National Census out of overall 65 million of the 
population of age 6 and above more than 60 million (around 93%) of them have 
received modern education.425 This means that around 0.2% of the whole Iranian 
population have received or are receiving Islamic classical education. It is 
remarkable that this tiny population of less than half a percent have such a strong 
presence in the governing body of the country. 
Shia Islamic classical studies, which is fundamentally based on fiqh, constitute of 
three duration of teaching courses. Each of these durations normally takes five years 
to complete. In addition to the teaching educational durations, there are also two 
duration of education by research which each roughly takes around five years each. 
However, unlike the teaching durations the research ones are more flexible (and 
usually do not have a strict time limitation). These arrangements which were laid 
out by the founder (or restorer in more accurate meaning) of the Qum Seminary, 
                                                          
423 http://ruhaniat.parsiblog.com/ 
424 http://howzeh.org/news/hawzahqom_16656/318515/ 
425 http://www.tabnak.ir/fa/news/268021 
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Haeri Yazdi (d. 1937) for the first time have faced some changes since then. Haeri 
Yazdi merged several madrasas and established the biggest Iranian seminary in 
1921. Despite all changes the main structure, more or less, has survived until now.  
The five grades of study of fiqh and its related fields that provides the qualification 
for practicing ‘ijtihad’ are as follows: 
Grade one: 5 years of study of muqaddmat or preparational/ preliminary studies 
Grade two: 5 years of sath or intermediate studies 
Grade three: 5 years of kharij or advanced studies 
Grade four: 5 years of research on one single field of fiqh and reaching level of 
ijtihad in that specific field which accordingly is called ‘partial ijtihad’ and the 
one reaching this level is called Mujtahid-e Mutejazzi or ‘partial mujtahid’. 
Grade five: minimum 5 years of broad research on all fields of fiqh and reaching 
level of ijtihad on all fields of fiqh which because of its inclusivity is called 
‘absolute ijtihad’ and the one who has reached this level is called Mujtahid-e 
Mutlaq. 
The graduates of the first grade are called Rouhani or Akhound, graduates of the 
second level are called Thiqat al-Islam, graduate of the third grade are called Hujjat 
al-Islam, graduate of the fourth grade are called Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, and 
graduates of the fifth grade are called Ayatollah. Those Ayatollahs who are popular 
and have big number of followers among Shia Muslims are called the Grand 
Ayatollah or ayatollah al-udhma or marja’ taqlid. In Shia Islam it is only a Grand 
Ayatollah who is allowed to release fatwa. This is the main reason why in Shia 
Islam we do not witness graduates of engineering or medicine releasing fatwas on 
religious issues for example, as is the case within Sunni Islam. Fatwas of people in 
position of Usama bin Laden and Aiman al-Dhawahiri for instance, will not find 
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any echo in the Shia world simply because their promulgator has not passed the 
stages which qualify them to issue fatwas. 
In addition to a carefully defined hierarchy, in Shia Islam there is also a strict code 
of dressing for the clergy. Graduates of the first level should put a long garment, 
namely aba, and a skullcap, called araqchin, on to distinguish them from others. 
Graduates of the second level of classical Islamic studies are allowed to wear 
turban. For those descendants of the Prophet the turban must be black and the title 
of ‘Seyyed’ is added to their names. Those who are not descended from the Prophet 
must wear white turbans and title of ‘Shaikh’ is added to their names. For example 
the Grand Ayatollah of Iraq is called Ayatollah al-Udhma Seyyed Ali al-Sistani. 
This is why the former president of Iran who is not a descendant of the Prophet and 
is not a marj’a taqlid is called Ayatollah Shaikh Akbar Rafsanjani. 
Recently a new system has been introduced to some seminaries which is closer to 
the modern international education system and constitutes of four grades and starts 
after graduation from the modern intermediate school: preliminary (6 years) equal 
to post high school diploma, intermediate (3 years) equal to Bachelor degree, 
advanced (2 years) equal to Masters Degree, and research degree (6 years) equal to 
PhD. 
Students of fiqh usually complete their preliminary studies in the seminary closest 
to their place of residence. To complete the intermediate studies they usually go to 
more famous centres, whilst for undertaking the advanced studies they can find top 
experts to supervise their researches only in one of two centres: usually Najaf in 
Iraq and Qum in Iran, and occasionally in few other major centres of Islamic studies 
such as Mashhad. 
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Ijtihad as divider of Usulis and Akhbaris  
In this research we study Shia jurisprudence from an ‘Usuli perspective’. Thus, we 
need to briefly explain what distinguishes the Usulis from others. Like their Sunni 
counterparts Shia jurists are divided to pro-reason and anti-reason, as another 
naming for ahl al-ra’y and ahl al-hadith or rationalists and traditionists. The Shia 
jurists of ahl al-ra’y are called Usuli and the ahl al-hadith ones are called akhbari 
ot traditionist. In the Shia camp the ahl al-ra’y or Usulis have the absolute upper 
hand426 unlike the Sunni camp where the ahl al-hadith enjoys supremacy. What 
divides Shia Usulis from their traditionist counterparts is concept of ‘ijtihad’. While 
today ijtihad is almost a unuminously agreed principle of Shia jurisprudence for 
years Shias were divided over this issue into the Akhbari School and Usuli 
School.427 Unlike Akhbaris, the Usuli School not only supports the use of ijtihad in 
issuing religious laws but also bases the whole jurisprudence on ijtihad. Usulis use 
reason as tool for ijtihad: the famous conviction of: “whatever is ordered by reason, 
is also ordered by religion and whatever ordered by religion, is also ordered by 
reason”428 is a clear indication of importance of role of reason in Shia Ijtihad. 
While Shia Usulis emphasize on ijtihad based on reason as the main way of deriving 
religious duties Akhbaris reject any form of ijtihad and believe that Muslims must 
literally follow traditions of the Prophet and Imams without any interpretation or 
personal reasoning of “ijtihad”.429 More than that Akhbaris also reject any direct 
reference to the Quran and believe that ordinary people should directly refer to the 
traditions for deriving rulings because only the Prophet and Imams can understand 
                                                          
426 Motahari, Usul fiqh, p. 13. 
427 Asalan, No god but God, p. 184. 
428 لقعلا هب مکح  رشلا هب مکح ام و  رشلا هب مکح لقعلا هب مکح ام 
429 Motahari, Usul fiqh, p. 17 
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the Quran fully.430 As such Akhbaris reject the concept of ijtihad fundamentally and 
consequently refuse any necessity for role of experts, or mujtahids, in deriving 
appropriate rulings for ordinary people. Since Akhbari School rejected employment 
of ijtihad altogether then it requires the jurisprudence to be based directly on the 
traditions of the Prophet and Imams, meaning that such traditions replace verdicts 
of foqahah.431  
The main figure of the Shia traditionist school, or Akhabri, was named Amin 
Astarabadi and his theory of ‘rejection of ijtihad’ is explained in his book of Fawaid 
al-Madaniyya.432 To conclude it should be said that ijtihad is the characteristic of 
Shia Usulis and distinguishes them from the camp of Shia traditionists who reject 
ijtihad. Whatever that we discuss regarding the viewpoint of Shia jurisprudence in 
this research is based on the ‘Usuli perspective’. 
Conclusion  
It is hoped that the above discussion has sufficiently demonstrated the differences 
between Shia and Sunni jurisprudential schools and also the differences among Shia 
themselves. Although, in theory, ‘Reason’ has enjoyed a central position in the Shia 
jurisprudence it is unrealistic to describe the current Shia jurisprudence as a fully 
‘rationalist jurisdiction’. Despite the grandiose superscription of theoretical role of 
Reason in Shia jurisprudence, in practice, the role of reason has turned into a 
shallow title with limited actual outward result. What Shia jurists today do is little 
more than a mere imitation of the great ancient jurists. Their only initiative is that 
they try to find rulings for new conditions based on ijtihad of the early jurists. Then 
                                                          
430 Ibid, p. 13. 
431 Asalan, op cit., p. 184. 
432  Ibid, p. 13. 
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their ijtihad in its current form is, at the best, an informed commentary on the ijtihad 
of the early jurists and not as independent reasoning any more. For the 
contemporary Shia jurists two of the four sources of fiqh are not considered actual 
sources any more. These sources are divided into primary sources which are the 
Quran and the Sunna, and the secondary sources, which are ijma’ and aql. The 
function of the secondary sources is little more than extracting rulings for new 
situations from the primary sources (the Quran and the Sunna). Due to this it is 
better to say that even ‘Usuli Shia jurisprudence’ lacks element of ‘independent 
reasoning’ or ‘original ijtihad’ as it should. 
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Chapter Eight 
Fiqh as divine law: Liturgical Nature of Jurisprudential Jihad 
 
Introduction 
In an empathetic approach we should bear in mind that, for those who see 
products of jurisprudence as Divine Will, the technical language of 
jurisprudence is of a substantial importance. Even the smallest difference in 
the arrangement or composition of the words can change the meaning 
significantly. Not all issues covered by jurisprudence are of the same 
significance. To know level of significance of each jurisprudential ruling we 
need to familiarize ourselves with the language of jurisprudence. In this 
chapter we will, briefly, introduce the language that Shia jurisprudence uses 
in transferring its demands and commands. Before entering the section related 
to the practical duties of believers, jihad one of them, first we must be familiar 
with different categorisations and segmentations of Shia jurisprudence and 
their importance. This section is arranged according to Motahari’s book of 
fiqh433 which is better organised when compared to the classical 
jurisprudential books which have all these details but not in a coherently 
structured style. 
 
                                                          
433 Mortaza Motahari, Ashenaei ba ulum-e islami (3); usul-e fiqh, fiqh, Sadra Publications, no date, 
pages 51 onward. 
I have used the following translation of the Motahari’s book as well: Morteza Motahari, 
Jurisprudence and its Principles, trans. Salman Tawhidi, Tarikhe Tarsile Quran publications, no 
date. 
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The nature of divine laws in Shia jurisprudence 
In Shia jurisprudence, divine laws have different natures and according to 
their particular nature are divided into various categories. One of the first 
classifications divides divine laws into: the laws of human duty (ahkam taklifi 
یفیلکَ ماکحا) and the laws of human status (ahkam wad'i عضو ماکحای ). The laws 
regarding duty consist of ‘do's’ and ‘don'ts’. According to Shia jurisprudence 
(similar to its Sunni counterpart) no single action is empty of one of the 
following five taklifi laws: either it is obligatory (wajib بجاو), or it is 
forbidden (haram مارح), or it is desirable (mustahab م بحتس ), or it is 
undesirable (makruh هورکم), or it is permissable (mubah حابم). They are termed 
as the “five laws" (ahkam khamsah  سمخ ماکحا). [See Appendix No. one for 
more detailed information] The laws regarding status, or ahkam wade`i, are 
those laws which are related to one’s status rather than actions. For example, 
for the one who is in a marital situation or has ownership of something, there 
are laws which are exclusive of such situation per se.434 
As we learnt before jihad has different meanings in different Islamic contexts. 
While for Mysticalists and Theo-ethicalists jihad is not about warfare in 
jurisprudence, as will be shown later, jihad means only warfare.435 In Shia 
jurisprudence all possible actions are seen from one of the above mentioned 
ahkam taklifi of wajib, haram, mustahab, makruh and mubah categories. 
Jihad in Shia jurisprudence, as will be discussed shortly, is wajib. As such 
and since jihad in Shia jurisprudence is categorized as a religious obligation 
or al-amr al-wajib, I focus here on the categorizations of obligatory laws. 
                                                          
434 Morteza Motahari, Jurisprudence and its Principles, p. 28. 
435 Allama Hilli, Tabsera al-mutallimin, p. 79. 
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Obligatory laws, in turn, are divided into several different classifications. 
Firstly, they are divided into ta'abbudi (یدبعَ) and tawassuli (یلسوَ). 
Ta'abbudi includes those obligatory laws of which the correct and valid 
performance depends upon the intention (niyyat تین )436 of nearness to God, 
and without that kind of intention is not valid and one's duty has not been 
fulfilled. Daily prayers and fasting, for example, are both "wajib ta'abbudi".  
Wajib tawassuli refers to the fact that the performance of the obligation 
matters in and of itself, such that even if performed without the intention of 
nearness to God, still the obligation has been met. For example, since absolute 
loyalty to all one's promises is a religious obligation, should a person 
undertake to do a certain work in return for a certain payment then the 
undertaking or performance of that work is enough to meet his religious duty 
as well, and so there is no need for an additional intention of proximity to 
God. It is the same with paying off a debt, for example.437 
Obligations can also be divided into exact [on individual], or 'aini (ینیع), and 
communal [collective], or kifayah [kifaei (ییافک) in Persian] categories. An 
'aini obligation means that such law is obligatory on each and every 
individual. Daily prayer and fasting, for example, are of `aini obligations. 
Kifaei obligation is that which is obligatory for the general Muslim 
population, and which, when performed by an individual or a group, there is 
no sense of specific obligation laid upon any one for that. Such types of 
obligation are usually related to the needs of the community as a whole. A 
clear example can be when a dead body is left unburied. While the body is 
                                                          
436 It means that the action is performed solely with the intention of nearness to God without any 
worldly or material motive.  
437 Motahari, op cit., pp. 28-9. 
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unburied it is a collective duty of all capable Muslims to do the job. If this 
duty is fulfilled by some, there is no longer an obligation for others. However 
if the deed is undertaken improperly all qualified members of the society are 
sinful because of a failure to fulfill their religious duty. The level of kifayah, 
or sufficiency, in this case is the proper burial of the dead body and until then 
all qualified persons are responsible toward that objective.438 
Another way that the obligations are divided is into specific, or ta`yini (ینییعَ) 
and optional, or takhiyiri (یرییخَ). A ta`yini obligation is when a specified 
thing must be performed, like the daily prayers, and it cannot be replaced by 
anything else. A takhiyiri obligation on the other hand, means that the duty-
bound individuals and groups are to perform one thing out of two or several 
things. For example, if a person has intentionally not fasted one day during 
the fasting month (Ramadan), it is a takhiyiri obligation for him either to feed 
sixty poor people or to fast for two months or, as in previous times, to free a 
slave. In this case when fasting itself is a t`ayini obligation its atonement is 
takhiyri and the duty-bound can choose of several options to fulfil his/her 
religious duty.439 
Obligations are also divided is into nafsi (یسفن) and muqaddami (یمدقم). A 
nafsi obligation means that the duty matters by itself while a muqaddami 
obligation is obligatory for the sake of something else. Canonical prayers, for 
example, are nafsi obligations, while to take ablution, Wudu (وضو) in order to 
enter the state of cleanliness necessary for the performance of prayer is not 
obligatory until the time of prayer has begun. Then Wudu (ablution) which is 
                                                          
438 Ibid, p. 29. 
439 Ibid. 
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not obligatory in and of itself, becomes mandatory as preparation for the 
obligatory prayer.440 
In order to discuss Jihad as a religious obligation, we should bear in mind that 
depending which category nature of jihad belongs to, the term ‘jihad’ can 
have different dimensions and forms. Shia jurists usually confine themselves 
to mentioning religious duties without discussing the nature of them. The 
silence of jurisprudence with regards to a detailed explanation of the nature 
of each individual law provides the opportunity for those who want to modify 
the practical outcomes of such laws when they find it difficult to modify the 
law itself. Then even if the law is well accepted and unalterable, still the 
discussion over its nature can make significant differences in practice. In our 
case of study, for instance, if jihad is supposed as a fixed religious obligation 
and as such there is no way to remove it from the religious system there is 
still a great chance to modify its outward consequences by challenging its 
nature as a religious duty. Below I will mention some examples of how 
outward result can be affected when jihad is moved from one categorization 
to another. 
For example if jihad is considered as an `aini obligation then all qualified441 
populations of Muslims must be engaged in jihad all the time. However if it 
is considered as a kifaei obligation then in addition to its effect on the number 
of those who will become engaged in jihad (which is the primary interest of 
jurisprudence) another important issue emerges as well. This second issue, 
                                                          
440 Ibid, pp. 29-30. 
441 In Shia jurisprudence only mature, male, healthy, sane, free, capable persons are qualified for 
jihad. This will be discussed in section of jihad soon. 
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which is as important or even more important than what is the concern of 
jurisprudence, is the embedment of a goal for jihad whereby fulfilling it is the 
criterion for measuring the religious duty of the individuals concerned as 
fulfilled. As we discussed above the goal of the religious duty in the case of 
a “dead body”, as a “collective duty” or wajib kifaei, is the proper burial of 
that body. The “proper burial”, for example, can be done both manually by 
several people engaged or one person doing it using a machine and this part 
is not of interest to jurisprudence provided the goal is achieved. In the case of 
jihad, while it is difficult to challenge jurists regarding other rulings related 
to jihad, it is easier to challenge them in regard with goal of jihad as a kefaei 
obligation. Without the clear determination of a concise goal, the element of 
‘kifayah’, or sufficiency, as a measuring criterion, will be absent. Determining 
the right criteria as the “point of sufficiency” or kifayah, for jihad is the salient 
point where there is enough opportunity to not only affect but also determine 
both form and consequences of kifaei jihad. For example putting a just goal 
for jihad, as the point where meeting it is sufficient for the religious duty to 
be fulfilled, is easier to contain destructive consequences of jihad in its 
jurisprudential form than by engaging in technical debates over other details 
or bargaining/begging jurisprudents to put their fatwas on hold temporarily –
because they cannot cancel such fatwas permanently anyway. 
Regarding the difference between the tawassuli and ta`abbudi natures of jihad 
for example, whereas jihad as a tawassuli obligation targets an intended 
result, ta`abbudi jihad relies merely on the intention of proximity to God, 
regardless of the result. A tawasuli jihad can be executed /fulfilled by non-
Muslims as well because it is only a tool for achieving the result. The words 
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Tawasul and ‘wasylah’, meaning the use of a tool for undertaking something, 
are from the same root. In tawasuli obligations it is the result that matters and 
the action is only a tool that should be assessed according to the degree of 
achieving the result. If jihad be considered as a tawasuli obligation then the 
whole focus goes to its ultimate goal rather than to the particular form of jihad 
itself. 
Regarding the difference between considering jihad as a nafsi or muqaddami 
obligation, again the outcomes can be quite heterogeneous. For instance if 
jihad is considered as a nafsi obligation, then it would be rigid and 
unmodifiable. On the other hand, if jihad is considered as a muqaddami 
obligation with respect to keeping the Islamic society safe and developing, as 
the ultimate obligation, then the story will become quite different. A 
muqaddami obligation has no value of itself but seen obligatory as a necessary 
prelude for a greater and main thing. If we consider jihad as a muqaddami 
obligation then self-defense, the promotion of religion, and the expansion of 
the Islamic lands and so on may be among the main ultimate obligations. 
Accordingly if each of the possible ultimate obligations are examined and 
critiqued effectively then there is no need to examine or critique jihad as such 
as the ground element. 
The difference between the ta`yini and takhyiri nature of jihad can be as 
significant as the other cases noted above. While jihad as a t`ayini obligation 
is quite rigid and has no flexibility, if jihad be understood as a takhyiri 
obligation for achieving certain goals, such as safeguarding the security of 
society, then the means of achieving such a goal can be quite flexible. In that 
case, for example, diplomacy can be considered as a way of waging jihad for 
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reaching the desired goal of security. To conclude I should repeat that there 
are interesting ways available to contain the potential negative consequences 
of jurisprudential jihad using jurisprudence itself through discussion over 
possible nature of jihad as a religious duty. I tried to point some of the most 
important ones here, however a proper investigation in this regard takes a full 
research. 
Segmentation of Shia jurisprudence 
Shia jurisprudential language, as seen above, is quite complicated. To know 
the stand of this jurisprudence on a specific issue we need to know where such 
an issue is discussed in the different sections of jurisprudential books. To find 
the position of Shia jurisprudence regarding an issue we need to take three 
main elements into account: first, the nature of such ruling; second, to whom 
the ruling applies (whether it is the individual or the society, including the 
government, which is responsible for fulfilling the duty); third, the number of 
parties engaged442 in the ruling or its consequences. The first element divides 
rulings into worship-acts and non-worship acts. The second element divides 
rulings into commands and non-commands. The third element divides rulings 
into categories of contracts and non-contracts. I will show below how the way 
these three elements that divide the religious laws in Shia jurisprudence shape 
the segmentation of jurisprudential books. However, despite the clear criteria 
about the segmentation of religious rulings, not all jurists treat all rulings 
equally and in some cases there is considerable ambiguity and confusion 
involved. The confusion escalates when some locate a specific action within 
                                                          
442 By engagement here it means those who their agreement or permission is required for the action 
to take place. 
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one segmentation but then load the requirements of other segmentations onto 
it. Jihad is an example of such confusion as will be discussed below. 
Despite some cases of ambiguity and confusion, familiarity with the 
segmentation of the rulings is necessary in order to recognize the position and 
significance of different rulings in Shia jurisprudence. As a side advantage, it 
also enables us to find the ruling related to each specific action within the 
Shia jurisprudential texts. Knowing the position of different sets of religious 
rulings becomes more relevant when we notice that not all Muslims treat all 
sets of rulings the same as outlined previously. As mentioned, many Muslims 
do not believe in an all-encompassing jurisprudence, therefore they do not 
practice all the various sets of rulings. The jurisprudential segmentation of 
rulings, besides showing the level of importance of each ruling, also indicates 
who and how should practice each ruling. For example if an issue is 
categorized as ‘unilateral instigation’ or iqa` then no one can interfere but if 
it is a ‘bilateral contract’ or aqd then the second part or her/his 
representative/lawyer can interfere, and furthermore if it regards social issues 
or hudud then the government can or shall interfere. 
Muhaqiq Hilli’s Segmentation of religious rulings  
Apart from creed, or religious belief as such, and ethics, all subjects related 
to actions about which Islam contains instructions are included in 
jurisprudence. Thus the range of jurisprudence is extremely wide. To organize 
and structure this wide range of subjects Shia jurists have offered different 
classifications for the segmentation of religious laws. Among the most 
famous is Muhaqiq Hilli’s Classification which today is followed by the 
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majority of Shia jurists.443 According to this classification, introduced by 
Muhaqiq Hilli in his Sharay`,444 all the issues of jurisprudence are divided 
into four categories: acts of worship [worship rites], two-party contracts, one-
party contracts and commands. This division has been based on the fact that 
all actions that must be performed in accordance to the Islamic law are either 
such that a condition of their validity is the intention of proximity to God, or 
it is something else.445 The four categories of jurisprudential rulings are in 
their turn subdivisions of the main categorization of actions into intention-
based (liturgical or worship acts) and non-intention based (legal or non-
worship acts) actions.446 
With respect to the first group of actions it means that they must be done 
solely for God and if there is any other motivation for their performance the 
obligation is not fulfilled. More than that, it is only the intention of nearness 
to God which gives meaning to such actions and therefore such actions do not 
have any independent value in and of themselves. If an action does not belong 
to the above category it means that the mere performance is enough for 
fulfilling the religious duty. This second category again has its sub-divisions 
of contracts and non-contracts which the latter are called commands. 
                                                          
443 Motahari, op cit, p. 37. 
444 Najm al-Din Jafar ibn Hasan famous as Muhaqiq al-Hilli, Sharay` al-islam fil-halal wal-haram, 
Ismaeilian publication (Qum), 1408LH (Lunar Hijri). 
445 Motahari, op cit, pp. 36-7. 
446 Intention here is different from the general good intention or good will that all Muslims are 
expected to keep in every aspect of their lives. Intention here is what turns a normal or even a 
meaningless action into a valuable one and the value exclusively belongs to the intention and not 
the action. Worship-acts are among such actions which without an intention behind them are quite 
meaningless. For example repeating some movements during a canonical daily prayer makes no 
sense by itself. It is a specific intention behind it which gives it a meaning. 
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Contracts in their turn are divided to bilateral contracts and unilateral 
contracts447 which will be discussed shortly. 448 
As was mentioned before, the first group of actions which require ‘niyyat’, or 
the intention of proximity to God, are liturgical or devotional actions, which 
in some quarters are called “worship”. These actions primarily deal with the 
inner rapport of men and women with God.449 With respect to devotional acts 
of worship, no third party, just God and the performer of the act, is involved. 
Such acts are called ‘arkan’(ناکرا), or pillars, of Islam. There are four 
(excluding shahada which is not an ongoing act) that are unanimously 
accepted by all Muslims of different jurisprudential and non-jurisprudential 
schools as discussed before. These main rituals of Islam are: 1- The canonical 
prayers, or salat (هلاص) in Arabic and namaz (زامن) in Persian. 2- Fasting in the 
month of Ramazan, or sawm (موص) in Arabic and Rouzeh (هزور) in Persian. 3- 
Pilgrimage of Ka`bah in Mecca, or hajj(جح). 4- The obligatory almsgiving, or 
zakat (هاکز). The shared part of jurisprudence between all schools is this part 
of basic rituals or arkan. Other than arkan some Muslims might not believe 
in or practice the other parts of the jurisprudence. Unlike the non-
jurisprudentialists, who mostly confine themselves to the above mentioned 
four practices, or arkan, as obligatory worships, jurisprudentialists include 
more practices as obligatory worships as will be discussed hereunder. Usually 
around 10 actions are mentioned by jurists as ‘ibadat’ (تادابع), or worship 
acts, which will be discussed in the section related to acts of worship below. 
                                                          
447 Motahari, op cit, p. 37. 
448 For more details see: Najm al-Din Jafar ibn Hasan famous as Muhaqiq al-Hilli, Sharay` al-
islam fil-halal wal-haram, Ismaeilian publication, 1408LH. 
449 Nasr, Islam, p. 28. 
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As mentioned above, non-intention based actions are of two types: either their 
actualization does not depend upon the execution of a special contract, or it 
does. Acts that do not depend upon the execution of a special contract, like 
inheritance, punishments (hudoud), retribution and so on, are grouped 
together in jurisprudence under the heading ahkam (commands). If they do 
depend upon the execution of a contract, then again they are of two types: 
either the contract must be recited by two parties, or there is no need for two 
parties and the contract is unilateral. If they are of the first type, like selling, 
hire, and marriage, they are called contract, or `aqd plural `uqud (دوقع), in 
which one party states the contract and the other agrees. If, however, one 
person can carry it out alone with no need of another party to agree, like when 
one forgives one’s debt, it is called unilateral instigation, or iqa` plural iqa`at 
(تاعاقیا). The following chart illustrates how all aspects of the actions, indeed 
the entire life of believers’ is covered by jurisprudence. 
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In ‘Hilli’s Classification of jurisprudence’ each of the four sections of 
jurisprudence which are: 1- ibadat (worship-acts), 2- ahkam (commands), 3-  
`uqud (contracts) and 4- iqa`at (unilateral instigations), have their own 
subdivisions and each subdivision is called a book. According to this 
classification the section on ibadat has 10 books, ahkam has 12 books, `uqud 
has 19 books, and iqa`at has 11 books. Since in all of those versions of Shia 
jurisprudence that follow Hili’s classification jihad is mentioned as a part of 
God 
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ibadat, we will accordingly focus on the ibadat section. To show the 
environment surrounding devotional/liturgical acts in Shia jurisprudence I 
briefly mention the contents of each book of the liturgical category so that 
when we discuss jihad in this context, a better understanding may be 
achieved. 
Liturgical Category (Ibadat تادابع)  
There are usually ten books of devotional/liturgical acts in Shia 
Jurisprudence.450 I will describe each in turn. 
1- The Book of Cleanliness (kitab al-taharah هراهطلا باتك) 
The book of cleanliness discusses cleanliness from both a general perspective 
and cleanliness as a requirement for engaging in worship, and then if the 
worship or liturgical act is obligatory, the required cleanliness becomes 
obligatory as well. Cleanliness is of two kinds: being clean from external, 
non-inherent, material filth and pollution; and being spiritually clean of 
internal pollution. The first type of cleanliness refers to the body and the 
clothes of the performer of certain devotional actions being clean from the ten 
types of filth which include urine, faeces, blood, sperm, contact with corpses, 
and so on. All of these are termed najasat or filth. The second type of 
cleanliness means entering the state of purity by performing either the partial 
ablution (wudu), or total ablution (ghusl). Entering this state is a condition of 
certain forms of worship-act like prayer and the circumambulation of the 
Ka'ba during pilgrimage. Cleanliness of the second type is annulled by a 
series of natural things like sleep, urination, and sexual intercourse. The state 
                                                          
450 Zain al-Din al-Jubaei al-Amili famous as al-Shahid al-Thani, Arl-Rawda al-Bahiyya fi sharh al-
Luma al-Dimashqiyya, Al-Adab Publications of Najaf,1387L/ 1967. 
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of cleanliness must thereafter be re-entered before any worship act which 
requires it is undertaken. The first type of cleanliness, which is cleanliness 
from material filth such as urine and so on, is an on-going responsibility for 
a Muslim. A Muslim is supposed to keep his or her body and clothes clean 
from filth all the times.451 
2- The Book of Prayer (kitab al-salat هلاصلا باتک) 
The Book of Prayer includes requirements, conditions, preparations, essential 
activities, preventions and delayers of different prayers. In this book both the 
obligatory prayers and desirable, or nafilah (هلفان), prayers are discussed. 
Obligatory prayers are the five daily ritual prayers, the prayers of 'id ul fitr 
and 'id ul adha, the prayer for the deceased, the prayer of special signs such 
as earthquakes, and the prayer of the circumambulation of the Ka'ba. Unlike 
obligatory prayers which are fixed, the desirable prayers are not limited in 
number and can be undertaken in a range of circumstances as, for example, 
when thanking God for a happy situation, entering holy sites, and so on. Of 
course there are regular daily desirable prayers of which some are performed 
between the obligatory prayers, or late at night time on a regular basis. In the 
Book of Prayer the qualities of prayer, such as the prayer of a person when at 
his or her hometown and the prayer of a person who is travelling (traveller’s 
prayer رفاسم زامن), individual prayer and congregational prayer, the prayer 
offered at the right time (ida ءادا) and the prayer missed and made up for after 
its time (qada ءاضق ) are all discussed in detail.452 
                                                          
451 Motahari, op cit., p. 38. 
452 Ibid. 
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3- The Book of Fasting (kitab al-sawm موصلا باتک) 
In a state of fasting, one must refrain from eating and drinking, from sexual 
intercourse, from immersing one’s head in water, from breathing in dust 
intentionally, and from certain other things. Each lunar year during the month 
of Ramazan it is obligatory for every mature, sane person who is not ruled as 
an exception453 to fast each day from daybreak until sundown. However, other 
than the month of Ramazan fasting is generally desirable although on the 
festivals of Eid ul-Fitr and Eid ul-Adha fasting is forbidden, and on certain 
other days, like the day of 'Ashura, it is undesirable (makruh هورکم).454 
4- The Book of pilgrimage (kitab al-hajj جحلا باتک) 
The performance of the Hajj consists of 13 obligatory actions including, in 
this order of performance: 
1- Ihram455  upon oneself in Mecca. 
2- A stay in Arafat. 
3- A night in Mash'ar. 
4- The symbolic ceremony of throwing stones at the furthest (of three) 
boulders which represents Satan. 
5- The sacrifice of an animal and giving the meat to needy. 
6- The shaving of the head (or shortening the hair) for men and the 
cutting of a few curls for women. 
7- Circumambulation (walking seven times around the Holy Ka'ba). 
                                                          
453 Those who are travelling or suffering from illness and also   women during their monthly 
period or or having young child are exempt from fasting. 
454 Motahari, op cit., p. 38. 
455 Wearing two simple white pieces on unsewn cloths for men and wearing white undecorated 
cloths for women and intention to start Hajj for nearness to God. 
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8- The prayer of circumambulation.  
9- Walking seven times between the two hills of Safa and Marwah. 
10- The final circumambulation.456  
11- The prayer of the final circumambulation.  
12- Throwing stones for a second time at the three boulders.  
13- The night stays at Mina.  
Hajj is obligatory for each Muslim who can afford to go to Mecca once during 
his or her lifetime.457 
5- The Book of lesser pilgrimage (kitab al-umrah هرمعلا باتک)  
Umrah is a kind of Pilgrimage with fewer performances. Umrah is a desirable 
action which, unlike the obligatory pilgrimage, can be undertaken at any time 
of the year other than in the month of Hajj. The actions of umrah are as 
follows: Binding "ihram" on oneself at one of the special places (mi'qat)458; 
circumambulation; the prayer of circumambulation; walking seven times 
between Safa and Marwa; and, finally, the cutting of a few hairs or a 
fingernail or toe nail.  
6- The Book of one-fifth tax (kitab al-Khums سمخلا باتک) 
Khums is one of the two main Shia Islamic taxes. Khums and its homologous 
religious tax, Zakat, are obligatory for Muslims. Khums, which means a fifth, 
in the view of most of the Sunni Ulama refers only a fifth of the spoils of war 
that is to be transferred to the bait ul-mal, or public treasury of the Islamic 
                                                          
456 The final circumambulation, which is also called as tawaf al-nisa` (ءاسنلا فاوط), is only done by 
Shias because Umar, the second Caliph banned it during his caliphacy and Sunnis follow his 
ijtihad on this issue.  
457 Motahari, op cit., p. 39. 
458 There five points in different distances from Mecca that those who want to do hajj can start 
“ihram” from there. 
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society, and it is to be spent for the public’s benefit.459 In the Shia view, 
however, spoils of war are just only one of the things from which khums must 
be paid. In addition, profits of mining, the finding of buried treasure and of 
diving in the sea, wealth that is mixed with illegitimate wealth when unable 
to discern the amount and/or the owner, and that which exceeds one's yearly 
expenses from one's yearly earnings, must all be divided into five and one of 
those fifths be given as khums. Today Khums in Shia Islam is the great budget 
that can secure the important part of the budget of the state. When the 
government is not Islamic, Shia Muslims should give a big portion of khums, 
which is called the “share of the Hidden Imam” or sahm-e imam, to the Grand 
Ayatollahs or the representatives they introduce, as representatives of the 
Hidden Imam.460 The collected money will be spent on behalf of the payers 
of the tax. Khums has been the most significant factor in helping Shia Ulama 
to keep their independence from governments. 
7- The Book of compulsory charity (kitab al- Zakat هاکزلا باتک) 
Zakat in Shia Islam is more limited compared to Sunni jurisprudence.461 This 
is because zakat in Sunni jurisprudence covers most cases of khums as well. 
In fact it could be said that khums and zakat are combined in Sunni Islam 
while separated in Shia. In Shia jurisprudence zakat is another way of paying 
from wealth derived from nine things: gold, silver, wheat, barley, dates, 
                                                          
459 Motahari, Ashenaei ba ulum-e islami: fiqh (Introduction to Islamic sciences: jurisprudence), 
sadra publications, No year, p. 93. 
460 Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Bahjat, Verdict on khums, accessible via: 
http://www.bahjat.org/index.php/ahkam/esteftahat/111-2011-09-06-09-21-52.html 
 ریقف دیس هب طیارشلا عماج دهتجم نذا اب دیاب بجاو طایتحا ربانب هك تسا تاداس مهس نآ تمسق كی .دننك تمسق ود دیاب ار سمخ
 عماج دهتجم هب دیاب نامز نیا رد هك تسا ماما مهس نآ رگید فصن و دنهدب هدش هدنامرد هار رد هك ىدیس هب ای ،میتی دیس ای
 مدع تروص رد و دنهدب طیارشلادنناسرب دهد   ىم هزاجا وا هك ىفرصم هب ،دهتجم هبلاطم . 
461 Sajjad Choubineh, “Ahl-e sunnat va masaleh zakat (Sunnis and the question of zakat.”  Journal 
of Farhang-e jihad, No. 38, 1383/2004, p. 226. 
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grapes, and animals of the cow family, animals of the sheep family, and 
animals of the camel family. In jurisprudence the conditions for zakat are due 
from these nine things; the amount of zakat due; and the ways it is to be spent 
are discussed. In the Qur’an, zakat is mostly mentioned along with prayer, but 
only that it is to be given and the ways it is to be spent has been explained – 
the rest is known from the Sunna.462 Zakat was one of the very first sources 
of disagreement within the young Islamic society after the Prophet passed 
away. Abu Bakr, the first caliph, cracked down those who refused paying 
zakat as they had rejected Islam or became apostates. These early internal 
wars of Muslims are named ‘the battles of apostasy’ because the first Caliph 
called those insurgents as ‘apostates’. 
There is a need for an explanation regarding the nature of zakat as the ‘poor 
tax’ and its difference with general optional charitable acts as cases of right-
doing. Optional charitable acts are called sadaqat (sing. Sadaqa). Unlike 
charitable acts zakat is compulsory and is regarded as a purification for what 
one gains when enjoying the general facilities and infrastructures of society. 
It is while general charitable acts are optional, although highly recommended. 
This is why zakat is less of a voluntary and more of a required religious 
observance.463  
According to the Quran the main utilizations of zakat are as follows which 
one of them is related to jihad: 
 First and formost the poor and needy 
                                                          
462 Motahari, op cit., p. 38. 
463  Farah, Islam, p. 142. 
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 Slaves, to purchase their freedom 
 Officials who gathered the zakat 
 Those non-Muslims whose hearts are to be reconciled as ta`lif 
al-qulub.464  
 Paying back debts incurred as a consequence of acts of 
benevolence 
 Arming the Muslim army  
 Supporting institutions dedicated to the service of God 
 Aiding poor travellers including those searching for 
knowledge465 
8- The Book of Taking Seclusion (Kitab al-i'tikaf فاکتعلاا باتک)  
I`tikaf which literally means ‘to reside in a specified place’ is a type of 
‘worship-act’ whereby a person resides in a mosque for at least three days 
during 13th to 15th of month of Rajab. The performer of i`tikaf is supposed not 
to exit the mosque and is meant to be fasting all three days. I'tikaf is desirable, 
not obligatory, but if it is begun and kept up for two days, the third day 
becomes obligatory.466  
                                                          
464 Ta`lif qulub has a lot of potential to work on. Actually when ta`lif qulub is mentioned clearly in 
the Quran jihad has never been mentioned as warfare in the Quran. It is while jihad is now treated 
as a fixed pricnciple while ta`lif qulub is ignored. I believe ta`lif qulub has the potential to become 
a basis for reshaping Muslims way of treating non-Muslims and as such should not be limited only 
to giving them gifts but to treat them in a way that become friendly with Muslims. 
465  Farah, Islam, p. 143. 
466 Motahari, op cit., p. 39. 
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9- The Book of commanding to good and Prohibiting from evil (kitab al-amr 
bil-m 'aruf wa nahy anil-munkar رکنملا نع یهن و فورعملاب رملاا باتک)  
There is a verse in the Quran which encourages the believers to appoint a 
qualified group from among themselves to promote the good and admonish 
evil: 
And let there be among you a community calling to virtue, and 
advocating righteousness, and admonish about evil. These are the 
successful. (3:104)467 
This verse has been used to derive a ruling which orders all Muslims to be 
guardians of virtue and goodness, and to deter evil and wrong-doings. The 
guarding of virtue and good is named amr bil-m'aruf and the deterrance of 
evil and wrongs is called nahy anil-munkar. The requirements and conditions 
of those who are qualified for amr bil-maruf and nahy anil-munkar are stated 
in jurisprudence in detail. We will discuss this principle later on, when 
examining the position of jihad according to Shia jurisprudence regarding 
suicide terrorism. 
Before discussing the Book of Jihad, which is the centre of our focus in this 
research, it is necessary to mention that when we talk about jurisprudential 
jihad, or jihad in the jurisprudence, it means jihad as an act of worship – like 
the above mentioned nine worship acts – which is compulsory for all those 
Muslims who qualify for it. Seeing jihad as an act of worship limits, if not 
completely removes, any flexibility for challenging it if one belongs to the 
                                                          
467 Transliteration: Waltakun minkum ommatun yada`wna ila alkhayri wayamuroona bialma`roofi 
wayanhawna a`ni almunkari waolaika humu almuflihoon. 
  لن  وله نلی لو نفو مر  ع لم لانب لنو مر م
 ألی لو نر ی لخ لا ىللنِ لنومع  دلی ٌةـم
مَ  م ُم ن  م نُم لت ل لو  :نارمع لآ﴿ لنو محنل ف م  لا م مه لكنئ َٰهللومَ لو نر ُل ن م  لا نن لع١٠٤﴾  
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jurisprudential camp and believes in all-encompassing jurisprudence. Still 
there are some ways, or better to say techniques, which can be applied to 
manage jurisprudential jihad by questioning or modifying its nature rather 
than questioning itself as was discussed before. 
10- The Book of Jihad (Kitab al-jihad داهجلا باتک) 
The book of jihad deals with issues concerning Islamic warfare. Jihad has two 
meanings in Shia jurisprudence. The first is the particular meaning of jihad, 
or jihad bi ma`na al-akhas (صخلاا ینعمب داهج), and it means attacking non-
Muslims preeptively to force them to convert if they are polytheists, or 
ensuring submission to the Islamic rules if they are people of the Book 
(monotheists).468 Jihad in its preemptive meaning must be led by the 
immaculate Imam or his representative exclusively appointed for war. Jihad 
in its second meaning or jihad bi ma`na al-a`am ()معلاا ینعمب داهج) is much 
broader. It not only covers all forms of armed conflict but also theoretically 
rules foreign policy and international relations of the Islamic state as well. 
The word ‘jihad’ in Shia jurisprudence when used without any perfix or 
suffix, for example jihad al-difa` or jihad al-boghat, means the first one or 
jihad bi ma`ana al-akhas. The definition of jihad provided by Shahid Thani, 
                                                          
468 Al Hassan ibn Yuosof famous as Allamah al-Hilli, Tabsirah al-mutia`limin, No publication, No 
year, pp. 80-81. 
رافکلا نم دهاجی نم یف 
و هلاتق و هداهج بجو نیَداهشلا رکنا و ملاسلاا فلاخ نم لک :نیمسق نومسقنی مه  
.سوجملا و یراصنلا و دوهیلا مه و ،همذلا طیارش اومزتلی و هیزجلا اولبقی وا اوملسی نا لاا مهنع عجری لا امهدحا 
.اولتقی وا اوملسی نا یلا مهلاتق بجی قرف ثلاثلا ادع نم و 
 عیبانیلا هلسلس ،داشرا یلا یداهلا :داصتقلاا ،یسوطلا نسحلا نبا دمحم رفعج یبا توریب ،هعیشلا هقفلا هسسوم ،هیهقفلا-  ،نانبل
1993 صص  ،3-4 .  
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whose book is taught in todays Shia seminaries as a staple text book, is clear 
in this regard: 
Jihad has different forms:  
 Fighting non-believers preemptively to invite them to Islam. 
 Fighting against an attack by non-believers to the Muslims 
in which case the attack is so severe that it leads to the 
domination of non-Muslims over Muslims, or taking their 
properties and so on, even if the damage be limited. 
 Fighting one who is going to kill an innocent person, or 
takes his belongings, or assulting others sexually. In all 
cases there is no difference whether the victim is Muslim or 
non-Muslim. In this category fits the case when a captured 
Muslim fights to save his life. From above mentioned other 
than section one others better be called difa`, or defence, 
rather than jihad. 
 Fighting those who rebel against the just ruler. 
What we mean here by jihad is the first section only. We will also 
discuss the second section briefly and not as the main subject but as 
a secondary issue. Section four will be discussed at the end of this 
book and section three will be discussed in the Book of punishments, 
or kitab al-hudoud.469 
                                                          
469  ثیحب رافکلا نم نیملسملا یلع مهدی نم داهج و -2 .ملاسلاا یلا مهئاعدل ائادتبا نیکرشملا داهج -1 :ماسقا )داهجلا( وه و
 .لق نا و ههبشا ام و مهلام ذخا وا مهدلاب یلع مهئلایتسا نوفاخی3-  دیری نم داهج و یبس وا ،لام ذخا وا ،همرتحم سفن لتق
مسقلا اذه یلع قلطا امبر و .هسفن نع اعفاد نیملسملل نیکرشملا نیب ریسلاا داهج هنم و اقلطم میرح )لولاا ریغ(  لا  افدلا
 .یلوا وه و ،داهجلا4- .ماملاا یلع هاغبلا داهج و  
  و ءافیتسا ریغ نم یناثلا رکذ درطتسا و  لولاا نع انه ثحبلاو.دودحلا باتک یف ثلاثلاو ،باتکلا رخآ یف عبارلا رکذ  
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Although jihad concerns armed conflict, if we consider the contents of the Book of 
Jihad as its subject matter, then its scope becomes much broader. Jurists also include 
in the Book of Jihad discussions of peace treaties with non-Muslim states and also 
the conditions for allowing non-Muslims to live inside an Islamic polity as citizens 
of that state, or ahl al-dhimah (همذلا لها).470 According to this broad approach, in 
addition to religiously legal armed actions, jihad covers the main three 
responsibilities of the Islamic state. These are Internal Security Policy, Defence 
Policy, and Foreign Policy. Despite different approaches of famous Shia jurists – 
including Shaikh Tusi, Muhaqiq Hilli, Allama Hilli, Shahid Awwal and Shaid 
Thani, in including various subjects in their Books of Jihad – what is discussed 
commonly under the particular meaning of jihad in Shia jurisprudence is usually 
preemptive jihad. Other subjects are discussed under fighting rebels, difa` or 
hudoud. Thus jihad in Shia jurisprudence primarily means waging war against non-
Muslims who have no peace agreement with Muslims, and the fighting is for the 
sake of converting them to Islam or forcing them to submit to Islamic rules and law. 
This is what we call it ‘jurisprudential jihad’ or ‘preemptive/offensive jihad’ in this 
research. 
Jihad in this meaning is a fard kifayah, or collective obligation, for all mature, sane, 
free, males who are not too old and are able to move properly, able to see properly, 
are healthy, and financially independent, acting upon the order of a just ruler or his 
representative.471 Jihad in its jurisprudential meaning must be waged at least once 
                                                          
 ،هینیدلا فجنلا هعماج ،هیقشمدلا هعمللا حرش یف هیهبلا هضورلا ،)یناثلا دیهشلا( یلماعلا یعبجلا نیدلا نیز1967 (1387 ،)
 صص379-380.  
Shahid Thani, Al-Rawda, pp. 379-380. 
470 Ibid, pp. 379-420. 
471 Al-Shahid al-Thani, al-Rawdah al-Bahyyah, p. 79. 
 :هیلع بجی نمیف 
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annually472 against non-believers who are not Jews, Christians or Zoroastrians until 
they accept Islam as their religion. Jihad against believers in God, whether they are 
people of the Book like Jews and Christians, or those who believe in God like 
Zoroastrians, but who do not accept to pay the poll tax, or jizyah (هیزج), is 
compulsory as well.473 
As was noted above in this discussion of Shia jurisprudence, the main 
understanding of the term jihad is preemptive attack on non-believers. Other 
versions of warfare such as self-defense, defense, and fighting against rebellions 
are essentially secondary uses of this term and are included only because they are 
discussed within the Book of Jihad.474 Jihad in its basic meaning as a preemptive 
attack in Shia jurisprudence is a compulsory duty just like other duties of worship 
or liturgical acts such as prayer, almsgiving, and fasting. However, I argue that such 
an understanding of jihad, although it has served the worldly power of Muslims 
during the history of Islam, is arguably nevertheless against the basic teachings of 
Islam. This claim will be elaborated in the following chapter. 
 
  
                                                          
 لا و ،یمعا لا و ،ادعقم لا و ،امه نوکی لا نا و ،هروکذلا و ،هیرحلا و ،لقعلا و ،غولبلا :هعسَ طورشب هیافکلا یلع ضرف وه و
.هیلع هبصن نم وا ماملاا ءاعد و ،هنع زجعی اضیرم 
هملاعلاب روهشملا رهطملا نب یلع نب فسوی نب نسحلا  .ص ،نیملعتملا هرصبَ ،یلحلا79.  
472 ماع لک یف هرم هلقا و 
 ص ،هیهبلا هضورلا ،یناثلا دیهشلا380  
473 Allahah Hilli, Tabsirah al-mutia`limin, p. 80. 
:مهداهج بجی نم یف 
.همذلا طیارش اومزتلی وا اوملسی نا یلا نولتقی ءلاوه و ،سوجملا و یراصنلا و دوهیلا :لولاا 
 نم :یناثلا.ملاسلاا لاا هنم لبقی لا و هداهج بجی رافکلا نم ءلاوه ادع  
 ص ،نیملعتملا هرصبَ ،یلحلا هملاعب روهشملا رهطملا نب یلع نب فسوی نب نسحلا روصنم یبا نیدلا لامج80 .  
  
474 Salehi Najafabadi, Jihad, p. 39. 
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Chapter Nine  
Jihad in Shia jurisprudence: a critical analysis 
 
Introduction 
Jihad is one of the least understood concepts not only among non-Muslims 
but among Muslims themselves as well. The spectrum in which jihad is 
understood is so wide that while for some it is a medium of peace for others 
it is nothing but offensive warfare. In this chapter I will analyse the concept 
of jihad in Shia jurisprudence (as we call it Jurisprudential jihad) and will 
assess its compatibility with Islamic teachings and Shia theological 
foundations. 
Jihad: a general terminology 
The Arabic word Jihad is a classical term which has its root in ج-ه-د  [j-h-d] 
meaning ‘to strive’ or ‘hard effort’. Contrary to popular perceptions, the word 
jihad in the Quran is not necessarily employed as a holy or even a positive 
term, certainly not all the time. For example in the Quranic verse 29 of chapter 
eight, jihad has quite a negative meaning. In this case the Quran uses the term 
‘jihad’ pointing to the hard effort of those parents who want to impose 
disbelief on their Muslim children, which is a great sin:  
And We have enjoined upon man goodness to parents. But if they 
endeavour (strive) to make you associate with Me (God) that of 
which you have no knowledge, do not obey them. To Me is your 
return, and I will inform you about what you used to do. (Q.29:8)475 
                                                          
475  لنو مل لم  علَ  ممتن مك ا لمنب مُم مئ بلنم ألف  م ُم مع نج  ر لم ـيللنِ ۚ ا لممه  ع نطمَ للالف ٌم ل نع نهنب لكلل لس یلل ا لم ينب َل نر  شمتنل َل ا لدلها لج ننِ لو ۖ اان  س مح نه ی لدنلا لونب لنا لسن ن  لْا الن یـص لو لو
﴿ توبکنعلا٨﴾  
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Jihad in the Quran is not a militant expression either.476 There is no place in 
the Quran where ‘jihad’ undoubtedly means ‘war’. To know the exact 
meaning of jihad in the Quran, and according to Izutsu’s vast researches, the 
best way is to take a semantic approach and read Quranic terms in line with 
their neighbouring words belonging to the same meaning field.477 In none of 
41 cases where the word jihad occurs in 36 verses of the Quran is this term –
at least directly and definitely - associated with ‘warfare’. While the term 
‘qital’ in the Quran is clearly about warfare. This is why for many scholars 
the Quranic terms for war are qital and harb and not jihad.478 Jihad, in the 
Quran, is reserved for the overall religious struggle – mostly in the form of 
personal purification but even in the social form it is not violent but a 
collective effort to establish a just social order. In the Quran, as mentioned 
above, military activity is consistently identified by other terms, such as qital 
and harb which both mean “fighting”.479  
Outside the Quranic context, generally speaking, jihad as an Islamic concept 
includes any effort in the way of God, or jihad fi-sabil Allah (الله لیبس یف داهج). 
Jihad in this meaning is a religious phenomenon and may have three main 
forms drawn from different perspectives: 
1- Jihad as warfare (for ideology, theology or pure conquest) 
2- Jihad as the spiritual journey of a believer 
                                                          
476   Farah, Islam, p. 158. 
477 Toshihiko Izutsu, Ethico-religious Concepts in the Quran, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2002, pp. 26. 
478 Mirbagheri, War and Peace in Islam, p. 117. 
479 Brek Batley, The Justifications for Jihad, War and Revolution in Islam, Australian Strategic 
and Defence Studies Centre, Working Paper No. 375, June 2003, p. 4. 
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3- Jihad as striving in the way of God by all means which can include just 
war as well.480 
 
The first concept indicates that jihad primarily means warfare. Among 
Western scholars, for example, the Middle East historian Bernard Lewis 
argues that for most of the recorded history of Islam, from the lifetime of the 
Prophet Muhammad onward, the word jihad was used in a primarily military 
sense and therefore the usage of the term without further explanation refers 
to military combat.481 Within Islamic jurisprudence jihad merely means 
‘warfare’ -as was discussed before. Advocates of the second meaning of 
jihad, which consider it as referring to the spiritual journey of believers, deny 
any relationship between jihad and violence.482 This latter approach toward 
jihad indicates that many of the Quranic verses and Prophetic traditions 
confirm such non-violent understanding of jihad. Sufi Muslims, who mostly 
refuse any kind of violence even in its defensive form483, can be considered 
as the typical representatives of the second understanding of jihad. For 
example the great mystic Ghazali, in his plenary work ‘Kimiaye saadat’ 
(which is written for general and not for expert readers, as he himself 
indicates), discusses all aspects of religion but does not have any heading on 
the question of fighting at all.484 Even though such omission of mentioning 
                                                          
480 Armstrong, Muhammad, p. 168. 
481 Bernard Lewis, The Political Language of Islam, University of Chicago Press, 1988, p. 72.  
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militaristic jihad could not be interpreted as its rejection by Ghazali, it is 
nonetheless a clear sign of its insignificance in Ghazali’s view. 
The third understanding of jihad is a middle way between the first two. The 
inclusivity of the third understanding of jihad has made it quite popular and 
consequently this understanding is repeated by both Muslim and non-Muslim 
scholars when discussing jihad. Karen Armstrong’s describtion of jihad is a 
good example: 
Jihad is not one of the five pillars of Islam. It is not the central prop 
of the religion, despite the common Western view. But it was and it 
remains a duty for Muslims to commit themselves to  astruggle on 
all fronts- moral, spiritual, and political – to create a just and decent 
society, where the poor and the vulnerable are not exploited, in the 
way that God had intended man to live. Fighting and warfare might 
sometimes be necessary, but it was only a minor part of the whole 
jihad or struggle.485 
I suggest a fourth way for understanding jihad, namely differentiating betwen 
jihad in a jurisprudential context and jihad outside the jurisprudential context. 
Jihad within jurisprudence, which can be called the ‘jurisprudential jihad’ 
clearly means not only militant combat but also the offensive version of it 
both in Shia and Sunni jurisprudence. I believe bargaining with jurists to 
modify their understanding of jihad is of a very limited use because such a 
modification will not only be quite limited, but, more importantly, will be 
temporary. Unlike jihad in jurisprudence, jihad outside jurisprudence is 
probably not related to violence if we put the Quran as the criterion. Although 
mainstream Muslims might, and actually should, support legitimate defence, 
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it is not necessary to undertake legitimate defence in the name of jihad. This 
is what we explained in the section related to the position of ‘Theo-ethical 
Islam’ towards jihad. The theo-ethicalist approach towards violence can be a 
clear instance for such a supra-religious attitude toward the just and moral use 
of force. I will not get into details here again.  In contrast to the jurisprudential 
understanding of jihad, in none of 41 occurrences of the word in the Quran486 
does jihad undoubtedly mean fighting. Even in verses 41, 44, 81, 86 and 88 
of the Chapter 9 there is need for interpreting ‘falling behind’ as ‘withdrawal 
from war’. In the Quran, as mentioned previously, the word qital (لاتق) and 
harb (برح) are the synonym of fighting and not the word ‘jihad’.  
Not only does the word ‘jihad’ not mean violence in the Quran but, with two 
exceptions, it is not even associated with other words meaning violence. In 
the Quran verses 9:73 and 66:9 we find the only instances where ‘jihad’ is 
accompanied by a word which might be interpreted as indicating violence. 
The word ‘rough’ and the expression of ‘be rough on them’ (مهیلع ظلغو) in 
these two verses are the only occasions that the term ‘jihad’ is accompanied 
with such words. In other Quranic verses where the term jihad is mentioned 
the surrounding words lack such characteristics. However roughness, as 
articulated within these two verses, cannot be interpreted as warfare. This is 
because in both cases they talk about ‘hypocrites’ and according to Islamic 
teachings, including Islamic jurisprudence, fighting hypocrites is not allowed. 
This is the case in both Sunni and Shia jurisprudence. So, however the 
                                                          
486 2:218, 3:142, 4:95, 5:35, 5:53, 5:54, 6:109, 8:72, 74, 75, 9:16, 19, 20, 24, 44, 73, 79, 81, 86, 88, 
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‘roughness’ might be interpreted, it cannot include warfare. Good evidence 
that roughness by itself does not mean fighting is found in verse 3:159 which 
says if the Prophet was rough to his followers they would leave him. It is 
obvious that the notion of the Prophet physically or militarily fighting his own 
followers does not make sense, so then ‘roughness’ as such cannot imply 
fighting.487 
Unlike ‘jihad’ the term ‘qital’, derived from the root ل.ت.ق [q.t.l] meaning 
murder, not only literally means fighting but the surrounding words in the 
verses are also about physical fighting as well. Thus interpreting ‘jihad’ as 
warfare needs a significant critique as to its literal meaning. It requires one to 
ignore the surrounding words in those verses where the word ‘jihad’ is used. 
While ‘qital’ has been repeated 170 times in the Quran and is the most 
frequent term meaning ‘fighting’, still there is another term in the Qur’an 
which bears a similar meaning. ‘Harb’, or war, which has been used seven 
times in the Qur’an, means fighting as well. So although word ‘fighting’ is 
present in the Quran, the use of jihad as warfare is actually absent from it. As 
Aslan remarks: “There are a handful of words in Arabic which can be 
definitively translated as ‘war’; jihad is not one of them”.488 
The question is then why, in spite of existence of other terms and more 
specifically the frequently repeated term of ‘qital’, it was that ‘jihad’ was used 
                                                          
487 So by mercy from Allah, [O Muhammad], you were lenient with them [the believers]. And if 
you had been rude [in speech] and harsh in heart, they would have disbanded from about you. So 
pardon them and ask forgiveness for them and consult them in the matter. And when you have 
decided, then rely upon Allah. Indeed, Allah loves those who rely [upon Him]. (3:159) 
 مك  ولل لو ۖ  ممهلل لتننل نهـهللا لن  م ٍة لم  ح لر ا لمنبلف ۖ نر  مل  لْا ينف  ممه  رنوا لش لو  ممهلل  رنف  غلت  سا لو  ممه ن لع مف  عالف ۖ لكنل  و لح  ن نم او ُّضلفن للا نب للق لا لظینل لغ ا
ا ظلف لتن ا لذنإلف
 نارمع لآ﴿  لنینل  ك لولت م  لا ُّب نحمی لهـهللا ـننِ ۚ نهـهللا ىلل لع  لـك لولتلف لت  م لز لع١٥٩﴾  
488 Reza Aslan, No god But God, p. 80. 
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for warfare after the Prophet. The answer to this question becomes clearer if 
we pay attention to the conditions/restrictions imposed by the Quran on 
‘qital’, or ‘fighting’. In the Quran Qital is quite bound by strict conditions in 
a way that it is not easy to apply outside of its Quranic context:  
Fight in the way of Allah those who fight you but do not start fighting. Indeed. 
Allah does not like transgressors. (Q.2:190)489 
Due to rigid  restrictions imposed by the Quran on ‘qital’ those ambitious 
scholars, strategists, and statesmen who were supportive of an aggressive  
foreign policy by the early Islamic states found such restrictions regarding 
‘qital’ cumbersome and searched for a replacement which gave them an open 
hand.490 They found the term ‘jihad’ capable of freeing the accumulated 
energies of Muslims. The only thing which was needed to adapt ‘jihad’ with 
the requirments of that ‘aggressive foreign policy’ was some degree of 
modification of this term in a way that brought it out of context.491 As is 
usually expected in similar situations, many of scholras who pursued glory 
and the flourishment of their own society and faith welcomed the 
responsibility to help with the modification of the term to match it with the 
evolving political requirements.492 This is why some scholars such as Joseph 
Schacht consider that Islamic law follows politics when it comes to issue of 
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Peace in Islam, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 118. 
 241 
 
war rather than the other way around: “The (Islamic) law of war was deduced 
from a one-sided picture of the wars of conquest.”493  
Jihad is one of few fields where not only there was a full agreement between 
the ruling elite and the pious scholars, but as Schacht argues, the scholars 
followed the ruling elite. As such Islam was used to justify propagation and 
empire-building through unconditional warfare. Clear prohibition against 
aggression and forceful conversion, however, were sometimes neglected or 
‘divinely’ overridden by Quranic verses judged more supportive of the 
political or material interests of the governing group or ruler.494 The early 
jurists’ formulations of rules of jihad and proactive interpretation of jihad 
reflected the interests of the established Muslim authority which sought the 
expansion of the Islamic empire, rather than the creation of a just social order 
as insisted upon in the Quran.495  
Clear evidence that jihad in its military form was not a religious concept is 
seen in the Masoudi’s understanding of jihad as a progressive secular policy. 
Masoudi (d. 956), the great historian of the third century of Islam, in his book 
of ‘Murouj al-Dhahab’, reports how the Chinese government of the time was 
not waging jihad (by which he means a progressive military campaign of 
course and not a religious duty of Islam) and that led to weakness and collapse 
of China’s power.496 China was a non-Muslim state and had minimal relations 
with the Islamic polity of the period. Thus the term ‘jihad’ used by Masoudi 
                                                          
493 Schacht, Islamic law, p. 76. 
494 Brek Batley, “The Justifications for Jihad, War and Revolution in Islam.”  Australian Strategic 
and Defence Studies Centre, Working Paper No. 375, June 2003, p. 12. 
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was equal to an ‘aggressive foreign and military policy’ rather than as a 
strictly spiritual concept. This illustrates how quickly even scholarly Muslims 
of the time regarded jihad as a tool for such an ‘aggressive policy’. The 
concept of jihad in its jurisprudential meaning and as unconditional warfare 
gradually became one of dominant meanings of this term by the third century 
of Islam497 and as such fiqh was following the realpolitik of the era in this 
regard rather than shaping it. According to the prominent Egyption scholar 
Ali Abdel Raziq (d. 1966), the rule of those who came after the death of the 
Prophet, including the first generation of Muslims, rather than being an 
Islamic state it was in fact an imperial Arab entity.498 As such introducing 
jihad as offensive warfare was due to the requirements of the imperial policies 
of Muslims rather than a religious doctrine. When jihad finished its job in 
serving the Muslims’ emprial expansionism it was marjinalized: “Once the 
Muslim expansion ended quietism set in; there seemed no need for jihad 
[anymore].” 499 
Jihad as an imperial policy, as will be discussed in the next section, was quite 
instrumental in serving the expansive political and territorial interests of the 
post-Muhammadan Muslim polity. 
                                                          
497 Ahamad Kazemi Mousavi, “Rethinking concept of jihad.”  Accessible via: 
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 Services of jihad for Muslims 
As we witnessed above jihad was used by Muslims to serve their temporal 
interests and in this was extraordinarily successful. As will be discussed 
shortly, the aggressive foreign policy undertaken by the successors of the 
Prophet of Islam under the name of jihad was not only useful but also essential 
for the survival of the nasceant Islamic society of the time. Was this 
aggressive military and foreign policy understood as an offensive or jihad 
ibtida`n from the very beginning (as was promoted by the Islamic 
jurisprudence after its formation later on in mid second Islamic century)? Or 
was it a mere requirement of the time as some scholars such as Reza Aslan 
argue500 and developed a religious characteristic later? In either case the 
aggressive policy of conquering new lands in the name of jihad had a 
significant effect on what we know as Islam today. It is well-known that the 
Islamic state after the death of the Prophet of Islam faced a vital crisis of 
legitimacy.501 In absence of the Prophet Arab tribes (except one) refused to 
obey the new Caliph and the first thing affected by this disobedience was the 
flow of taxes and manpower – two main pillars of any given state. The 
aggressive policy, later famous as offensive jihad, was introduced to address 
this situation. The new Caliph announced those who refused to pay taxes and 
join the army to defend the polity were henceforth ‘apostates’ and legitimate 
targets of religiously approved warfare, later, jihad. Despite the fact that the 
Quran had prohibited believers from questioning the faith of those who claim 
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it502 and as such implying disobedient Muslims to be apostates, which seemed 
against the very basic teachings of Islam, this policy worked quite well. 
Therefore it could be said that early Islamic society, which was threatened by 
a serious lack of material and social resources, owed its survival a debt to this 
rethinking of jihad503 -although at this stage not in its established name as a 
jurisprudential term yet.  
It is well documented that, after the Prophet, all Arab tribes outside Medina, 
except the Banu Saqif and inhabitants of Mecca, refused the authority of the 
first Caliph.504 The tribes of Arabia not only rejected the new ruler, refused to 
pay taxes and stopped sending their troops for military missions, but they also 
started fighting the Muslim state over different issues including political 
power and succession of the Prophet. This threatened to paralyze the newly 
stablished polity completely. The opposition was so intensive that advocates 
of the Muslim state were by comparison just a small minority within 
Arabia.505 Pro-government people were feeling so unsafe that the first Caliph, 
Abu Bakr, ordered them to stay armed all the time so as to be able to defend 
themselves in the case of a sudden ambush.506 To meet the crucial challenges 
fiqh (of course in its primitive form) was used as a tool and not as a guide at 
this stage. Firstly it was utilised in establishing the insitutution of caliphate 
which had no clear basis in the Quran or Prophetic tradition.507 Secondly it 
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was employed to crack down on the nominally rebelling tribes by calling them 
‘apostates’ and expose them to harsh punishments. Such unusual use of fiqh 
was contrary to teachings of Islam and faced objections from close 
companions of the Prophet including the second and the fourth Caliphs of 
Islam.508   
Fiqh was also used to justify an aggressive foreign policy, later known as the 
doctrine of jihad, to attract resources outwards by conquering new lands in an 
effort to address the ongoing problem of internal economic disparity more 
sustainably by distributing wealth instead of asking for taxes.509 This attitude 
toward the new aggressive foriegn policy, namely jihad, can be seen in the 
argument of Amr ibn al-A`s, the Muslim commander. Ibn al-A`s does not 
point to jihad as a religious duty when he suggested the conquest of Egypt to 
the second Caliph Umar. He simply provided quite a secular argument that 
Egypt would be a good source of manpower and wealth for the Muslim state 
and that it was an easy target.510 The aggressive foreign policy based on what 
later on became famous as ‘jusrisprudential jihad’ helped with the rapid 
expansion of Muslim power. The power of the nascent Islamic caliphate grew 
well beyond the Arabian Peninsula in the form of a Muslim Empire with an 
area of influence that stretched from the borders of China and the Indian 
subcontinent, across Central Asia, the Middle East, North Africa, Sicily, and 
the Iberian Peninsula, to the Pyrenees, within around a century. Its advance 
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into Europe was stopped only in 110/732 as result of defeat in the Battle of 
Tours by Franks. 
 
 
Figure 11 expansion of Islam in around one century after its emergence 
 Expansion under the Prophet, 622–632 EC/ 1-11 A.H.   
 Expansion during the Rashidun Caliphate, 632–661 EC/ 11-40 A.H. 
 Expansion during the Umayyad Caliphate, 661–750 EC/ 40-129 A.H. 
The power and success that followed opening new lands and gaining access to 
unprecedented level of wealth and glory provided Muslims such a self-confidence 
which helped them open the way for all kind of intellectual activities from art to 
science and philosophy.511 We pointed to this era of competency which is known 
as the ‘golden age of Islam’ previously. This service of jihad, in my opinion, is even 
                                                          
511 Abdulkarim Soroush, “hele barkhiz ke andishe digar bayad kard (It is the time for waking up).” 
accessible via: http://sorush-andishe.persianblog.ir/ 
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more important than its material gains for Muslims. Most, if not all, glorious 
intellectual productions of the Muslims belong to this era.512  
From what we learnt about challenges facing the Muslim state, it could be said that 
jihad in this new era (after the Prophet) meant the opposite of sitting idle watching 
the new Islamic faith and state fading and even disappearing quickly. Perhaps Jihad 
can be thought of as a movement, like other movements around the world, and at 
that time everything was evaluated through it including what it meant to be a good 
Muslim. With the advent of this new form of jihad, Muslims were not thinking 
about their internal clashes anymore because they were invited to something 
worldly, much more fruitful, and at the same time religiously rewarded. Any other 
internal dispute would look ridiculous compared to what Jihad was offering. Ayoub 
pointing to this fact suggests: 
[Jihad] changed the course of world history, spread Islam far beyond 
its original home, brought rich avenues into Muslim treasury, and 
turned the energies of the disaffected tribes of Makkah [Mecca] and 
Madinah [Medina], at least for a while, away from their inter-tribal 
squabbles.513 
By virtue of the development of the ‘jihad doctrine’, a society which was quite 
unstable became one of the dominant powers of the world. Jihad effectively 
                                                          
512 One may say that, as the progressive policy itself was not directly rooted in the teachings of 
Islam, the freedom given to minorities and the generous behaviour toward all subjects of Muslims 
and non-Muslims by the ruling elite neither was not the result of literal following the religious 
commands rather was result of the self-confidence injected by the consecutive succeses owed to 
this progressive policy executed under the name of “jihad”. As such if we do not count Islam 
responsible for side effects of the Muslim empire’s progressive policy conducted in the name of 
jihad, we should not credit it for the tolerant policy of the Muslim empire toward minorities either. 
This, in my view, is a valid argument because such details were not point of concern for Islam as a 
religion as they are not primary points of concerns for other religions either. Of course the general 
moral guidelines promoted by Islam among its believers could have indirect influence on Mulims 
outward behaviour but not in a form of an exact policy as was followed by the Muslim empire. No 
doubt any self-interest behaviour does not have its roots in moral guidelines as such the 
“progressive jihad” even lacked an indirect connection to Islam as religion. 
513 Ayoub, Islam: Faith and History, p. 74. 
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redirected Muslim attention from internal disputes to expanding their power 
externally. This untied the believers by changing priorities of the competing 
groups within the Islamic society from weakening each other to uniting to 
dominate others. Yet the doctrine of jihad was not fully developed as an 
ideological expression at this stage. Until Muslim conquerors began 
absorbing the cultures and practices of the Near East where an aggressive 
doctrine similar to jihad was a part of the belief system, jihad stayed on 
margins of religion rather than being its core.514 Muslim armies just joined 
the existing fracas between the warring empires of Persians and Romans and 
learnt from them how to further their strategic plans using religion. The use 
of religion for furthering the imperialistic ambitions abroad was an important 
part of the strategy of the main empires of the time. Both the Christian 
Byzantines and the Zoroastrian Persians used religion as an ideological tool 
in their struggle for empire.515 As such Muslims neither created offensive 
jihad (as an ideological expression) nor defined it, though they quickly 
dominated it.516  
As we witnessed fiqh, at this stage, was not an antecessor but was used as a 
tool to serve demands and interests of the Islamic polity rather than showing 
it the way and serving as a guide. The Muslim scholar Timothy Winter, also 
known as Abdal Hakim Murad, believes that it was not fiqh which shaped the 
conduct of the post-Muhammedan Muslim army in the first place but it was 
the conduct of the Muslim army which shaped the Islamic laws regulating 
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warfare.517 For instance issue of ‘murabitah’ or guarding the borders arose 
only after the Islamic state became a direct neighbor of the Byzantine Empire. 
There was no such notion during the Prophet’s lifetime. In other words it was 
the practice of the conquerors that laid the foundations for most of the 
medieval jihad theory. Quite a lot of the rules of jihad are actually traced back 
to the Caliph Umar, for instance, rather than back to the Quran and the hadith. 
518 Rudolph Peters, who has written a book on jihad in medieval Sharia argues 
extensively and in detail that the doctrine of jihad became as a part of Islamic 
teachings in the latter half of the second century of Islam.519 
Fiqh was coordinated with the requirements of Islamic society of the time and 
because of that its position toward jihad remained quite fluid. At the end of 
eighth century it was al-Shaybani, Harun al-Rashid’s chief justice of Abbasid 
Empire, who for the first time wrote ‘Introduction to the Law of Nations’ 
which provided detailed guidelines for the conduct of jihad against 
unbelievers, as well as guidelines on the treatment of non-Muslim subjects 
under Muslim rule.520 Others followed al-Shaybani in expanding the doctrine 
of jihad based on the actual conduct of Muslim conquerors.521 Judge 
Weeramantry, member of the International Court of Justice, believes that 
siyar of al-Shaybani was the first systematic treatment of international law 
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and not, as it is taught in law schools, work of Grotius law of war some 800 
years later.522 
Even after the treatise of al-Shaybani, the Islamic military jurisprudence or 
siyar -which dealt with relations with neighboring states including questions 
of peace and war- did not remain unchanged but kept pace with changing 
concepts and needs.523 It was after the closure of the gate of ijtihad in 13th 
century when jihad, along with other findings of previous jurists, was labelled 
as divine and irreversible. The fact that fiqh became rigid might be attributed 
to a decision of the jurists themselves, however it seems it was because fiqh 
lost its importance following the Mongol invasion when it was no longer 
referred to by the government anymore. Then fiqh became fixed and rigid 
because it was ignored at the political level and this rigidity was simply 
consequence of its marginalization.  This was not a calculated decision by 
Muslim leadership. After the closure of the gates of ijtihad all jurists did 
henceforth was only repeating characteristics of their ideal version of society 
as they perceived or understood past events and issues when such 
jurisprudence was of any use for politics. This nostalgia for a semi-mythical 
‘golden past’ and the sacralisation of its characteristics seems to have become 
an inherent trait of Islamic jurisprudence. It may well remain like that until 
the next time of prosperity and success is experienced by Muslims and the 
self-confidence returns. As such, and in support of my argument in Chapter 
six, it was the mental status of feeling insecure and threatened which led to 
close-mindedness and rigidity rather than Islamic jurisprudence as such. If 
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historically self-confidence resulting from consecutive successes brought 
open-mindedness and tolerance then the Islamic world needs to break the 
circle of failure and desperation before it becomes open and tolerant as it was 
in its ‘golden age’. Of course if such a situation of self-confidence re-emerges 
then Islamic jurisprudence will adapt itself as it was the case in its early 
stages. 
To return to our point regarding services of jihad it is worthy to mention that 
in its military campaigns the Muslim state did not change the dominant 
strategies of the non-Muslim empires of the time, rather it modified the 
existing war tactics to avoid clash with Islam’s main teachings. Accordingly 
it could be said that, compared to what was happening in the battlefields of 
the time, Muslims humanized war.524 For example, they defined illegitimate 
targets for war in a way that excluded a substantial part of human populations 
such as women, children, the ill, the clergy, and the elderly from becoming 
targets in armed conflicts. Giving an immunity to such a big portion of the 
enemy’s population was quite a revolutionary development to the then 
concept of war. Such immunity was one-sided and the other side would fight 
Muslims in the same traditional way of killing and destroying 
indiscriminately. 525  
Contrary to the perception that the early Muslim conquerors used to force 
conversion upon the conquered people in fact they did not even encourage 
it.526 The financial and social advantages of being an Arab Muslim in the 
                                                          
524 Armstrong, Muhammad, p. 169. 
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eighth and ninth centuries were so much that Islam became an elite clique, 
which a non-Arab could join only through a complex process that involved 
becoming first the client, or mawali, of an Arab.527 A significant development 
that happened in Islamic jurisprudence at a later time, and after the time of 
successful conquests was over, was that jurists not only added the concept of 
‘forceful conversion’ to jihad but also made a pillar of it. This was because of 
the self-confidence started to fade away as Muslims felt under pressure after 
the flow of wealth slowed down because of lack of improvement in the new 
fronts of Europe, India, and China.528 In previous times the wealth gained 
after conquering new lands would cover the whole expenses of the campaign 
and the leftover was enough to fund more new campaigns, making such 
ventures a wise investment. However after facing failure in several fronts at 
the same time the circle of success stopped spinning and the whole process 
changed inalterably.  
Muslims in the conquered lands with non-Muslim majority populations, 
without the traditional self-confidence generated by consecutive successful 
conquests, felt uncomfortable and under pressure. While Arabia itself did not 
enjoy any significant strategic importance, many of these newly conquered 
lands were among top strategic elements of the then civilized world. Muslims, 
in my opinion, not protected by the grandeur produced by such dazzling 
conquests, were seen ordinary people now and as such were more feeling like 
‘renters’ in the new lands rather than established owners. This lack of self-
confidence created a lot of pressure from Muslim public and elite to the 
                                                          
527 Aslan, No god but God, p. 80. 
528 See: Reza Aslan, No god but God, Random House, 2005 
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political institutions to change the course and force the non-Muslims to 
convert to Islam. As such the new policy of conversion grew out of weakness 
and insecurity. The ruling elite, in need of the public support, had no choice 
but to follow popular demand to show less tolerance toward non-Muslims. It 
was how another shift in concept of jihad took place when the previously 
forbidden element of forceful conversion became one of pillars of jihad. 
Although this new approach toward jihad helped with adding more to number 
of Muslims and increased their quantity at the same time it weakened quality 
of the community of Muslims and led to even more defeats which full 
destruction of their capital ‘Baghdad’ was its pick. To conclude when 
successful jihad promoted self-confidence and consequently tolerance among 
Muslims its decline brought intolerance and rigidness. 
Another service of jihad was its influence on strengthening the believers’ 
faith. Masoudi reports a dialogue between the Muslim commander, Mughirah 
ibn Shu`ba, and one of local governors of Iran when the Muslim army was 
about to attack that territory. This conversation shows how military successes 
deepened the faith in heart of the new born society of Muslims: 
The local governor said: “you Arabs suffer from starvation. If it is 
why you are here we are happy to give you food you need and you 
return.” Mughirah replied: “we Arabs were a bunch of despicable 
and contemptible people. We used to eat dogs and dead bodies. It 
was until God sent to us a Prophet from ourselves who was, noble 
and soothfast. The Prophet encouraged us to rise and predicted a 
glorious future for us that we found it true [as result of conquests] 
…529 
                                                          
529 Masoudi, Murouj al-Dhahab, Vol. 1, pp. 679-680. 
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Despite all its positive benefits or consequences for some Muslims, the 
doctrine of jihad was not without fault. Now we turn to some of the main 
negative consequences or effects that ‘offensive jihad’ had upon Islam and 
start from its contradiction with the Prophetic doctrine of a just war. 
Jihad as an imperial strategy and not a Prophetic doctrine 
The battle over land and trade routes was the basis of the foreign policies of 
other contemporary religious empires such as Christian Byzantium and 
Zoroastrian Persia.530 Jihad, as a political and military doctrine, was in line 
with the similar strategies of other world powers of the time. What early 
Muslims did was to use their religion as the element of social cohesion to 
compete with the rival empires in the same way that the rival empires were 
doing. This new development differed from what Muslims experienced 
regarding safeguarding their own trade routes and threatening the enemy’s 
trade routes during the Prophet’s time. Not only the scale but also the 
philosophy behind these two were not comparable. Raiding Meccan carvans, 
during the Prophet’s time, not only would provide the Umma with desperately 
needed income in return for their confiscated properties by the Meccans, 531 it 
also would disrupt the trade flowing in and out of the hostile Mecca.532 
Therefore attacking Meccan caravans was used as a defensive military 
strategy to weaken the enemy through affecting its main source of income in 
order to force them accept a peace treaty with the Muslims and to stop them 
attacking Muslims militarily. Right after the “Hudaybiah Peace Treaty” these 
                                                          
530 Armstrong, Muhammad, p. 55. 
531 Ibid, p. 169. 
532 Ibid, p. 170. 
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kinds of raids were stopped by Muslims. This strategy suited the small army 
of the Muslim state of Medina, and Muslims had an advantage in using it 
because, unlike Meccans, they were more reliant on labour-dependant 
agriculture and less on trade. As such, arguabaly, there was a significant 
difference between what happened during the Prophet’s era and after the 
Prophet by Muslim government in the name of jihad. The strategy of the 
Islamic polity during the lifetime of the Prophet was defensive by nature; 
while labelling the strategy of Muslims after the Prophet as ‘defensive’ 
requires ignoring substantial facts of vast conquests outside Arabia and also 
the issue of forceful conversion which was recommended by jurisprudence 
but did not find any chance to be fulfilled due to collapse of an already 
weakened Islamic empire by the Mongols.  
It is interesting to know that, as verse 22:39 indicates, even defence was not 
approved by the Quran in the first place. The first time Muslims were allowed 
to defend themselves militarily was 15 years after advent of Islam.533 It was 
then when the Quran finally permitted Muslims to do ‘qital’ in self defence.534 
According to the Quranic teachings on ‘qital’ there was a significant 
difference between the pre-Islamic notion of war and the Islamic one. 
Armstrong calls it as “evolvement of theology of the just war by the 
Quran.”535 For the first time in Arabia, in which hitherto tribes would not 
hesitate to wage war if their interests would require so, the two concepts of 
‘just war’ and ‘justice in war’ were introduced by the Islamic doctrine of war. 
                                                          
533 Ibid, p. 168. 
534 Permission is given to those who are fought against, and God is Able to give them victory. 
(Q.22:39) 
535 Armstrong, Muhammad, p. 169. 
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The Islamic doctrine of ‘justice of war’, or jus ad bellum, prohibited all but 
defensive wars.536 With regard to the ‘justice in war’, or jus in bello, in the 
Islamic doctrine of war there was a clear distinction between civilians and 
non-civilians of the enemy.537 It was while, according to the pre-Islamic 
doctrine of war, killing members of the enemy’s tribe was quite common and 
in some cases civilians were slaughtered in an inhumane way to teach enemies 
and opponents a lesson that would not be forgotten quickly and to set an 
example to other tribes.538 The emerging Islamic doctrine of war prohibited 
the killing of non-combatants, and it also banned any kind of sexual violence, 
torturing prisoners of war, destruction of properties and religious or medical 
institutions. These elements several centuries later were incorporated into the 
modern international laws of war.539 The Islamic doctrine of war during the 
lifetime of the Prophet was based on the Quranic concept of ‘qital’ and 
different from later ‘jihad’. Still later jihad applied to tactical levels some 
rulings of ‘qital’ as legitimate way of fighting but not that much at the 
strategic level of confining to defensive war. The main effect of ‘Quranic 
qital’ on the later jihad was humanization of war to some significant extents.  
Hereunder I will re-count the main inconsistencies between ‘offensive jihad’ 
of the later time and the early Prophetinc defence policy. There are some 
points that can help with clarifying the nature of the armed conflicts that early 
Muslims, during the time of the Prophet, were engaged in and their difference 
                                                          
536 And fight in the cause of God those who fight you, but do not begin hostility; God does not 
love the aggressors. (Q.2:190) 
537 Aslan, No god but God, p. 84. 
538 Ibn Athir, Tarikh kamil, trans. Seyyed Hossein Rouhani, Vol. 2, Asatir Publications, 
1370/1991, pp. 582-802. 
539 Aslan, No god but God, p. 84. 
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with later ‘offensive jihad’ which later on was theorised by Islamic 
jurisprudence (now known as jurisprudential jihad) and is the centre of our 
focus in this research. These points are: 
1- Except for a few incidents all other cases of the war that Muslims were 
engaged in happened a few miles around Medina which shows clearly 
that Muslims were in a defensive position rather than an offensive one. 
A big part of Arabia was untouched by the Muslim army until warring 
tribes attacked Muslims in Mecca after the return of the Prophet to this 
city and the Muslim army chased them in the desert to their strongholds 
during battles of Hawazen and Thaqif. Basically those battles which the 
Prophet himself took part or expeditions sent by him were for securing 
Medina and its routes or fighting back against Meccans and their allies 
of tribes close by Medina. In those wars that the Prophet himself did not 
attend some mistakes happened.  Fighting in the ‘Forbidden Months’ in 
some occasions by Muslims, killing some of those who stopped 
fighting, or those who were in peace with allies of Medina are among 
them. Then such incidents in these kinds of ‘Saraya’540 could not be 
considered as role models or exemplary for Muslims while they were 
clearly condemned by the Prophet himself.541 
2- The Prophet’s policies were quite different in each war then deriving 
specific rules from these incidents, which each of them was different 
from others, is another misjudgement.542 What fiqh claims as deriving 
                                                          
540 Wars in which the Prophet himself was not attending. 
541 Armstrong, Muhammad, pp. 170-171. 
542 Salehi, Jihad, pp. 34-38. 
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its rulings regarding jihad from the conduct of the Prophet contradicts 
this simple fact that actually there was no single method for fighting 
during the time of the Prophet and every situation was treated 
differently by the Prophet.543 Therefore claiming some fixed 
jurisprudential rulings in the name of jihad by fiqh contradicts historical 
realities and jurisprudential jihad cannot be based on the Prophet’s 
conduct. 
3- Defence was a necessity for the Muslims’ Medina state of the 
prophet’s time. The Muslim polity of that time, like any other given 
state, was supposed to have a defence policy for protecting its people 
against outside threats. This defence policy was designed for the 
Medina city-state of the time and was exclusive for those specific 
conditions.544 The Islamic jurisprudence which decontextulalized, 
generalized, and rendered defence policy of Medina as ahistorical 
applicable universally and eternally for all times and all places545 
ignores that only members of the city-state of Medina were addressed 
by the Quranic verses of defence. For example in verse 9:120 only 
people of Medina are mentioned as responsible for defending the city-
state.546 In another verse it is clarified that the city-state should not 
breach conditions of peace treaties with disbelievers and get involved 
                                                          
543 Ibid. 
544 Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari, “Tanqih-e mahall-e neza` ba faqihan.” Secton2. Accessible 
via: http://mohammadmojtahedshabestari.com/articles.php 
545 Mirbagheri, War and Peace in Islam, p. 120. 
546 It was not [proper] for the people of Medina and those surrounding them of the Bedouins that 
they remain behind after [the departure of] the Messenger of Allah or that they prefer themselves 
over his self … . (Q.9:120) 
 اومب لغ  رلی للا لو نهـهللا نلومسـر ن لع اومـفل لخلتلی نلَ نبا لر  عل  لْا لن  م ممهلل  و لح  ن لم لو نةلنی ند لم لا نل هل نلْ لنا لك ا لم ٌأ لملظ  ممهمبی نصمی للا  ممـهنلأنب لكنل
َٰلذ نه نس ـفن ن لع  منه نسمفنلأنب
 لطلی للا لو نهـهللا نلینب لس ينف ٌة لصلم  خ لم للا لو ٌب لصلن للا لو ـللا ـننِ ٌحنلا لص ٌل لم لع نهنب ممهلل لبنتمك ـلانِ الا ـین ٍّومد لع  ن نم لنوملالنلی للا لو لرـاف ُم  لا مظی نغلی اائ نط  و لم لنومئ لهه
 :ةبوتلا﴿ لنینن نس  حم  لا لر  جلَ معی نضمی للا١٢٠﴾  
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when other Muslims outside Media are attacked by non-Muslims even 
if the attack on Muslims is because of their faith.547 My point is that 
when non-Medinan Muslims of the Prophet’s time had no 
responsibility toward Medina city-state how could universal rulings 
be sensibly derived from specific conditions of that period and be 
obligatory for all Muslims of the world for all times. 
4- In seventh century Arabia the political system was based on tribal 
affiliation. A fellow-tribesman would be defended no matter how 
genuine his case was and outside the tribe all obligations ceased and 
no agency existed to prevent wrong being done to members of other 
tribes.548 The tribe was the primary source of security and therefore 
anyone expelled from a tribe was not able to find a replacement source 
of security.549 The life of the Prophet is a good example of how losing 
the tribe’s protection could make a person vulnerable and 
defenseless.550 That was because of the rigidity of the tribal system 
based on blood kinship. A scarcity of resources and a culture of 
intolerance resulted from the roughness of the surrounding 
environment was source of extensive conflicts. This provided the 
grounds for endless animosity among existing tribes to the extent that 
                                                          
547 Indeed, those who have believed and emigrated and fought with their wealth and lives in the 
cause of Allah and those who gave shelter and aided - they are allies of one another. But those who 
believed and did not emigrate - for you there is no guardianship of them until they emigrate. And if 
they seek help of you for the religion, then you must help, except against a people between 
yourselves and whom is a treaty. And Allah is seeing of what you do.  (Q.8:72) 
 مر لصلنـو او لوآ لنی نـذلا لو نهـهللا نلینب لس ينف  منه نسمفنلَ لو  منهنلا لو  ملأنب اومدلها لج لو او مر لجاله لو اومن لمآ لنی نـذلا ـننِ اومن لمآ لنی نـذلا لو ٍ  علب مءالینل  ولَ  ممه مض  علب لكنئ َٰهللو
مَ او
 َٰـىت لح ٍء  ي لش ن  م منهنتلی للا لو ن  م مُم لل ا لم او مر نجالهمی  ملل لو  ٌقالثی  م ممهلن یلب لو  م ُم لن یلب ٍم  ولق َٰىلل لع ـلانِ مر  ـصنلا م ُم  یلل لعلف ننی  دلا ينف  م مكو مر لصنلت  سا نننِ لو او مر نجالهمی
 :لافنلْا﴿ ٌری نصلب لنومل لم  علَ ا لمنب مهـهللا لو٧٢﴾  
548 Armstrong, Muhammad, p. 58. 
549 Ibid, p. 102. 
550 Ibid, pp. 134, 135. 
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a state of war was the normal relationship between tribes unless there 
was a peace treaty. This is what Karen Armstrong describes as the 
“bloodbath of seventh-century Arabia”.551 Converts to the new 
religion of Islam not only had lost their traditional source of security, 
following their rejection of their tribal idols, but also faced additional 
threats by questioning the whole belief system of idolatry which was 
supported by all tribes. This would provide the grounds for rival tribes 
to cooperate in putting pressure on Muslims. Muslims after the 
Prophet were not living in a state of war with other countries, as the 
early Muslims were with rival tribes. Therefore; simulation of later 
centuries, when Muslims were not living under tribal systems any 
more, with Arabia of the 7th century and perceiving a continuous ‘state 
of war’ and basing ‘preemptive jihad’ on it, in my opinion, was a clear 
deviation from the Prophetic defense policy. 
5- If offensive jihad had a place in the Islamic teachings the Prophet 
himself was supposed to articulate or undertake it first while he did 
not.552 We know that when the Muslim army entered Mecca, the 
Prophet prohibited any harm to pagans as long as pagans did not start 
attacking Muslims and again no pagan was forced to convert553 which 
both are clearly contrary to the jurisprudential jihad. It is interesting 
to know that pagans fought along with Muslims to protect Mecca 
against Hawazen and Thaqif tribes. 
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From the above five points we can conclude that the defense policy of the Prophet 
had little in common with the later ‘offensive jihad’. It could be said that a state of 
war was imposed on Muslims from the very beginning and therefore the Muslims’ 
defence policy was a reaction to it.554 This is why, when the Quran allowed defence, 
it only addressed the Emigrants ‘muhajerun’ from Mecca and not the native Medina 
Helpers ‘ansar’ because pagan Meccans did not attack the Helpers before.555 
However when the Meccan army attacked Medina then Medinans were allowed to 
fight as well. Having this in mind we can gain a better understanding of the 
justification for permitting Muslims to fight during the Prophet’s lifetime: it was a 
matter of self-defence.556  
It is important to bear in mind that when Muslims fled to Medina (Yathrib) this city 
was suffering a civil strife as result of clashes between two main tribes of Aws and 
Khazraj along with religious disputes among Jews, idolaters, and the growing 
community of Muslims.557 These troublesome divisions had made agreeing on any 
kind of united set of rules to solve the disputes effectively unattainable. When the 
tribes of Medina suggested the rule of the Prophet, as the first non-tribal leader of 
the city, he accepted it. After the formation of the new state there was a need for a 
set of laws to replace the tribal laws which, because of their nature, were not in line 
with the new developments. The immigration of a notable number of (Muslim) 
Meccans who had no tribal affiliation in the new location and also intense disputes 
between the main tribes of the city left no place for any kind of tribal system in the 
new state, Armstrong argues.558 This was how the first state system was introduced 
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by Muslims to this part of the world. The Constitution of Medina, or ‘Sahifah al-
Madinah’, was the manifest of the new state.559 ‘Migration’ to Medina and the 
formation of Medina state was a very important step for Muslims. This incident 
kept its importance during the history of Islam. In the 16th year of the hijrah Umar 
bin Khattab, the second Caliph, decided to put a date for governmental written 
corespondeces, especially for his letters to heads of other states.  When he decided 
to indicate the date of the Prophet’s birthday or advent of Islam as the beginning of 
Islamic calender, Ali suggested the hijrah and formation of the Muslim state be used 
for that.560 This was how the Islamic calender based of hijrah and formation of the 
first Muslim state was introduced.  
Whatever happened at the time of the Prophet after formation of the city-state of 
Medina, including its defence policy, must be understood according to its own 
context rather than being generalized for all times with substancially different 
circumstances. In Islamic jurisprudence jihad as ‘warfare’ is seen independently as 
a religious concept. Thus jurists when refering to the Islamic concept of ‘warfare’ 
see it as an essential part of the religion. In this way they ignore the concept of 
‘statehood’ as the factor which shaped conducts of Muslims, including the Prophet, 
regarding war. By neglecting requirements of statecraft, fiqh uploads all historical 
incidents happened during the Prophet’s administration in Medina directly on the 
shoulders of the religion. The key element concerning the Islamic concept of 
‘warfare’ is that it was a side effect of the formation of the initial Muslim state 
which itself was a side effect of the lack of existence of statehood in Arabia.561 All 
recorded incidents related to that time-frame need to be understood according to the 
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560 Yaqubi, Tarikh, vol. 2, p. 29. 
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context of that state. A generalisation of those incidents and turning them into 
inseparable parts of the religion is neither authentic nor useful. Especially when we 
notice that, according to the Quran, the formation of a political state was not 
basically a part of the Prophet’s mission determined by God.562 There is no verse in 
the Quran that orders the Prophet to establish a state but, as showed above, there 
are verses that indicate such a thing is not a part of his Prophetic Mission.563 As 
such it is to say that it was a practical need of Muslims which led them, including 
the Prophet, to form their state in Medina. As Armstrong says if Muhammad, like 
Jesus, was born inside a properly functioning state he would not have needed to get 
involved in establishing a state in the first place so that he need a defence policy for 
it: “Jesus and St Paul did not have to worry about social and political order because 
it was already set up.”564 
Muslims, including the Prophet, were ordered by the Quran to run their public 
affairs through “consultation”.565 The Muslim state was demanded and formed 
through the process of such consultation. Although the Medina state was more 
developed and humane comparing to its counterparts of the time it was by no mean 
a sacred existence.566 Most of the social rulings, including punishments for crimes, 
were the modified versions of what pertained to Arab society of the time.567 Islam’s 
                                                          
562 Not upon the Messenger is [responsibility] except [for] notification. And Allah knows whatever 
you reveal and whatever you conceal. (Q.5:99) 
 :ةدئاملا﴿ لنوم مت  ُ لَ ا لم لو لنومد بمَ ا لم م لل  علی مهـهللا لو مغ للالب لا ـلانِ نلومسـرلا ىلل لع اـم٩٩﴾  
563 You are not over them a controller. (88:22) 
564 Armstrong, Muhammad, p. 165. 
565 And those who have responded to their lord and established prayer and whose affair is 
[determined by] consultation among themselves, and from what We have provided them, they 
spend.  (Q.42:38) 
 لنومقنفنمی  ممهالن ق لز لر اـم نم لو  ممهلن یلب َٰى لرومش  ممه مر  ملَ لو لة للاـصلا او م القلَ لو  منه ب لرنل اومبا لجلت  سا لنی نـذلا لو :ىروشلا﴿ ٣٨﴾  
566 Armstrong, Muhammad, p. 169. 
567 Hassan Yousefi Eshkevari, “Islam aghazi now dar tadavom-e sonnatha-ye kohan” (Islam a new 
start in continuation of the old traditions), 25 October 2013. Accessible via: 
http://yousefieshkevari.com/?p=4049 
 264 
 
message was to redirect Arabs’ (initially and then all humans) attention from the 
material life to the spiritual aspects of it. It was not the mission of the religion to 
manage Muslim’s daily material life, Schacht argues: “… in the time of the Prophet, 
law as such fell outside the sphere of religion, and as far as there were no religious 
or moral objections to specific transactions or modes of behaviour, the technical 
aspects of law were a matter of indifference to the Muslims.”568  
Exclusivity of Prophetic politics, including warfare, does not mean that there was 
not anything in the political conduct of the Prophet and the early Muslims that could 
be useful for Muslims of later times. Of course later Muslims could, and in 
occasions did, learn from the early Muslims’ way of running their material life. The 
biggest lesson that can be learnt from the early Muslims is how to reform the 
traditions of the period which have fallen out of efficiency, justice, spirituality, and 
morality. This job must be undertaken by the common human reasoning based on 
universal values such as justice, human rights, fairness, cooperation for peace, and 
so on. Reducing the message of Islam to a rigid set of rulings for a human’s material 
life is an injustice against Islam which unfortunately is provoked by fiqh especially 
when it comes to the concept of jihad.569 Arguably the adoption of an aggressive 
military policy as ‘offensive jihad’ went against conditions of self defence 
experienced by the Muslim state during the Prophet’s era. However the positive 
results of this new interpretation of jihad created a situation that few Muslims had 
the inclination to oppose. Today Muslim extremists are targeting the main message 
of Islam and destroying the whole ideals promoted by Muslims during their history 
                                                          
568 Schacht, Islamic law, p. 19. 
569 When fiqh recklessly promotes forceful conversion through jihad it is vain to expect any 
reasonable person take promotion of the above mentioned high ethical values by followers of such 
fiqh seriously. 
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by using jihad in an aggressive way. After witnessing all these wrong things done 
in the name of jihad by extremists, now we can understand better why that worldly 
approach of offensive jihad had no place in Islam (both the Quran and Prophetic 
conducts).  
Problems of offensive jihad 
After the demise of the Prophet, the nascent Muslim society faced significant 
challenges mostly in relation to political issues such as taxation, obedience, and 
exclusive loyalty toward the central government, as discussed above. To solve the 
problems a policy was followed in order to suppress rebellions on the one hand and 
gain new resources on the other. In doing so the modified and trans-located concept 
of ‘jihad’ in its military and offensive form was employed to achieve both goals. 
The interior rivals were labelled as apostates so that jihad (at this stage as mere 
military force withour any religious connotation to it yet) could be legitimatly 
waged against them. For the second objective, offensive jihad against non-Muslim 
countries was introduced to provide the grounds for policies of territorial 
expansion.570 While the first usage of ‘jihad’ against local opposition during 
caliphate of Abu Bakr was rejected by many of the companions of the Prophet the 
second re-interpretation faced less resistance. Ali, the first Shia Imam and the fourth 
Caliph any way, remained a stable part of the opposition against policies of the 
caliphs including their offensive jihad but he was forced to stay silent because of his 
fear for the stability of the Islamic society. Ali describes his silence to avoid division 
among the young Umma as “a thorn in the eye and a bone in the throat.”571 
                                                          
570 W. Montgomery Watt, ‘Islamic Political Thought’, quoted in S.M. Farid Mirbagheri, War and 
Peace in Islam, p. 118. 
571 Nahj al-Balaghah, Lecture No. 3. 
اجش قلحلا یف و یذق نیعلا یف و تربصف 
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The new sources of wealth gained by jihad changed the lifestyle of Arab Muslims 
dramatically.572 Each Arab was given a big amount of money as a benefit collected 
from taxes over non-Arab lands such as Iraq, Iran, Egypt, Palestine, Syria and so 
on. Even those Arabs who stayed in Mecca and Medina and did not join the 
forefront activities, which were shifted outside Arabia at that time, still were given 
around 700 dirhams by the second Caliph from the year 20th of hijrah onward. For 
migrant Arabs the benefit was much higher. For example for migrant women 2000 
up to 2500 dirhams was allocated.573 It was while non-Arab Muslims were almost 
ignored.574  The discrimination between Arab and non-Arab Muslims was so 
problematic that Umar himself in his final year of life said that if he survived that 
year he would put all Muslims of Arabs and non-Arabs equal, “the way that the 
Prophet used to do” he said.575 But he did not have the chance to do so and 
Uthman’s, the third Caliph, policies intensified such inequalities even more.  
Umar himself believed that if Uthman gained the caliphacy he would give his 
relatives of the Ummayads the upper hand among Muslims and allocate ‘God’s 
money’ (public treasury) to them.576 There were many cases which proved Umar’s 
comment about Uthman to be right. For example, in one case Uthman ordered the 
governor of Basra (in today’s Iraq) to give all the taxes collected from that region 
to his son in law, Abdullah Bin Khalid Bin Asid.577 Uthman was consequently 
accused of being unjust which ended up with him facing a revolution. But it was 
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not only Uthman who faced such criticism. Other Caliphs were not immune from 
being accused for similar reasons. For example it is reported that Mughirah bin 
Shu`ba asked Umar to appoint him as the governor of Kufa (today Iraq) and when 
Umar reminded him that he was a lecher and people knew it, Mughirah’s response 
was interesting. He replied “my debauchery harms myself while my tact benefits 
you”. 578 Umar was satisfied with Mughirah’s reasoning and appointed him as the 
governor of Kufa.579 The majority of these moral crises and fighting over wealth 
and power was aftermath of Muslims gaining access to the new sources of wealth 
through jihad.580 
This new trend, of which ‘offensive  jihad’ was a fundamental part, despite some 
challenges it raised regarding dividing Muslims into privileged Arabs and under-
privileged non-Arabs, was quite successful in the material sense.  It attracted a great 
amount of wealth and power to the Islamic society. While these new developments 
satisfied many of ordinary Muslims it angered those who believed this much 
worldliness was against the main message and spirit of Islam, as we witnessed in 
chapter five when discussing Islamic mysticism. Since the first two caliphs 
themselves were living a plain and simple life their promotion of worldly policies 
had fewer backlashes. However the third claiph’s pro-materialistic approach was so 
harsh that people revolted against Uthman, accusing him of giving privileges to his 
relatives. This contributed to his eventual murder. Uthman, the third Caliph, was a 
pious and close companion of the Prophet, but he was widely perceived to favour 
his own Umayyad relatives (whom, in turn, he viewed as simply more competent 
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and reliable than other folk). The older he became the more his relatives 
manipulated him to their own advantages.581 Then when Uthman passed away the 
power was already in hands of Umayyads led by Mua`wiah. 
After Uthman, Ali was appointed as Caliph. Ali’s main strategy was to redirect the 
Islamic society back to the Prophet’s way.  When Ali refused to follow the path of 
the former Caliphs, he was in part opposing also the worldliness they promoted, 
including the ‘aggressive jihad’ they had followed and the consequences it had 
brought. In the event Ali lost his life as a result of the position he took. Despite the 
apparent failure of Ali in material sense, he was successful in showing an alternative 
path.582 Ali on his first day of caliphate had addressed the people expressing his 
agenda: 
O people, be aware that the difficulties that you faced during the 
Prophet of God [because of his justness] have come upon you and 
seized you again. Your ranks must be turned around so that those 
people of virtue who have fallen behind should come forward and 
those who had come to the fore without being worthy should fall 
behind.583 
As his first speech where he announced his policy, Ali wants people to be prepared 
for ‘justice’ and not, for example, for jihad. Imam Ali’s position against worldliness 
created a core position for him among those who opposed too much crass 
materialism. This position is still axiomatic among many Muslim groups including 
both Shia Dervishes and Sunni Sufis. After Ali the policies were redirected in 
favour of more worldliness and material goals. The Umayyad dynasty, which was 
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founded by Mua`wiah (r. 661-680) in the year 40/661, was a hereditary monarchy 
and as Mua`wiah himself decreed, he did not care about people’s religious 
matters.584 Although the Umayyads were quite successful politically and formed a 
very strong Arab empire in the name of the Islamic caliphate, from a religious 
perspective they fell short of Islamic ideals and practices.585 For example Walid ibn 
Yazid (r. 743-744), the Ummayad caliph, is reported to had ordered his tent be set 
up on top of the most sacred place of Muslims, Ka`bah, so that he would be able to 
amuse himself when Muslims doing pilgrimage.586 There is a poem which is 
attributed to Yazid ibn Mua`wiah (r. 680-683), the second Umayyad ruler, which 
says: “[Banu] Hashim [claiming prophecy] played up for power, otherwise there 
was no revelation and no message [sent by God].”587 Even if this attribution be 
considered as suspicious from a historian’s point of view still shows the ill-
reputation of some Umayyad rulers in a way that provides the ground for such 
imputations. The fact that Yazid burnt and destroyed Ka’bah in his third year or 
rule is another sign of his ill reputation.588 
To sum up, ‘jihad’ as a strategy for acquiring new lands and gaining new sources 
of manpower and wealth was first introduced after the death of the Prophet.589 
Arguably, despite its comparatively massive short term material benefits, in the 
                                                          
584 Tabatabaei, Shia`h, p. 91. 
585 Schacht, Islamic law, p. 24. 
586 Tabatabaei, Shia`h, p. 97. 
587 ‘laebat hashimo bil-mulk fa la   khabaron jaa` wa la vahi nazal’. 
لزن یحو لا و ءاج ربخ    لاف کلملاب مشاه تبعل 
ج ،ةیاهنلاو ةیادبلا ،ریثلاا نبا8 ص192.  
 Banu Hashim and Banu Umayyah [Umayyad] both were clans of the Quraish tribe but were 
rivals. Banu Umayyah led most of wars against Islam and finally after conquer of Mecca was one 
of the last groups which accepted Islam. 
588 Mohammad Hossein Tabatabaei, Shi`a, tarns. By Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Yeganeh Publications, 
2002, p. 97. 
589   Salehi Najafabadi, Jihad, pp. 41-43. 
 270 
 
long run this new jihad led to the inevitable decline of Islamic society. Although 
such an expansionist policy in the name of jihad helped Muslims politically, 
religiously it was a great reversal. It brought to power rulers that fitted its 
requirements. It is the underlying reason why dynasties such as the Umayyads were 
able to rule the Islamic world for a long time. The semi-apartheid policy of 
Umayyads considering non-Arab Muslims as second class or ‘mawali’ indicates the 
real intension behind jihad was gaining more revenues rather than, as claimed by 
jurisprudence, removing obstacles against the religion’s message. Many of mawali 
and other under-privileged elements of Muslim society joined the Shia movement 
and also played a major role in the Abbasid revolution against Umayyads which in 
its turn proved the unsustainability of such worldly policies.590 In response to those 
who might support ‘offensive jihad’ exercised by Muslim dynasties it is enough to 
say that most of the achievements of military jihad was soon lost (as was the case 
in Europe and India) while what Muslims achieved through the preaching and living 
examples of pious traders, Sufi mystics, and teachers in South East Asia – a place 
that no Muslim army ever entered – has flourished in a way that even foriegn 
occupation and colonalisation was not able to eradicate.591 Now that we have 
studied problems of ‘offensive jihad’ from a mainstream Muslim perspective, I will 
discuss in the following section inconsistencies of ‘offensive/jurisprudential jihad’ 
from Shia Islamic perspective. 
Offensive jihad as a deviation from Shia theology 
Previously I tried to show how ‘preemptive jihad’ gained ground in the Islamic 
society after the Prophet and what problems it presented the faith. Now I intend to 
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investigate how this notion found its way into Shia Islam and why ‘offensive jihad’ 
contradicts Shia theology. As we discussed earlier turning jihad into an offensive 
policy was a basic violation of many Islamic teachings and also the Prophetic 
defence policy. Now we are going to see if ‘preeptive/jurisprudential jihad’ fits 
within the main beliefs of Shia. Shias claim to be the most sincere followers of the 
faith who have not been affected by the whims of those corrupt dynasties which 
followed their own worldly interests in the name of Islam (read Sunni Islam).592 As 
such their conduct should not contradict the Quran as the main source of the religion 
while believing in ‘offensive jihad’ requires such a contradiction. There are several 
clear Quranic verses that block the way for any offensive policy toward others.593 
For inconsistencies of ‘offensive jihad’ with Quranic verses see Appendix No. 5. In 
addition to fundamental inconsistencies of ‘offensive jihad’ with the Quran, this 
notion has also theological inconsistencies with Shia Islam.  
In Shia Islamic theology the Imam plays an important role in guiding the society of 
believers to the right path after the Prophet.594 Although Imams are not prophets 
they are understood to have the most genuine understanding of the religion. In other 
words when the Prophet transmits the message of God, the Imam translates it for 
human beings.595 According to this understanding of Imam ‘Imamate’ does not 
exclusively belong to Shia. Such a relationship between the Prophet and an Imam 
can be traced in the history of prophecy. It was Abraham who was given the 
covenant by God, but it was Issac and Ismail who, as his Imams, fulfilled it. Again 
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although it was to Moses that the divine law was revealed, the task fell upon Aaron 
who expanded it into the Holy Land. St. Peter who built the Church can be 
considered as an Imam regarding the preaching of the salvation introduced by Jesus 
and so on.596 Therfore the concept of Imamate, although different in name, has been 
a part of other Abrahamic religions and cultures as well. Therefore Shia believe the 
Imamate of Shia Islam was not a serious break-away from the mainstream 
monotheism in this regard. 
Imams, as interpreters and executers of God’s Will revealed to the Prophet, are 
believed by Shias to have been appointed by the divine decree (nass صن) through 
the Prophet and have been given the knowledge which is necessary for guiding the 
believers.597  The Imamate was so important that appointing the successor and the 
mundane executer was the very first thing that the Prophet accomplished when 
starting to preach Islam publicly.598 Beside the knowledge of guiding the society of 
believers, which is called ‘Imamate’, the Imams also had the divine right to do so 
which this right is called ‘wilayah’. Wilayah is the esoteric function of interpreting 
the inner mysteries of the Quran and Sharia and the responsibility of believers is to 
follow it.599 This wilayah has two sides: The ‘wali’ (religious and spiritual leader) 
and the followers. Shia Islam is based on this mutual relationship between wali (or 
Imam) and his followers which is called ‘nidham al-Imamah’, or system of 
imamate.600 According to doctrine of imamate, the Prophet, through divine 
designation, appointed Ali as his legatee or ‘wasi’. Ali in his turn appointed his son 
Hasan to succeed him as Imam, and Hasan appointed his younger brother, Hossein, 
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as Imam. Each Imam in turn designated his successor, usually his oldest son. The 
line of Imams continued to the twelfth Imam who, according to majority of Twelver 
Shias, did not die but went into an occultation in 941 and is expected to return with 
Jesus to establish true Islam and universal justice on earth.601 
Based on this ‘Imamate System’ Shias are supposed to follow the examples of the 
Prophet and, in circumstances where his conduct regarding a certain issue is not 
available, follow the Imams in all religious matters. Due to these points, it is 
important to ascertain the perspective of the Shia Imams with respect to ‘offensive 
jihad’ in order to understand classical Shia views on jihad. First of all we should 
notice that none of Shia Imams took part in jihad in its offensive form against other 
countries. For example, when Umar asked Ali, the first Imam of Shia, to become 
commander of the Muslim army attacking Iran he refused.602 This was despite the 
fact that Ali was commander of most of the defensive wars during the Prophet’s 
era. Being the commander of the Muslim army attacking the biggest Empire of the 
time was considered a great honour and refusing such a mark of respect needed a 
very strong reason. 
The rejection of offensive jihad by Ali cannot be simplistically referred to his 
political disagreements and disputes with the Caliphs. Ali was commander of the 
Muslim army defending Medina against Arab tribal attacks during the caliphate of 
Abu Bakr.603 This demonstrates that while Ali was active in defending the Muslim 
state he refused to join the aggressive jihad. Again the second and third Imams in 
their turn refused to join jihad while they were quite active in defensive armed 
actions including defending the third Caliph and fighting the Umayyad rebellion. 
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There is an interesting dialogue between Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet and 
the third Shia Imam, and one of his Shia followers concerning jihad which supports 
our argument here. Hussein decided to examine Abdul Malik bin Amr and asked 
him why he did not contribute to the jihad against Iran. The response of Abdul 
Malik was that they followed him (as their Imam) and since he did not take part 
then nor would they. Hussein liked his reply and said: you are correct if it was the 
right thing we would do it before anyone else.604 
As soon as Ali became the Caliph there was a clear change in the Islamic 
government’s policy because the administration shifted its attention inward.605 Ali 
announced clearly that he was intent on building a just society, as founded by the 
Prophet.606 As such the ‘jihad policy’ of the previous Caliphs was replaced by 
‘justice policy’ of Ali. Ali ordered Malik al-Ashtar, his governor in Egypt, to be 
equally just and kind to all people, both Muslims and non-Muslims, he ruled over 
because: “they are either your bothers in faith or similar to you in creation.”607 Non-
Muslims were also supposed to enjoy the same level of justice as Muslims did. It is 
reported that after Ali was informed that a Jewish woman was robbed and her 
anklets removed from her feet, he said that for such a thing to happen to a non-
Muslim (a protected minority) “is sad enough for a Muslim to die from grief”.608 
He put such an enormous stress on justice that was unacceptable for those who were 
pursuing exclusive privileges and upset the relatives of Uthmans (the Umayyads) 
who felt his murderers had not been punished adequately. Finally Ali paid the price 
                                                          
604 Muhammad ibn al-Hassan (famous as al-Hurr al-Amili), Wasae`il al-Shia, Vol. 11, p. 32. 
.هیلا انوقبس ام اریخ ناک ول و 
 دمحم دلج ،هعیشلا لیاسو ،یلماعلا رحلا نسحلا نب11 ص ،32.  
605 Yaqubi, al-Tarikh, voll. 2, p. 154. 
606 Masoudi, Muruj al-Dhahab, voll. 2, p.364. 
607 قلخلا یف کل کیرش وا نیدلا یف کل خا 
608 Nahj al-Balaghah, Lecture 95. 
 275 
 
of this policy with his life. Justice was so important for him that it is said: “Ali was 
killed because of being uncompromisingly just”.609   
From what have reached us of Ali’s policies during his caliphate it can be said that 
Ali aimed for a society of quality and justice rather than material quantity and the 
territorial expansion of the Islamic lands through jihad. This is why he was not 
intent on pursuing jihad in its offensive form, although he could use jihad as such 
to overcome internal problems. Attracting public attention to a foreign enemy has 
always been a common policy in unifying a society. Ali witnessed role of ‘offensive 
jihad’ in eliminating internal conflicts during the first and second Caliphs. It is not 
acceptable to say that Ali was not smart enough to use ‘jihad’ for that purpose; he 
was famous for his intelligence and his words collected in ‘Nahj ol-balaghah’ 
demonstrate this. Again it is not logical to say that Ali, was abstaining from military 
‘jihad’ to avoid personal risk for his life. Ali says that his relationship with death is 
better than the relation of child with his mother’s breast.610 As a proof for his claim 
it is reported that Ali laid on the bed of the Prophet during the night that Pagans of 
Mecca wanted to assassinate the Prophet.611 He saved the Prophet’s life through 
risking his own. Ali also took part in all major battles defending the Muslim state 
during the Prophetic era. Thus accusing Ali of refusing to undertake military ‘jihad’ 
because of fear for his life becomes implausible. While Ali was experienced and 
smart enough to know the benefits of using military jihad against foreigners to bring 
unity among his subjects and was brave enough to approach such an aggressive 
policy if he believed in it he would not hesitate in undertaking such policy. It is 
surely his disbelief in ‘offensive jihad’ that explains a policy of avoiding needless 
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conflict. Members of the Umayyad dynasty pursued the ‘offensive jihad’ in the 
same time period and were successful in it. This means when the situation allowed 
the Umayyads, who did not enjoy the same level of public support and legitimacy 
that the ‘Righteous Caliphs’ (including Ali) did, Ali could follow a similar policy 
if he believed in it. Thus it could be said that rather than being imposed on him by 
external conditions Ali’s choice of rejecting ‘offensive jihad’ was free and must 
have been rooted in his disbelief in such an offensive policy. 
The point of the foregoing discussion is to show that Ali was not in favour of 
offensive jihad which was the policy of the former caliphs. According to what has 
been recorded Ali was able to become caliph after Umar on the condition that he 
would accept the policies of the first two caliphs.612 Ali strongly refused to follow 
the previous Caliphs’ policies and therefore was rejected by the board in charge of 
appointing the new caliph after Umar. Uthman agreed the condition and became the 
third caliph.613 Rejecting the conditions of the board and losing the chance to 
become caliph does not necessarily mean that Ali was indifferent toward 
government. It is obvious that controlling the government was vital for at least a 
part of Ali’s programs especially for creating a ‘just society’ in its Prophetic model. 
Then why didn’t he follow the previous two Caliphs’ policies and pursue political 
power? The only reason that justifies Ali’s refusal is that his way was fundamentally 
different from the previous Caliphs and that is why he felt unable to compromise. 
Ali’s policy in creating a ‘just society’, which is elaborated in Nahj al-balaghh 
especially in the Sermon No. five, as his main difference with the previous Caliphs 
who were after building a big empire, does not mean that the expansion of Islam 
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had no place in Ali’s plan. Building a just society which would be followed by other 
nations voluntarily without any need for using force (armed jihad) was a wise 
replacement for the previous Caliphs’ ‘offensive jihad’. For Ali this could be done 
by going back to the ideal society that was founded by the Prophet.614 The 
expansion of Islam in the South East Asia, without involvement of any militaristic 
jihad, proves Ali right. 
Other Shia Imams’ position toward ‘offensive jihad’ 
Although Ali’s position toward jihad, because of his role as the first Imam who also 
ruled the Islamic empire for over five years, is more important still other Shia 
Imams’ position toward jihad is also illustrative of how offensive jihad is (due to 
system of imamate) against Shia theology. With respect to subsequent Imams, 
according to Shia beliefs all Imams were killed by the government of the day.615 
What was so important for Shia Imams that they were ready to sacrifice their lives 
for it? We know that not one of Shia Imams took part in any military jihad and they 
even discouraged their followers to do so.616  
If military jihad was considered a religious duty, Shia Imams would have put their 
lives at risk for it because they, as their fate showed, were not disengaged from 
social affairs and their murder by their governments is the proof for that. The best 
logical explanation for the disengagement of Shia Imams from the concept of 
military jihad is that they did not believe in it. This must have been because it was 
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وی آوردن فقها به این قول که آیات مقیده جهاد منسوخ شده اند و جهاد ابتدایی آیت الله صالحی نجف آبادی در مورد دلیل ر 
 واجب است به عوامل سیاسی بیشترین نقش را می دهد:
سئوال مهم و َعجب آوری که در اینجا وجود دارد این است که چه عواملی در کار بوده است که این مطلب مسلم که باید 
ده گرفته شده است؟ مطلبی که در عرف قانون شناسی و َفسیر قوانین، همه اهل فن به آن مطلقات حمل بر مقیدات شوند نادی
اذعان دارند و در همه زمانها و همه نحله ها به آن عمل می شده و می شود چگونه در مورد آیات جهاد به آن عمل نشده است، 
فطری جهاد دفاعی که مدلول آیات مقیده است َحریف  و در نتیجه چهره اسلام در نظر جهانیان نازیبا نشان داده شده و قانون
شده و بجای آن جنگ ابتدایی برای َحمیل دین به عنوان جهاد معرفی شده است؟ آیا سیاست در این مسئله َاثیر داشته است و آیا 
نقل از دیگران این قول را افرادی مانند ربیع ابن انس و عبدالرحمان بن زید بن اسلم (که امام شافعی بدون نام بردن از آنها به 
نقل کرده است) َحت َاثیر جو حاکم قرار داشته اند که خلفای زورگو برای کشور گشایی به جنگهای ابتدایی اقدام می کرده و 
خون مردم صلح طلب را به نام جهاد اسلامی می ریخته اند َا دامنه ملک خود را گسترش دهند؟ بدیهی است که در چنین 
دید حاکم است و کسی جرات ندارد فتوایی بدهد یا آیه ای از قران را طوری َفسیر کند که لازمه اش محکوم فضایی اختناق ش
 شدن اینگوه حمله های نظامی ظالمانه باشد که به دست خلفای ستمگر انجام می گرفت.
شده و جنگ ابتدایی واجب است در هر حال اینکه  کسی که بگوید آیات مقیده جهاد که جنگ ابتدایی را َجویز نمی کند منسوخ 
 با سیره خلفای ستمگر هماهنگ است نه با سیره رسول خدا.
  .14و  34، ص ص  2831نعمت الله صالحی نجف آبادی، جهاد در اسلام، نشر نی، 
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Recent research has shown that the ancient sects of Islam [Khrijite 
and Shia], at the time they hived off from the orthodox community, 
could not have shared with the majority the essentials of a system of 
law which did not as yet exist. For some considerable time, and 
during the second and third centuries of Islam in particular, they 
remained in sufficiently close contact with the Sunni community for 
them to take over Islamic law as it was being developed in the 
orthodox schools of law, making only such modifications as were 
required by their particular political and dogmatic tenets.619 
 
When Shias decided to form their own jurisprudence they based it on the dominant 
Sunni schools of law and only modified whatever was seen in clear contrast with 
their theological beliefs and jihad, mostly because of its benefits, was not seen as 
such, Salehi argues.620 Jihad in its offensive form entered in Shia Islam through 
works of the first Shia jurist al-Tusi. Abu Jafar Muhammd ibn al-Hasan al-Tusi 
famous as Shaikh Tusi, who because of his special position in Shia jurisprudence is 
called ‘the leader of clan [of Shia]’, or shaikh al-taifah, was in fact a follower of 
Sunni methods of jurisprudence in his day. Even when Shaikh Tusi, started 
introducing a separate jurisprudence under the name of ‘fiqh al-imammyyah’ 
distinct from ‘fiqh al-`ammah’ or ‘jurisprudence of the mainstream’ he based his 
work on book of Shafi`ei, ‘al-Umm’, to the extent that sometimes even wordings 
of  the two books are the same or quite close.621  
                                                          
619 Schacht Islamic law, p. 16. 
620 Salehi, Jihad, p. 46. 
621 See:  Salehi Najafabadi, Jihad dar Islam (Jihad in Islam), Nei Publications, 1382/2003, pp. 41, 
43. 
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 dewollof osla yeht ,seussi rehto ni isuT-la wollof stsiruj aihS tneuqesbus esuaceB
 yllacigoloeht ylbaugra si ti hguoht neve dahij evitpmeerp ot tcepser htiw mih
 226.etamamI fo elpicnirp aihS niam eht tsniaga
  
                                                          
در محیطی که شیخ طوسی در بغداد به مجاهدت علمی می پرداخت روش معمول او در بحثهای فقهی و َفسیر قرآن و  226
سایر علوم اسلامی این بود که به منابع عامه (اهل سنت) مراجعه و از آنها اقتباس می کرد. ... در رشته فقه نیز ایشان مراجعه 
به کتابهای فقهی عامه را دردستور کار قرار داده است، و کتاب "مبسوط" را که مفصل َرین کتاب فقهی اوست به روش 
طبیعی است که او گاهی از اجتهادات و افکار رایج در آن محیط متاثر شود و فتوایی را اجتهادی آنان نوشته است، از این رو 
که عموم به آن ملترم اند بپذیرد و در کتابهای فقهی خود بیاورد. در جوی که فقه عامه بر حوزه های علمیه حاکم بود از شیخ 
بینیم او در مسئله جهاد و در موضو  مورد بحث طوسی و هر فقیه دیگری جز این انتظار نمی رفت، و از این جاست که می
همان نظری را که امام شافعی در "ام" اظهار کرده است در کتابهای فقهی خود آورده است و بی آنکه آن را مورد نقد قرار 
 دهد پذیرفته است.
  .64صالحی، جهاد، ص 
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Chapter Ten 
Commonalities and Disparities of Suicide terrorism and Jihad in 
Shia jurisprudence 
 
Introduction 
At the first glance the name of this section might look quite irrelevant because 
Shia jurisprudence, despite all superficial changes, has maintained its 
classical nature both in subject matters and methodologies, as has been 
previously demonstrated. Accordingly, suicide terrorism as a modern 
phenomenon is not covered by Shia jurisprudence and its law of war directly. 
Yet this cannot be an excuse for not investigating suicide terrorism from the 
perspective of Shia jurisprudence because in reality suicide terrorism is 
undertaken in the name of Islam, including the Shia branch, using Islamic 
juridical language. In this chapter I will try to do an unbiased non-apologetic 
and at the same time objective critical study of shared elements of religiously 
legitimate use of violence in Shia jurisprudence and suicide terrorism to find 
out how exactly they match and how much they differ.  
Shia jurisprudence and violence 
As we learnt previously, the main rulings with respect to the use of armed 
violence in Shia jurisprudence are covered by the book of jihad. To start our 
discussion about position of Shia jurisprudence about suicide terrorism first 
of all we need to remove some primary obstacles and prepare the ground for 
our examination. As pointed out before, jihad and suicide terrorism not only 
belong to different times but also are product of their exclusive surrounding 
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environment as well. Because of being lodged in two different contexts of 
time/space, it is not practical to compare suicide terrorism and the Shia 
concept of jihad directly. Accordingly, and to prepare the required ground for 
specifying the position of substantively old Shia jurisprudence in relation to 
the recent phenomenon of suicide terrorism, it is necessary to break down 
both jihad and suicide terrorism into their fundamental constituting elements 
to the extent that these elements be identifiable independent from elements of 
time/space. The next step is to compare these essential elements of jihad and 
suicide terrorism with each other and examine the level of 
overlapping/commonality on the one hand and inconsistency/contradictory 
on the other.  
In part one we derived essential and distinguishing elements of terrorism and 
clarified that suicide terrorism has no cardinal difference with other forms of 
terrorism except for the tool it uses. We found out that terrorism has four 
distinguishing elements which all-together differentiate it from other forms 
of violence, and that the suicide version of it is only different in respect to the 
tactics it uses for achieving the same goals. To avoid confusion, and make a 
valid investigation of suicide terrorism in Shia jurisprudence possible, I do 
not use jihad as a blanket term covering all forms of violence all together, the 
way that extremists do it these days. I will refer to the requirments of each of 
different legitimate use of force in Shia jurisprudence, which is governed by 
the concept of jihad, separately. Similar to the same technique which was used 
for terrorism, I will highlight separational characteristics of each of legitimate 
use of force which distinguish it from other forms of jihad before comparing 
it with suicide terrorism. As such I will compare different forms of jihad and 
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suicide terrorism based on their constituting elements. The four essential and 
constituting elements of jihad (in its different forms) and suicide terrorism 
which will be compared are: 1- Executers, 2- Targets, 3- Means, and 4- Goals. 
Differences in these elements are what differentiate different forms of jihad 
from each other and also, possibly, separate them from suicide terrorism.  
War in Shia jurisprudence 
Shia jurisprudence is quite strict about use of violence. At private level, any 
iligitimate623 use of violence is subject to the relevant punishment called 
hadd,624 for physical punishment, and diah,625 for non-physical 
punishment.626 At social level, all varieties of legitimate forms of the use of 
violence, either by state or non-state actors, are treated under the title of jihad 
in the Shia Islamic jurisprudence. For example while theft is punished by 
hadd, highway robbery (as an armed/violent offence) is addressed by jihad. 
According to Shia jurisprudence it is a well-established principle that use of 
violence needs religious permission and any form of armed violence without 
religious permission is seen as a sin and therefore rejected. Such a prohibition 
is based on the Quranic verse which rejects transgression.627 For a 
jurisprudentialist Shia all religious permissions are exclusively determined by 
the Islamic law. Regarding the use of armed force it is the law of war, or jihad, 
                                                          
623 Allamah Hilli: Harming anyone who is not sentenced to punishment, or ‘al-nafs al-
muhtarimah’, is forbidden. (Tabsirah al-Mutialimin, the book of qisas, p. 201, 205). 
624 ‘Qisas’ means symmetrical physical punishment. 
625 ‘Diah’ means compensation [literally financial punishment] and applies when the intention to 
harm is absent, or the exact symmetrical physical punishment is not possible, or the victim chooses 
compensation. 
626 Allamah Hilli, Tabsirah al-Mutialimin, pp. 202-218. 
627 Fight in the way of Allah those who fight you but do not transgress. Indeed. Allah does not like 
transgressors. (Q.2:190) 
لا﴿  لنی ندلت  ع م  لا ُّب نحمی للا لهـهللا ـننِ ۚ اومدلت  علَ للا لو  مُم لنوملنَالقمی لنی نـذلا نهـهللا نلینب لس ينف اوملنَالق لو هرقب١٩٠﴾  
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in Shia jurisprudence which regulates who can target whom, how, and why. I 
will not discuss jus ad bellum, or the justification of armed conflict, out of its 
jurisprudential context and as a separate concept from jus in bello, because 
jurisprudence as the source of legitimization of the use of force in our current 
discussion does not separate them as such and see them together as one 
concept. Therefore I shall only focus on jurisprudential justifications of war 
along with the rules of conducting war, according to Shia jurisprudence. 
In Shia jurisprudence there are six forms of the legitimate use of armed 
violence: 1- Jihad (preemptive attack), 2- Defa` (defence), 3- Qital al-Boghat 
(Confronting rebels), 4- Qital al-Muharibin (fighting the fearmongers), 5- 
Ribat (guarding borders), 6- Nahi anil-munkar bil-yad (physical forbidding 
of evil).628 In what follows I will introduce the legitimate executers, targets, 
means, and goals of each of these forms of armed violence and will discuss 
their possible conformity with suicide terrorism. To do this I will address the 
following four questions about each of the legitimate forms of the use of force 
in Shia jurisprudence: 
1- Who are the legitimate executers of jihad?  
2- Who are the legitimate targets in an armed conflict? 
3- What is the legitimate way of the use of armed force?  
4- What is the objective of a legitimate use of armed force? 
 
                                                          
628 Muhammad ibn Jamal al-Din Macci al-A`meli (famous as Shahid Thani), al-Rawdah al-
Bahyyah fi sharh al-Luma`h al-Dimashqyyah , Vol. 2, pp. 379-380. 
 285 
 
Legitimate warfare in Shia jurisprudence 
Jihad  
According to Tusi, the first Shia jurist whom other Shia jurists have followed 
in almost all of major subjects of jurisprudence, jihad means  attacking non-
Muslims countries preemptively for the propagation of Islam and is a 
conditional/collective obligation (fard kifayah)629 applicable to all mature,630 
healthy,631 capable males.632 This definition is the primary meaning of jihad 
in Shia jurisprudence. However, since all forms of the legitimate use of force 
are mentioned in ‘the Book of Jihad’, in Shia jurisprudence there is confusion 
that all of them are identified as jihad. It was the segmentation and structure 
of Shia jurisprudence that arguably has provided the ground for such 
misinterpretation. The great Shia jurist, Zain al-Din al-Juba`i al-Amili, 
famous as Shahid Thani or the second martyr, in his book ‘al-Rawda al-
Bahyya’ (which is a commentary on “al-Luma`h al-Dimashqyyah” of 
Muhammah Macci al-Amili famous as Shahid al-Awwal or the first martyr, 
and has been taught in almost all Shia Seminaries around the world for 
centuries), clearly mentions that in Shia jurisprudence jihad means the 
category of preemptive attack against non-Muslims.633 Jihad in its primary 
                                                          
629 نیقابلا نع طقس هیافک همایق یف نم ماق اذا هیافکلا یلع ضرف وه و ،ملاسلاا  رش یف ضرف رافکلا داهج 
 دلج ،هیهقفلا عیبانیلا هلسلس ،داشرلا یلع یداهلا :داصتقلاا ،یسوطلا نسحلا نب دمحم رفعج یبا32یشلا هقفلا هسسوم ، ،هع
1413 ق.ه1993 ص ،م3.  
630 From jurisprudential perspective any male who had reached puberty or passed the age 15 is 
mature and therefore religiously ‘mukallaf’ or responsible for religious duties. 
631 By being healthy jurisprudence means one who does not suffer from disabling problems such as 
being weak, blind, cripple, insane, or be above 50 years old. 
632 One should be able to afford all his family needs before going to jihad and therefore should not 
be that poor that his family suffer from his absence. (Allamah Hilli, Ershad al-azhan, pp. 191-2) 
633 Zain al-Din al-Jaba`I al-Amili, al-Rawdah al-Bahyyah fi sharh al-Luma`h al-Dimashqyyah: 
Kitab al-Jihad, al-Adab publications, Najaf, Iraq, 1387A.H./1967C.E., p.380. 
لاا یلا مهئاعدل ءادتبا نیکرشملا داهج :ماسقا )داهجلا( وه و نوفاخی ثیحب رافکلا نم نیملسملا یلع مهدی نم داهج و ،ملاس
 نع انه ثحبلا و ...همرتحم سفن لتق دیری نم داهج و ،لق نا و ههبشا ام و مهلام ذخا وا مهدلاب یلع مهئلایتسا
.لولاا 
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meaning has several other names of which the most common are: jihad al-
Da`wah (missionary jihad or jihad of invitation), jihad ibteda`i (initiative or 
preemptive jihad), and jihad al-kuffar (fighting unbelievers).634 
For Tusi, Jihad, in its primary meaning, is only allowed by virtue of the 
command of the Immaculate Imam. Jihad is not only not subject to reward if 
waged under a non-Immaculate Imam, or as non-state actors (as independent 
of the government), but it is a sin and punishable in the hereafter. If someone  
takes part in a jihad without the command of the Immaculate Imam or 
independent from the government, and either achieves a lot or is injured or 
killed, he not only will not be rewarded but his great effort is sinful and he 
will be punished (by God) for it.635 Jihad has only one goal and that is to force 
non-monotheists to convert to Islam, or for monotheists636 to submit to the 
rule of the Muslim state.637 
Since Shia jurisprudents, as we witnessed in chapter eight, have considered 
jihad as an act of worship, or God’s right, then there was a need for indicating 
the timing for it as well. Shia jurists consider jihad compulsory at least once 
                                                          
یهشلا( یلماعلا یعبجلا نیدباعلا نیز ،فجنلا ،بادلاا هعبطم ،هیقشمدلا هعمللا حرش یف هیهبلا هضورلا ،)یناثلا د1387 ق.ه
1967 صص ،م380-379.  
634 Shahid Thani, al-Rawdah al-Bahyyah, Vol. 2, p. 379. 
635 Tusi, al-Mabsut, Selselah, p. 77. 
 مذلا هلعاف قحتسی حیبق اطخ لاصا ماما ریغ نم وا روجلا همئا عم داهجلا و ناک باصا نا و رجوی مل بیصا نا ،باقعلا و
.اموثام 
 ،توریب ،هعیشلا هقف هسسوم ،هیهقفلا عیبانیلا هلسلس ،هیماملاا هقف یف طوسبملا ،یسوطلا نسحلا نبا دمحم رفعج یبا1413 ق.ه
1993  ص ،م77.  
636 The jurisprudential term for monotheists is ‘ahl al-kitab’ or people of the Book which means 
Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, and others who believe in one god. 
637 Abu Ja`far Muhammad al-Tusi famous as Shaikh Tusi, al-Iqtisad, Kitab al-Jihad, pp. 3-4. 
ی مه و ،هلاتق و هداهج بجو نیَداهشلا رکنا و ملاسلاا فلاخ نم لک :رافکلا نم دهاجی نم یف عجری لا امهدحا :نیمسق نومسقن
 بجی قرف ثلاثلا ادع نم و ... سوجملا و یراصنلا و دوهیلا مه و ،همذلا طیارش اومزتلی و هیزجلا اولبقی وا اوملسی نا لاا مهنع
.اولتقی وا اوملسی نا یلا مهلاتق 
 صص ،داصتقلاا ،یسوطلا3-4.  
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a year.638 In another words, according to Shia jurisprudence Muslims are 
religiously obligated to attack non-Muslim countries at least once a year and 
force them to convert to Islam (if non-monotheist) or submit to the Islamic 
rule (if monotheist). This has created an unacceptably aggressive image of 
jihad even among Shias themselves. The aggressiveness of jurisprudential 
jihad is so harsh that many modern Shia scholars have tried to re-interpret it 
in a way that softens its image, but rulings of the classic jurists are so clear 
and numerously repeated and emphasized that all efforts for providing a soft 
gloss on it has remained fruitless. What modern Shia ‘mujtahids’ do to keep 
some distance from the problems of harshness of jihad in its primary meaning 
is to have simply removed it from their books of religious codes of conduct 
or ‘risalah’. For example risalah of Ayatollah Khomeini, as the most 
influential jurist of the century, lacks any part on jihad. 
In addition to the aggressive image of jihad, there are three points about jihad 
that make jihad look vulnerable to leading to uncontrolled use of violence, 
including a version of terrorism. First; Jihad amounts to a religiously 
legitimate use of force which allows preemptive attack against peaceful 
people, and this means the element of reaction against aggression towards 
Muslims is absent and consequently; if this is generalized, then no non-
Muslim would be safe in respect to it. Second, jihad in its offensive form 
might consider unbelief punishable639 and this can open the way for those 
                                                          
638 See for example: Muhammah Macci al-Amili famous as Shahid al-Awwal, Al-Luma`h al-
Dimashqyyah, Vol. 2, al-Adab publications, Najaf, Iraq, 1387A.H./1967C.E., p.380. 
ماع لک یف هرم هلقا و 
 ،فجنلا ،بادلاا هعبطم ،هیقشمدلا هعمللا ،)لولاا دیهشلا( یلماعلا یکم نیدلامج نبا دمحم1387 ق.ه1967 ص م380.  
639 Although Shia` jurists do not mention unbelief as the justification for jihad but in reality no 
other justification could be found because non-Muslim are targets of jihad exclusively because of 
their difference in belief and not for attacking Muslims or so on.  
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who want to deploy violence against non-Muslims. Third, jihad is the term 
which is used publicly by Muslim terrorists to justify their actions so that even 
without any further evidence it is suspected for promoting terrorism. 
To respond to the above arguments, which have the potential to relate jihad 
to a broad range of violence including terrorism, it should be said that the 
premises have been based on an obvious disregard of several characteristics 
of jihad which regulate conduct of Muslim fighters during armed conflicts in 
a way that, in fact, cannot lead to terrorism. As was mentioned previously, it 
is not the case that use of violence against non-Muslims per se and 
unconditionally is accepted by Shia jurisprudence, and it is clear that an 
unapproved use of force is not only without reward, but is indeed punishable. 
In response I investigate jihad’s legitimate executers, targets, means, and 
goals to discern if they can apply to terrorism in one way or another.  
Legitimate executers of jihad 
Jihad, according to Shia jurisprudence, only can be commanded by the 
Immaculate Imam. Because of sanctity of human life in Islam, in waging jihad 
the Immaculate Imam himself or his particular representative (na`ib al-khas 
داهجلل صاخلا بیان) for jihad, and not general representative (na`ib al-amm بیان
 ماعلا), must lead the Muslim army.640 Only mature, healthy, capable Muslims 
are supposed to contribute to jihad.641 Any war commanded by a non-
                                                          
640 Shahid al-Awwal, Al-Luma`h al-Dimashqyyah , p. 381.  
.داهجلل بوصنملا وه و صاخلا هبیان وا لداعلا ماملاا طرشب  داهجلا بجی امنا و 
 ص ،هعمللا ،لولاا دیهشلا381.  
641 Shahid Thani, al-Rawdah al-Bahyyah, p. 382. 
لا و غولبلا )ییادتبلاا( لولاا ینعملاب داهجلا هیلع بجی نم یف طرتشی وع ضرملا نم هملاسلا و رصبلا و هیرحلا و لق نم عناملا
 هب مایقلا نم عناملا هخوخیشلا همکح یف و هداع لمحتَ لا یعسلا یف هقشملل بجوملا وا داعقلاا دح غلابلا جرعلا و ودعلا و بوکرلا
.هحلاس نمث و هقیرط و هلایع هقفن و هتقفن نع زجعلل بجوملا رقفلا و )داهجلا( 
 ص ،هعمللا ،لولاا دیهشلا382.  
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Immaculate Imam or his representative, or including any unqualified 
executers is an unholy and evil one.642 Jihad independent from the 
government and by non-state actors is alike the above case and illegitimate.  
Terrorism, in which its executers are sub-national groups, differs from jihad 
in this sense. Since jihad has a systematic, substantive, non-detachable, and 
organic relation with the Islamic government this differs it from terrorism in 
the issue of executers. Jihad must be launched explicitly thus use of armed 
force by clandestine agents is not included in jihad. Moreover hiding the real 
identity, as what clandestine agents do, in case of war is banned by Islamic 
jurisprudence as regarded to be included in “tricks”.643 
Illegitimate targets of jihad 
Every non-Muslim, who has similar conditions to those Muslims who are 
qualified to do jihad on the Muslim side, is a legitimate target of jihad on the 
non-Muslim side. There is only one exception and that is the (non-Muslim) 
clergy which is an illegitimate target of jihad. It is worthy to mention that a 
Muslim clergy (if such a title was applicable for Muslim religious scholars of 
the time at all) is supposed to take part in jihad and therefore is treated 
differently by Islamic jurisprudence from his non-Muslim counterparts. 
Unlike what might look at the first glance, in Shia jurisprudence the targets 
of jihad are not based on their belief. In Shia jurisprudence there is a specific 
definition for civilians and according to this definition they have immunity 
during war and their belief is not of relevance in this regard. According to 
                                                          
642 Tusi, al-Mabsut, p. 77. 
643 لایل مهیلع لوزنلا وه و تیبتلا هرکیو 
 ص ،هعمللا ،لولاا دیهشلا394.  
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Shia jurisprudence non-combatant has its exclusive meaning and only 
includes those who are not able to fight and not those who are not practically 
fighting but are in the camp of enemy. Only the clergy is an exception because 
it is supposed that clergy have no motivation to fight. Other than clergy, all 
mature males who are capable of fighting are considered military members of 
the enemy, with the rest considered to be civilians. To avoid confusion we 
use the term civilians instead of non-combatants with this extra explanation 
that only the five following groups are considered civilians by many jurists 
and so enjoy immunity during jihad. Although like many other issues there is 
no full agreement among jurists about who precisely qualifies to be a 
legitimate target in ‘exceptional situations’. The five groups of the enemy’s 
people which are illegitimate targets such that harming them during armed 
conflict is impermissible are as follows: 
1. Women 
There is a unanimous agreement among Shia jurists that the women of an 
enemy are illegitimate targets during war.644 To avoid any possible 
misunderstanding it should be mentioned that despite this agreement, jurists’ 
opinions vary when exceptional conditions require exceptional action, which 
will be discussed as “permissibility of targeting human shield” later. Many 
jurists not only believe in impermissibility of targeting an enemy’s women in 
general but also believe that even when women help the enemy’s army and 
contribute to fighting they still keep their immunity.645 The only exception is 
                                                          
644 See for example: al-Iqtisad, al-Khilaf, and al-Mabsut of Tusi, Tabserah al-Mutia`limin, Talkhis 
al-Maram, and al-Risalah al-Fakhryyah of Allamah Hilli, al-Doroos al-Shary`yah, and al-Luma`h 
al-Dimasqyyah of Shahid Awwal, and al-Rawdah al-Bahyyah of Shahid Thani. 
645 Mohammad Ibn Idriss al-Hilli, famous a Mohaqiq Hilli, al-Saraer, Vol. 2, Moassesat ol-Nashr 
al-Islami, p. 177. 
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that if someone feels danger for his life from a woman during the fighting 
then he can defend himself based on the obligation of self-defence, and this 
is not jihad.646 However Allamah Hilli insists that the one defending himself 
against illegitimate targets including a woman’s attack in the battle-field, 
must not intend to kill them.647  
2. Children 
Children of the enemy enjoy the same immunity as women. Children are 
defined jurisprudentially in a way that includes those who have not reached 
puberty and are not above 15 years old.  The same criteria is applied for 
Muslims regarding the age when jihad becomes a religious obligation for 
them. As such all of those groups, with exception of clergy, who are supposed 
to contribute to jihad on the Muslim side are considered military members on 
the enemy’s side. Youngsters should not be fought with the intention of 
killing them when they attack a Muslim soldier. Rather, only stopping the 
danger to one’s life is permitted, with the least harm to the young attacker. 
The term ‘exigency’, or darourah (هرورض), has been used as the condition for 
fighting immature youngsters and women, and exigency clearly excludes 
fighting with the intention of killing.648  
                                                          
And also Shahid al-Awwal, Al-Luma`h al-Dimashqyyah, p. 393. 
ی لاو.اونواع نا و ءاسنلا و نیناجملا و نایبصلا لتق زوج  
 ص ،هعمللا ،لولاا دیهشلا393.  
646 Tusi, al-Mabsut, Selselah, p.76. 
داهجلا دصقی لا و ... سفنلا نع  افدلا هب دصقی و مهعافد ذئنیح بجی هناف 
 ص ،طوسبملا ،یسوطلا76.  
647 Allamah Hilli, Talkhis al-Maram, p. 204. 
648 Ibid. 
هرورضلا عم لاا ... نع نا و ءاسنلا و نایبصلا و نیناجملا لتق زوجی لا و 
 ص ،مارملا صیخلَ ،یلحلا هملاعلا204.  
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3. The elderly 
Old-aged people are illegitimate targets in an armed conflict according to Shia 
jurisprudence.649 Some jurists include aged people in the category of ill ones 
but many of them mention this group as ‘shaikh’ or ‘elderly’ separately. 
Based on some traditions, the age of 50 and above has been indicated to 
exclude a male from being a militarily legitimate target. But most jurists 
confine themselves to the term “elderly” and a few add the lack of capability 
of fighting as well.650  
4. The ill 
All ill people are considered illegitimate targets of jihad by Shia 
jurisprudence. The term ill, jurisprudentially, is quite broad and includes the 
insane, the incapacitated, the blind, the cripple, the (temporarily) sick, and all 
those who are not capable of fighting. All are included in this category and 
enjoy immunity during war.651 
5. The clergy 
The clergy, being those men of religion who devote themselves to worship, 
constitutes the final group who enjoy immunity during war. 652 Female clergy, 
                                                          
649 Tusi, al-Khilaf, p. 10. 
.نابهرلاک مهیف لاتق لا و مهل یار لا یذلا خویشلا 
 ص ،فلاخلا ،یسوطلا10.  
650 Shahid al-Awwal, al-Luma`h al-Dimashqyyah, p. 393. 
 و.ینافلا خیشلا لتق زوجی لا  
 ص ،هعمللا ،لولاا دیشلا393.  
651 Allahmah Hillih, Talkhis al-Maram, Selselah, p. 204. 
.لولغلا لا و ردغلا لا و لیثمتلا لا و دعقملا لا و یمعلاا )لتق زوجی( لا و 
 ص ،مارملا صیخلَ ،یلحلا هملاعلا204.  
652 Ibid, p. 204. 
 نابهرلا )لتق زوجی(لا و.اهیف مهسفنا اوسبح یتلا عضاوملا نم اههبشا ام و عماوصلا یف  
 ص ،مارملا صیخلَ ،یلحلا هملاعلا204.  
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where and if applicable, are not mentioned in this group because they already 
have been included in the first group for woman. 
Some jurists believe there is a technical difference between women, children, 
and the insane on one side, and the aged, other groups of the ill, and clergy as 
the second group in immunity. According to them the first group enjoys 
absolute immunity to the extent that even if they fight a Muslim soldier he is 
not allowed to fight them back with the intention of killing them, so must 
confine himself to saving his life without any intention of harming them. But 
with the second group he can kill them when is attacked by them.653.  
In my opinion nowadays, since the capability of fighting requires receiving 
military training and access to necessary equipment and military supplies, 
then those who are not members of military, para-military, or militant groups 
should be considered as incapable of fighting in its modern sense and 
therefore illegitimate targets in situation of war. To sum up, no matter what 
the enemy’s conduct is654 the above mentioned groups are not permissible 
targets of jihad and since it is a self-imposed law implemented by those 
rulings that regulate Muslims’ conduct during war, even with accepting the 
supposition that other countries are at war with Muslim countries, targeting 
these groups is impermissible according to Shia jurisprudence. As such any 
attack, including suicide attacks, against one of these five groups is 
                                                          
653 Allamah Hilli, Talkhis al-Maram, p. 204. 
نیلَاقم اونوکی نا لاا 
 ص ،مارملا صیخلَ ،یلحلا هملاعلا204.  
654 O you who have believed, be persistently standing firm for Allah, witnesses in justice, and do 
not let the animosity of a people prevent you from being just. Be just; that is nearer to 
righteousness. And fear Allah; indeed, Allah is Acquainted with what you do.  (Q.5:8) 
 ـولق اومنومك اومن لمآ لنی نـذلا الهُّیلَ الی نل مب لر قلَ لومه اومل ند  عا اومل ند  علَ ـلالَ َٰىلل لع ٍم  ولق منآلن لش  مُم ـن لمنر  جلی للا لو نط  سنق لانب لءا لدله مش نهـهلنل لنی نما ـننِ لهـهللا اومـقَا لو َٰى لو ـقتل
 :ةدئاملا﴿ لنومل لم  علَ ا لمنب ٌرینب لخ لهـهللا٨﴾  
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religiously forbidden regardless of their countries’ policies and way of 
treating Muslims.  
Legitimate way of fighting in jihad 
Legitimate weapons 
According to Shia jurisprudence the use of indiscriminate weapons (of the 
time) such as mangonel, fire, flooding, and poisoning is impermissible.655 The 
main reason for this prohibition is the risk to the illegitimate targets’ lives.656 
It seems Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei’s fatwa on rejection of 
building, storing, and utilization of atomic weapons is based on this principle 
of Shia jurisprudence. Cutting trees and killing animals is unaccepted as 
well.657 The reason for impermissibility of these acts is, probably, related to 
undesirability of using destroying the enemy’s property as a weapon. Another 
reason could be related to excluding these from the battle field because jihad 
is focused only on the battlefield and these are not coherent parts of the 
battlefield.658 
Impermissibility of Night Attack and attack by surprise 
Attacking the enemy at night has been disapproved by Shia jurisprudence.659 
This disapproval might be because this kind of attack is regarded as a kind of 
                                                          
655 Shahid Thani, al- Rawdah al-Bahyyah, p. 392. 
656 Tusi, al-Iqtisad, p. 4. 
.نیناجملا و ءاسنلا و نایبصلا نم هلتق زوجی لا نم کلاه هیف نلا 
 ص ،داصتقلاا ،یسوطلا4.  
657 Hilli, Talkhis al-Maram, p. 204. 
658 Mortaza Motahari, Jihad, pp. 44-5. 
Also see: Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, Fiqh al-`onf al-Mosallah (the jurisprudence of armed 
violence). 
659 Allamah al-Hilli, Ershad al-Azhan, p. 193. 
.لایل هراغلاا هرکی و 
 ص ،ناهذلاا داشرلاا ،یلحلا هملاعلا193.  
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surprise attack, and also can be considered as an independent issue. If it is the 
first case, in my opinion, the danger which it can bring to those groups who 
enjoy immunity including women, children, the aged, the ill, and the clergy, 
is the reason for its prohibition. The undesirability of attack by surprise is 
directly derived from the Quranic verse which orders the Prophet to avoid 
attack by surprise.660  The element of surprise is very much a characteristic of 
terrorism. If attacking the enemy’s army by surprise is not permissible, then 
it is clearly the case that attacking civilians by surprise is doubly undesirable. 
The question of targeting human shield 
As defined in Shia jurisprudence, a human shield, or tatarros (سرتَ), is the 
use of civilians by the enemy as a shield so as either to avoid harm to the 
enemy forces, or to force the Muslim army to submit to the enemy’s will. 
Almost all jurists agree that targeting those groups of the enemy’s people who 
enjoy immunity during war is prohibited. This ruling, arguably, is based on 
sanctity of human life against the military necessity of winning the war 
although the reason has not clearly been mentioned. There is no difference 
between Muslims who have been used by the enemy as human shield and 
those people of the enemy who are not legitimate targets661 such as women, 
children, the aged, the clergy, the insane, the sick, the blind, and the 
                                                          
660 If you [have reason to] fear from a people betrayal, throw [the peace treaty] back to them, 
[putting you] on equal terms. Indeed, Allah does not like traitors. (Q.8:58) 
لافنلْا﴿ لنینننئا لخ لا ُّب نحمی للا لهـهللا ـننِ ٍءا لو لس َٰىلل لع  منه یللنِ  ذنبنالف اةلنالی نخ ٍم  ولق ن نم ـنلفا لخلَ اـمنِ لو :٥٨﴾  
661  اذا و ... هفلخ نم دصقی لب لفطلا دصقی لا و مهیمر زاج لاتقلا ماحتلا لاح کلاذ ناک ناب مهلافطاب نوکرشملا سرتَ اذا و 
 و ،زئاج یمرلا ناف همحتلم برحلا تناک نا و ،... یمرلا زجی مل همئاق برحلا نکَ مل ناف نیملسملا یراساب نوکرشملا سرتَ
.نیملسملا یقوتی و نیکرشملا دصقی 
 ص ،طوسبملا ،یسوطلا80 .  
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incapacitated. Dhimmis, or non-Muslim citizens of the Islamic state, are 
treated as Muslims when taken as human shield.662 
Despite the jurists’ unanimous agreement on the prohibition of targeting a 
human shield, most jurists consider targeting the enemy while there is a risk 
to the human shield (whether be Muslims or non-Muslims) to be 
permissible663 although they emphasize the intention must be to target the 
enemy soldiers, otherwise it is a sin: 
If the enemy uses his own women, children, the insane, the old, 
and [different categories of] the ill people or Muslims as the 
human shield, and this might lead to big loss for Muslim army 
(هرورضلا) then it is allowed to target the enemy although there 
might be the risk of non-combatants getting hurt. For the Muslim 
army it is necessary to do its best to avoid harm (مهنع فک) to 
former groups when targeting the enemy.664 
The conditional permissibility of targeting the enemy when there is a risk for 
the ‘human shield’ to be harmed is the main justification provided by 
executers and supporters of suicide attacks for justifying targeting civilians.665 
It is interesting that this notion has been employed for the justification of 
                                                          
662 Al-Shaikh Tayy al-Ameli, al-Masael li-Ibn Tayy, p. 244. 
.ملسملا مکح همکحف یمذلا سرَ اما و 
 ص ،یط نبلا لئاسملا ،یلماعلا  یط نب دمحم نیدلامج نب یلع نب یلع مساقلاوبا خیشلا244.  
663 Tusi, al-Mabsut, p. 80. 
664 Allamah Hilli, Talkhis al-Maram, Selselah, p. 204. 
ع نا و ءاسنلا و نایبصلا و  نیناجملا لتق زوجی لا و هرافک تبجو ملسملاب ناک ول و ،هرورضلا عم لاا مهنع فک اوسرتَ ول و ،ن
 نا لاا یار یلع اهیف مهسفنا اوسبح یتلا عضاوملا نم اههبشا ام و عماوصلا یف نابهرلا لا و  ،لودعا نکما نا دوقلا و اقلطم
ولغلا لا و ردغلا لا و لیثمتلا لا و دعقملا لا و یمعلاا لا و ،نیلَاقم اونوکی.ل  
 ص ،مارملا صیخلَ ،یلحلا هملاعلا204.  
665 Amir Molla Mohammad Ali, Mabani fiqhi amalyat esteshhadi (the jurisprudential bases of self-
martyrdom operation, Zama zam hedayat publications, Qom, 1385 S.H., pp. 153-4. 
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suicide attacks as well as reasoning that since there is no difference between 
sanctity of others’ lives and one’s own life then, if it is allowed to endanger 
innocents’ lives (of human shield), then why one should not be allowed to 
endanger his own life (as executer of suicide operation)?666 
To conclude this section, we may say that, while terrorism seeks to spread 
terror among civilians, the above mentioned limitations in the use of force 
indicates that, in opposition to terrorism, jihad guarantees the safety of those 
groups which are the main targets of terrorism. Thus it can be said that 
terrorism and jihad do not have any of the targets, means, objectives, and also 
executers in common. In addition to clear contradiction between jihad and 
suicide terrorism if there is still any doubt about that there is a jurisprudential 
ruling which addresses such doubt. Based on the “principle of bara`ah”,667 
which was discussed in chapter seven, if there is doubt with respect to an act 
as to whether or not it is a religious duty, it is not a duty until proven so. 
Accordingly, since suicide terrorism is a new phenomenon, therefore in the 
case of being unsure if it is religiously approved, as a form of jihad, then the 
correct position to take is that it is not. The second point is that if suicide 
tactics are considered to be jihad then, since jihad, as mentioned above, is 
compulsory at least once a year, all of those who claim to literally believe in 
suicide terrorism as jurisprudential jihad inevitabaly must kill themselves in 
the first year (because it is compulsory at least once a year for them to do 
jihad). If they be sincere in their claim it means that after only one year all of 
them will kill themselves and there will be no more of suicide bombers and 
                                                          
666 Ibid, pp. 163-8. 
667 One has no religious duty if there is doubt of having it. 
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the problem will be solved because no preacher of such terrorism will exist. 
Arguably, promoters of suicide terrorism flounder in hypocrisy and 
inconsistency, if they really believe suicide terrorism to be a case of ‘jihad’ 
then they must act accordingly which they obviously do not. 
Defence (Difa`) 
Self-defence, or difa` ( افد), is an unconditional obligation (wajib a`yni) for 
every capable person. Unlike jihad, it is obligatory for women to defend 
themselves as well.668 And again, different from jihad, it does not require 
government’s permission. The objective of self-defence is to stop the threat 
and self-defence can continue till the aggression is stopped.669 The objective 
of defence must be to defend one’s life and property and not to kill the 
invader, rather only “minimum” harm to the other side, enough for fulfilling 
the goal of defence, is permitted.670  
There is a term in Shia jurisprudence which has opened the space for some 
interpretations that gives more flexibility to the executer than what self-
defence requires, namely ‘defending the seed of the religion’. The seed of 
religion is endangered when the enemy’s attack is so serious that there is the 
danger of destruction of the whole Muslim society, or a real threat of being 
forced to leave Islam.671 Still, such a defence must be limited to the removal 
                                                          
668  یا( مهریغ و ،دبعلا و ٍیرملا و ،یمعلاا و میلسلا و ،یثنلاا و رکذلا ءاوس ،رداقلا یلع )سفنلا نع  افد( عفدلا بجی و 
.)مهیلع داهجلا بجی لا نیذللا 
 ص ،هیهبلا هضورلا ،یناثلا دیهشلا383.  
669 Tusi, al-Mabsut, p. 165. 
ب ،هلتق دصقی لا.هلام و هسفن نع ناسنلاا عفدی امک ... مهعفد دصقی ل  
 ص ،طوسبملا ،یسوطلا165.  
670 Tusi, al-Mabsut, pp. 166.  
.هب هعفد هنکمی ام لقاب هسفن نع اعفد هلَاقی نا هلف همیرح وا هلام وا هسفن دیری لاجر لجر دصق اذا 
 ص ،طوسبملا ،یسوطلا166.  
671 Shahid al-Awwal, al-Doroos al-Shar`yyah, pp. 221-2. 
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of the threat and not to victory as such over the enemy.672 The term ‘defending 
seed of the religion’, which is also mentioned under category of ‘defence’, 
focuses on rescuing the society and the religion in distinction to one’s own 
life and property. Therefore, this possibility can prepare the ground for going 
further than self-defence per se. I will discuss this shortly under ‘exigency’.  
As noted above, self-defence or ‘difa`’ requires minimum necessary harm to 
the attacker.673 It is while in terrorism maximum spread of fear among 
innocent civilians is a key factor. Such a fear is seen as a necessary part of the 
pressure needed for furthering the group’s political objectives.  Since 
elements of maximum harm (at least psychologically) and political objectives 
are absent in ‘difa`’ and it only applies to actions against attackers, then it 
differs from terrorism in its targets, means, and goals. Suicide terrorism is 
even more at odds with difa` than jihad. This is because in suicide terrorism 
one endangers (sacrifices) his own life intentionally in order to harm others, 
while in difa` the defender tries to save his life with the minimum harm to the 
attacker. Thus, with the exception of the fact that both are practiced by non-
state executers, terrorism and ‘difa`’ have nothing in common. 
Confronting Rebels  
Confronting the rebel, or ‘qital ahl al-baghi’(یغبلا لها لاتق),  is a jurisprudential 
term which refers to fighting a Muslim group which takes up weapons against 
                                                          
  ملاطصلاا فاخی وا ملاطصلاا نم هعمتجم و هلصا یه و ملاسلاا هضیبلا یلع فاخی نا لاا ارایتخا رئاجلا عم داهجلا زوجی لا و
.نیملسملا نم موق 
 صص ،هیعرشلا سوردلا ،لولاا دیهشلا221-222 .  
672  و مهعافد ذئنیح بجی هناف ،مهنم موق یلع فاخی وا هراوب یشخی و ملاسلاا هضیب یلع هعم فاخی رما نیملسملا مهدی نا لاا
.ملاسلاا یف اولخدیل داهجلا اودصقی لا و نینموملا و ملاسلاا و سفنلا نع عفدلا هب دصقی 
 ص ،طوسبملا ،یسوطلا76.  
673 هب هعفد هنکمی ام لقاب هسفن نع اعفد هلَاقی نا هلف 
 ص ،طوسبملا ،یسوطلا166 . 
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the just ruler (technically, the Immaculate Imam for Shia) to overthrow or 
disobey him. Rulings of ‘baghi’, which literally means “insubordination” or 
“oppression”, are based on verse 49:9 of the Qur’an and this determines 
policy toward internal rebellion.674 Some of the rulings of ‘confronting the 
rebel’ are, interestingly, in the rebels’ favour. According to al-Tusi, for 
example, if the rebelling group is not well equipped and well organized, it 
should not be fought.675 Again, if the rebelling group leaves the battlefield 
and does not head to another part of their army which is strong and organized, 
it is forbidden to chase and kill them.676 Another interesting point is that if 
non-Muslims help rebels and fight alongside them they must be treated like 
Muslim rebels that should not be chased, and their properties should not be 
seized as well.677 The belongings of rebels must be returned to them after the 
fighting is over.678 It is not permissible even to use rebels’ captured weapons, 
                                                          
674 And if two factions among the believers should fight, then make settlement between the two. 
But if one of them oppresses the other, then fight against the one that oppresses until it returns to 
the ordinance of Allah. And if it returns, then make settlement between them in justice and act 
justly. Indeed, Allah loves those who act justly.  (9) 
  القلف َٰى لر  خم  لْا ىلل لع ا لممها لد  حنِ  ت لغلب ننإلف ا لممهلن یلب او محنل  صلألف اومللتلت قا لنینن نم  ؤ م  لا لن نم ننالتلفنئالط ننِ لو ننإلف نهـهللا نر  ملَ َٰىللنِ لءينفلَ َٰـىت لح ي نغ بلَ ينـتلا اوملنَ
 ـننِ اومط نس قلَ لو نل  د لع لانب ا لممهلن یلب او محنل  صلألف  ت لءالف  :تارجحلا﴿ لنی نط نس ق م  لا ُّب نحمی لهـهللا٩﴾  
675 Tusi, al-Khilaf, selselah, p. 150-151. 
 مهعمج قیرفَ و مهفک نکمی لا هعنم یف اونوکی نا امهدحا :طورش ثلاثب لاا مهماکحا مهب قلعتَ لا و یغبلا لها لاتق بجی لا و
لق هفئاط اوناک نا اماف ،لاتق و شویج زیهجَ و قافناب لاا.یغبلا لهاب اوسیلف فیعض دیک اهدیک و هلی  
 صص ،طوسبملا ،یسوطلا150-151.  
676 Tusi, al-Khilaf, p. 52. 
 .فلاخ لاب مهلاتق مرح هعاطلا یلا اوعجر وا اودعق وا حلاسلا اوقلا وا هئف ریغ یلا یغبلا لها یلو اذا 
 ص ،فلاخلا ،یسوطلا52.  
677 Tusi, al-Khilaf, pp. 53-4. 
Also: Tusi, al-Mabsout, p. 159. 
 اوجرخی مل )کلاذ یف( نیملسملا نم موق هنواعم زوجی لا هناب اوملعی مل و لدعلا لها یغبلا لها عم همذلا لها نم موق لَاق اذا
.همذلا نم کلاذب 
 صص ،فلاخلا ،یسوطلا53-54.  
.اندنع مهتمذ ٍقتنَ هناف )زاوج مدع( کلاذب نیملاع )همذلا لها( اولَاق نا اما و 
لا ص ،فلاخلا ،یسوط159.  
678 Shahid alAwwal, al-Luma`h, p. 408. 
.اقلطم مهلاوما همسق مدع حصلاا و 
 ص ،هعمللا ،لولاا دیهشلا408.  
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horses and so on during the fight against them, and these must be returned to 
them when the war is over.679 Such rulings seem to be based on a saying of 
the Prophet that using anyone’s belongings needs his/her permission,680  and 
of course it is assumed that the rebels will not give permission to their enemy 
to use their weapons against themselves. Another interesting point is that if 
some of the rebels’ belongings are damaged before or after the war, the 
government should replace the damaged items, but if it happens during the 
war there will be no compensation.681  
The killed one of rebels, if a just person (i.e., a good believer), should be 
treated as a martyr with respect to being prayed over and buried with war-
clothing, without any need for funerary ablutions. This is because rebels may 
have a just cause and consider themselves martyrs.682 The captured rebels 
must be freed after the fighting is over even if the rebels’ side has killed 
government soldiers.683 Tusi’s reason for this ruling is that you can’t retaliate 
                                                          
679 Tusi, al-Khilaf, selselah, pp56-7. 
مهباشنب اومری لا و ،لاتقلل اهنوبکری لا و مهحلاسب لا و یغبلا لها باودب اوعتمتسی نا لدعلا لهلا زوجی لا  یف لا و ،لاتقلا لاح
.مهیلع در برحلا تضقنا اذاف ،هبابرلا اظوفحم ناک مهدنع ءیش کلاذ نم لصح یتم و ،لاتقلا لاح ریغ 
 صص ،فلاخلا ،یسوطلا56-57.  
680 Tsui, al-Mabsut, p. 152. 
.هسفن نم هبیطب لاا هلام و همد لحی لا ملسملا خا ملسملا 
 ص ،طوسبملا ،یسوطلا152.  
681 Tusi, al-Mabsut, p. 153. 
.لاام وا ناک امد ،کلاذ فلَا نم یلع نامضلاف اهدعب وا برحلا لبق ناک نا لثم لاتقلا لاح ریغ یف ناک ناف 
 ص ،طوسبملا ،یسوطلا153.  
682 Tusi, al-Khilaf, pp. 55-56. 
Also: Al-Shahid al-Awwal, al-Dorous al-share`yyah, p. 231. 
نم( هکرعملا یف لوتقملا ناک اذا  لسغی لا دیهشلا نا یلع هقرفلا  امجا :انلیلد .هیلع یلصی و لسغی لا لدعلا لها نم )یغبلا لها
.مهدنع دیهش اذه و ،هیلع یلصی و 
 صص ،فلاخلا ،یسوطلا55-56.  
.اعامجا دیهشف لتق اذا لدعلا و :اضیا 
 ص ،سوردلا ،لولاا دیهشلا231.  
683 Tusi, al-Mabsut, p. 158. 
 تضقنا اذاف ،یراسلاا قلطی مل همئاق برحلا تناک ناف ،مهیف رظنی مث ،مهریغ لَاقلا نلا مهاراسا لتقی مل یراسلاا اولتق نا و
.ءاوس هریسا اوقلطی امک مهنئاهر اوقلطا برحلا 
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for killing by killing someone other than the actual killer; and in this case 
since the the captured rebel is not the actual killer then killing him is not 
considered as legitimate reciprocation.684 This reasoning can be used against 
blind retaliation that Muslim terrorists currently base their attacks against 
innocent civilians on. While Islamic jurisprudence respect armed rebels how 
come killing innocent Muslims in markets, places of worship, hospitals and 
schools in the name of perceived wrong deeds of unknown individuals can be 
justified? 
There are seven conditions that govern legitimate fighting against rebels: 
1- That there is no other way to stop them but by fighting back. However, 
if they constitute a weak small group which does not cause a real threat, 
or which could be managed without fighting, then it is not permissible 
to use force against them.685  
2- That the rebel withdraws from the community so that there is no 
information about their destructive activities. As long as they act 
publicly and not secretly, despite being suspected of engaging in anti-
government activities, force shouldn’t be used against them unless and 
until they rebel in an armed way.686 This ruling is based on Imam Ali’s 
policy toward rebels that did not prevent them from using the mosques, 
did not cut their social benefits, and did not start fighting them until 
                                                          
 ص ،طوسبملا ،یسوطلا158.  
684 Ibid. 
685 Shahid al-Awwal, al-Doroos al-Shary`yah, p. 231.  
عنم یف مهنوک.شویجلاب لاا مهقیرفَ نکمی لا ه  
 ص ،هیعرشلا سوردلا ،لولاا دیهشلا231.  
686 Tusi, al-Mabsut, p. 151. 
.یغبلا لها اوسیلف هتضبق یف و هعم اوناک نا اماف ،فیداب وا دلب یف هنع نیدرفنم  ماملاا هضبق نع اوجرخی نا 
 ص ،طوسبملا ،یسوطلا151.  
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they started the war. Eventhough Imam Ali was aware of their activities 
in advance he did not use force against them until they attacked the 
government’s army.687  
3- That the rebel group consider themselves right, otherwise they would 
be treated as muharibun which will be discussed shortly.688 
4- That they have appointed a leader for themselves which means they 
have a plan of overthrowing the just Imam and replacing him with their 
own leader. However, it should be noted that some jurists do not 
consider this as a requirement.689 
5- There must be a public debate between the government’s 
representatives and the rebels’ representatives, held in such a way that 
the public witnesses who is wrong and so who should be blamed for the 
consequences.690 
6- The goal of fighting must be to contain the rebellion by confronting the 
rebels and putting them to flight, dispersing their supporters, and 
weakening their position. Killing the rebels must not be the intention.691 
                                                          
687 Ibid, p. 151. 
لاسلا هیلع یلع لاقف ام ءیفلا مکعنمن لا و ،الله مسا اهیف اورکذَ نا الله دجاسم مکعنمن لا نا :ثلاث انیلع )یغبلا لها( مکل ... :م
.لاتقب مکءدبن لا و ،انعم مکیدیا تماد 
 ص ،طوسبملا ،یسوطلا151 .  
688 Ibid, p. 151. 
.مهدنع غئاص لیواتب هنیابملا یلع اونوکی نا 
689 Tusit, al-Mabsout, p. 151. 
صن.طرش ماملاا ب  
690 Ibid, p. 151. 
 اذاف ،اهلح ههبش مهل ناک نا و ،مهل هلذب اقح ناک ناف ،هنم نومقنی ام مهل رکذی و مهرظانی نم ماملاا ثعبی یتح مهلاتق لحی مل
.مهلَاق هیلا اوعجری مل تا و کاذف اوعجر ناف کلاذ مهفرع 
 ص ،طوسبملا ،یسوطلا151.  
691 Tusi, al-Mabsout, p.165. 
 لا.مهعمج قیرفَ و مهدح لیلقَ و مهعفد دصقی لب ،)یغبلا لها( هلتق دصقی  
 ص ،طوسبملا ،یسوطلا164.  
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7- The fighting should be continued only until the rebels are dispersed and 
not until the whole insurgence is defeated.692 This is why killing the 
escaping rebels is forbidden.693  
The main point that can be said about the relation of ‘the principle of 
confronting rebels’ and ‘terrorism’ is that this principle limits violence even 
against an armed and threatening group let alone justifying harming innocent 
civilians while terrorism is essentially based on harming innoncent civilians. 
‘Confrontation of rebellion’ and ‘terrorism’ differ in identity of executers, 
targets, and means and might only be considered to have political objectives 
in common. Rebels do not target civilians and as soon as they do all their 
privileges are removed because they will be treated as muharibun and nor al-
bughat any more. In translating from the original texts I use the word 
‘confront’ instead of ‘fight’ to show the nature of this principle more 
accurately. Still, the word ‘fight’ could be used, and is used, in some 
occasions for this kind of armed conflict which is not wrong.  
While killing even Muslim armed rebels is not to be intended in an armed 
conflict, nowadays around 97 percent of all casualties of suicide terrorist 
attack executed by Muslim militants are Muslims.694  
Fighting the fear mongers or muharibun 
Hirabah (هبارح) literally means taking wealth by force. In Shia jurisprudence 
hirabah or muharibah is used to name the act of use of arms by a group of 
                                                          
692 Ibid, p. 164. . 
693 Ibid, p. 157. 
.مهربدم عبتی لا 
 ،طوسبملا ،یسوطلا157.  
694 The US department of state 2011 annual report on terrorism. 
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Muslims to terrorize their civilian victims for robbery, sexual assault and so 
on. Most jurists mention terrorizing, irhab (باهرا)695 or ikhafah (هفاخا), as the 
inherent characteristic of this kind of crime.696 Such jurists emphasize on the 
element of spreading terror among the victims as a principal intention behind 
this crime which makes it quite similar to ‘terrorism’. 
Shia jurisprudence rulings toward muharibah are exceptionally harsh. Unlike 
other legitimate forms of the use of force, in fighting muharibun (sing. 
muharib براحملا), even a woman engaging in muharibah may be killed.697 It 
is while in no other case does Shia jurisprudence allow fighting women with 
the intention of killing them. Again unlike fighting rebels, fearmongers 
(muharibun), who are also called highway robbers by some jurists, are fought 
to be killed and should be chased and killed even if they escape from the 
combat. If they get captured before they repent, depending on what kind of 
crime they have committed and whether they have killed their victim, have 
robbed or merely terrorized the victim, they might be sentenced to execution 
and gibbeting for a combination of all, having their right hand and left foot 
amputated if the victim was robbed and terrorized but not killed, and must be 
sent to exile if they have merely terrorized the victim.698 Unlike other crimes 
against citizens, the victim or his family cannot waive the punishments 
because it is an act against the society.699 If muharibun repent and surrender 
                                                          
695 The same word used in modern Arabic for terrorism. 
696 Shahid al-Awwal, al-Dorous,p. 238 
.هریغ وا رصم یف هفاخلا حلاسلا درج نم وه و 
 ص ،هیعرشلا سوردلا ،لولاا دیهشلا238.  
697 Ibid. 
هارما ناک نا و 
 ص ،سوردلا238  
698 Ibid., p. 239. 
699 Al-Shahid al-Awwal, al-Dorous, p. 239. 
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themselves before they get captured then those punishments related to 
violating the society’s right could be dropped, but they still need to content 
their victim for his personal rights, otherwise the victim or his heirs can ask 
for ‘qisas’ (talion/retaliation).700 Since punishment is a matter of ‘hudud’ and 
not ‘jihad’, or fighting, we will not go further here with qisas. 
According to Shia jurisprudence, rules of engagement with muharibun are the 
harshest, and even much harsher than treatment of invading unbelievers. For 
deducing punishments for muharibah Shia jurists refer to verses 5:33 and 
5:34 of the Quran.  
Muharibah is the closest term in Shia jurisprudence to the present day concept 
of terrorism. Since muharibah is strongly opposed in Shia jurisprudence, 
regulations concerning the confrontation of muharibah maight have the 
potential to provide some bases for a counterterrorism approach using Shia 
Islamic laws. Shia jurisprudence has allocated the severest punishments for 
muharibah and if the relation between muharibah and terrorism is formulated 
properly then it can act as an effective element for disarming Muslim 
extremists’ acts of terrorism which claim their actions as religiously justified 
while can easily be branded as ‘fearmongering’ or muharibah. 
However, as noted above, while the Shia jurisprudence book of jihad has a 
section on fighting terrorism (muharibah) it doesn’t allow fighting women 
and children even though they fight Muslim army in an armed conflict. Then 
if someone decides to investigate terrorism in Shia jurisprudence he will find 
                                                          
.ادح لتق هنع افع ناف 
یهشلا ص ،سوردلا ،لولاا د239.  
700 Ibid. Pp. 239-240 
.ءیش طقسی مل هردقلا دعب باَ ول و ،هصاخ یلاعَ الله قح طقس هیلع هردقلا لبق باَ ول و 
 صص ،سوردلا ،لولاا دیهشلا239-240.  
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a section against terrorism while, as we witnessed, it will be difficult for him 
to find anything in favour of it (at least up to now and regarding topics covered 
here).  
Guarding borders and related fighting  
Ribat or murabitah (هطبارم), which means patrolling and safeguarding the 
Islamic state borders, is highly recommended by Shia jurisprudence although 
it is not a religious obligation. It is so favourable that if done for more than 
40 days it has the same reward of jihad.701 Some have included ribat in 
defence and some in jihad and others like Tusi have mentioned it separately. 
Murabitah is the only premised contribution of Shias in military activities of 
a temporal (or non-Immaculate) ruler.702 Murabitah under a non-Immaculate 
Imam’s rule is permissible in the case that does not include any fighting. 
Fighting during murabitah is not allowed except if the person’s life is 
endangered.703 If the guard is injured or loses his belongings whilst serving 
in a non-Imam’s government he will not be rewarded (in the hereafter) for 
that, although defending himself is a religious duty upon him at any 
circumstances nevertheless.704 
                                                          
701 Tusi, al-Mabsout, p. 77. 
هج ناک کلاذ یلع داز ناف ،اموی نیعبرا یلا مایا هثلاث )هطبارملا( اهدح و.ادا  
 ص ،طوسبملا ،یسوطلا77.  
702 Allamhah Hilli, Talkhis al-Maram, Selselah, p. 204. 
.ماملاا باغ نا و هطبارملا بحتسی و 
 ص ،مارملا صیخلَ ،یلحا هملاعلا204.  
703 Tusi, al-Mabsout, p. 77. 
.ملاسلاا و سفنلا نع  افدلا نم هانلق ام یلع لاا ودعلا دهاجی لا هنا ریغ 
 ،یسوطلا ص ،طوسبملا77.  
704 Ibid. 
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Murabitah does not fit terrorism because it must be done through the just 
government, if includes any fighting. Other than that, and as its name shows, 
murabitah is not an offensive tactic but rather a passive one. In addition to 
the difference in executers and means, murabitah and terrorism do not have 
common targets and objectives either. 
Physical Forbidding of evil as an armed conflict 
Muslims are duty-bound to be guardians of virtue and goodness, and to 
combat evils and wrongs among themselves. The guarding of virtue and 
goodness is named ‘calling for good’, or amr bil-m'aruf (فورعملاب رملاا) and 
the combating of evil is called ‘Forbidding of evil’ or nahi anil-munkar, ( یهنلا
رکنملا نع) and they (both together) form one of the ten worship-acts, or God’s 
rights, according to Shia jurisprudence. Amr beil-Ma`ruf and nahi anil-
munkar has three forms: by the heart, by the tongue, and by the hand. It is 
compulsory for all Muslims to be happy with good and unhappy with evil in 
their heart, but for the other two certain conditions apply. For amr bil-ma`ruf 
and nahi anil-munkar with the tongue, there are three requirements: 1- It is 
necessary that the executer has the full knowledge of the good and evil 
himself/herself. 2- The executer must be able to assess if conditions are 
prepared for an efficient amr bil-ma`ruf and nahi anil-munkar. Without 
assurance of efficiency this principle is not obligatory (nor even permissible). 
3- The executer is to be safe from the consequences of amr bil-ma`ruf and 
nahi anil-munkar which means that no harm endangers his/her safety and 
property because of executing this ‘worship-act’.705 
                                                          
705 Al-Allamah al-Hilli, al-Risalh al-fakhryyah, p. 216. 
.رکنملا نع یهن و فورعملاب ملعلا و ریثاتلا زیوجَ و ررضلا ءافتنا هطرش و .دیلاب مث ناسلاب مث بلقلاب بجی و 
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Amr bil-ma`ruf and nahi anil-munkar by hand or physical ‘Calling for good 
and forbidding of evil’ is the final form or stage which might require the use 
of force in its extreme form. This needs all the requirements of amr bil-ma`ruf 
and nahi anil-munkar by tongue and again has two extra requirements. The 
exclusive requirements of amr bil-ma`ruf and nahi anil-munkar by hand are: 
1- only negative part of ‘forbidding of evil’ can include physical deterring, 
and 2- that if there be any possibility of causing any injury or harm to the one 
who is forbidden it is to be done exclusively through the appropriate 
government authority.706 
Few jurists have mentioned the ‘physical forbidding of evil’ or nahi anil-
munkar bel-yad (دیلاب رکنملا نع یهنلا) in the Book of Jihad when it requires the 
use of force. The most famous jurist who has mentioned this stage of nahi 
anil-munkar bil-yad in the Book of Jihad is Allamah Hilli.707 Unlike Hilli and 
the few other jurists such as Shahid Thani, who followed him, the majority of 
jurists mention the final stage of amr bil-ma`ruf and nahi anil-munkar in the 
Book of hudoud or punishments. Whether the physical stage of amr bil-
ma`ruf and nahi anil-munkar is mentioned in the Book of Jihad or not, there 
are four characteristics of this principle that disqualify it for being used for 
terrorism: 1- If it is only among Muslims and against the wrong-doers then 
non-Muslims and all innocent Muslims cannot be targeted. 2- It must be done 
through the government and therefore sub-national groups are not qualified 
                                                          
 ص ،هیرخفلا هلاسرلا ،یلحلا هملاعلا216.  
706 Al-Hassan Ibn Yousof famous as Allamah Hilli, Tabserah al-Mutia`limin, no publisher, no 
date, pp. 83-4. 
.ماملاا نذاب لاا هلعفی مل حارجلا یلا رقتفی نا و 
 ص ،نیملعتملا هرصبَ ،یلحلا هملاعلا83.  
707 Allamah Hilli, Tabserah al-Mutia`limin, p. 83. 
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to execute it. 3- The spread of terror is not among objectives of this principle. 
4- It lacks direct political objectives, although indirect political objectives 
might be supposed for many of religious activities in general. 
Bypassing jurisprudence: exigency and temporary suspension of 
jurisprudence 
As discussed above, none of the six cases of religiously legitimate use of 
armed force in Shia jurisprudence share the least common elements with 
terrorism in general and suicide terrorism in particular. Not only is it the case 
that jurisprudential principles regarding use of armed force do not support 
suicide terrorism, but also there are some elements in these principles which 
can be used to confront suicide terrorism as executed by Muslims. The 
question is that why, despite the clear inconsistencies between concepts of 
‘jihad’ and ‘suicide terrorism’, still Muslim militants justify their acts of 
terrorism. The reality is that since it is quite difficult for Muslim terrorists to 
justify their actions by jihad as a jurisprudential concept -with all the above 
mentioned restrictions and limitations- what they do is that they use some 
techniques to bypass jurisprudence in a way that their actions are not seen as 
against jurisprudence. As will be discussed below, ‘exigency’ is the main 
medium in this regard. ‘Exigency’ clearly means a suspension of fiqh until 
the precipitating situation has changed and as such is against jurisprudence. 
Regarding importance of ‘exigency’ it is to say that the permission that some 
jurisprudents have given for suspension of fiqh in some specific contexts 
understood as ‘exigencial situations’ might be claimed as Shia 
jurisprudence’s support for suicide attacks, but arguably with a deeper 
examination as presented here such a claim would be disqualified.  The 
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bottom line is that ‘suicide terrorism begins where jurisprudence (as regulator 
of actions) ends’ even if the permission for that is given by jurisprudents 
themselves because it cannot be but permission for suspension of fiqh. 
Lodging a set of rules which regulate the believers’ conduct, especially during 
stressful events such as time of conflict, is the main purpose of jurisprudence. 
It is while terms such as ‘exigency’ are post-jurisprudential and give executer 
the freedom to act as he wants or at least as he perceives to be right. 
‘Exigency’, by opening hands of executers, constitute violation of the main 
goal of jurisprudence which is controlling humans conduct. The mere use of 
juridical language should not mislead us to conclude that terrorism is 
approved by Islam as a religion. Today even committed Baathists, who are 
ideologically against religion, also call themselves ‘mujahid’ and their 
organization in Iraq as “general Command of the Mujahidin of the Armed 
Forces”.708 This mess is partially because jurisprudential terms are used so 
loosely that everyone use them at his own will which indicates significance 
of adequate studies for crystallization of these terms. Previously I tried to 
investigate ‘Martyrdom’, ‘Retaliation’ and ‘Jihad’ and now will try to do the 
same in regard with ‘Exigency’. 
Shia jurisprudents’ fatwas validating ‘suicide operations’ are based on the 
‘rule of exigency’ or darura. ‘Rule of exigency’ is a term derived from a 
maxim of usul al fiqh (principles of jurisprudence) which allows suspension 
of jurisprudential rulings. The rule of exigency indicates that “necessity 
makes the unlawful lawful” (al-darurat tubihu al-mazurat).709 The legal 
                                                          
708 John David Payne, Donna Lee Bowen and Joseph Woolstenhulme, “How Religious is Islamic 
Religious Terrorism?”  In Ward and Sherlock (eds.), Religion and terrorism, 2014, p. 139. 
709 Kamali, Shari‘ah Law, p. 285. 
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maxim of ‘necessity’ is usually used in favour of the interests of believers, 
meaning that when the special conditions make the consequences of acting in 
accordance with religion so onerous, the believer’s obligation is suspended 
until conditions return to normal, or at least to a more tolerable state. For 
example, eating pork is strictly forbidden by Shia jurisprudence, but will be 
permitted if one’s life is endangered by starvation. Here the first ruling of 
prohibition is called ‘hukm awwalyyah’ – the primary or the main ruling – 
and the enabling ruling in conditions of extreme hunger is called the ‘hukm 
sanawyyah’ – the secondary or subsidiary ruling. The Primary Jurisprudential 
ruling is suspended until the exigent circumstances pass. The example of 
where eating pork is permissible to avoid starvation only applies to the extent 
that the urgent danger is overcome. The believer may not eat more than what 
is deemed necessary to preserve his life. 
Danger to the seed of the religion and concept of exigency  
The jurisprudential principle of exigency has been employed in some cases to 
justify abnormal actions such as suicide tactics.710 The complementary term 
which is used as darura to justify norm-breaching actions of suicide tactics is 
that the ‘seed of the religion is in existential danger’ and it requires urgent 
reaction to repulse the threat in any way possible. The ‘seed of religion’ is 
supposed to be in danger when the enemy’s attack is so serious that there is 
the danger of destruction of a Muslim community in its entirety, or that the 
community is faced with being forced to renounce Islam.711 Supporters of 
suicide tactics hold the view that such a tactic is an irreplaceable tool that may 
                                                          
710 Amir Molla-Mohammad-Ali, Mabani fiqhi amaliyat istishhadi (Jurisprudential bases of 
martyrdom operations), Zamzam-e hedayat, 1385/2006, p. 135. 
711 Shahid al-Awwal, al-Doroos al-Shar`yyah, pp. 221-2. 
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be used to achieve their defensive end of protecting the ‘seed of the religion’. 
The analogy is drawn from the same principle which allows eating pork in 
the case of potentially fatal hunger, namely darurah or exigency (see the 
fatwa on permissibility of suicide tactics in the footnote).712 Despite general 
agreement the term ‘exigency’ is deceptively simple, and there is not 
unanimous agreement among Shia jurists about characteristics of a state of 
exigency in which the ‘seed of the religion’ can be considered imperilled.  
There is one case that may be cited in which a small but still notable number 
of Shia jurists considered it to be a situation in which the seed of the religion 
was endangered. The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the foreign 
intervention in favour of the pro-Israeli Maronite Christian ruling party of 
Lebanon was considered to be a threat so existential that it imperilled the seed 
of the religion in the eyes of a small number of Lebanese Shia ulama.713 As 
we see, despite numerous cases of armed conflicts in the Islamic world, only 
this single case found some level of agreement regarding being a ‘threat to 
the seed of religion’, although the number of supporters of such notion among 
Shia ulama still remained far from being the majority and the vast majority of 
Shia ulama chose silence toward it. When majority of Shia ulama refused to 
consider Israeli’s occupation of Lebanon as ‘a threat to the seed of religion’ 
                                                          
712 Fatwa of Ayatollah al-Udma Duzduzani on suicide tactics: if the suicde tactic is used for 
religiously approved necessity although it is not permissible primarily (as hukm awaliyya) but can 
become permissible as secondary ruling for defending the “seed of the religion”. 
Qouted in: Amir Molla Mohammad Ali, Mabani Fiqhi Amaliat Istishhadi (Jurisprudential bases of 
self-martyrdom operation), Zamzam Hedayat Publications, 1385/2006, p. 254. 
:یداهشتسا تایلمع دروم رد ینازودزود یمظعلا الله تیآ یاوتف 
 زیاج ملاسا هضیب زا  افد و یوناث ناونعب و تسین زیاج یلوا مکحب دوش یم ماجنا یعرش ضارغا یارب هک یداهشتسا تایلمع
.دوش یم 
تایلمع یهقف ینابم ،یلع دمحم لام ریما :رد هدش سکعنم  ،تیاده مزمز تاراشتنا ،یداهشتسا1385 ص ،254.  
713 See: Hizbullah Official Website, 11-11-2007 
(http://www.english.moqawama.org/essaydetailsf.php?eid=653&fid=11) 
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labelling smaller cases as such is even more unacceptable. Despite all clashes 
between the West and the Islamic world, no major Muslim authority has ever 
considered the West (or imperialism in general) as a threat to the seed of 
religion. It is because the West’s policies, despite all their bitterness, do not 
include ethnic cleansing of the whole Muslim population of the world or 
forcing them to convert. Anything less than these two cannot be interpreted 
as a ‘danger to the seed of religion’ which is instrumental for justification of 
‘exigency’. 
Shia militants’ version of suicide attacks: an indispensable breach of the 
rules  
In Shia Islam, religious arguments against suicide attacks are so strong and 
numerous that a religious person is not able to ignore them even if conditions 
become so desperate that mounting a suicide attack could transform the 
tactical situation favourably to stop the existential threat. Shia militant groups 
that have used or supported the use of suicide tactics have tried to overcome 
the intractable religious problem – the contradiction between tactical 
expediency and religious teachings – by applying the principle of exigency. 
Although, as a principal ruling (‘hukm awwaliyya), suicide tactics are 
forbidden, the argument is simply put that such actions are indispensable if 
they hold out the prospect of turning the tide of the conflict in favour of the 
Muslims. Thus this condition temporarily turns an otherwise forbidden tactic 
into a permissible act, and one which would be spiritually rewarded. 
Accordingly, and despite the fact that there is no support for suicide attacks 
as such among mainstream Shia religious scholars, the few who support such 
actions conditionalize it with respect to very specific situations. Thus they 
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believe that if certain contingent conditions are met, then the prohibition for 
suicide attacks will be temporarily removed through the application of the 
secondary ruling, or hukm thanawiyya.714  At least seven conditions have been 
indicated as necessary for such temporary jurisprudential consent to be 
extended. These can be enumerated as follows:  
1- A Muslim majority country is being attacked by non-Muslim forces 
from outside. 
2- The attack endangers the Islamic community existentially so that the 
seed, or ‘baydah’, of Islam is endangered.  
3- There is no other way of repulsing the attack.  
4- The operation is done on the battlefield.  
5- Non-combatants are not hurt.  
6- It is done for defence and not to defeat the enemy, and therefore should 
cease as soon as the enemy’s attack has been terminated.  
7- And last, it does not promote a negative image of Islam and Muslims.715  
Some supporters of suicide tactics cite fewer conditions. For example Molla 
Mohammad Ali, author of the book Jurisprudential bases of martyrdom 
operations, mentions only three conditions, namely;716 
                                                          
714 See: Fatwa of Moosawi Ardabili, Fatwa of Ayatollah Yadollah Doozdoozani and Fatwa of 
Qorban-Ali Mohaqiq Kabuli. 
715 See: The interview with Allamah Fadlollah by Mohammad Javad Akbarain. 
See also: US Army Handbook on Suicide Bombing. 
716  
1- دشاب نآ رب فقوتم نیملسم و ملاسا زا  افد 
2- دوش ماجنا  رش مکاح هزاجا اب 
3- دنوشن هتشک هانگ یب دارفا 
 ینابم ،یلع دمحم لام ریما ،تیاده مزمز ،یداهشتسا تایلمع یهقف1385 صص ،92-93.  
 316 
 
1- It is the only means to stop the existential threat against Islam and 
Muslim society. 
2- It is approved by the just ruler. 
3- It does not harm non-combatants.717  
The above illustrates that even for those Shia religious scholars who extend 
hypothetical support for suicide tactics in some exigencial circumstances, and 
are considered by average Shiites to be radical; the carrying out of suicide 
attacks is not in any way a religious obligation but is ‘a temporary removal of  
their prohibition under circumstances of exigency’. This is justified as an 
irreplaceable means necessary in some rare circumstances which then could 
lead to a temporary suspension and breach of the main religious ruling that 
otherwise prohibits the act, for the execution of it involves unavoidably two 
obvious sins – murder and suicide. As the U.S. Army Handbook on Suicide 
Bombing indicates, it was such religious limitations which forced the 
Lebanese Shia militant groups – the innovators of suicide tactics – to call a 
halt to their suicide attacks in 1986, four years after they were introduced as 
an effective tactic. Lebanese Shia groups carried out their first suicide attack 
on November 11, 1982 against an eight-story building in Tyre city in southern 
Lebanon, where the Israeli military headquarters was located. The operation 
killed 141 members of the Israeli Defence Force (IDF), along with a number 
of Arabs from among Israel’s allies in the Southern Lebanon Christian Militia 
and also some detainees.718 It was the greatest loss of life in a single day for 
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the IDF.719 The operation was executed by Ahmad Jaafar Qasir a young Shia 
militiaman who drove his private white Peugeot pickup truck, filled with 
different kinds of explosive materials, into the building.720 The Israeli army 
announced the incident was a result of an explosion of gas cylinders and did 
not release details of the casualties. The second suicide operation against 
Israeli military bases took place one year later. Israeli security forces reported 
the incident as follows: 
On November 4, 1983, at 6:00 in the morning, a booby-trapped car 
laden with six hundred kilograms of explosives entered a military 
compound in the Tyre district in Lebanon, which served the ISA and 
the Border Police. The car was driven by members of the Islamic 
Jihad and the Lebanese Resistance Front. Twenty-eight members of 
the security forces were killed in the explosion, including 16 soldiers 
from the Border Police, three ISA employees, and nine IDF soldiers. 
31 Lebanese detainees were killed. Twenty-three people were 
wounded.721 
Second major attack against the Israeli armed forces was part of a series of 
further operations. The success of the initial attacks encouraged the Lebanese 
militant groups to continue employing the tactic, which led to one of the worst 
attacks against the U.S. military forces since World War II. Overall, six 
suicide attacks took place between April and December 1983, including 
attacks against the U.S. and French military bases in Beirut, resulting in the 
withdrawal of Western military forces from Lebanon. The success of previous 
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attacks led to six more suicide attacks against Israeli targets, between 
November 1983 and April 1985, designed to force Israel to withdraw its army 
from southern Lebanon. They were partially successful. However, despite the 
fact that the Israeli Army then decreased its presence and consequently its 
threat to the Lebanese Shi’a community, another 16 suicide operations were 
carried out between June 1985 and June 1986 against Israeli military forces. 
These achieved little and brought no change to the strategic balance. 
Henceforth, Lebanese Shia groups abandoned their suicide attacks.722  
Although since 1986 Shias have been attacked in many countries including 
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bahrain, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, and 
Lebanon, and in majority of these countries they have been constant targets 
of suicide attacks, they have not resumed carrying out suicide attacks. This 
may be because in Shia Islam, unlike in Sunni Islam, there is a strict religious 
hierarchy, which although it might at times resist progressive innovations and 
reform, at the same time it can act more in concert to prevent destructive 
norm-breaking innovations in the communities it serves. In Shia Islam, those 
without high ranking religious positions cannot talk influentially in the name 
of the religion, which makes introducing radical norm-challenging changes 
difficult. The development of suicide tactics among Lebanese Shiites in the 
1980s and the subsequent expression of dissatisfaction or a silent boycott of 
those tactics by high ranking Shia ulama led to the eventual cessation of those 
attacks.723 It may be an indication of the influence and success of the Shia 
religious hierarchy in combating such norm-breaking innovations. 
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There is a significant difference between ‘exigency’ and ‘retaliation’. When 
‘exigency’ requires ‘immediate action’ ‘retaliation’ can take ages. A very 
clear instance is the case of 1982 invasion of Lebanon by Israel. We know 
that both inspirational suicide operations of 1983 against the US and France 
barrack buildings in Beirut by Shias and 9/11 attacks by Sunnis were a 
reaction to that invasion. When connection between the 1983 suicide attacks 
agains US and France barrack buildings in Beirut to that incident is self 
evident the relation between 9/11 incidents and 1980s developments needs 
supporting evidence. If it was not for the clear announcement of Usama Bin 
Laden such a connection would seem irrelevant: 
God knows it did not cross our minds to attack the Towers, but after 
the situation became unbearable—and we witnessed the injustice 
and tyranny of the American-Israeli alliance against our people in 
Palestine and Lebanon—I thought about it. And the events that 
affected me directly were that of 1982 and the events that 
followed—when America allowed the Israelis to invade Lebanon, 
helped by the U.S. Sixth Fleet. As I watched the destroyed towers in 
Lebanon, it occurred to me to punish the unjust the same way: to 
destroy towers in America so it could taste some of what we are 
tasting …724   
Shia militants were able to convince a small minority of Shia ulama that 
Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon was an existential threat for Shias and as 
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such a ‘threat to the seed of religion’. Israeli army forcing Shias out of their 
homes in the south Lebanon and pushing them up north was perceived as a 
literal cleansing of the land from Shias. Masscre of the Shia neighbourhood 
of Sabra by Israeli backed Christian militia was another significant evident 
for such an ethnic cleansing. These incidents, in addition to what happened to 
Palestinians a few decades earlier, helped Shia militants to sell the situation 
as a Judeo-Christian plot of christianizing Lebanon by cleansing the country 
from Muslims and particularly Shias as the most vulnerable ethno-religious 
group. Despite their initial success in selling the situation as the ‘threat to the 
seed of religion’ to few Shia ulema the majority of Shia ulema refused such a 
quest by Shia militants of Lebanon. 
Conclusion 
‘Exigency’ implies the suspension of standard jurisprudential rulings, at least 
temporarily. Therefore, it is beyond the core competence of fiqh by its very 
nature, even if such conditions are addressed hypothetically by jurists. Thus, 
jurisprudence cannot be adduced directly to support justifications for suicide 
attacks. Rather it is the jurists’ very occasional granting of permission for its 
suspension in extreme circumstances that is cited by radicals. Scott Appleby 
characterised the role of Shia Ulama in the promotion and containment of 
suicide attacks during Lebanon war quite trenchantly: 
Submission to Islamic law freed Hizbullah's guerrillas from other types 
of moral constrains explaining their actions as a Jihad, launched by the 
oppressed against the oppressors. Jihad had its own requirements, 
however. Islamic law is open to interpretation, Kramer comments, but 
it is not infinitely elastic. [Thus] the religious scholars subjected 
Hizbullah's selection of targets and techniques to such criteria. In doing 
 321 
 
so, they forced Hizbullah to resist the temptation to deteriorate into one 
more sectarian Lebanese militia devoted to battling other sectarian 
militias.725 
Suicide tactics used in the context of exigency are considered to be an 
inevitable evil with no religious legal value and therefore cannot be 
commanded, as such, by religion. If this is so, then religion should be 
criticised for staying silent and doing nothing to stop such incidents, and not, 
as such, for playing a role in ordering/causing them. Some scholars claim that 
the apparent silence, or occasional connivance, in situations of exigency is 
not exclusive to religion and they suggest that it can even be expanded to 
moral stands as well. Such scholars believe that committing a minor evil to 
avoid a greater one, when there is no third way to stop the greater evil, 
mitigates the moral responsibility of the doer.726 Although such a position 
might not be considered as offering moral support for violence, the fact is that 
it can serve violence indirectly by not demoralising such actions. It seems that 
the stand of jurisprudence in opposing terrorism unconditionally gives it a 
better position in this regard. While legal rulings are supposed to be evaluated 
by moral ones it seems that in this case jurisprudential rulings are ahead of 
the moral standpoints of some scholars. 
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Chapter Eleven 
Conclusion 
  
Although the focus on religious ideology, as undertaken by violent extremists, plays 
an important role in today’s religious extremism, this challenge should not lead to 
overlooking the deeper causes of extremism such as political suppression, poverty, 
injustice, foreign intervension and internal corruption. As for the public support for 
extremism in the Islamic world, according to the result of a Gallup Poll study 
between 2001 and 2007, undertaken in several Muslim majority countries, those 
who condemn violence against civilians [i.e., terrorism] refer directly to the Islamic 
teachings including Quranic verses, whilst those Muslims who support such 
violence without exception (at least in that specific survey) refer to political issues 
including foreign intervention in Muslim lands.727 The fact is that impudent foreign 
intervention, as well as the crippling internal corruption and the perceived 
‘backwardness’ of much of the Islamic world has not attracted only the attention of 
religious zealots. A wide range of activists, from staunch leftists to devout 
westernizers, all shared the idea that such a devastating situation could not continue. 
Of course, the proposed ways out of this situation differed from one group to 
another. There were three main approaches among Muslims as how to respond to 
this situation: ‘Alliance with other Sufferers’, ‘Westernization’, and ‘Return to the 
Self’. Interestingly, the first and the most popular one was ‘adoptation of western 
civilization’ although in practice this approach did not bring anything other than 
‘suppressing despotism (in the name of secularism)’ together with ‘unyielding 
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corruption’ internally and ‘derogatory dependency’ externally. ‘Alliance with other 
Sufferers’ did not fare better and although it was manifested through the ‘non-
alliance movement’ in practice it ended up producing a ‘dependency on 
communism’, as the other imperialist block. The ‘Return to the Self’ movement, 
suffered deeply from a lack of unity among the advocates of this approach. This, to 
a great extent, was due to disparity of understandings of the ‘true self’ and the ‘ideal 
past’ among sympathizers of this approach.  
The socio-politico-cultural roots of the current civilizational frustration facing 
Muslims, especially in the Iranian context, and the violence that such frustration 
can cause, does nothing to explain the religious, and more specifically, the 
jurisprudential language that agents of the current era of violent extremism are using 
– not only to justify but also to promote their acts. It has been the aim of this thesis 
to examine the reasons for the popularity of the Islamic juridical language among 
violent extremists and the jurisprudential justification for the worst kind of current 
violence, namely suicide terrorism. 
To find the roots for the current widespread prevalence of Shi’a Islamic juridical 
language among Muslim violent extremists, including agents of suicide terrorism, 
we needed to dig deep into recent history and locate the precise foundations where 
these extremists can and/or may base their claims. While a number of revivalist 
movements were searching out their ‘ideal past’ in respect to a pre-Islamic identity, 
Islamic movements were engaged in an endless dispute over an ideal past, which 
was not limited to the Shia-Sunni and other inter-dominational disputes. Perhaps 
this was the reason why Islamic religious movements gained public attention and 
support later than other, non-religious, movements. This said it could be argued that 
if such other movents had been relatively successful in pulling people out of the 
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misery of backwardness, corruption, poverty, foreign intervension and internal 
despotism, religious movements would never have gained the chance to attract 
public attention, as was indeed the case for a very long time. 
It is not difficult to surmise that when Western powers were plotting against 
national-secular movements in the Muslim countries to ensure they failed, and in 
the most humiliating way, as they did with Mosadeq of Iran for example, they had 
no idea as to how challenging the alternative could be. Thus the 1979 Islamic 
revolution in Iran, which was the pioneer for the rise of Islamism in the whole 
Muslim world, was supported by Iranians only because all the non-religious efforts 
had failed miserably as result of the sabotage of them undertaken by foreign powers 
(specifically the UK and US).  
When pointing to the role of Islam regarding the current situation of extremism it 
is necessary to include all elements involved, rather than over-simplifying complex 
issues by branding Islam as the mother-lode of extremism. To gain a proper 
understanding I have tried to include information necessary for a comprehensive 
picture of what is going on within the Shi’a Islamic world. As the the second part 
of this research – Battle of Interpretations – indicates, what is going on, from unrest 
to extensive violence inside the Islamic world, is in fact an internal clash between 
different interpretations of Islam in an attempt to find a way out of a current 
unsatisifactory situation. Muslim activists simply try to brand their particular ideal 
as the one true Islam. Their ideal is supposed to provide the best solution for their 
carefully defined problems. For example, if corruption and foreign interference are 
seen as a problem, almost any agenda with a solution might simply be sold as 
 325 
 
‘Islamic’ by such activists.728 To explain why Islamic jurisprudentialism has gained 
such a high position so that its language has been found attractive by the Muslim 
violent extremists in the articulation of their actions and supporting rationales, we 
need to unfold the characteristics of this movement and its place in relation to other 
comparable Islamic movements. 
In doing this we learn that the Islamic faith, when responding to the spiritual, 
epistemological, and social needs of its followers, does so in terms of mysticism, 
rationalism, and jurisprudence. Three macro-movements of Sufism, Islamic ethico-
rationalism or kalami movement, and jurisprudential or fiqh-mindedness 
movement, not only demonstrate three main qualities of Islam but also divide the 
believers accordingly. Each developed its own religious knowledge, namely Irfan, 
kalam, and fiqh, which resulted in the formation of three essentially different 
understandings of Islam: Irfani (Mystical) Islam, Kalami (Theo-ethical) Islam, and 
Fiqhi (Jurisprudential) Islam.729 Such division has not remained at a theoretical 
level but rather has influenced practical conduct of the believers as well. Regarding 
the question of jihad, for instance, while the two camps of Mysticalism and Theo-
ethicalism emphasize non-violent understandings of jihad, for the jurisprudential 
camp jihad is warfare. In order to provide a comprehensive understanding of the 
issue I have designed my thesis in a way that makes a study of the recent 
phenomenon of suicide terrorism in the context of classical Islamic (Shi’a) 
jurisprudence possible.  
Part one of this thesis thus focused on the recent development of suicide terrorism. 
In chapter two the definitional elements of terrorism were examined so that a 
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comparison between this modern phenomenon and classical jihad was possible to 
undertake. Chapter three covered the latests facts and figures about suicide 
terrorism. In chapter four two main non-jurisprudential religious concepts, 
Martyrdom and Retaliation and their relation with suicide terrorism, were examined 
and discussed. 
In part two, three main interpretations of Islam – namely Mystical Islam, Theo-
ethical Islam and Jurisprudential Islam – were introduced and their relation to 
violence, and more specifically jihad, was explained. The final chapter of this part 
was exclusively concerned with ‘jurisprudentialism’ as a political movement which 
promotes a rigid legalism as the solution for the problems of today’s Muslims, and 
especially the issue of corruption, which is posited as a result of foreign intervention 
or colonialism/imperialism. The main focus of research was on this movement 
because its language is used by violent extremists the most. 
Part three covered the mechanisms of law-making/fatwa-realising in Shia Islam and 
explained the basic criteria for a valid religious law. Chapter seven was focused on 
the main sources of Shia Islamic law or usul al-fiqh and also the process of law-
making, or ijtihad. Chapter eight was on Shia fiqh as the body of Shia Islamic laws 
and had an exclusive focus on ‘jihad” as an act of worship among nine other acts of 
worship. In chapter nine, I analysed the theological position of ‘jihad’ in Shia Islam 
and explained the three main understandings of jihad: jihad as warfare, jihad as 
spiritual struggle, and jihad as a pious way of life in all aspects. In chapter ten the 
legitimate forms of jihad according to Shia jurisprudence were compared with the 
definitional elements of suicide terrorism and the compatibility or inconsistency 
between different forms of jihad were examined. Finally use of ‘exigency’ as a 
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technique for bypassing jurisprudence by Shia militants was discussed in the last 
section of chapter ten. 
Although jihad in Islamic jurisprudence, which should be called ‘jurisprudential 
jihad’, is exclusively about warfare, it is difficult to relate it directly to terrorism. 
None of the six forms of armed jihad, namely; Preemptive Attack (jihad ibtida`i), 
Self-defense (difa`), Confronting Rebels (qital al-boghat), Fighting Fear-mongers 
(qital al-muharibun), Guarding Borders (al-ribat), and Physical Forbidding of Evil 
(nahi anil-munkar bil-yad) overlap with the four constitutional elements of 
terrorism. These six forms of jihad in Shia jurisprudence have different executers, 
targets, means and goals in comparison to terrorism. Terrorism is distinguished by 
four elements, namely, the use of violence ‘by non-state actors’, being ‘against 
civilians’, aimed ‘to spread fear’ for ‘political objectives’. By contrast, proper jihad 
in all of its forms, except that of self-defence, requires the approval of legitimate 
authorities. Thus non-state actors cannot wage jihad as they wish in the manner that 
non-state executers of terrorism do. Regarding the issue of targets, in jihad there are 
five categories which enjoy immunity during armed conflict, namely women, 
children, the elderly, the ill, and the clergy. By contrast, these groups are very often 
among the main targets of terrorism. Whereas spreading fear is one of the main 
means of terrorism, fear-mongering is seen as a crime in Shia jurisprudence and 
there is indeed a specific form of legitimate use of force against it. Finally jihad, in 
none of its six forms, shares the same political objectives which terrorism tries to 
achieve through the spread of fear.  
Furthermore, terrorism is associated with the sin of harming innocent civilians, and 
suicide terrorism includes an additional sin, namely ‘suicide’ as such. Thus the 
rejection of terrorism by Shia jurisprudence logically leads to the rejection of 
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suicide terrorism as well. However, there is one concept in Shia jurisprudence 
which offers some flexibility in the use of force that makes it attractive for the 
supporters of suicide terrorism. This is the ‘negligibility/impunity of unintentional 
harm to a human shield’ or the ‘question of tatarros’. Despite the Shia jurists’ 
unanimous agreement on the prohibition of targeting a human shield, most jurists 
consider targeting the enemy while there is a risk to the human shield (whether 
consisting of Muslims or non-Muslims) to be permissible.730 This rule has been 
widely used by supporters of suicide terrorism to justify both harm to innocent 
civilians and also the act of ‘suicide’ by the executers of such operations. This 
misuse of tatarros for justifying suicide terrorism is no more valid than any other 
excuse for such operations. When suicide terrorists have a clear intention of 
harming civilians and also themselves by way of counting their action as a case of 
tatarros, in which harm to civilians is deemed ‘unintended’, makes no sense. This 
rudimentary twisted use of ‘tatarros’ for the justification of suicide terrorism 
shows, jurisprudentially speaking, how empty are hands of terrorists for justifying 
their acts. The selective use, even misuse, of jihad; being unable to point to any 
specific section of fiqh that states that suicide terrorism is clearly justified, or the 
clumsy twisting of jurisprudential terms and concepts, demonstrate the lack of any 
valid support for suicide terrorism in Islamic jurisprudence. 
While all forms of (jurisprudentially) legitimate jihad reject terrorism, there is one 
principle among the six forms of legitimate use of armed force in Shia 
jurisprudence, namely, qital al-muharibun or ‘fighting the fear-mongers’, which 
has the potential to be used for directly confronting terrorism. Further, in addition 
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to jihad, there are three other concepts, Martyrdom, Exigency, and Retaliation 
which are also used to justify terrorism and its suicide version, religiously. 
Martyrdom used to justify suicide terrorism has distorted the concept of reward for 
doing the religiously good deed to being an independent valid action and thus it is 
why suicide terrorism events are called ‘Martyrdom Seeking Operations’ or 
amaliyya al-istishhadiyya. ‘Seeking Martyrdom’, as an independent action from 
what is approved jurisprudentially, is a deviation from jurisprudence and so jurists 
cannot sanction it jurisprudentially as it violates the ‘sanctity of life’ principle which 
is a fixed principle of the religion.  
Retaliation is another concept which is used frequently by the perpetrators of 
suicide terrorism to justify such incidents religiously. Muslims militants who 
advocate indiscriminate terrorism against civilians justify their actions as a reaction 
to the wrong deeds of their opponents. Retaliation in the way used by Muslim 
militants to justify suicide tactics against civilians, more than being a just reaction, 
is closely associated with pre-Islamic, or jahili, tradition of intiqam. The term 
intiqam or ‘blind revenge’ has a negative meaning pointing to ‘causing suffering 
out of hatred and anger’ to random members of a community in retaliation for a 
harm received from a member of that community. As such intiqam is opposite to 
nay valid notion of a ‘just retaliation’ and is rejected by Islam because wrong deeds 
of the enemy does not justify any unjust reaction: “… and do not let the animosity 
of a people prevent you from being just. Be just; that is nearer to righteousness” 
(Q.5:8). 
Exigency in certain circumstances allows for the ‘suspension of jurisprudential 
rules until the State of exigency is over’. ‘Rule of exigency’ is a term derived from 
a maxim of usul al fiqh (principles of jurisprudence) which allows the suspension 
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of jurisprudential rulings. The rule of exigency indicates that ‘necessity makes the 
unlawful lawful’ (al-darurat tubihu al-mazurat).731 The legal maxim of ‘necessity’ 
is used essentially in favour of the interests of believers, meaning that when the 
special conditions make the consequences of acting in accordance with religion so 
onerous, the believer’s obligation is suspended until conditions return to normal, or 
at least to a more tolerable state. Using this principle, which is fundamentally in 
favour of the wellbeing of the believers, as justification for suicide terrorism which 
requires a guaranteed harm to the executer creates a clear paradox. Despite such 
paradox those Shia ulama who support suicide tactics usually recourse to ‘rule of 
exigency’ as was discussed in chapter ten. 
Recommendations arising from Research 
Understanding the divisions within the Islamic faith community is not only of the 
utmost importance for gaining a better grasp of current intellectual trends in the 
Islamic scholarship, it can also have specific practical benefits as well. These 
divisions are not only matters of intellectual debate, but also play an important role 
in the way that believers see their religion and behave religiously. Distinguishing 
between three different understandings of Islam is essential for combatting 
terrorism effectively. Gaining a precise knowledge of an enemy is the first step in 
an effective struggle, otherwise any uncalculated action in fighting a supposed 
enemy might bring more harm than good. For example the anti-terror forces that 
target (militarily or otherwise) the wrong suspects is unconditionally a victory for 
the extremist camp. Ill-treatment of innocent people, who otherwise have no need 
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for terrorist extremists, then helps the terrorist campaign for recruiting new 
personnel in a way that no other means can help them that effectively. 
To combat terrorism we need to know where this phenomenon, both ideologically 
and materially, is rooted in and fed by. Again to combat the current violence spread 
by extremist Muslim militants we need to know about its real nature. Needless to 
say that any miscalculation about the nature and roots of this violence not only 
leaves any counter-terror attempt fruitless, it also, by aiming at the wrong targets, 
may create new challenges and threats. To combat the current wave of terrorism the 
anti-terror strategy needs to demolish terrorism’s social base and for that they need 
strong cooperation of the mainstream. To gain mainstream support requires 
speaking to the mainstream in its own cultural language and assuage its concerns 
regarding the anti-terrorism agenda. Extremists constantly monitor the anti-terrorist 
actions and approaches and will try to find an excuse to fuel the mainstream’s 
suspicion toward them. And of course losing the mainstream’s trust is the last thing 
that the anti-terror camp needs. We should be aware that extremists can easily use 
the long history of western colonialism/imperialism to fuel the Muslim masses’ 
suspicion if they can find enough similarities between gestures of the current anti-
terror camp and the colonial powers. To win a battle against an enemy such as 
terrorism, in which the hearts and minds of the affected society are the focus of the 
combat, first and for most there is a need for winning hearts and minds. For that 
purpose a clear distinction between different actors of that society is necessary. 
Such a distinction is essential both for selecting proper communicating language 
and also avoiding targeting wrongly suspected people. 
Issues related to representation is another practical realm where a proper 
understanding of the internal divisions among Muslims can help with avoiding 
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miscalculations and escaping costly policies based on wrong assumptions. As Pratt 
argues ‘true representation’ has always been a major issue in Islam as it has been 
the case with its sister religions of Christianity and Judaism.732 Usually believers 
see their own understanding of the religion as the authentic and correct one. 
Muslims are not exceptions in this regard. In today’s Islamic world different 
perspectives are competing to gain legitimacy and leadership to guide the direction 
of the Muslim community.733 Sufi movements see their version of Islam as the cure 
for the lustful and violent environment destroying human qualities and are seeking 
to revive their tariqas. Rationalist reform movements seek to purify the faith from 
customs of pre-modern societies and match it with the current condition and need 
of modern human society. And of course legalists seeking to establish the Islamic 
state based on Sharia. Needless to say that each movement sees itself as the true 
Islam and invites people to its way. We need to be aware of the nature of these 
movements and their internal clashes to avoid painting all Muslim activists with the 
same brush and treat them accordingly which, in certain circumstances, can have 
quite problematic consequences. If, as the media is eager to portray, major 
developments in the Islamic world be seen as anti-west there will be limited 
optimism regarding success of any joint combat against violent extremism. Whilst 
if these developments be seen, as they truly are, an internal competition over 
supremacy and representation among different camps of Islam the outcome can be 
substantially different. On the contrary, if any development in the Islamic world be 
seen necessarily as anti-western, and the wrong prescription be advised for 
confronting it, the outlook for combatting violent extremism can turn even darker. 
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Any foreign attack against Muslims might easily lead to marginalization of 
fundamental internal controversies among Muslims in favour of confronting the 
foreign threat. An outside threat has always the potential to unite unlike-minded 
activists and help them forget their essential differences. Such a prioritization of 
confronting a foreign attack inherently benefits the hardliners in promoting a 
response of violence. 
When approaching Muslims’ divisions we need to also be careful about misreading 
similarities and differences among these divisions. There is, for example, one major 
confusion resulted from the commonality of a minimal level of spirituality, 
jurisprudence and creedal discussion among all three camps of Islam which has 
created the impression that all three are the same with only superficial differences. 
That is not the case in any way. For example while all three agree on the existence 
of spiritual elements embedded in the prescribed rites or manasik, other than 
mysticism they do not see Islam as a vehicle for spiritualism without a major 
outward dimension to it. Again while all three follow minimal outward rites, apart 
from than jurisprudential camp, the other two do not see Islam as a set of rulings 
and commands. The same applies to the creedal rational discussions. While the 
rationalist camp sees the religion as a mere continuation of human reason, with 
revelation as only a new tool without any superiority over reason,734 the other two 
either reject reason, as mysticism does, or limit it to merely a tool for discovering 
rulings of the religion, as jurisprudentialism does.735 As a practical result of 
misreading the similarities among Muslims of different camps, for example, one 
might consider any practicing Muslim inherently a fundamentalist and the only 
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tolerable Muslims for them are the ‘nominal Muslims’ who do not have sincere 
belief in their religion.736 Whilst in many cases some non-practising Muslims 
support violence in a much stronger way, it is because they care less for limitations 
laid down by religion.737 The bottom line is that without a precise understanding of 
the problem and a genuine knowledge of the engaged factors, doing nothing is better 
than doing something. But the attitude of ‘doing something’ seems to be the 
dominant approach in many prescriptions introduced for combatting the current 
extremism undertaken in the name of Islam. This approach might have gained some 
battles but has made winning the war against terrorism even more complicated. 
A lesson that can be learnt from phenomenon of suicide operations among Shias is 
that while jurisprudence – because its terms such as jihad are used by the militants 
– might look like a prominent suspect in the expansion of this phenomenon among 
religious Shia militants, it seems the strict hierarchy of Shia jurisprudents played an 
important role in containing suicide tactics and has forced Shia militants to abjure 
such tactics. When recommending policies for confronting religious terrorism, 
strategists should pay attention to both the divisions among Muslims, consequently 
carefully defining the ‘enemy’ and suggesting proportional strategies for different 
situations – and also the internal capabilities of the target societies in combatting 
terrorism. 
                                                          
736 Sam Harris vs Fareed Zakaria on Islam - Are most Muslims extremists?, accessible via: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BCM2rU7mFKk 
737 Ramadan, Good Muslim, bad Muslim, Op cit. 
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Appendices 
Appendix No. 1: Shahadah in the Quran 
 
In some English translations including “Saheeh International” the term ‘shohada’, [singular 
‘shahid’] has been translated as “martyrs” which is not correct  because it turns the term, 
which is in fact the second attribute of the same group (the believers), into a separate group 
as “martyrs”. Such translations which are based on understanding the term ‘shahadah’ as 
“martyrdom” ignore the rest of the term which is ‘inda rabbihim’ and translate the term 
‘shahadah’ separately. It is while ‘shohada inda rabbihim’ (  مءا لدله ُّشلا  لدن نع   منه ب لر ) or “those who 
present before their Lord” points to a very high spiritual position which has been allocated 
to those with true belief and deed. The same as other translations, there are a wide range of 
translations of the Quran in other languages which some are more committed to the literal 
meaning and some are less committed. The difference is that the Quran like other holy texts 
is manifesto for virtuous conduct for many Muslims and therefore such translations not 
only affect the believers’ conduct but can also shape non-Muslims’ image of Islam and 
Muslims as well. 
While these kinds of differences might appear to arise from simple differences of taste 
among translators, the fact is that such disparities are actually based on varying 
understanding of the holy text and can therefore alter the sense of the text significantly. 
Briefly, those who believe that the term ‘shahadah’ in the Quran means “martyrdom” 
usually base their view on such translations which, as detailed above, are the result of 
interpolating this understanding of the term into the translation. Of course, good 
translations express as close a meaning to that intended in the source language text, and do 
not impose the translator’s subjective preference on the term.  
Below is a selection of different translations of the relevant verse (57:19), which shows 
how the translations can alter the sense.  
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Saheeh translation: 
And those who have believed in Allah and His messengers - those are [in the ranks of] the 
supporters of truth and the martyrs, with their Lord. For them is their reward and their light. 
But those who have disbelieved and denied Our verses - those are the companions of 
Hellfire. 
Ahmed Ali translation: 
Those who believe in God and His apostles are true of word and deed; and by their Lord 
are considered testifiers of the truth. They have their guardian and their light. As for those 
who do not believe and reject Our revelations, are the people of Hell. 
While neither of the above reflects an exact literal translation, they are significantly 
different. As we see Ahmed Ali has translated ‘shohada inda Rabbihim’ as: “[those who] 
by their Lord are considered testifiers of the truth” which is more in-line with literal 
meaning of the term while in ‘Saheeh’ ‘shohada’ has been translated as “martyrs”. 
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Appendix No. 2: Five categorisation of religious duties according to Shia 
jurisprudence: 
Wajib, or obligatory, means that it must be done and must not be left undone, like 
fasting during Ramadan or doing the five daily prayers. 
Haram, or forbidden, means that it must not be performed and must be refrained 
from like lies, drinking alcohol and eating pork. 
Mustahab, or desirable, means that it is good to do but leaving it undone is not a 
sin such as praying in a mosque instead of doing it individually at home. 
Makruh, or undesirable, means that it is bad to do but if done no punishable sin is 
committed, like talking about worldly affairs in a mosque which is a place of 
worship. 
Mubah, or permissible, means that the doing of it and the not doing of it are exactly 
equal, and this includes most actions which there is no harm to oneself or others in 
doing or leaving them. 
 
  
 359 
 
Appendix No. 3:  Jihad verses in the Quran 
1- Surely those who believed and those who fled (their home) and strove hard 
(j-h-d) in the way of Allah these hope for the mercy of Allah and Allah is 
Forgiving, Merciful. (2:218) 
2- Do you think that you will enter the heaven while Allah has not yet known 
those who strive hard (j-h-d) from among you, and (He has not) known the 
patient. (3:142) 
3- The holders back from among the believers, not having any injury, and those 
who strive hard (j-h-d) in Allah's way with their property and their persons 
are not equal; Allah has made the strivers with their property and their 
persons to excel the holders back a (high) degree, and to each (class) Allah 
has promised good; and Allah shall grant to the strivers above the holders 
back a mighty reward: (4:95) 
4- O you who believe! be careful of (your duty to) Allah and seek means of 
nearness to Him and strive hard (j-h-d) in His way that you may be 
successful. (5:35) 
5- And those who believe will say: Are these they who swore by Allah with the 
most forcible (j-h-d) of their oaths that they were most surely with you? 
Their deeds shall go for nothing, so they shall become losers. (5:53) 
6- O you who believe! whoever from among you turns back from his religion, 
then Allah will bring a people, He shall love them and they shall love Him, 
lowly before the believers, mighty against the unbelievers, they shall strive 
hard (j-h-d) in Allah's way and shall not fear the censure of any censurer; 
this is Allah's Face, He gives it to whom He pleases, and Allah is Ample-
giving, Knowing. (5:54) 
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7- And they swear by Allah with the strongest (j-h-d) of their oaths, that if a 
sign came to them they would most certainly believe in it. Say: Signs are 
only with Allah; and what should make you know that when it comes they 
will not believe? (6:109) [Meccan] 
8- Surely those who believed and fled (their homes) and struggled hard (j-h-d)  
in Allah's way with their property and their souls, and those who gave 
shelter and helped-- these are guardians of each other; and (as for) those 
who believed and did not fly, not yours is their guardianship until they fly; 
and if they seek aid from you in the matter of religion, aid is incumbent on 
you except against a people between whom and you there is a treaty, and 
Allah sees what you do. (8:72) 
9- And (as for) those who believed and fled and struggled hard(j-h-d)  in 
Allah's way, and those who gave shelter and helped, these are the believers 
truly; they shall have forgiveness and honorable provision. (8:74) 
10- And (as for) those who believed afterwards and fled and struggled hard  (j-
h-d) along with you, they are of you; and the possessors of relationships are 
nearer to each other in the ordinance of Allah; surely Allah knows all 
things. (8:75) 
11- What! do you think that you will be left alone while Allah has not yet known 
those of you who have struggled hard (j-h-d)  and have not taken any one 
as an adherent besides Allah and His Apostle and the believers; and Allah 
is aware of what you do. (9:16) 
12- What! do you make (one who undertakes) the giving of drink to the pilgrims 
and the guarding of the Sacred Mosque like him who believes in Allah and 
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the latter day and strives hard (j-h-d) in Allah's way? They are not equal 
with Allah; and Allah does not guide the unjust people. (9:19) 
13- Those who believed and fled (their homes), and strove hard(j-h-d)  in Allah's 
way with their property and their souls, are much higher in rank with Allah; 
and those are they who are the achievers (of their objects). (9:20) 
14- Say: If your fathers and your sons and your brethren and your mates and 
your kinsfolk and property which you have acquired, and the slackness of 
trade which you fear and dwellings which you like, are dearer to you than 
Allah and His Apostle and striving (j-h-d) in His way, then wait till Allah 
brings about His command: and Allah does not guide the transgressing 
people. (9:24) 
15- Go forth light and heavy, and strive hard (j-h-d) in Allah's way with your 
property and your persons; this is better for you, if you know. (9:41) 
16- They do not ask leave of you who believe in Allah and the latter day (to stay 
away) from striving hard (j-h-d) with their property and their persons, and 
Allah knows those who guard (against evil). (9:44) 
17- O Prophet! strive hard (j-h-d) against the unbelievers and the hypocrites 
and be hard against  them; and their abode is hell, and evil is the 
destination. (9:73) 
18- Those who criticize the contributors among the believers concerning [their] 
charities and [criticize] the ones who find nothing [to spend] except their 
effort (j-h-d), so they ridicule them - Allah will ridicule them, and they will 
have a painful punishment. (9:79) 
19-  Those who were left behind were glad on account of their sitting behind 
Allah's Apostle and they were averse from striving (j-h-d) in Allah's way 
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with their property and their persons, and said: Do not go forth in the heat. 
Say: The fire of hell is much severe in heat. Would that they understood (it). 
(9:81) 
20- And whenever a chapter is revealed, saying: Believe in Allah and strive hard 
(j-h-d) along with His Apostle, those having ampleness of means ask 
permission of you and say: Leave us (behind), that we may be with those 
who sit. (9:86) 
21- But the Apostle and those who believe with him strive hard (j-h-d) with their 
property and their persons; and these it is who shall have the good things 
and these it is who shall be successful. (9:88) 
22- And they swear by Allah with the most energetic (j-h-d) of their oaths: Allah 
will not raise up him who dies. Yea! it is a promise binding on Him, quite 
true, but most people do not know; (16:38) [Meccan] 
23- Yet surely your Lord, with respect to those who fly after they are persecuted, 
then they struggle hard (j-h-d) and are patient, most surely your Lord after 
that is Forgiving, Merciful. (16:110) [Maccan] 
24- And strive hard (j-h-d) in (the way of) Allah, (such) a striving as is due to 
Him; He has chosen you and has not laid upon you an hardship in religion; 
the faith of your father Ibrahim; He named you Muslims before and in this, 
that the Apostle may be a bearer of witness to you, and you may be bearers 
of witness to the people; therefore keep up prayer and pay the poor-rate and 
hold fast by Allah; He is your Guardian; how excellent the Guardian and 
how excellent the Helper! (22:78) 
25- And they swear by Allah with the most energetic (j-h-d) of their oaths that 
if you command them they would certainly go forth. Say: Swear not; 
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reasonable obedience (is desired); surely Allah is aware of what you do. 
(24:53) 
26- So do not follow the unbelievers, and strive (j-h-d) against them a mighty 
striving(j-h-d) with it (the Quran). (25:52) [Meccan] 
27- And whoever strives hard (j-h-d), he strives (j-h-d) only for his own soul; 
most surely Allah is Self-sufficient, above (need of) the worlds. (29:6) 
[Meccan] 
28- And We have enjoined on man goodness to his parents, and if they contend 
(j-h-d) with you that you should associate (others) with Me, of which you 
have no knowledge, do not obey them, to Me is your return, so I will inform 
you of what you did. (29:8) [Meccan] 
29- And (as for) those who strive hard (j-h-d) for Us, We will most certainly 
guide them in Our ways; and Allah is most surely with the doers of good. 
(29:69) [Meccan] 
30- And if they (your parents) contend (j-h-d) with you that you should associate 
with Me what you have no knowledge of, do not obey them, and keep 
company with them in this world kindly, and follow the way of him who turns 
to Me, then to Me is your return, then will I inform you of what you did-- 
(31:15) [Meccan] 
31- And they swore by Allah with the strongest (j-h-d) of their oaths that if there 
came to them a warner they would be better guided than any of the nations; 
but when there came to them a warner it increased them in naught but 
aversion. (35:42) [Meccan] 
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32- And most certainly We will try (examine) you until We have known those 
among you who exert themselves hard (j-h-d), and the patient, and made 
your case manifest. (47:31) 
33- The believers are only those who believe in Allah and His Apostle then they 
doubt not and struggle hard (j-h-d) with their wealth and their persons  in 
the way of Allah; they are the truthful ones. (49:15) 
34- O you who believe! do not take My enemy and your enemy for friends: would 
you offer them love while they deny what has come to you of the truth, 
driving out the Apostle and yourselves because you believe in Allah, your 
Lord? If you go forth struggling hard (j-h-d) in My path and seeking My 
pleasure, would you manifest love to them? And I know what you conceal 
and what you manifest; and whoever of you does this, he indeed has gone 
astray from the straight path. (60:1) 
35- You shall believe in Allah and His Apostle, and struggle hard (j-h-d) in 
Allah's way with your property and your persons; that is better for you, did 
you but know! (61:11) 
36- O Prophet! strive hard (j-h-d) against the unbelievers and the hypocrites, 
and be hard against them; and their abode is hell; and evil is the resort. 
(66:9) 
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Appendix No. 4: Some official definitions of terrorism 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/210 (1996)  
“…criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general 
public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any 
circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, 
philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may be 
invoked to justify them.” 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004) 
“criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death 
or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state 
of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, 
intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to 
do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of 
and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, 
are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, 
philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature.” 
Official United States Government Definition of Terrorism 
“[An] act of terrorism, means any activity that (A) involves a violent act or an act 
dangerous to human life that is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States 
or any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the 
jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; and (B) appears to be intended (i) 
to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a 
government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a 
government by assassination or kidnapping.” 
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(United States Code Congressional and Administrative News, 98th Congress, 
Second Session, 1984, Oct. 19, volume 2; par. 3077, 98 STAT. 2707 [West 
Publishing Co., 1984]) accessible via:  
http://yeoldeconsciousnessshoppe.com/art98.html 
United States Department of States 
“Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetuated against non-combatant 
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence 
an audience”  
(Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1996, 
US Department of State Publication 10433, Washington, DC: State Dept., April 
1997, vi.) 
United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
“The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or 
coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance 
of political or social objectives” Accessible via:  
http://www.azdema.gov/museum/famousbattles/pdf/Terrorism%20Definitions%2
0072809.pdf 
United States Department of Defence 
“the unlawful use of — or threatened use of — force or violence against individuals 
or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve 
political religious, or ideological objectives”. Accessible via:  
http://www.azdema.gov/museum/famousbattles/pdf/Terrorism%20Definitions%2
0072809.pdf 
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United States Army 
“calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear. 
It is intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies ... [to attain] political, 
religious, or ideological goals."  U.S. Army Field Manual No. FM 3-0, Chapter 9, 
37 (14 June 2001). 
European Union 
The European Union defines terrorism for legal/official purposes in Art.1 of the 
Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism (2002).  This provides that terrorist 
offences are certain criminal offences set out in a list comprised largely of serious 
offences against persons and property which:  
“given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international 
organization where committed with the aim of: seriously intimidating a population; 
or unduly compelling a Government or international organization to perform or 
abstain from performing any act; or seriously destabilizing or destroying the 
fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or 
an international organization.” Accessible via:  
http://www.azdema.gov/museum/famousbattles/pdf/Terrorism%20Definitions%0
072809.pdf  
Canadian Security Intelligence Service  
“…the deliberate and systematic threat or use of violence to achieve an objective. 
In the modern context, the expression is generally associated with politically 
motivated coercion”   
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(Canadian Security Intelligence Service Publications, Commentary No. 13, 
“Terrorism and the Rule of Law: Dangerous Compromise in Colombia,” October 
1991.)  
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
In Australia, what constitutes an act of terrorism is defined in Commonwealth 
legislation. The Criminal Code Act 1995 states that a terrorist act means an action 
or threat of action where the action causes certain defined forms of harm or 
interference and the action is done or the threat is made with the intention of 
advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. Further, the Act states that 'the 
action is done or the threat is made with the intention of: 
i. coercing, or influencing by intimidation, the government of the 
Commonwealth or a State, Territory or foreign country, or part of a State, 
Territory or foreign country; or 
ii. intimidating the public or a section of the public and where the action: 
(a) causes serious harm that is physical harm to a person; or 
(b) causes serious damage to property; or 
(c) causes a person's death; or 
(d) endangers a person's life, other than the life of the person taking the action; 
or 
(e) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of 
the public; or 
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(f) seriously interferes with, seriously disrupts, or destroys, an electronic 
system including, but not limited to: (i) an information system; or (ii) a 
telecommunications system; or (iii) a financial system; or (iv) a system used 
for the delivery of essential government services; or (v) a system used for, or 
by, an essential public utility; or (vi) a system used for, or by, a transport 
system. 
The Criminal Code makes it an offence if a person commits a terrorist act, provides 
or receives training connected with terrorist acts, possesses a thing connected with 
terrorist acts, collects or makes documents likely to facilitate terrorist acts, or does 
any act in preparation for or planning of terrorist acts. The penalty for engaging in 
a terrorist act is life imprisonment. 
Accessible via: http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/terrorism/chapter1.html  
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Appendix No. 5: Contradiction of ‘preemptive jihad’ with Quranic verses 
Regarding justification of “preemptive jihad” by the Quran first of all we should 
notice that 10 out of 41 cases where the term jihad is mentioned in the Quran are in 
Meccan suras. Out of these 10 cases in 4 of them (16:110, 25:52 [two times], and 
29:69] jihad is used quite general. These four Meccan verses have been used by 
pro-preemptive jihad to support their argument in interpreting jihad in military way. 
We know that the first time armed defence was permitted was the second year of 
hijra through verse 22:39. Then when many verses of jihad are Meccan (before 
armed defence become allowed) jihad cannot mean warfare even if it is used in 
general sense as it is in Meccan suras. Other than that those verses on war clearly 
limit fighting to self defence. As such Quranic verses have been an obstacle in front 
of “preemptive jihad” rather than been a facilitator for it. Overcoming this obstacle 
was the necessary step for achieving the goal in justifying an offensive strategy 
religiously. How was this significant obstacle overcome?  
To overcome the limitations imposed on use of armed force, Muslims jurists use 
some techniques to distort the clear message of the Quran in this regard. Previously 
I discussed some of the principles of jurisprudence including those of “generalities” 
and “particularities”. “General” rulings are limited by “particular” ones in 
jurisprudence. It means that when a general verse like Q.2:244 is referred to, it must 
be understood within the framework indicated by related particular verses such as 
Q.2:190. In this case the later one limits the former and determines its range. Thus 
verse Q.2:244 generally invites believers to fight in the cause of Allah: 
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And fight in the cause of Allah and know that Allah is Hearing and 
Knowing.  (Q.2:244) 738 
At the same time verse Q.2:190 prohibits believers to start fighting and only allows 
them to fight back when they are attacked: 
Fight in the way of Allah those who fight you but do not start fighting. 
Indeed Allah does not like transgressors.  (Q.2:190)739 
The principle of “generalities and particularities” requires verse Q.2:244 to be 
limited according to Q.2:190. It is also the case with general rulings in verses 
Q.2:216, Q.4:74, Q.4:76, Q.9:28, Q.9:123, and Q.47:4. While verses 2:216, 2:44, 
4:74, 4:75, 4:76, 9:29, and 9:123 generally encourage believers to be prepared to 
fight back if required, verse 47:4 is a verse of battlefield and has no potential to 
be generalised beyond that. Verse 47:4 is fundamentally about jus in bello rather 
than supportive of war in general. If the above mentioned verses including 47:4 
are interpreted in contradiction with verses Q.190, Q.2:191, Q.2:192, Q.2:193, 
22:39, 22:40, 9:13, and 9:36 then it means that the Quran has been biasedly 
misused. If they are understood naturally and in line with the recent group they all 
together only approve self defence and nothing more. 
 
What scholars in favour of “offensive jihad” did to enervate the limiting verses 
and the verses of peace was using another principle called “the abrogater and the 
abrogated”, or nasikh and mansukh ( لاخوسنملا و خسان ). They claimed that all limiting 
verses have been abrogated by the general verses.740 This was demonstrated by 
                                                          
738 ﴾٢٤٤ :ةرقبلا﴿ ٌمینل لع ٌعی نم لس لهـهللا ـنلَ او م لل  عا لو نهـهللا نلینب لس ينف اوملنَالق لو 
739 ﴾١٩٠ هرقبلا﴿  لنی ندلت  ع م  لا ُّب نحمی للا لهـهللا ـننِ ۚ اومدلت  علَ للا لو  مُم لنوملنَالقمی لنی نـذلا نهـهللا نلینب لس ينف اوملنَالق لو 
740 Imam Shafi`I,  Kitab al-Umm, Beirut, Dar al-Ma`rafa,  section 4, p. 161. 
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Imam Shafiei, founder of Sunni Shafiei School of jurisprudence.741 Such 
interpretations, and imposing self preferences on the religious ruling and the 
Quran, were not uncommon among earlier Muslims either. For example Khalid 
bin Walid did several wrong things in one incident of war. These included killing 
a rebel Muslim and marrying his wife the same day. The issue was brought to Abu 
Bakr, the first Caliph. Khalid simply defended himself saying that his “ijtihad” 
convinced him that it was not wrong to do so and that he acted based on his ijtihad, 
or interpretation of religious rulings. His reasoning was accepted and he did not 
face any punishment.742 It was mostly because Khalid was a very strong 
commander and his punishment might have been against interests of the Islamic 
state especially during the hard time of “battle of apostates”.743 It might be 
interpreted that when ijtihad can be used for the interest of one person it can be 
used for interest of the whole Islamic society.  
 
In addition to the “particular verses”, offensive doctrine of jihad also violated 
those Quranic verses which declare “peace” as the abiding principle744 and “war” 
as a temporary situation in case of being attacked.745 Verse 2:256, 60:8, and 61:8 
are among those which clearly issue an invitation to peace and reject 
aggression.746 Like the limiting verses of “particulars”, all these verses of peace 
                                                          
741 See: Imam Shafi`I,  Kitab al-Umm, Beirut, Dar al-Ma`rafa,  section 4. 
742 Muhammad bin Jarir al-Tabari, Tarikh Tabari, Vol. 3, pp. 387-389. 
743 Tabari, Tarikh, p. 387. 
744 Q.4:128. 
745 Q.2:192, Q.2:193. 
746  Allah does not forbid you from those who do not fight you because of religion and do not expel 
you from your homes - from being friendly toward them and acting justly toward them. Indeed, 
Allah loves those who act justly.  (Q.60:8) 
  دلا ينف  م مكوملنَالقمی  ملل لنی نـذلا نن لع مهـهللا م مكاله نلی ـلا  لنی نط نس ق م  لا ُّب نحمی لهـهللا ـننِ ۚ  منه یللنِ اومط نس قمَ لو  ممهو ُّرلبلَ نلَ  م مكنرالی ند ن  م ممكو مجنر  خمی  ملل لو ننی
 هنحتمم﴿٨﴾  
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also have been labelled as “abrogated” by advocates of aggressive jihad.747 The 
question is that if such verses of peace were vain, why did God send them to his 
Prophet in the first place? Accusing God of being forgetful or being someone who 
changes his mind every now and then, and abrogates what he was believing right 
and good before is the direct consequence of such opportunistic approach toward 
peace-binding verses of the Quran. Showing God’s words so inconsistent that 
need to be corrected so that favour Muslims gaining more lands and wealth in the 
name of jihad. Arguably, accepting “general” and “particular” verses on fighting 
and also the verses of peace all together implies the rejection of aggression and 
proves self defence. Approval of self defence by Islam is something that no one 
needs to be ashamed of and apologise for it. But the Quran clearly rejects “jihad” 
in its offensive form and technical tricks used by jurists, as we witnessed in case 
“abrogation” recently, does not change the reality. Tabari in his “exegesis”, or al-
Tafsir, announces claim of advocates of offensive jihad illogical and says that 
there is no evidence and no need for such an “abrogation”.748 
 
  
                                                          
 And if they [your enenmy] incline to peace, then incline to it [also] and rely upon Allah. Indeed, it 
is He who is the Hearing, the Knowing.  (Q.8:61) 
(  م ینل لع لا معی نمـسلا لومه مـهننِ ۚ نهـهللا ىلل لع  لـك لولَ لو الهلل  حلن  جالف نم لـسلنل او محلن لج ننِ لو لافنلاا﴿٦١ ا﴾  
747 Imam al-Shafiei, Al-Umm: section of jihad. 
748 Muhammad bin Jarir al-Tabari, Tafsir al-Quran, Interpretation of the verse number 190 of 
Chapter two. 
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Appendix No. 6: Sufi Tariqas 
Bektashi 
The Bektashi Order was founded in the 13th century by the Islamic saint Haji Bektash Veli. 
Because of its adherence to the Twelve Imams it is classified by some under Twelver Shi'a 
Islam. Bektashi are concentrated in Albania and Turkey, and their headquarters are in 
Albania.  
Chishti 
The Chishti Order was founded in the 10th century by Abu Ishaq al-Shami who brought 
Sufism to the town of Chist, in present-day Afghanistan. Before returning to the Levant, 
Shami initiated, trained and deputized the son of the local governor Abu Ahmad Abdal. 
Under the leadership of Abu Ahmad’s descendants, the Chishti Tariqa flourished as a 
regional mystical order and still has a noteable number of followers. 
Naqshbandi 
The Naqshbandi tariqa is one of the major Sufi orders of Islam. Formed in 14th century by 
Baha al-Din Naqshband Bukhari, the order is known for its silent dhikr (remembrance of 
God) rather than the vocalized forms of dhikr common in other tariqas.  
Uwaysi 
Uwaysi tariqa is called after Uways of Qaran a place in today Yemen. The Uwaysi tariqa 
claims to be founded 14 century ago by Uways al-Qarn. Uways received the teachings of 
Islam inwardly through his heart and lived by them, although he had never physically met 
Prophet Muhammad. A well-known quote attributed to the Prophet Muhammad has him 
say about Uways "I feel the breath of the Merciful, coming to me from Yemen." Pointing 
to Uways’ high spiritual qualities.Qadiri 
The Qadiri tariqa derives its name from Abdul-Qadir al-Jilani (d. 1166), a native of the 
Iranian province of Gilan (pronounced Jilan in Arabic because of lack of the letter “G” in 
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Arabic language). The order is one of the most widespread of the Sufi orders in the Islamic 
world. The Qadiriyyah have not developed any distinctive doctrines or teachings outside 
of mainstream Islam. They believe in the fundamental principles of Islam, but interpreted 
through mystical experience. 
There are also some small Sufi orders such as Mouridi, Tijaniyyah, and Shadhili, which 
among them the previously mentioned Mawlawyyah order (better known in the West as 
the “whirling dervishes”) is more famous because of its special sama or dance. 
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Appendix No. 7: Note on translation and transliteration 
For the Quran, Hadith and classical jurisprudential text, direct quotations are placed 
in Italics. In transliteration I transliterate as words are prounanced. For example the 
name ‘Mortaza’ which is prounanced differently in Persian and Arabic is written 
according to the source language. As such the Persian jurist, Motahari’s first name 
is written ‘Mortaza’ while the classical jurist name ‘al-Murtada’ is written as 
prounanced in Arabic while both are actualy the same name but are prounanced 
differently in Arabic and Persian. 
For translation of the Quranic verses I have used Tanzil translations but have 
modified and corrected them whenever necessary to suit this research. All 
translations of the classical jurisprudential texts are mine unless stated otherwise. 
 
